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Abstract
The thesis offers an analysis of the Reza Sah period in terms of the balance 
between religion and politics and their societal and institutional power, the discussion of 
which is located within a historical framework. The relationship between religion and 
politics and their related effect on the ‘legitimacy’ of the structure of domination are 
considered within Weber’s tripartite typology of domination. Whilst acknowledging the 
overall implications of the feasibility of adopting a Weberian framework and criticisms 
concerning the lack of accuracy of Weber’s study of Islam, the thesis proposes that it is 
nevertheless possible to use a Weberian perspective in the study of Iranian Shi’ism. The 
changes introduced in the period are examined through an analysis of institutional changes 
deemed necessary for the process of modernization and secularization. An adequate 
understanding of this period is proposed to be critically dependent upon an understanding 
of the nature of the secularization process in Iran. This thesis is therefore concerned with 
two interconnected themes, one theoretical and the other historical. The theoretical 
theme, namely, the nature of the secularization process, arguably forms the core of the 
thesis in terms of its applicability to the period under study. It is the centrality of the 
secularization process which necessitates the analysis of a subsidiary argument concerning 
the limitations arising from Western (including Weberian) understanding of secularization, 
in particular with regard to Iran during the stated period. The historical theme - the 
analysis of the events between 1921 and 1941 - is considered for its own importance as a 
period of structural and institutional change and as a testing ground for the secularization 
thesis.
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Style and Usage
The system of transliteration used in this thesis is based on the system used in 
Encylopaeda Iranica, with a few symbolic differences. Words are transliterated with 
allowances for pronunciation. Arabic words have been transliterated as they are 
pronounced in Persian. The spelling of names of persons and places are rendered in the 
way they are most commonly known and pronounced. Titles often serve as family names 
(e.g. Sepahsalar) and are used interchangeably.
In the sections directly translated from Persian, words that appear in [ ] have been 
added for further clarification. Parentheses are used whenever they are used in the original 
texts. Some names appear in abbreviation or in slightly different version; when this is the 
case the full name is provided in parenthesis. Unless otherwise indicated all translations 
are my own.
The sections from the Memoirs of SeH$; ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri Yazdl have been 
placed in chronological order after translation and do not appear so in the original texts. 
Also some of the people mentioned are referred to by their first names and SeBj: ‘Abdol- 
Karim Ha’eri Yazdts son, SeH<; Morteza, has added their last names to the texts. 
Furthermore, there are notes in the margins of the Memoirs that have been added for the 
purposes of clarification by Se% Morteza. At the end of the Memoirs there is a separate 
section written by Sel^ Morteza about his father, as well as an attached telegraph.
The system of conversion of dates is based on G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville, The 
Islamic and Christian Calendars AD 622-2222 (AH 1-1650), Reading 1995. In cases 
when the Iranian solar is used, the date is followed by ‘SH’ and then by the corresponding 
Christian era date.
In Chapter Two, for the translation of the term Na ’eb ]£a§ and Na ’eb ‘Am, the 
words ‘deputy’ and ‘delegate’ are used interchangeably.
Finally, please note that some footnotes may appear on the following page.
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Transliteration Table
Consonant Consonant Vowel
Persian Arabic Persian Arabic Persian Arabic
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C_J B T J A
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Introduction
The general focus of this thesis is the period between 1921 and 1941 in Iran, and 
the particular focus is the relationship between religion and politics, and its effect on 
socio-political change and development. An adequate understanding of this period is 
proposed to be critically dependent upon an understanding of the nature of the 
secularization process in Iran. This period marks an era of rapid modernization and 
centralization for the first time in Iranian history. Reza Sah implemented a series of 
reforms that had been attempted unsuccessfully by previous rulers, such as European style 
educational institutions, a secular and centralized judicial system, a modem standing army, 
modem economic structures, mass communication, networks connecting the entire 
country, and investment banks. A series of new institutions were established in order to 
help implement the centralization policies of the government.1 This thesis is therefore 
concerned with two interconnected themes, one theoretical and the other historical. The 
theoretical theme, namely, the nature of the secularization process, arguably forms the 
core of the thesis in so far as its applicability to the period under study. The centrality of 
the secularization process necessitates the analysis of a subsidiary argument concerning 
the limitations arising from Western (including Weberian) understanding of secularization, 
in particular with regard to Iran during the stated period. The historical theme - the 
analysis of the events between 1921 and 1941 - is considered for its own importance as a 
period of structural and institutional change and as a testing ground for the secularization 
thesis.
Recently there has been a renewed interest in the Reza Sah period. However, most 
of the research undertaken tends to adopt what may be called a ‘nineteenth-century, two- 
dimensional outlook’. The period is studied either in terms o f ‘microstudies’, adopting an 
anthropological approach focusing on specific parts of the political or the social system, 
or alternatively in terms of the political realm, with particular emphasis on the impact of 
international power politics and its effect on transforming the internal structure. Little is 
written about the way in which religion has had a notable effect on political behaviour and 
significantly transformed Iran’s polity. Religion and politics often compete to establish the 
legitimacy of their authority in a hegemonic way, and to this extent rivalry between them
1 For a detailed account of the various changes that were introduced during this period please refer to the 
section entitled Reforms of Reza Sah, pp. 321-328.
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for the loyalty of the subjects is inevitable. In the words of Max Weber, ‘The antagonism 
of political and magical charisma is primeval.’2 The structural elaboration of religious 
thought and the development of the ‘Olama as an institution with vested interests in the 
enforcement of religious beliefs and norms through spiritual and coercive sanctions, and 
its consequences for the political system, particularly during the Reza Sah period, have 
not been considered. Accordingly, a three-dimensional perspective may seem more 
appropriate in understanding the dynamic and interconnected relationship between social 
structure and the religious basis of politics, in terms of both national and international 
politics and political organizations. This approach will enable us to have a better 
understanding of the importance of Shi’ism as a cohesive factor and the significance of the 
particular socio-historic development of Iranian ‘Olama and their role within the socio­
political sphere.
Iran has had a long history of strong religious institutions that controlled law, 
education and social welfare. Government control of these institutions was viewed as 
necessary for both modernization and centralization. Governmental attempts to bring 
these spheres under its jurisdiction were viewed as an attack on religion. Hence the 
processes of modernization and secularization were deemed as synonymous, 
secularization being the inevitable outcome of modernization. However, if one looks at 
the stated period in terms of the relationship between religion and politics and their effect 
on the ‘legitimacy’ of the structure of domination, the actual process of secularization 
becomes far more complex and merits both a closer examination of terminology and a 
reassessment of historical events. We propose to provide an analysis of the Reza Sah 
period in terms of the balance between religion and politics and their societal and 
institutional power, as well as historical contingencies. Weberian sociology of religion 
and, more broadly, his sociology of domination provide us with the analytical tools to 
undertake such an endeavour. We hope to provide a theoretical framework drawing on 
Max Weber’s sociology of religion in the analysis of the study of Shi’ism and its 
consequences in term of the political sphere. The relationship between religion and 
politics will be considered in terms of their effect on the legitimacy of the structure of 
domination.3
2 Weber (1968), p. 1173.
3 Weber (1968), pp. 941-956, 1158-1368.
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In Weber’s sociology, there is a certain parallel between the state as the sector 
with the monopoly of physical violence and the church as the sector with the monopoly of 
sacral violence. The precise relationship between these two institutions he left open to 
historical and empirical inquiry. The church offered the state the protection of divine 
legitimacy and disciplined citizens. The state offered security, both external and internal in 
terms of the removal of the threat of heresy and unorthodoxy, by means of its disciplinary 
apparatus. Weber, in the chapters of Economy and Society, deals with the state and 
church dichotomy in terms of the ultimate sources of legitimacy. Furthermore, religious 
(hierocratic) and political (temporal) charisma seem to be equally fundamental, in their 
institutionalized form, in that one can not be reduced to the other. Political and hierocratic 
domination as the ultimate sources of legitimacy form the underlying basis for Weber’s 
typology of the varying role of religion in the charismatic legitimization of domination.4 
Weber provides a tripartite typology of domination, namely theocratic, hierocratic and 
Caesaropapism, each classification presenting the relative predominance of one of the two 
autonomous charismatic types of domination: the religious or the political.
Weber in the Sociology o f Religion clearly recognized the essential tension 
between Christianity as a religion of ‘brotherly love’ and the state which monopolizes 
violence within a given territory. Weber explored historically how various compromises 
and accommodations were achieved between the church which has a monopoly of grace, 
and the state which has a monopoly of military violence. The societal structure of 
domination within the cultural logic of Shi’ism constituted a major force in the dynamics 
of Iranian society, particularly during the Reza Sah period and merits a comprehensive 
study of the formative years of Shi’i hierocracy. Shi’i ‘Olama will be considered in the 
light of the emergence and consolidation of an institution with vested interests in the 
enforcement of religious beliefs and norms through spiritual and coercive sanctions. This 
thesis aims to examine the full extent of the effects of Reza Sah’s policies on the 
relationship between religion and politics, and the consequent social change. These 
changes will be examined in the light of institutional changes deemed necessary for the 
process of modernization and secularization - namely law and education - as strongholds 
of the ‘Olama and the military as the catalyst for the implementations of state policy.
4 W eber (1968), pp. 941-956 &  pp. 1158-1368.
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Finally, the importance and relevance of Weber’s sociology of religion to the 
substantive analysis of the relationship between religion and politics in the case of Iran lies 
in the less recognized or fully confronted implication of Weber’s analysis - namely that 
religion provides some components of the broader civilizational premises and frameworks 
which determine the way in which religious activities and organizations are related to 
political processes. The development and institutionalization of the perception of the basic 
tension between the transcendental and the mundane were closely linked to the emergence 
of a new social elite, which in the case of Iran were the Shi’i ‘Olama. This process of 
institutionalization turned the new scholar class into relatively autonomous partners in the 
major ruling coalitions. Shi’i mysticism, like Sufism, represents an indispensable mode of 
institutionalization of transcendence in Islam. Irrespective of its a-political and world 
renouncing tendencies Shi’i mysticism had far-reaching political implications: It amplified 
normative pluralism and enhanced the duality of religious and political authority. Shi’i 
religious beliefs and institutional structures historically shaped by them have been crucial 
in the motivation and determination of political action in the history of Iran. Shi’i Islam as 
a world religion of salvation has had considerable transformative potential as it contains 
significant implications not only for religious ranking but also for political stratification.
Whilst acknowledging the overall implications of the feasibility of adopting a 
Weberian framework and the criticisms concerning the lack of accuracy of Weber’s study 
of Islam, we believe that it is still possible to draw upon Weber’s tripartite typology of 
domination in the study of Iranian Shi’ism. The full extent of the effects of Reza Sah’s 
policies on the relationship between religion and politics and the consequent social change 
cannot be conceived fully without a historical framework. It becomes necessary to 
consider briefly the situation prior to the advent of Reza Sah to the throne. Furthermore, 
to be able to arrive at a well-informed conclusion as to the nature of Reza Sah’s reign and 
its consequences for Iran, we must establish a geo-political, military, financial, social and 
cultural understanding of Iran. We shall consider the historical setting only in so far as it 
helps to clarify the nature of Iranian society prior to the rise of Reza Sah. We do not 
intend to provide a detailed historical account of this period as it has been dealt with 
categorically by numerous other scholars elsewhere,5
5 In Persian by such historians as MakkI, AStlyanI and Bahar, to name but a few. In English by such 
scholars as Ghani, Keddie, Abrahamian and many more.
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The Historical Setting Prior to the Advent of Reza §ah to the Throne
Iran is situated in a highly important strategic position within the Middle East. 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Iran was directly situated between 
the two geographical spheres of British and Russian influence. Although Iran was never 
formally colonized it did however face increasing pressures from both these governments, 
with significant consequences for internal politics. In 1907 the British and the Russians 
signed an agreement according to which Iran was divided into three geographical spheres. 
Northern Iran came under the sphere of Russian influence, which included areas that fell 
north of Qa§r Sinn, E§fehan, Yazd, and Gardaneh Zolfaqar and the mountains of 
Zolfaqar. Southern Iran was declared to be under the British zone of influence and 
encompassed areas bordering Afghanistan, Baludestan, the Sea of Oman, and the areas 
south of Zolfaqar, Blrjand, Yazd and Bandar ‘Abbas. All the territories between these 
specified zones were declared as neutral areas. The agreement came under fierce attack by 
the Iranian government. However, the British and the Russians had complete control over 
their specified zones. This agreement was in effect until 1915 and both Britain and Russia 
had a significant military presence in their specified area of influence.6
In 1915 a new agreement was reached between Britain and Russia according to 
which the neutral areas were to be further divided between the two powers. 
Consequently, the entirety of Iran was divided up into spheres of British and Russian 
influence. It was agreed that the Russians would keep 11,000 Russian Cossacks in the 
northern territories and the British would keep 11,000 South Persian Rifles (southern 
police) in the south. After the October Revolution, the newly established Bolshevik 
government officially cancelled all previous agreements and the 1915 Agreement 
practically collapsed. This led to the withdrawal of all Russian military presence from 
Iranian territory. Following the withdrawal of Russian forces from the northern territories, 
the British moved some of their constabulary from India to Balucestan, and sent their 
remaining military force to Hamadan, Qazvin and Rast, and as far as Baku. Consequently, 
towards the end of First World War, the entirety of Iran fell to the British. The presence 
of British troops in various parts of the country had greatly reduced Iranian sovereignty
6 For further details please refer to Chapter Five.
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and independence. Iran was faced with social disunity, tribal and ethnic conflict, political 
disorder, economic hardship and national poverty.7
The Bolshevik Revolution led to the withdrawal of Russian troops from Iranian 
territory, which consequently created a vacuum in the balance of power. The Iranian 
government anxiously tried to prevent the British from filling this vacuum. This led to 
marked hostility towards the British. In January 1918, with the repudiation of Tsarist 
privileges; a new wave of popular and official Anglophobia spread through Iran. There 
were growing demands from the British for a friendlier attitude on the part of Iran. The 
British were apprehensive about this situation and wanted to safeguard their regional and 
local interests. There followed two years of British political and diplomatic supremacy, 
highlighted by the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919. The British entered into 
negotiations with the cabinet of Vo§uqod-Dowleh, a highly unpopular politician, in order 
to reach an agreement whereby the Iranian government would employ British military, 
civil and technical advisors, to reorganize the army and the state administration. 
According to this agreement, Britain was to have military, administrative and financial 
protectorate over Iran. Internationally, the League of Nations did not acknowledge the 
1919 agreement as binding; internally, the 1919 agreement aroused overwhelming protest 
from all sections of Iranian society.8 Hence, in November 1920, when the Soviet 
government sent an ultimatum demanding the evacuation of all British military forces 
from Iran, it was received favourably by both the government and the public.9
The October Revolution created an altogether new situation in the political arena 
of not only Iran but also the world in general. The consequences of the revolution soon 
became apparent in the internal socio-political situation. The new Bolshevik government 
abrogated all previous treaties which were disadvantageous for Iran. However, the entry 
of the Bolshevik forces into the northern territories of Iran and the spread of communist 
ideology, together with internal instability, weak and ineffective central government, and 
the absence of a united national army, created a far more serious threat for the totality of 
Iranian territory than ever before. Furthermore, the conceivable collapse of northern Iran 
to the Bolsheviks made the threat of communism seem even more imminent.10
7 MakkT (1369 SH/1991).
8 AStlyani (1362 SH/1983), p. 67.
9 Bahar [Malekol So’ara] (1357 SH/1978).
10 Ibid.
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The prevalent socio-political situation in Iran was uncertain and unstable, to such 
an extent that the national unity of Iran was under threat. Iran was practically under siege 
by foreign forces, social relations were severely strained, and the central government was 
weak and ineffective. The inherent weakness of the government was reflected in the 
numerous cabinet reshuffles and continual changes in the government. Political instability 
had reached such a degree that in the space of one year six cabinets were formed, Prime 
Minister after Prime Minister came to power achieving very little while chaos and disorder 
continued. Political instability was both effected by and in turn had an effect on social 
instability. Already fragile and intricate social relations were further debilitated as each 
social elite fought hard to maintain its existing status quo and safeguard its own power 
and privilege in the face of a weak and ineffective central administration. The lack of a 
strong central administration had proved beneficial for various autonomous and semi 
autonomous groups such as the ‘Olama, tribal chieftains, major landlords, Qajar princes, 
the various revolutionaries, rebels and bandits. A weak and ineffective central government 
ensured the autonomy, power, and survival of these various groups. Regional self­
autonomy, powerful tribal chieftains, financially independent and interfering ‘Olama, and 
civil disintegration in turn further weakened the central government. The ‘Olama, for 
example, dominated all judicial, educational and cultural affairs of the country.11
In the words of Malekol So‘ara Bahar, a key political figure:
‘The §ah was about to flee, political figures were preoccupied with power, 
position and obtaining a place in the cabinet, and rebels were killing, 
plundering and acquiring wealth. Journalists were involved in printing 
obscenities against their rival groups, or promoting a particular political 
party at the expense of another. Competing political parties paid large 
sums to journalists to slander the opposition. Intellectuals had formed 
various political groups and set up numerous papers and were involved in 
internal fighting and back-stabbing. The commercial classes were anxious 
and feared the loss of their property due to social, economic and political 
insecurity. The average national income had greatly decreased. Iran had 
become increasingly dependent on foreign loans, and her financial future 
seemed bleak and uncertain.’12
The political instability of the country was further complicated by the social 
structure and the natural geography of Iran, which was in its veiy essence the antithesis to
11 DulatabadI (1371 SH/1992).
12 Bahar [Malekol So’ara] (1357 SH/1978), pp. 55-6. Yafiya DulatabadI and ‘Abdollah Bahrain! both 
important political figures of the time give a similar account as that of Bahar.
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centralization. Many of Iran’s villages, tribes and towns were on the whole isolated, 
economically self-contained and predominately self-governing.13 The combination of the 
factors stated above had loosened the very cement which held the social mosaic together. 
It is often argued that Shi’ism played a fimdamental role in the national unity of Iran; if 
one accepts this assumption, then the role of the ‘Olama becomes even more significant 
and consequential. During the period under study, 75 per cent of Iranians were village 
dwellers and nomads who were under the control of fCans, Maleks, or Ilkans.H Hence, 
this limited social elite were major players in the political scene and so determined the 
outcome of the internal situation. The local Molla was a figure of great influence as he 
was the link between the villagers and their Mar]a ‘ Taqlid. The Iranian population was on 
the whole at the mercy of this small but puissant minority. The elite groups were often 
involved in preserving and maintaining their own territory of influence, even at the cost of 
endangering the national unity of Iran. They were often the instruments by means of 
which imperialist powers played out their power politics and ensured foreign supremacy 
through internal instability. Foreign military intervention and political disintegration had 
exacerbated the prevailing regional disorder to such an extent that the strength and 
autonomous tendencies of local powers vis-a-vis the central government took on an 
unprecedented magnitude.15
The largest class in Iranian society, the peasantry, lived much as they had done for 
centuries. The tribal population of Iran, which, in the early 1920s, were nearly 15 per cent 
of the total population, remained completely untouched by modem advances of any kind. 
The peasantry and the tribal populations were mostly illiterate. Their fate was often in the 
hands of the local tribal leaders and landowners who ruled like kings in their little 
kingdoms. The people had no say in their own fate, let alone in the running of the country. 
Even their very life was in the hands of the local J^an, Ilkan or Malek. Women, who made 
up half of the population of Iran, were deprived of any role other than motherhood; even 
that was limited, as they did not have any legal rights in relation to their children. Women 
were deprived of any social or political involvement, they did not have the right to vote, 
or to employment, and were even limited in terms of their access to public places.16
13 Abrahamian (1982).
14 DulatabadI (1371 SH/1992).
15 AStlyanI (1362 SH/1983).
16 DulatabadI (1371 SH/1992).
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The outbreak of the First World War forced the Majles into a long recess which 
lasted until 1921. Irrespective of the several cabinets that were formed during the war­
time period, the political situation in Iran bordered on anarchy. The exercise of 
governmental authority came to a virtual standstill. The consulates of Britain and Russia, 
as well as the British-owned telegraph offices, became the real seats of power in the 
provinces. Political refugees often used these offices as places of sanctuary in much the 
same way as they would use a religious shrine. Russian, British and Turkish troops 
occupied various parts of the country. Wassmuss, a German agent, was active in southern 
Iran organizing tribal resistance to Britain. To substitute the Swedish-led Iranian 
gendarmerie and to counterbalance the Russian-commanded Persian Cossack Brigade, the 
British organized the South Persia Rifles. Brigandage, tribal lawlessness and highway 
robbery were alarming. In fact highwaymen, in the absence of authority, often raided 
towns and sometimes remained, wrecking all economic activity. Such were the political 
events preceding the coup d’etat of 26 February 1921 which brought Reza Kan to power. 
Many historians often argue that the original engineer of the coup was a young journalist 
named Seyyed Zlya’o-Dm Tabataba’I. On the morning of 26 February 1921, when the 
people of Tehran woke up, they found the streets plastered with posters. They read ‘I 
command!’ and were all signed by Reza Ipin, Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed 
Forces.17 Seyyed Zlya’o-Dm became Premier, but there was little doubt where the real 
power lay.
It was against such a background that Reza Ipln emerged as a dominant political 
figure. After the 1921 coup of Seyyed Zlya’o-Dm and the Cossacks, Reza Kan soon rose 
through the ranks of the army and entered the political scene. His first post was as Sardar 
Sepah; he went on to become Minister of War, and then Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces. In 1923 he became Prime Minster and finally in 1925 he was crowned as 
the King of kings, Sahansah. In retrospect, it is clear that the coup had been intended by 
the British as an alternative route to the achievement of the 1919 Agreement, namely 
political stabilization of Iran which would not pose a threat to the main local and regional 
interests of the British Empire.18 Reza Sah established a strong central government based 
on autocratic rule. His rule is most commonly described as a dictatorship established
17 Ibid.
18 Katouzian (1981), p. 538.
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through terror and the brutal destruction of all those who stood in his way. The other 
most commonly agreed point is that Reza Sah’s rule put an end to ‘provincial kingdoms’, 
regionalism, sectarianism, tribal fiefdoms, Kanism, and A^undism. He also restored 
internal security by putting an end to civil war and secessionist movements. Once Reza 
Sah had saved the country from the threat of disintegration he went on to concentrate on 
‘the second goal of the Constitutional Revolution: modernizing the state. Reza Kan was 
no less a child of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution than Napoleon was of the French 
Revolution.’19 It must be pointed out that Reza §ah’s rule was also a betrayal of many 
ideals and aspirations of the Constitutional Revolution such as civil liberties and 
parliamentary rule.
Throughout his region Reza Sah introduced and accomplished many 
unprecedented policies in Iran, achieved at the cost of sacrificing the aims and aspirations 
of the Constitutional Revolution, and fundamentally changing the fabric of Iranian society. 
However, despite the many new institutional innovations, social relations remained very 
much the same, as economic change occurred at a slower pace than in other areas such as 
the legal and educational system. The ongoing debate for Iranian scholars has been 
whether the achievements of Reza Sah justified the cost at which these new measures 
were accomplished: in other words whether the means justified the end. Whatever the 
response, it cannot be denied that the Reza §ah period was the comer- stone for what 
may be termed ‘modem’ Iran.
An Assessment of the Basic Characteristics of the Pahlavl Era
The period from 1921 to 1941 is viewed by most historians as one of cataclysmic 
change. The European influences that had been filtering into Iran since the 16th century 
finally gained ascendancy during this period and the country went through a phase of 
intense Westernization. Many of the physical aspects of Westernization are the product of 
this period. Ironically, this period also produced a great degree of suspicion and 
resentment towards the West. It was a period of ‘rapid borrowing of the Western model’, 
as well as the assertion of national identity. The two processes were simultaneous and 
related. The anarchic conditions of the country brought about the rise of Reza Sah and 
may, in some way, account for the nature of his reign. Reza Sah, unlike Kemal Ataturk 
whose reforms he emulated, wrote no articles, left no political testaments which can be
19 A rjom and (1988), pp. 62-3.
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taken as his ideological core. The circumstances of his rise to power did not make him 
sympathetic to idealists and theoreticians. He proceeded to immediate and practical goals. 
He is often criticized by Iranian intellectuals as having lacked a formulated ideology, while 
others have suggested that this was due to the fact that he was simply a ‘puppet’ ruler. A 
closer examination of the period reveals that a definitive ideological motivation was 
present in all the activities of Reza Sah’s regime. Although it cannot be located or studied 
in any one document, it can be deduced from his actions and from the writings of his 
supporters.
Reza Sah aimed at controlling society by means of the instruments of 
administration, regulation and military domination. This was in sharp contrast to the 
previous Qajar rule of manipulating communal rivalries, perpetuating tribal feuds, and 
weak, ineffective central government. The Pahlavl era marked the establishment of a 
highly differentiated political and social structure. Under Reza Sah, Iran became a 
transitional society, socially, economically and to a certain extent politically. Reza Sah 
embarked upon the construction of a comparatively modem state and inaugurated a 
course of rapid modernization. This process was achieved by reinforcing national 
unification and by establishing modem armed forces. From 1921 to 1941, most of the 
basic institutions needed for the elementary needs of society were established. It has been 
suggested that Reza Sah’s twenty-year reign ‘was a prolonged revolution, particularly in 
the light of the dramatic changes that he implemented in Iranian political society.’20 
Although considerable quantitative changes did occur in the bureaucracy and the 
economic powers of the state during the Reza Sah period, the basic format of political 
institution stayed intact. The political system was still headed by an absolutist monarch 
but with the difference that the Pahlavl monarchy was supported by strong military and 
bureaucratic institutions. Reza Sah attempted to modernize the country’s industrial 
infrastructure and its culture, but his reforms did not fully extend to the political realm and 
the basic political structure remained unaltered. The bureaucracy, the military and the 
royal court functioned as the primary pillars of the Pahlavl dynasty. However, the political 
structure of the Pahlavl regime had a fundamental difference from that of the Qajars, 
namely the reduction of the influence and power of the ‘Olama in the political system. The 
‘modernism’ of the Reza Sah period was more far-reaching, profound and consequential
20 Lenczow ski (1980), p. 88.
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than the measures implemented or even envisaged during the 1960s and 1970s. The 
period witnessed the most concentrated effort to limit and regulate the power of the 
‘Olama, and it may have succeeded further had it not been for the Allies’ invasion and 
occupation of the country in 1941. The foundations of present-day government structure 
were laid during the Reza §ah period.21
The three recurrent features of Iran’s political history - autocracy, foreign 
intervention and revolution - marked almost all stages of the Pahlavl era. In certain 
periods, in fact, outside powers exercised as much dominance over the Pahlavls as they 
did over the Qajars. During the reign of Reza Sah there was a conspicuous absence of 
revolutionary upheavals, although there were several regional challenges to the authority 
of the central government. Revolutionary situations did not arise because the regime 
initially courted the support of those groups who could form potential blocks of 
opposition, and then suppressed them when it no longer need their support.22 Despite the 
lack of rebellion against the regime, foreign intervention and political autocracy were 
paramount. The largely despotic and arbitrary nature of political power under the Qajars 
was replaced by a more systematic institutionalization of political power under the 
Pahlavls. Attempts were made to build political power and authority into the Pahlavl 
system instead of emanating from individual political figures. Or in the language of the 
Constitutional Revolution, ‘the achievement of the rule of law’. The §ah nevertheless 
continued to be central to the survival of the system he had established. Foreign 
interference in the internal affairs of the country also persisted during the Pahlavl era. 
Reza Sah believed that only through his direct personal control over political process 
would the country be saved from chaos and from lapsing into communism. He viewed this 
form of authoritarianism as necessary not only to maintain a strong personal hold of 
power, but also in the effective imposition of central government’s authority over the 
entire society.23
Reza Sah tried to legitimize his rule by reviving the memory and the splendor of 
Iran’s pre-Islamic past. However he was not able to gain widespread legitimacy or to give 
credence to his claim of divine kingship. Reza Sah attempted to rule with reference to the
21 Kamrava (1992).
22 This was most evident in the Republican movement, which will be fully discussed in Chapter Six, pp. 
281-287.
23 DulatabadI (1371 SH/1992).
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pre-Islamic model of Persian kingship in an attempt to assume total power. He knew that 
if his rule were to be superimposed upon society, the socio-political culture of Iranian 
society would need to be altered. It was hoped that this would bring about a shift in public 
attitudes towards the form of authority of the monarch and concepts of legitimacy, which 
had taken shape in over two-and-a-half centuries of ‘sacred-temporal’ dual power 
structure. This cultural adaptation would be achieved by releasing such matters as the law 
and its implementation, and education from religious regulation, and expanding the 
jurisdiction of the state over these spheres. The concept of legitimate authority, who 
possesses it and who has the right to exercise it are pivotal questions for Shi’i Islam. 
These concepts have played a crucial role in shaping not only the religious but also the 
political history of Iran. The Imam! doctrine as developed by the Mojtaheds holds that, 
after the Occultation of the Twelfth Imam, it is the Mojtaheds who must fulfil some of his 
duties and who are his representatives. In Iran, this belief was held not only by the ‘Olama 
but by the people at large. Due to the dual power structure of politics and hierocracy, 
political loyalty could easily shift to one of the ‘Olama if the ruler did not have religious 
legitimization. The polarization of Iranian society had nurtured different attitudes towards 
the two forms of authority.24
During the reign of Reza Sah, the institutional separation of religious and political 
power became virtually complete, but, the internal structure of Iranian society was far 
slower to change, and the influence of the ‘Olama over the masses stayed almost intact. 
Reza Sah wished to limit autonomous ecclesiastic charisma, and make it subordinate to 
secular power. However, this policy was part of a greater policy of reducing all other 
alternative sources of power (such as the autonomy of Tribal chieftains, for example) and 
was not specifically directed at the ‘Olama. Reza Sah sought to implement the power of 
the central government by establishing a professional standing army, a uniform judiciary, 
the rule of law, uniform secular education, and by curbing the power of ‘Olama, tribal 
chieftains, major landowners and all other alternative sources of power. These bourgeois 
reforms did not fundamentally change the fabric of Iranian society or the structure of 
social relations. Throughout this period, as the power of the central government 
increased, so the political power and influence of the ‘Olama decreased.25
24 Algar (1969).
25 DulatabadI (1371 SH/1992).
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Reza Sah sought to achieve two basic goals: firstly, the transformation of the 
Iranian economy into a semi-industrialized and commercialized system; and secondly, the 
expansion of the power of the central government over all segments of society with the 
purpose of centralization and unification. In the process of achieving these two basic 
goals, the government attempted to eliminate traditional social forces and ideologies, and 
substitute them with ideologies and attitudes seen to be more compatible with its 
‘modem’ aims. This had a particular and significant effect on religion and religious 
institutions. Reza Sah’s first and most important task was to build up an army and disarm 
potential separatists, especially nomadic tribes. Later he took a series of steps to curb the 
power of the ‘Olama and spread an official ideology of nationalism, drawing upon Iran’s 
pre-Islamic past and denigrating Arabs and by implication Islam. His rule may be 
described as ‘autocratic secular nationalism’. The social, economic and political changes 
during this period were unparalleled in Iranian history.
During the Reza Sah period there was an increase in central government 
intervention in the economic sphere which produced new social groups. Their political 
orientation and economic philosophy were in sharp contrast to the traditional elite. A new 
social elite was formed around the government and the throne, whose main aim was to 
gain recognition and power to create a ‘modem’ society. The term ‘modem’ is often used 
as belonging to the standard view of history which takes capitalist modernity as an 
inevitable outcome or even natural law. Modernity occurs during the evolutionary process 
leading from early forms of exchange and social structure constrained by the ‘irrational 
forces’ of tradition to the economic and social rationality of the bourgeois. This particular 
understanding of modernity belongs to a view of history that cuts across the great divide 
between capitalist and non-capitalist societies. It treats capitalist laws of motion as if they 
were the universal laws of history. It is important to point out that even anti-modernism 
can have a similar effect on naturalizing capitalism, as can be seen in the sociological 
theories of Max Weber. For Weber, modem history has been a long process of 
rationalization, the rationalization of the state in bureaucratic organization and the 
rationalization of the economy in industrial capitalism. The effect of this process - the 
progress of reason and freedom most often associated with the enlightenment - has been 
to liberate humanity from traditional constraints. But at the same time rationalization 
produces and disguises new oppression, which Weber refers to as the ‘iron cage’ of 
modem organizational form. This view of history makes capitalism inevitable and at the
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very least naturalizes it. Equating capitalism with modernity disguises the specificity of 
not only capitalism but modernity as well. It is commonly agreed that the reform policies 
of Reza Sah ‘modernized’ and fundamentally changed the fabric o f Iranian society. 
However, the extent to which the formation of the Pahlavl State can be viewed in terms of 
a continuity of a set of historical processes or a complete break with the past is debatable.
v
An Overview of the Various Approaches to the Reza Sah Period
In regard to the above proposition, two models of argument are generally 
presented. The first views the emergence of the political system between 1921 and 1941 
in terms of a fundamental change that resulted in a significant break with the past.26 The 
Reza Sah period is viewed as the beginning of the process of transformation of Iran from 
pre-capitalism to capitalism. The second model of argument views the stated period in 
terms of an underlying historical continuity. Within this perspective the Pahlavl regime is 
viewed as a neo-patrimonial state, a historical continuation of the patrimonial (Asiatic 
despotism) rule of the Qajars. Most research carried out on the Reza Sah period has been 
influenced by one of these theoretical models. The Reza Sah period has been considered 
either in terms of a historical continuity of patrimonial or Asiatic despotism, re-emerging 
under modem conditions as neo-patrimonialism, or in terms of a direct consequence of 
geo-political and global forces. There are, however theoretical problems with both 
models. The cultural essentialist model supposes that the events of the past determine and 
limit the possibilities of future development. One prevailing argument in terms of the 
Middle East is that the Islamic ‘essence’ is accountable for the weakness or 
developmental ‘failure’ of the region. Despotism is seen as implicit within the very nature 
of Islam and political behaviour limited by debilitating Islamic social structures. The 
Islamic heritage is viewed as an obstacle to all subsequent development. Moreover, this 
theory foils to take global and external forces into account.27 For its part, the first model 
fails to account for the specificity of Iranian political and social processes. The structural 
limitations of the theory overlook the distinctive characteristics of the Iranian case. The 
later structural account sees Iran in terms of the dependence of the ‘peripheral’ state on
26 See for example Halliday (1979), Abrahamian (1982), and Banani (1961).
27 For further discussion please see Zubaida (1993).
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the world order that maintains it as an agent. It is ‘external’ to the social relations and 
institutions over which it governs.28
Within the first perspective it is argued that there is a profound discontinuity 
between Iran prior to the First World War and Iran since then. Pahlavl rule was essentially 
different from previous monarchies in Iran. Under Reza Sah, the state controlled the 
whole of the national territory, whereas the Qajar control did not extend beyond the main 
cities. The state intervened, controlled and promoted economic development, whereas the 
other neglected it. For the first time in Iranian history there was a large modem standing 
army, a centralized secular legal system, and secular mass state education. These 
institutional changes were unprecedented, as were the social and cultural reforms 
introduced, such as the uniform dress code and compulsory unveiling. The Pahlavl 
monarchy was constituted on an entirely new basis - that of military dictatorship. Reza 
Sah’s rule provided some of the necessary pre-conditions for the transformation of Iran to 
capitalism. Within this model of argument there is no substantive continuity between the 
PahlavT monarchy and that of the previous centuries. There was such a very wide gulf 
between the two regimes, which is far more significant than the feet that they were both 
presided over by men calling themselves ‘Sah’.29
This model of argument views Iranian history in terms of a systematic process of 
historical development, the transition from pre-capitalism to capitalism, within a global 
context. The specificity of Iranian internal processes is placed within a global setting. 
Dependency theory encompasses a large body of literature which incorporates many 
concepts and methods; however, the distinguishing feature of all dependency theory is 
that the social and economic development of ‘underdeveloped’ countries is viewed as 
conditioned by external forces. Within this perspective, Middle Eastern states are forms of 
the peripheral state, shaped by relations of dependency on the major capitalist powers of 
the centre. Dependency both prevents genuine economic development and undercuts the 
legitimacy of the modernizing state in that it fails to deliver what it promises. The 
extemalization of the state from society in the Islamic world is the not historical outcome 
of ‘Asiatic despotism’ but rather the consequential creation of the capitalist world market. 
The state, by reason of its dependence on the world market, organizes the social
28 For more detail please see, Amin (1976), Baran (1957), and Frank (1971).
29 Halliday (1979), pp. 21-36, Abrahamian (1982), Keddie (1983), and Banani (1961).
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formation which governs in accordance with the needs of the world market. Indeed, it not 
only governs civil society but negates it, by assuming all its functions. The economy, 
community, religion, education and family are all penetrated by the state. It derives its 
power mainly from its dependence on central powers rather than an internal power base. 
The state is economically oriented to extracting surplus value; ideologically this is first 
done under the banner of development and modernization, whereby people are forcibly 
modernized.30
In developing countries, the economic role of the state is especially pronounced 
since the weakness of the indigenous bourgeoisie has tended to draw the state even 
further into an economically executive position than has been the case in the more 
developed capitalist countries. This pronounced role of the state under the conditions of 
capitalist development has been particularly noticeable in Iran. Discussion of the state and 
class interests represented are therefore essential to the analysis of the economic 
transformation in Iran.31 The Iranian state was not, as in many other Asian and African 
countries, a post-colonial state, in the sense of owing its very existence to the link 
between local bureaucrats and imperial states outside. Rather, the Iranian state was 
created in a comparatively independent manner.32 Furthermore, another feature often 
associated with a post-colonial state is the close relationship between bureaucrats and 
landowners: this too has been absent from Iran.33 It must be pointed out that the 
relationship between state and society has been in the process of evolution over the last 
century and this evolving has resulted in a number of different conjunctures at different 
moments in its history. It is only by ignoring this history that it becomes possible to 
present the problem as a confrontation between community and the state, without taking 
into account the important socio-political developments of a national kind.34
The second model of argument views the stated period in terms of an underlying 
historical continuity. Within this perspective, the Pahlavl regime is viewed as a neo- 
patrimonial state, a historical continuation of the patrimonial (Asiatic despotism) rule of
30 See for example Roxborough (1979).
31 Ibid.
32 It must be pointed out that the historical links between the British and Reza Sah’s consolidation of 
power are well documented. Furthermore the power play between Britain and Russia also had great 
significance for government formation in Iran.
33 Halliday (1979), pp. 21-36.
34 Zubaida (1993), pp. 144-5.
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the Qajars. In other words, it is argued that there is a historic and systematic continuation, 
as Iran is an Asiatic country where despotism is an inevitable feature of political life. 
Patrimonial forces continued and were still influential even under the modernizing 
attempts of Reza Sah. The reliance on extensive court patronage during the Reza Sah 
period is often cited as an example of the continuation of patrimonial patterns. This 
argument operates within the theoretical framework of ‘cultural essentialism’ which views 
obstacles to development as overwhelmingly internal and unchanging during the last 1400 
years of Islamic history.35 The logic of this assumption is that the present in any given 
history contains all of that history in its structure. This is the basic tenet of cultural 
essentialism. Its advocates have sought to explain the Reza Sah period in terms of the 
continuity of persisting patrimonial influences in the political field. Imported European 
modernization at the levels of both institution and of ideation resulted in the formation of 
a neo-patrimonial state rather than a modem nation state.
Analytically it is helpful to make a distinction between cultural specificity and 
cultural essentialism. Cultural specificity is argued in terms of particular inherent and 
continuously active cultural elements which favour certain socio-political development 
and inhibit others. The work of Bertrand Badie36 best illustrates cultural specificities 
sliding into cultural essentialism. Badie’s argument rests on the contrast between the 
Western and the Islamic state at two levels: ideational and institutional. The ideational 
level is concerned with the question of legitimacy. In the Christian West there is a 
multiplicity of philosophical options at this level which has coincided in the establishment 
of political spaces distinct from the religious, governed by systematic considerations of 
legality and legitimacy and by individualized political actors. All this is in distinct contrast 
to Islamic political structures.37 According to Badie, contrary to the Western model, the 
Islamic model is based on the divinely-revealed law (the SafPah) which means that, in the 
world of Islam, the political sphere in so far as it is distinct from the religious sphere is not 
subject to challenges in terms of systematic discourses of legitimacy other than those 
which would abolish it.
The contrast at the ideation level is reinforced at the institutional level. This rests 
on the uniqueness of Western political history - a familiar theme in Max Weber and later
35 For an extensive critique of this approach see Zubaida (1993).
36 Badie (1986), as qouted by Zubaida (1993).
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developed by Perry Anderson38 among others - the ‘triangular’ structure of prince, barons 
and Church, each with its own power and jurisdiction. For Badie, the common European 
political culture contains within it a double germ from its feudal birth: the law state and 
the idea of practice and representation both acting against patrimonial tendencies. 
Consequently the modem European nation state is a product of a unique history, whereas 
the Islamic state in contrast followed patrimonial patterns of development. In Islamic 
countries ‘imported’ European modernization resulted not in the formation of the nation 
state but rather in ‘neo-patrimonial states’. The failure of the modem nation state in the 
Islamic world is due to the following factors: failure of the ‘law-state’ and consequently 
failure of democracy, nation formation, continuation of regionalism and separateness of 
periphery from the centre. Cultural essentialism seeks to explain differences in political 
structures in terms of internal ‘cultural essences’ and makes a sharp distinction between 
Muslim countries and the West in terms of the ‘Islamic essence’. Within this perspective, 
each historical period in a particular country is the manifestation of that particular 
‘cultural essence’. This theory fails to take global and external forces into account.
‘Cultural essentialist’ theories view secularization as the key component of the 
development of capitalism and democracy in the West and the unsuccessful development 
of both in other societies. Modernization is seen as synonymous with capitalist 
development and secularization. The assumption that secularism is the consequential 
result of modernization is theoretically problematic placed within a historic perspective. 
Furthermore in terms of Islamic societies, its assumptions are based on the widely-held 
misconception present among Muslims and non-Muslims that Islam is both a religion and 
a state, an inherent theocracy, which, when examined closely, does not hold to be 
historically accurate. Although there is no institutionalized priesthood in Islam, the 
‘Olama played a crucial and decisive role in the political realm. This informally-structured 
institution acted in such a formalized and collective manner that it may be argued that they 
constituted a ‘church’ in the Weberian sense of the word. Shi’i Islam has undoubtedly 
played a formative role in shaping Iranian culture; Iran’s pre-Islamic culture, however, is 
also of equal importance. The language, mythology, and historic identity of Iran have all 
to some extent preserved their pre-Islamic past. The interplay of these two forces - Shi’i
37 Ibid., pp. 131-2.
38 See for example Anderson (1974), Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism & Lineages of the Absolutist 
State.
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Islam and the pre-Islamic - heritage have made Iran’s reaction to the West extremely 
complex and also different from the rest of the Middle East. This is why the secularization 
debate is of such importance to the overall structure of this thesis and merits an in-depth 
discussion, both in terms of secularization and the domain of Islam, and in relation to Iran 
during the period under study.
Setting Out Our Argument and the Thesis Outline
In Weberian terms religion and politics are central to the symbolization of order 
and the normative governance of action and therefore fundamental to organization of 
collective life. The importance and relevance of Weber’s sociology of religion to the 
substantive analysis of the relationship between religion and politics in the case of Iran lies 
in the less recognized or fully confronted implication of Weber’s analysis - namely that 
religion provides some components of the broader civilization premises and frameworks 
which determine the way in which religious activities and organizations are related to 
political processes. The development and institutionalization of the perception of the basic 
tension between the transcendental and the mundane were closely linked to the emergence 
of a new social elite, which in the case of Iran were the Shi’i ‘Olama. This process of 
institutionalization turned the new scholar class into relatively autonomous partners in the 
major ruling coalitions. Shi’i mysticism, like Sufism, represents an indispensable mode of 
institutionalization of transcendence in Islam. Irrespective of its a-political and world 
renouncing tendencies Shi’i mysticism had far-reaching political implications: It amplified 
normative pluralism and enhanced the duality of religious and political authority. Shi’i 
religious beliefs and institutional structures historically shaped by them have been crucial 
in the motivation and determination of political action in the history of Iran. Shi’i Islam as 
a world religion of salvation has had considerable transformative potential as it contains 
significant implications not only for religious ranking but also for political stratification.
From the formative years of the doctrinal power of the ‘Olama, which can be said 
to have been during the tenth century from the time of the Greater Occultation (329/940) 
until the establishment of the first Shi’i dynasty in the sixteenth century, the Shi’i ‘Olama 
were a distinct social group but did not constitute a recognized institution. The Safavid 
period marks the transition of the ‘Olama from a distinct social group to a hierocracy. 
Safavid rule may best be explained in Weberian terms as a ‘Caesaropapist’ rule. Safavid 
rulers exercised supreme authority by virtue of their decadence from the time of the
26
Seventh Shi’i Imam, Musa Ibn Ja‘far (Al-Kazem, d. 799) onwards. The Safavids 
‘imported’ a number of Shi’i ‘Olama mainly from Lebanon. These ‘Olama were, on the 
whole, state functionaries, treated as a branch of the political administration. Throughout 
Safavid rule, the high-ranking clerical position was transformed ‘into hereditary family 
property expropriate as a source of income’, with prestige and power. In the subsequent 
one-and-a-half centuries, the ‘Olama succeeded in establishing monopolistic control over 
the religious life of the population, monopolizing the authoritative interpretation of 
doctrine, creating an autonomous administrative apparatus, a tax system and legal forms 
for the protection of ecclesiastical land-owning.
During the eighteenth and most of the nineteenth centuries, Safavid 
‘Caesaropapism’ was replaced by the consistent Twelver Shi’i dualism of politics and 
hierocratic domination. It may be argued that, during this period, Shi’i hierocracy 
emerged as a ‘church’. The extent of this development was such that during the Qajar 
period, the only two legitimate institutions of domination were the state and the ‘Olama. 
The ‘Olama’s power was further strengthened by the inherent weakness of Qajar 
administration. Consequently, by the time Reza Sah ascended to the throne in the 1920s, 
the extent of ‘Olama power and influence was unprecedented. Reza Sah sought to limit 
autonomous ecclesiastic charisma, and make it subordinate to secular power. However, 
he was not able to eliminate completely the social and doctrinal power of the ‘Olama, as, 
by this time, the ‘Olama had a well-established foundation. During the Reza Shah period 
the modernization of the state did entail the drastic decline of the institutional prerogatives 
and social power of the hierocracy. However, it did not diminish the legitimacy of the 
exclusive hierocratic authority of the ‘Olama, which assured the continued financial 
independence of the hierocracy from the state. The institutionalization of the autonomy of 
the Shi’i hierocracy during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries assured its survival 
despite inexorable pressure from the state in the twentieth century. The Shi’i hierocracy 
not only survived but withstood the challenges of the Pahlavl state and triumphed with 
virtually exclusive control over religious learning and over authoritative interpretation of 
Shi’i Islam. Irrespective of the erosion of clerical control over education, the major defeat 
of the hierocracy in the legal sphere and the establishment of centralized supervision over 
religious endowments, the Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom maintained the independence of 
religious institutions of learning from the state.
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The central theme of this thesis is the relationship between religion and politics, 
and the institutional structures historically shaped by them. To this extent the nature of the 
secularization process also forms the core of the thesis in so far as its applicability to the 
period under study. To view historical transformation from the perspective of 
secularization means, to a large extent, to view reality from the perspective of religion, 
since the secular, as a concept, only makes sense in relation to its counterpart, the 
religious. Chapter One considers a theoretical analysis of the secularization thesis in order 
to develop an appropriate analytical framework for the historical study of Iran during the 
Reza §ah period. The analytical task of this chapter is to examine the complexities of the 
secularization thesis and address what exactly is meant by the ‘separation’ of church and 
state. It assesses how applicable is the theory of ‘separation’ or ‘differentiation’ to Islam 
and to Iran. We begin with an analysis of the limitations arising from Western (including 
Weberian) understanding of secularization. We go on to provide an analysis of the 
secularization debate in relation to Islam. Finally, the applicability of the secularization 
thesis to the Reza Sah period will be considered.
Chapter Two considers the structure of domination and legitimacy within the 
cultural logic of Shi’ism and the balance between religion and politics in Iranian history. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework drawing on Max 
Weber’s sociology of religion, in the analysis of the study of Shi’ism and its consequences 
in term of the political sphere. Shi’i ‘Olama will be considered in the light of the 
emergence and consolidation of an institution with vested interests in the enforcement of 
religious beliefs and norms through spiritual and coercive sanctions. The Weberian theory 
of authority, in particular traditional and charismatic authority, can help to clarify the case 
study of the nature of authority in Shi’i Islam. The theoretical claim of the holders of 
religious authority, including their right to determine the political, rests on their ability to 
enforce such a claim. This ability is in turn determined by the institutionalization and 
social organization of religious authority. It is hoped that this chapter will highlight the 
way in which Shi’ism had a notable effect on political action and significantly transformed 
Iran’s polity.39
Chapter Three will consider the reforms in the educational system and the 
consequent demise o f ‘Olama power. This chapter aims to examine the introduction of the
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new education system in Iran as a microcosm of the diminishing power of the ‘Olama. 
Education will be looked at within the larger framework of social processes and change 
during the reign of Reza Sah. The profound changes in the role of education in the 
shaping of modem Iran have been largely neglected. Scholars have given comparatively 
little attention to the part played by the introduction of a Westem-style education system, 
both as a catalyst for change and as an element itself subject to change. The study of the 
Reza Sah period, whether in terms of modernization, Westernization, secularization, or 
simply ‘development’ has focused largely on political change and its impact on social, 
economic, administrative and intellectual affairs. The importance and contribution of 
education are yet to be recognized. The transformation of the education system and the 
role of education are of paramount importance, as we shall attempt to argue.
Chapter Four will consider judicial reform and its consequences for the ‘Olama. 
The adaptation of a Westem-style legal system had far-reaching effects on the fabric of 
Iranian society. This was inevitable as the ‘transplanting’ of social institutions from one 
society to a totally different one would bring with it inherent value systems. The new 
system of codified and accessible laws specified not only the obligations of the individual 
as a believer in the case of SarVah law but also the rights of the individual. The legal 
reforms of Reza Sah were the result of an ongoing process from the time of the 
Constitutional Revolution. The Constitutional period was a time of great liberal 
aspirations and attempts to apply the principles of democracy to Iran. One of the main 
aims of the Constitutionalists was the establishment of an independent judiciary and legal 
system. During the reign of Re£a Sah, the Constitutional provisions proclaiming Shi’i 
Islam as the official state religion and designation of the Sah as the defender of the faith 
were never altered. In practice, however, the power of the ‘Olama was greatly 
undermined. Reza Sah’s main point of attack against the ‘Olama was in the sphere of the 
law. Attacking them here deprived them of their chief social function and principal source 
of legitimate revenue. The legal reforms introduced during the Reza Sah period were 
motivated by two factors: firstly, nationalistic considerations that aimed to abolish the 
system of capitulation, and secondly, an attempt to create a central and state-controlled 
legal system. The consequential outcome of both was the fundamental reduction of the 
power of the ‘Olama.
39 Arjomand (1984), General Introduction.
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Chapter Five will consider the military history of the PahlavT dynasty and military- 
led modernization and its consequences for the ‘Olama. The military history of the PahlavT 
dynasty is integral to understanding not only the dynasty’s origin, but also that of the 
modem Iranian state’s evolution and role in its internal, regional and international setting. 
Reza Kan achieved political power through a military coup in 1921, and the army 
remained a key component throughout the PahlavT period. The army played a significant 
role in the modernization policies of Reza Sah and was at the very heart of the centralized 
state that he sought to build. The growth of militarism changed the fabric of Iranian 
society in four distinct ways: firstly, the military were the means by which Reza Sah rose 
to power, the driving force behind his reformers, and the institution which ensured the 
survival of his reign; secondly, the military institution was novel to Iran, recruiting most of 
its officers from outside of the traditional elite and it came to dominate Iranian society at 
the expense of the traditional elite; the military was both the implementer of centralization 
and its benefactor; thirdly, the Conscription Law brought with it considerable social 
change, all of which were an essential part of the over-all scheme of modernization; 
fourthly, throughout Reza Sah’s reign the army continued to be as preoccupied with 
ensuring the survival of the regime as it had been from its outset. The ‘Olama remained 
opposed to the increased militarism of the Reza. Sah era as indicated in their involvement 
in the anti-conscription movements which will be fully discussed in this chapter.
Chapter Six will consider the establishment of Howzeh ‘ElmTyeh Qom. It will
A
examine the role of Howzeh in the continuation of the hierocratic challenge to the state as 
well as in terms of the pacification of this challenge by the state through the control of the 
Howzeh. The Howzeh ‘ElmTyeh is a conglomerate of educational institutions in which 
learned teachers teach Islamic sciences. The school was established just at the time of 
Reza Sah’s consolidation of power. It is interesting that the Reza Sah period, often 
characterized by secularization, should coincide with the establishment of one of the most 
important Shi’i theological schools. The revival of the Howzeh ‘ElmTyeh Qom as the 
centre of Shi’i studies meant that the Iranian government could excercise greater control 
over the school as it was within the geographical boundaries of Iran and under the 
jurisdiction of the government. Moreover, the Howzeh ‘ElmTyeh Qom came to represent 
the centre of orthodoxy; if the Howzeh did not protest against the policies of the 
government it meant that Shi’i orthodoxy had no objections. This, however, did not stop 
individual clerics from voicing their opinions or leading local uprisings. These individual
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cases remained usually at a local level as isolated incidents and did not take on the form of 
national protest. These local uprisings will also be examined in this chapter. Reza Sah 
endeavoured to revert Iran to ‘Caesaropapism’ but, through the school, Qom achieved the 
status of an alternative political centre and a potential challenge to the state. This was, 
however, a gradual development which did not make itself fully felt until the reign of 
Mofiammad Reza Sah.
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Chapter One: Setting Out the Theoretical Argument: 
The Nature of the Secularization Process
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Introduction
To begin with it must be pointed out that this wok is not a comprehensive or 
systematic study of the theory of secularization. The aim of exploring the secularization 
thesis is to develop an appropriate theoretical-analytical framework for the historical 
study of Iran during the Reza Sah period. The empirical study is not framed for 
theoretical-analytical purposes, and does in feet transcend the theoretical-analytical 
framework. We have tried to respect as much as possible the complexity and diversity of 
the different historical realties, avoiding the temptation to impose any homogenized 
interpretive scheme upon them.
Secularization as a concept refers to the actual historical process whereby the 
entire dualistic medieval system of classification of ‘this world’ and ‘the otherworld’ 
disappears, and is replaced by a new system of spatial structuration of the spheres. The 
medieval dichotomous classification of reality into religious and secular realms was to a 
large extent dictated by the church. In this sense, the official perspective from which 
medieval societies saw themselves was a religious one. Only the end of this dichotomous 
way of thinking permitted the secular realm to establish new perspective from which it 
could view itself differentiatedly.1 ‘The fall of religious walls opened up a whole new 
space for processes of internal differentiation of the various secular sphere,’2 or what 
Weber calls ‘internal and lawful autonomy.’3 Thus, to view historical transformation from 
the perspective of secularization means, to a large extent, to view reality from the 
perspective of religion, since the secular, as a concept, only makes sense in relation to its 
counterpart, the religious.4 When studying religion as a social phenomenon one should 
bear in mind the well-known difficulties inherent in the field of religion and the 
complexities it raises when it comes to evaluating empirical evidence.5 The protean nature
1 Casanova (1994) and Keane (1998). Casanova suggests that four related and simultaneously unfolding 
developments - the Protestant Reformation, the rise of the modem state, the rise of modem capitalism, 
and the rise of modem science - set in motion the dynamics of the process which undermined the 
medieval religious system of classification. Each of the four developments contributed it own dynamic to 
modem processes of secularization and was one of the carriers of the process of modernization.
2 Casanova (1994), p. 20.
3 Weber (1946), p. 336. Weber views this differentiation from the perspective of the clash of each of these 
spheres, as they follow their ‘internal and lawful autonomy,’ with the charismatic religious ethic of 
brotherliness or with the organic social ethics of the church.
4 Casanova (1994), p. 20.
5 There is consensus among social scientists concerning the difficulty in defining and measuring 
religiosity. In the study of religion social scientists need to address questions such as: are social structures
33
of religion makes it unsusceptible to scholarly classification. There is no consensus as to 
what counts as religion, even when there is agreement on the subject of study, there is 
disagreement on which of the dimensions of religiosity (membership, affiliation, beliefs, 
ritual and no-ritual practices, experiences, doctrinal knowledge and their behavioural and 
ethical effects) one should measure and how various dimensions should be ranked and 
compared.
The emergence of modem sociology is generally perceived as a complete shift 
from theology to a secular conception of the world. Such a view however overlooks an 
important factor in the history of modem sociology, one that concerns the interaction and 
correlation between sociology, including sociology of religion, and the long process of 
secularization of theology going back to the Renaissance. The founding fathers of 
sociology had merely transferred the grounds of religious validation from transcendence 
to immanence, from ‘God’s word’ to ‘God’s work’ as a part of the general shift in the 
order of knowledge from ‘inward’ to ‘outward’. In the general context of positivism 
based on the ‘philosophy of presence’ religion became a mirror of representation within 
the social order, and the task of the sociologist became one of grasping the image in the 
mirror. Auguste Comte provides a clear example of this when he speaks of ‘physical 
sociology’ as a synonym of physical nature, and his analogy of the function of the 
sociologist as that of a physician.6 In Comtean terms human history would replace the 
incarnate God, to be enshrined forever in the mind of the believer. It may be argued that 
the emergence of sociology reflected the general structural shift in Western epistemology 
from transcendence to immanence. However, it may also be conceived as the inclusion of 
transcendence in immanence or ‘otherworldliness’ in ‘innerworldiness’, or what 
Armando7 calls a shift from the politics of beyond to the politics of behind. It may be 
argued that sociology on the whole, and notably sociology of religion, is founded on a 
single Western narrative that reflects the process of secularization of Christian theology.
religious or the personal lives that people live within it? How can one effectively differentiate between 
official and formal forms of religiosity? And so on.
6 Comte (1976), & Fletcher (1966).
7 Armando (1979).
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The Limitations Arising From Western (including Weberian) 
Understanding of Secularization
For Weber, the historical uniqueness of Europe lies in rationalization and 
bureaucratic organization. In the road to these two processes rational legal systems would 
replace sacred traditional legal systems [QazI justice]. Weber views modem society as a 
machine. Rationality and bureaucratic organization offered man control over society and 
nature. The rational calculability of modem life ultimately leads not to freedom but to an 
‘iron cage’. Modem society brings with it a sharp distinction of the private and the public 
sector and an extended gap between rational knowledge and moral judgment. The 
problem facing modem man is disenchantment. Capitalism would continue without 
Protestantism at the cost of loss of intrinsic meaning. Secularization is presented in 
negative terms as it brings with it disenchantment and fragmentation. Weber was well 
aware of how Protestantism had prepared the way for secularization by clearly 
demarcating the sacred and the secular.
The theme of a negative interpretation of the secular is also to be found in 
Marxism in terms of Marx’s concept of alienation. It may be argued that alienation is 
modem secular politics; mass media and its generated culture are the new secular religion. 
In Weberian terms increased rationalization brings with it institutional and cultural 
differentiation and specialization of different social spheres - politics, economics, religion, 
and morality. The process of calculability of social life brings with it the autonomy of each 
sphere of activity that has no claim to universal relevance or communal authority. These 
institutional changes transform human experience; the individual is forced to make choices 
between values that are partial and shifting. The result is an existential crisis in the 
meaning of life or what Weber calls ‘disenchantment’. In the secular world the place of 
religion changes from the public to the private sphere of interpersonal relationships. It is 
somewhat paradoxical that the Reformation prepared the demise of religion as a social 
bond connecting all aspects of social life. For Weber the historical pressures for the 
separation of church and state emerged from the dual dynamics of internal religious 
rationalization and the secular state’s emancipation from religion.
Weber’s theory of secularization - namely that secularization was the product of 
capitalism and Protestantism on the one hand, and that secularization involves pluralism of 
conflicting values and the institutional regulation of religion on the other hand - has
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become the basis of much contemporary sociological research. Two examples of such an 
approach are the works of Peter L. Berger and Alasdair MacIntyre. Berger8 provides a 
distinction between objective secularization, the institutional regulation of religion and 
subjective secularization, and the loss of religious credence at the level of human 
experience. Like Weber, Berger conceived that secularization was due to the development 
of the capitalist and industrial process, and moved ‘outwards from this sector into other 
areas of society.’ In Alasdair MacIntyre’s approach, secularization resulted from the twin 
processes of urbanization and industrialization that shattered the communal morality of 
rural England.9 There are a number of criticisms concerning the perspective of 
secularization presented in the research of Weber, Berger and MacIntyre and others.10
There are a number of fundamental problems with the secularization thesis, even if 
one considers secularization only as a western phenomenon, as there is a lack of analytic 
distinction between the historical processes of secularization and the alleged consequences 
which those processes were suppose to have upon religion. For example, was Western 
secularization a homogenous process or can one distinguish distinctive variations, 
particularly in terms of ‘privatization’ and ‘marginalization’ of religion? Can we really 
discern a society that has become secularized? These theories must be able to account for 
religious revival as well as the continuity of religious beliefs and symbols in public life. 
The secularization thesis must accommodate for analytical distinctions between religion as 
the sacred culture of the common people and institutionalized forms of religion and go 
beyond the tendency to equate religion with the Church, and secularization with ‘de- 
Christianization’ of European society and culture. Sociologists who argue that 
secularization and industrialization are closely connected must also be able to explain the 
persistent tendencies of both institutional and popular religion in Eastern Europe and 
Russia.11 By focusing on the relationship between economic change and religion within 
the conventional view of secularization, sociologists have failed to perceive a more 
important relationship between organized religion and the state. In the West, whatever the 
contradictory relationship between a capitalist economy and organized religion, 
Christianity came to provide a crucial basis of legitimacy for the emerging nation-state.
8 Berger (1969), p. 128.
9 MacIntyre (1967).
10 For other discussions, c£ Wilson (1966), Bellah (1970), pp. 89-106.
11 For Russia see Bourdeaux (1968), and for Bulgaria see Martin (1969), chapters 10 and 11.
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Finally, if the secularization thesis is to have any analytical value in comparative 
sociology, it will need to reconsider three of its ethnocentric prejudices: its bias for 
Protestant subjective forms of religion, its bias for ‘liberal’ conceptions of politics and of 
the ‘public sphere,’ and its bias for the sovereign nation-state as the systematic unit of 
analysis.12
Some scholars have questioned the extent to which the process of secularization 
has occurred within the Western world, let alone as a global phenomenon. David 
Martin,13 for example, in attempting to refute the secularization thesis, has claimed that 
not only has secularization not occurred but also we cannot even point to a society or 
period that was Christian, or at least religious. Hence, most secularization theories depend 
on two myths: a ‘Golden Age’ view of a religious world, and some notion of the over­
secularized individual. He argues that just as we cannot discover some mediaeval society 
that was wholly religious, so witchcraft and superstition can flourish in a so-called secular 
world. Turner also disputes the ‘golden age of religion’ or more precisely the ‘golden age 
of the church’ thesis in which organized religion was dominant at all levels of society. He 
argues, ‘the very idea that the culture of the Church was the dominant ideology of the 
mediaeval period is highly dubious because even when the church had the political 
inclination to dominate through mission it simply lacked the institutional apparatus which 
would be necessary to transmit its ideology. ’14
If the process of Western secularization is denied, then what are the implications 
of this refutation for non-Western societies, which at some point sought to emulate the 
Western model under a modernizing leader? One argument in response to Martin may be 
that the lack of religious practices and a mixture of rationalization and superstition in 
religious belief at any given time do not negate the dominance of religion over society.15 
Furthermore, popular interest in magic may be taken as evidence of secularization in so 
far as such activities are no longer crucial to the maintenance of social order. We must not 
assume that secularization is an even and inevitable evolutionary process taking place with 
the same causes and same consequences in every culture. In other words, there is no 
blueprint for the secularization process; what will count, as secularization will depend on
12 Casanova ( 1994), p. 39.
13 Martin (1965), pp. 169-82; also Martin (1973), pp. 81-7.
14 Turner (1988), pp. 322-3.
15 Turner (1974).
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the dominant norms, practices, and institutions in every given culture. It is only when we 
raise the problem of secularization as a global process that we can turn to the more 
specific issues of Islamic secularization. It may seem somewhat obvious that if 
secularization is taking place then it will follow a different path of development in Islam 
than in Christianity. In David Lemer’s The Passing o f Traditional Society, the theory of 
global modernization entails a process of global secularization. While Lemer asserts that 
his theory is not from an ethnocentric perspective, he also asserts that the process of 
modernization in the West has had global significance. He argues that ‘the same basic 
model reappears in all modernizing societies on all continents of the world, regardless of 
variations in race, colour, or creed.’16
Arguably Lemer’s theory is in feet ethnocentric; however, many modernizing 
leaders within the Middle East, such as Reza Sah and Attaturk, did in feet seek to fully 
implement and imitate the Western model of modernization/secularization. This shows the 
extent and the far-reaching impact of this kind of thinking as a discourse of dominance 
within a global context. The emphasis on Western history as the global model of 
development largely ignores numerous non-Western types of development such as in 
Russia, China, Cuba and Japan. These cases are either ignored or treated as deviations 
from a normative type. Furthermore, Lemer’s theory is also deterministic since it claims 
that there is only one method of development that must be accomplished according to a 
set plan. It also assumes that traditional societies are static and homogenous, and also that 
modernity is uniform. Most modernization theories operate within the dualistic 
traditional/modem dichotomy that is far too simplistic to have any real analytical value.
Before proceeding further there is a need to clarify the extent which theories of 
secularization double as empirically descriptive theories of modem social processes and as 
normatively prescriptive theories of modem societies, and thus serve to legitimize 
ideologically a particular historical form of institutionalization of modernity. 
Secularization as a concept refers to the actual historical process of the transfer, or 
relocation of persons, things, function, meaning, and so forth, from their traditional 
location in the religious sphere to the secular spheres. Thus, the appropriation, whether 
forcibly or by default, by secular institutions of functions that traditionally had been in the 
hands of ecclesiastical institutions, has been defined as secularization. The core of the
16 Lemer (1985), p. 147.
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theory of secularization is the conceptualization of the process of modernization17, an 
equally problematic concept and theory. Broadly speaking modernization is the process of 
functional differentiation of the secular spheres - namely the sate, the economy, and 
science - from the religious sphere. Donald E. Smith identifies the following elements in 
the definition of political modernization:18
1. Polity secularization, the process by which a traditional system undergoes radical 
differentiation, resulting in separation of the polity from religious structures, substitution 
of secular modes of legitimization, and extension of the polity’s jurisdiction into areas 
formerly regulated by religion.
2. Mass politicization, the process by which mass participation in politics becomes the 
accepted norm and is substantially realized in practice.
3. Developmental capacity expansion, the process by which the polity increases its 
effectiveness in direct socioeconomic change.
In the first process the relationship with religion is a direct but negative one. Political 
modernization includes, as one of its basic processes, the secularization of polities, the 
progressive exclusion of religion from the political system. In the other two processes, the 
relationship with religion is indirect and partial but positive.19
The paradigm of secularization has been the main theoretical and analytical 
framework through which the social sciences have viewed the relationship of religion and 
modernity. The single theory of secularization is actually made up of three very different 
positions: secularization as differentiation of the secular spheres from religious institutions 
and norms, secularization as decline of religious beliefs and practices, and secularization 
as marginalization of religion to a privatized sphere.20 Each sphere merits an examination 
independently of the other spheres. The analytical task of the theory of secularization is to 
study what new systems of classification and differentiation emerge within the secular
17 Casanova (1994) defines secularization as ‘nothing more than a sub-theory of general theories of 
differentiation, either of the evolutionary and universal kind proposed by Durkheim or of the more 
historically specific kind of Western modernization theory developed by Weber.’ P. 18.
18 It must be pointed out that although we do not agree with Smiths ‘inevitability of secularism’ 
argument or his classification of Islam as an organic religion, one which religious and political functions 
are fused together, nonetheless, we think that some of his categorization may be helpful in clarifying the 
secularization process in Iran.
19 Smith (1974), p. 4.
20 Casanova (1994).
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world and what new place religion will have, if any, within the new differentiated system. 
Attached to the differentiation thesis there are two subtheses, which attempt to explain 
what will happen to religion as a result of the process of secularization. One subthesis 
suggested that the process of secularization would result in the progressive decline of 
religion until it eventually disappears. The other subthesis postulated that the process of 
secularization would result in the privatization and marginalization of religion in the 
modem world. There is a need to refine the theory of secularization by distinguishing 
between the general historical structural trend of secular differentiation and the different 
ways in which different religions in different places respond to and are affected by the 
modem structural trend of differentiation.
The theory of secularization as differentiation remains the core of the theory of 
secularization and serves as one of the primary distinguishing characteristics of modem 
structures. The process of functional differentiation refers to the development of 
institutional autonomy of the secular spheres - namely the state, the economy and science 
- and the religious sphere. ‘Religion itself is constrained not only to accept the modem 
principle of structural differentiation of the secular spheres but also to follow the same 
dynamic and develop an autonomous differentiated sphere of its own.’21 It must be 
pointed out that in this thesis we will only attempt to analyze some aspects of the process 
of differentiation of the religious and political sphere and are not concerned with 
substantiating the process of differentiation in each of the spheres. We will explore the 
dynamics of differentiation of the religious and political sphere by analyzing different 
patterns and interpretations of the separation of church and state.
Historical pressures for the separation of church and state emerged from the dual 
dynamics of internal religious rationalization22 and the secular state’s emancipation from 
religion. It is widely accepted that secularism advocates the separation of politics from 
religion, however, the type and degree of secularism is determined by a number of factors: 
1. Whether and to what extent is it possible to separate politics from religion? 2. How and 
what justifies the separation of politics from religion? 3. What does separation entail and, 
how, after separation, must the two relate to one another? The demands for separation are 
usually linked to some undesirable pre-existing unity, and the advocates of separation
21 Ibid., p. 212,
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argue for a parting of ways in two different and distinct approaches. From the first 
approach, separation means total exclusion and refusal of any contact whatsoever 
between religion and politics. From this viewpoint the secular state must be anti-religious. 
The anti-religiosity may be interventionist or non-interventionist. In its interventionist 
form the state actively discourages religion. The interventionist reading, suspicious of 
religion’s negative functions, favours government regulation of religion while denying 
religion any government support. Even when it accepts formal separation, the ‘statist’ 
interpretation is consistent with caesaropapist principles favouring both government 
support and government’s absolute control of religion.23 In its non-interventionist form it 
minimizes contact with religion and adheres to a strict secularist purity. The milder variety 
of exclusion of religion from politics proposes that religious and political institutions live 
as co-existing but independent institutions.24 The second view of separation does not 
demand total exclusion. Some contact is possible but some distance too, what Bhargava 
calls ‘principled distance’.25 Principled distance itself takes two forms. The first adheres to 
some version of political neutrality. The second form requires that the boundaries between 
religion and politics be respected. Religion and politics form distinct spheres with their 
own respective areas of jurisdiction.26
Bhargava27 distinguishes four versions of secularism: 1. Ethical secularism that 
excludes all religions from the affairs of the sate. 2. Ethical secularism that requires that 
the state maintain a principled distance from all religions. 3. Political secularism that 
excludes all ultimate ideals including religions from the affairs of the state. 4. Political 
secularism that demands that the state be principally distanced from all religious and non- 
religious ultimate ideals.28 Political secularism inevitably carries with it the values of 
comprehensive secular worldview. From this viewpoint secularization is part of a larger 
modernist project and some versions of the secularization thesis rely on an autonomy- 
based liberalism with an individualistic concept of the person.29 The neutralist justification
22 Casanova (1994), Halpem (1963) & Black (1966) refer to the necessity of changing one’s 
psychological system and Smith (1970) refers to this process as polity-transvaluational secularization.
23 Robbins & Robertson (1986), pp. 67-75.
24 Bhargava (1998), p. 493.
25 Ibid., p. 493.
26 Ibid., p. 494 for fiirther clarification please see Raz (1988) and Walzer (1984).
27 Bhargava (1998), p.495.
28 Generally, ethical secularism is found cohabiting with exclusionary separation.
29 Bhargava (1998), p. 9.
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of the separation of religion and politics lends itself to distinct interpretations. 30 The first 
interpretation justifies neutrality by protecting the interests of both religion and the state. 
The neutral state serves the interests of religion by checking corruption that frequently 
follows excessive dependence on civil authority and advances the interests of the state by 
preventing civil strife caused by church state entanglement. The second view justifies 
neutrality in the name of the individual’s freedom to choose.
The problem with the liberal conception is its tendency to conceive of the 
relationship between religion and politics as simply the constitutional separation of church 
and state. While separation may be necessaiy to guarantee the freedom of the state from 
religion and visa versa, it does not follow that religion must be privatized in order that 
these freedoms be guaranteed or that separation necessarily entails the progressive decline 
of religion. This brings us to the second and third subthesis of the theory of secularization 
- secularization as decline of religious beliefs and practices, and secularization as 
marginalization of religion to a privatized sphere, the most questionable theoretical and a 
general empirical proposition of the secularization thesis. Those versions of the theory of 
secularization that envisage the process of secularization as inevitable and progressive 
decline of religious beliefs are caught in a myth that sees history as the progressive 
evolution of humanity from superstition to reason, from religion to science. The 
privatization thesis only become problematic when it is turned into a prescriptive 
normative theory of how religion and religious intuitions ought to behave in the modem 
world. The theory of secularization should be flexible enough to be a testable and 
falsifiable empirical theory of dominant historical trends. Casanova31 has demonstrated 
that by analyzing the secularization thesis in terms of three very different and unintegrated 
subtheses, one is able to apply the theory of modem functional differentiation without 
accepting the other two subtheses, and without doing away with the theory of 
secularization altogether. There is a need to refine the theory of secularization by 
distinguishing between the general historical structural trend of secular differentiation and 
the different ways in which different religions in different places respond to and are 
affected by the modem structural trend of differentiation.
30 Ibid., p. 15.
31 Casanova (1994).
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If the theory of secularization is have any analytical function it should be complex 
enough to account for the historical ‘contingency’ that there may be public religions in the 
modem world, which do not need to endanger either modem individual freedoms or 
modem differentiated structures; and that there may be forms of ‘public’ religion which 
allow for the privatization of religion and for the pluralism of subjective religious belief.32 
The theory of secularization should be reformulated by reconsidering its biased 
ethnocentric prejudices. It is only by addressing these ethnocentric prejudices that one can 
disentangle the thesis of differentiation from the thesis of privatization. ‘Unlike secular 
differentiation, which remains a structural trend that serves to define the very structure of 
modernity, the privatization of religion is a historical option...,33
Nikki Keddie34 provides an extensive critique of the ‘secularization thesis’. She 
contends that secularization cannot be explained adequately in terms of an 
overwhelmingly ‘societal’ view. The secularization thesis centres heavily on Great Britain, 
with some attention to Western Europe. Secularization theory shares the linear- 
progressive viewpoint of modernization, and is really a sub-category of that theoretical 
approach. Broadly speaking societal secularization has usually accompanied 
modernization; the theory is undialectical and plays down contradictory forces. The main 
contradiction is that governmental secularization policies often bring anti-secular 
reactions, especially among certain classes and groups. This is one aspect of the point that 
secularization cannot be explained wholly by industrialization, modernization and so forth, 
but is related to political acts and to culture. Secularization is not a one way process, 
constantly growing with the forces of modernization. While the word ‘secularization’ is 
commonly used mainly for a social trend and the word ‘secular’ largely for a 
governmental policy, the two are dialectically related in a way not covered by the 
secularization thesis.35
Furthermore the degree to which religion is secularized is not considered. For 
many Westerners, the word ‘secular’ means the separation of Church and state. 
Secularists in this sense are those who favour Church-state separation, whatever their 
private religious beliefs. However, the reality in Western countries is much more varied
32 Ibid., p. 39.
33 Ibid.
34 Keddie (1994).
35 Ibid., p. 5
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than any such phrase would imply. Besides the ambiguity of such a concept as separation 
of Church and state, particularly when the ideal is compared to actual conditions, there is 
the fact that some application of ‘secularism’ in practice has meant something quite 
antithetical to the ideal of Church-state separation: increasing control of Church by the 
state. This is clearly the case in PahlavT Iran where strong religious institutions controlled 
much of the law, education and social welfare. Considerable state control of institutions 
hitherto under religious control seemed necessary to introduce modernization and 
centralizing changes. There seems to be a lack of clarity in applying the word ‘secular’. 
Communist countries for example are often not referred to as secular; this may be due to 
the obvious way in which the state controls the Church. Yet on this point there is little to 
choose between communist countries and Ataturk’s ‘secular’ Turkey, which, if anything 
forcibly changed religious practices far more than communist governments did.36
So far we have looked broadly at the secularization thesis and some of its 
implications. The analysis of the secularization thesis shows a number of things: 1. The 
concept and theory of secularization is embedded in a historical account of the 
development of western modernity. 2. What passes for a single theory of secularization is 
actually made up of three very different and unintegrated positions: secularization as 
differentiation of the secular spheres from religious institutions and norms, secularization 
as decline of religious beliefs and practices, and secularization as marginalization of 
religion to a privatized sphere. Each sphere merits an examination independently of the 
other spheres. 3. The thesis of separation/differentiation of the religious and secular 
spheres remains as the core of the theory of secularization. 4. The 
separation/differentiation thesis means different things in the US, in France, Germany, 
Britain, India or Iran and, should be interpreted differently at different times in each place, 
allowing for historical ‘contingency’ and variation.37 5. If the secularization thesis is to
36 Ibid., p. 8.
37 Casanova suggests that four related and simultaneously unfolding developments - the Protestant 
Reformation, the rise of the modem state, the rise of modem capitalism, and the rise of modem science - 
set in motion the dynamics of the process which undermined the medieval religious system of 
classification. Each of the four developments contributed it own dynamic to modem processes of 
secularization and was one of the carriers of the process of modernization. If one accepts this assumption, 
it follows that one should expect different historical patterns of secularization. As each of theses carriers 
developed different dynamics in different places at different times, the pattern and the outcome pf 
historical processes should vary accordingly. Only when it comes to capitalism has it been nearly 
universally recognized that there is a positive correlation between rates of secularization and rates of 
economic development, urbanization, industrialization, proletarianization, and education. Casanova 
(1994), pp. 21-25.
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have any analytical value in comparative sociology, it will need to reconsider three of its 
ethnocentric prejudices: its bias for Protestant subjective forms of religion, its bias for 
‘liberal’ conceptions of politics and of the ‘public sphere,’ and its bias for the sovereign 
nation-state as the systematic unit of analysis.38 6. There is a need to make an analytical 
distinction between the thesis of differentiation and the theses of marginalization and 
privatization.
Finally, due to the highly complex nature of the relationship between religion and 
politics, it is necessary to distinguish between different kinds of politics and culturally 
specific differences in religion when interpreting diverse traditions. The mutual 
interdependence of the religious and the political spheres makes scholastic categorization 
challenging and as these spheres overlap the distinction between the two becomes 
increasingly difficult to define. More challenging than scholastic categorizations, however, 
is analyzing the relationship between the religious and political spheres in concrete 
historical cases. In the Iranian case, the institutionalization of Shi’ism made possible the 
distinction between the actual and ideal orders and is an important factor in the analysis 
and understanding of the nature of Iranian secularization. Thus we will start by 
considering the relevance of the secularization thesis to Islam, and in particular Shi'ism 
and then go on to engage in an in-depth discussion of the secularization thesis in relation 
to the Reza Sah period. In this section we will consider the following points: 1. The 
Christian origins of secularism are undeniable but does this mean that it has no application 
elsewhere? 2. What exactly is meant by the separation of church and state? 3. Why is the 
separation/differentiation of religion and politics necessary and what does it entail? 4. 
How far can a distinction between religious and cultural practice be drawn in societies 
dominated by religions that emphasize practice rather than belief? 5. How can we measure 
the effects of secularism in a country where religious and cultural practice is more or less 
indistinguishable?
An Analysis o f the Secularization Debate in Relation to Islam
In terms of secularism39 and the domain of Islam as distinct from its connotations 
in Christian countries, many scholars have viewed secularism as alien to the Islamic polity
38 Casanova (1994), p. 39.
39 Although it may be argued that the ‘doctrine of secularism’ is alien to the Islamic ‘ideal’, however, 
this does not mean that the social process of ‘secularization’ is also ‘alien’ or ‘incompatible’ with Islam.
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as there is no separation of temporal and spiritual authority in Islam.40 ‘In Europe, the 
struggle between temporal and spiritual authority (and their eventual separation in the 
modem state) are part and parcel of the course of history. In Islam such separation is 
totally irrelevant to traditional thinking on the nature of polity, and altogether 
unacceptable to the men of religion. In essence, rather than being a creed and set of 
rituals, Islam lays down for its adherents norms of behavior and guidelines for lifestyle in 
all spheres of life. Secularization cannot be a matter limited to the issue of religion and the 
state, or of religion versus science.’41 Niyazi Berkes notes that in Islam, ‘Religion and 
state were believed to be fused together; the state was conceived as the embodiment of 
religion, and religion as the essence of the state.’42 However, if one examines this claim 
within a historic perspective, it does not seem to be validated, particularly with regard to 
Shi’i Islam.
A close study of original Islamic sources (Qoran and Hadis) shows that they have 
very little to say on matters of government and the state. The first issue to confront the 
Muslim community immediately after the death of the Prophet Mofiammad was the 
problem of successorship and consequently of government. Muslims, therefore, had to 
‘innovate and improvise with regards to the form and nature of government.’43 Indeed, 
the very first disagreements that emerged within the Muslim community and led to the 
eventual division into Sunnis, Kharijites and Shi’a were pivoted on the concept, 
characteristics and legitimacy of political leadership. Theorizing about politics, however, 
occurred much later on in Islamic history and most of what emerged, at least within the 
Sunni tradition, was produced in the ‘shadow of the state’, in that the official 
jurisprudence sought to impart religious legitimacy to the government of the day, which 
had usually come to power by force or intrigue and which, in its daily conduct, was not 
generally living up to the Islamic ideal. The traditional jurists were sponsored by the state
It may be helpful here to distinguish more clearly between a social process, namely secularization, and a 
political ideology, namely secularism. The latter is an aspiration, the former a process. Like other 
ideologies, e.g. nationalism the aspiration claims legitimacy from the objectivity of the process, but a 
similar distinction prevails.
40 Berkes (1964).
41 Ibid., p. 8.
42 Ibid.
43 Von Grunebaum (1953), p. 142.
46
to ‘forge’ a link between politics and religion by giving a religious legitimacy to the 
political power.44
The state had sanctioned a certain ‘methodology’ of writing based on linguistic 
explanation, Bayan, and reasoning by analogy, Qlyas, backed by a juridic elite. The result 
was an elegant and elaborate body of jurisprudence and a formal theory of caliphate with 
recurring themes from traditional Arab conceptions of authority, which, through 
monopoly and repetition, had become altogether entrenched in the Muslim mind. 
Subsequent generations have found it extremely difficult to distinguish between what was 
meant as ‘description’ and what was meant as ‘prescription’ within this literature.45 This 
body of jurisprudence has been elevated to the level of the religious law. The important 
fact, which is often overlooked, is that this jurisprudence was in feet a human 
improvisation meant to address certain political and social issues in a certain historic and 
geographic context. It was heavily influenced by pre-Islamic Arab conceptions of 
authority and legitimacy. It fulfilled a certain political function by imparting religious 
legitimacy to the government of the day.
The idea that Islam is both a religion and a state, Dm va Dowla, is in fact a very 
recent concept, which may date back to the second decade of the twentieth century at the 
earliest.46 All that ‘political Islam’ retains from the past is the juristic tradition linking 
politics to religion. If this is so, then how can one address the question of why there was a 
certain fusion between religion and politics throughout the history of the Islamic state? 
One familiar argument is that Islam is a ‘political religion’ by its ‘very nature’. Another 
explanation may be that religion and politics were brought together in the historical 
Islamic state by the way in which the state appropriated religion. Islam is in fact a religion 
of collective morals, but there is very little in it that is specifically political. There is very 
little in the original Islamic sources on how to form states, run governments or manage 
organizations. The ‘monopoly’ of a certain religion has always been one of the state’s 
usual instruments for ensuring ideological hegemony. The historical Islamic state inherited 
this tradition. It was against a background of religio-political opposition movements 
against the state, such as that of the Shi’a who challenged the legitimacy of the 
government, that the official juridic theory of the state emerged by a way of counter­
44 Ayubi (1990), pp. 1-35.
45 Ibid., pp. 1-35.
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argument. The new official theory had to justify and legitimize, in religious terms, the 
government and its activities. This was the historic origin of the convergence between 
religion and politics. Ideologically, it was expressed in a body of writing that was 
produced by state-employed jurists with the implicit intention of conferring religious 
legitimacy on the political rulers.47
In Shi’i Islam, there existed a separation of power of the state and authority of the 
Imam from the death of the Prophet onwards. The Shi’a lived as members of the Islamic 
community, but with allegiance to the Imam and not to the state. The only legitimate 
authority was the religious authority of the Imam of the time - until the Greater 
Occupation of the Twelfth Imam. The Shi’a believe that the rightful temporal rule of the 
Imams was denied to them through the system of caliphate. The only time that the Shi’i 
ideal was recognized was during the short caliphate of ‘All (656-d.661). From the death 
of the Prophet onwards there existed a separation of temporal and spiritual rule for the 
Shi’i minority. Thus, any state claiming to be an Islamic state represented illegitimate 
power, tyranny, and brutal force.
The period of infallible rulers came to an end with the Greater Occupation of the 
Twelfth Imam, who remains alive but hidden, because the universe could not survive 
without a representative of God on earth, or without His proof, Hojja. To continue the 
link between the Imam and the community, four consecutive ‘specific’ agents were 
appointed by the Hidden Imam. The fourth agent was the seal of the ‘specific’ agents. 
This marked the end of the Lesser Occupation and the beginning of the Greater 
Occupation (873-940). For the Shi’a from the time of the Greater occupation, there 
existed no direct link to legftimate authority. In time, the ‘Olama came to partake of the 
authority and, to some extent, the charisma of the Imam as the upholders of religion, 
although, according to Shi’i doctrine, after the death of the last agent no-one could claim 
any privileged position in relation to the Imam. Temporal/political power was devoid of 
any religious authority preceding the advent of the Hidden Imam. Until such time, all 
states would be devoid of religious authority. No claims could be made on such authority, 
only that the consensus, Ijma, of the body of the ‘Olama was a guarantee that the 
community was not acting against the wishes of the Imam. The idea of rulership gradually
46 Ibid., p. 4.
47 Ibid.
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came to hold an important place amongst the ‘Olama. The following arguments are often 
quoted by ‘Olama in order to establish the right of rulership for themselves:
1) The Prophet is reported to have said: ‘May God be compassionate to my caliphs, 
those who will come after me and will deal with my Hadis and Soma.9
2) The Prophet is reported to have said: ‘When a believing jurist dies, Islam suffers an 
irreparable loss because the believing jurists, Al-Mu’memnol-Foqaha, are the 
protectors of Islam.’
3) The jurists are the authorized representatives of the Messengers on the stipulation that 
they do not follow secular rulers.
The political authority of the ‘Olama is one of the subjects of polemics in clerical 
circles and no final conclusion has yet been achieved.48 Concerning other matters there is 
little disagreement amongst the ‘Olama. According to §e% Murtaza An§aff: ‘There are 
three offices: 1) The office that deals with religious matters; this office belongs to the 
FaqJh without any question. 2) The administration of justice; this institution has also been 
unquestionably entrusted to the Mojtahed. 3) The third office is that of politics, that is, 
rulership; the idea of its being under the authority of the ‘Olama is not yet accepted by all, 
and therefore it requires further discussion.’49 This is of course not an exhaustive and 
categorical treatment of the basis of the political and legal claim of the ‘Olama nor have 
all these Afladis been fully accepted by all the ‘Olama. To be able to further expand the 
argument a closer examination of the theory of legitimate authority in Shi’i Islam is 
required and will be fully considered in Chapter One.
The Safavid period (1501-1722) marked the establishment of the first Shi’i state. 
For the first time in history, the Shi’a were no longer a minority group living among the 
Sunni majority. In this period the ‘Olama enjoyed a great deal of influence in the state. 
Many of the ‘Olama cooperated closely with the Safavid rulers. The interaction and 
involvement of the ‘Olama with the Safavid state and the misconceptions regarding the 
history of Sunni Islam as discussed earlier, have led many to argue that one cannot talk 
about a separation of temporal and spiritual realms within Islamic countries. It may be 
more accurate to argue that due to the all encompassing nature of Islam and the close 
association of the ‘Olama with the state, such distinctions are hard to trace. However, 
from this proposition one cannot draw the conclusion that due to the Islamic ‘essence’
48 Hairi (1977), pp. 59-60.
49 Ibid., pp. 59-60.
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such a separation of temporal and spiritual authority is not possible or could not exist in 
Islam. Historically, the ‘Olama have come to take on the role of leaders and advisors on 
religious matters. This privileged role has come to be viewed as synonymous with Islam 
per se. In Muslim societies, therefore, any change in the traditional lifestyle and the 
removal of any sphere of activity from clerical influence came under the heading of 
‘secularization’. Consequently, in practical terms this has often meant restricting the 
power and influence of the ‘Olama.
It may be concluded that despite the widely held misconception that any Islamic 
polity is inherently a theocracy, the Qoran does not specify a distinct political sphere. In 
the Sunni world, the period of the rule of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs has been 
idealized into a ‘golden age’ of Islamic theocracy. Lapidus has demonstrated that with the 
growth of the independent body of religious advisors and jurists, forming a religious elite, 
and the emergence of the schools of jurisprudence, the Caliphate was no longer the sole 
identifying symbol of Islam.50 The formation of the ‘Olama thus marked the separation 
between the Caliphate and the institution embodying Islamic revelation. The two, 
however, cooperated. The ‘Olama provided religious legitimacy for the caliphate, while 
the caliphate ensured the support and the maintenance of the ‘Olama. This occurred 
relatively early on in the Sunni world. The process was much slower to unfold for the 
Shi’a, as before the consolidation of Shi’ism as the state religion by the Safavids in the 
sixteenth century, the Shi’i community lived as a minority group under Sunni rule. 
However, after one and a half centuries of Shi’i rule, the Shi’i ‘Olama had come to 
assume the exact same functions as their Sunni counterparts. Moreover, the principle of 
Ijtehad and Ijma as restricted to the consensus of the Mojtahed had ensured far greater 
power for the Shi’i ‘Olama. If one compares some of the treatises, mentioned earlier on 
the nature of the relationship between religion and politics, one finds overwhelming 
similarities with Sunni theories. Shi’i ‘Olama by the end of Qajar period had come full 
circle to the exact same position as the Sunni ‘Olama in terms of the relationship between 
religion and politics.
50 Lapidus (1975), pp. 368-85.
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The Applicability o f the Secularization Thesis to the Reza §ah 
Period
The secularization thesis seems to be a prevalent theme in sociology. Nineteenth- 
century social theorists as far removed as Friedrich Engels and Ferdinand Tonnies shared 
a common perspective in which it was confidently assumed that the development of 
capitalism would necessarily undermine the social and cultural bases of religion. The 
thesis of religious decline has its origins in the Enlightenment critique of religion. This 
critique was not so much a theoretical statement or an empirical proposition as a practical 
political program. This practical political program was most effective wherever churches 
had attained caesaropapist establishment and were resisting the process of differentiation. 
In such cases the Enlightenment critique of religion was usually adopted by social 
movements and political parties, becoming in the process a self-fulfilling prophecy. Once 
in power those movements and parties tended to translate the theory into applied state 
policies, in extreme cases enforcing and administering through violent coercion the 
process of secularization from above.51 Secularists supposed that the separation of 
religion from such domains as law, education, and government released citizens from 
irrational prejudices, promoted open mindedness, provided the necessary precondition for 
democracy, and led to the decline, marginalization and privatization of religious belief and 
practices. This was not the case in Iran. In Iran secularization did not bring with it a 
democratic process whereby supporters of religion could take advantage of the freedom 
of association provided by civil society to protest against the decline of religion. ‘Perhaps 
the most striking contradictory self-paralyzing feature of secularism is its theoretical and 
practical affinity with political despotism.’52 One problem with the view that the struggle 
for secularity was a struggle for toleration of differences is its failure to spot the inherent 
dogmatism of the process of secularism from above. Attempts to institutionalize 
secularism, as in the case of Iran, have been so riddled with violence and coercion that 
‘they qualified as experiments in internal colonialism’.53
‘Secularism’ with all its ambiguity, is the most used concept when referring to the 
reign of Reza Sah. However, the exact extent of actual secularization has never been fully 
studied. This is partly due to the highly complex nature of the relationship between
51 Casanova (1994), p. 214.
52 Keane (1998).
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religion and politics, which makes binary classification particularly difficult. The mutual 
interdependence of the religious and the political spheres makes scholastic categorization 
challenging and as these spheres overlap the distinction between the two becomes 
increasingly difficult to define. More challenging than scholastic categorizations, however, 
is the analysis of the relationship between the religious and political spheres in concrete 
historical cases. It, therefore, becomes necessary to distinguish between different kinds of 
politics and culturally specific differences in religion when interpreting diverse traditions. 
In the Iranian case, the institutionalization of Shi’ism made possible the distinction 
between the actual and ideal order. The institutionalization of the norm of the juristic 
authority of the ‘Olama enhanced by the evolution of the juristic norm of authority 
throughout the nineteenth century resulted in the economic and political independence of 
the hierocaracy from the state. This development forced religious scholars to combat 
and/or accommodate competing normative orders. This process paved the way for the 
‘secularization* of religion in more or less the same way as Weber describes Protestantism 
as having prepared the way for secularization by clearly demarcating the sacred and the 
secular.
In Iran education, law, social practices and traditions all had strong religious 
elements which involved both considerable control by Shi’i hierocracy and a set of beliefs 
guiding ideology and activity. Furthermore Shi’i religious institutions enjoyed 
considerable economic and political power. Such cultural, political, and economic power 
in the hands of religious institutions was tied to traditional ways of doing things, including 
both economic and political structures. This meant that when national integration and 
centralization began to develop, the old religious institutions came under attack by 
intellectuals and by rulers. ‘These institutions were inadequate to provide or even adapt 
quickly to modem technology, science centralized and bureaucratic political structures 
and other aspects of modernity, and so new ways of thought and new structures 
developed outside the old religiously-controlled ways. This is a simplified and schematic 
picture of the rise of political secularization....’54 If the changes in Iran are to be viewed in 
terms of political secularization, it becomes necessary to make an analytical distinction 
between whether the reforms of Reza Sah were designed to diminish the hold of the Shi’i
53 Keane (1998).
54 Ibid., p. 10.
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worldview over the masses or an attempt to differentiate and reduce the institutional 
power of the Shi’i hierocracy. The defining characteristics of Iranian secularization seems 
to indicate that the prevalent critique of religion was a practical-political critique, directed 
against the ideological functions of religious institutions, rather than a cognitive critique 
of religion directed against the truth claims of religious worldviews. The predominant 
presence of anticlericalism serves as the best indicator of the suitability and effectiveness 
of the political critique of religion in Iran and consequently the political nature of Iranian 
secularization. Reza Sah’s policies were an attempt at initiating and implementing a 
process of differentiation of spheres which would enable and ensure government control 
of these spheres, including religion.
We now need to consider the extent to which Reza Sah’s polices could be viewed 
as secular. The judgment on whether or not Reza Sah’s policies were secular depends on 
an understanding of what constitutes a secular state and what exactly differentiation or 
separation means. What are the characteristics of a secular state? Three principles are 
usually mentioned in the liberal-democratic doctrine on the subject. 1. The principle of 
liberty, which requires that the state permit the practice of any religion, within the limits, 
specified by certain other basic rights, which the state is also required to protect. 2. The 
principle of equality which requires that the state not give preferences to one religion over 
another. 3. The principle of neutrality which requires that the state not give preference to 
religious over the non-religious, and that the state should not involve itself with religious 
affairs or organizations. The idea of a secular state requires that the liberty principle be 
limited only by the need to protect some other universal basic right, and not by appeal to 
particular interpretation of religious doctrine.
The implementation of the first principle involves reforms in the legal sphere. In 
the area of legal reform in Iran, there was a desire to initiate a process of rational 
interpretation of religious doctrine, to find a representative and credible institutional 
process for the reform of religious practices, and reduce ecclesiastical hold over the legal 
sphere. The use of state legislation to achieve this modernist purpose came into conflict 
with another modernist principle; the freedom of religion and this is one of the anomalies 
of the process of secularization in Iran. The problem with the applicability of the second 
principle - that of equality - which concerns us is the way in which religion was reformed 
by state legislation both institutionally and in terms of practice. The use of state legislation
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to bring about reforms only in the religion of the majority created a series of 
inconsistencies in the very notion of equal citizenship. Furthermore, reform in religious 
practices through state legislation negated both the rights of the citizen and the principle 
of liberty. The third principle - that of the separation of state and religion - was not 
recognized in the Iranian constitution, which declared Shi’ism the official state religion of 
Iran. In Iran Shi’ism remained the official state religion and theoretically the state 
favoured one religion over and above others.55 In practice however, this was not the case 
as has been clearly demonstrated throughout this thesis and does not require further 
exploration here. What the polices of the state accomplished was the separation and 
differentiation of religious institutions from the affairs of the state. Finally, the neutrality 
principle did not apply in the case of Iran as the state continually involved itself in the 
affairs of religion. This is precisely the ground on which the argument that Iranian 
secularism has to have a different meaning from Western secularism is based on. The 
historic realities of the Iranian situation call for a different relationship between state and 
civil society than what is regarded as normative in Western political discourse, at least in 
the matter of religion.
The need for separation of religion from politics and the reasons cited for the 
necessity of secularization by its advocates are: 1. To prevent sectarian violence. 2. To 
ensure civic peace and toleration of differing beliefs. 3. To ensure full religious liberty. 4. 
To promote a life lived within the bounds of human reason and autonomy. 5. To 
safeguard the value and notion of citizenship, the prerequisite of modem democracy. 
None of these factors can be said to have been the motivating reasons behind Reza Sah’s 
polices with the exception of the last. However, the promotion of the concept of 
citizenship during the Reza Sah period was to produce loyalty and obedience to the state 
rather than the promotion of a democratic ideal. One salient aspect of Reza Sah’s polices, 
and one, which is viewed as a necessity of political secularism, is that religion is irrelevant 
to citizenship. Being a fellow citizen is more important than being a religious other. The 
concept of citizenship is viewed as the functional requirement of a modem state. The 
desire to cultivate a sense of citizenship and common allegiance to Iran can be clearly seen
55 Although there were no state taxes to support religious institutions, the state could not stop the 
voluntary payment of religious taxes to the ‘Olama. The payment of voluntary taxes to the ‘Olama as 
‘vicegerents of the Hidden Imam’ was one of the major contributing factors to their survival and relative 
independence even during the Re±a Sah period.
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in the education reform and the introduction of compulsory military service. It was also 
one of the underlying objectives behind the judicial reforms* Uniform Dress Code, the Hat 
Law and Compulsory Unveiling. It must be noted that all of these policies56 negate the 
principal defining characteristics of a secular state: the principle of liberty; the principle of 
equality; and the principle of neutrality.
As pointed out by Donald E. Smith57 the secular state must not be identified with 
the separation of religion from the state, as mere separation does not guarantee religious 
liberty. A secular state must view the individual as a citizen independent of membership of 
any particular religious group but at the same time the state must protect religious liberty 
and non-discrimination in the political arena by its neutrality in religious matters. During 
the Reza Sah period the promotion of the notion of citizenship did not entail the 
protection of religious liberty and non-discrimination in the political arena by its neutrality 
in religious matters. If separation is taken to mean that the state provides no support in 
any form to religion and domination is taken to mean that all public religious functions are 
state controlled then in Iran secularism entailed both separation and domination. In Iran 
Separation was the means by which state domination of religious institutions was 
accomplished. It is particularly difficult to measure the exact extent of separation in Iran 
as religious and cultural practices were more or less indistinguishable, giving rise to ample 
ambiguity, flexibility, and often confusion between political, religious, and cultural 
boundaries. Furthermore, to ascertain the distinction between religious and cultural 
practices is principally more complex in societies dominated by religions that emphasize 
practice rather than belief. This, however, does not mean that we can not provide some 
sort of analysis as to what the separation of religion and politics entailed in Iran. The Reza 
Sah period marks the instigation and implementation of the process of state driven 
differentiation of spheres. Broadly speaking Iranian secularism during the Reza Sah period 
can be characterized by the following:
1. The differentiation of the spheres of religion and politics by virtue of which Shi’i Islam 
stopped being an inclusive institution coextensive with politics. Or in other words the 
erosion of the dual sacred-temporal power structure.
56 Judicial Reform, Uniform Dress Code, the Hat Law and Compulsory Unveiling.
57 Smith (1974).
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2. The continuation of the view that religion provides the foundation of morality and 
performs a useful public function in so far as it does not interfere with affairs and practices 
of the state.
3. The promotion of a nationalist-secular worldview that establishes a hierarchical relation 
between the secular and the religious and expels religion form public life.
4. Attempts at privatizing religion and diminishing the power and influence of the Shi’i 
hierocracy, particularly in the legal sphere and education.
5. The expansion of state control over religion at the expense of religious liberty.58
6. Emphasis on the irrelevance of religion to citizenship and the endorsement of loyalty 
and obedience to the state over and above religious, ethnic and regional royalties.
7. State intervention in the religious sphere, challenging religious authority by subjecting it 
to external superiority of legal norms. The use of state legislation to bring about reforms 
in religion.
8. An attempt to separate some religious and non-religious institutions in their 
institutionalized form, rather than an effort to strictly separate every religious form from 
every non-religious practice.
9. The promotion of religion-as-faith rather than religion-as-national-identity.59
10. The promotion of the state as the defender of religion by checking corruption that 
follows excessive dependence on hierocractic authority (state sponsored anticlericalism).
Western works about secularism often over-emphasize the role of intellectuals and 
understate the role of government as instruments of secularization. Although scholars 
often stress intellectual trends, the pragmatic and governmental impetus to secularize was 
far more important in terms of its effect on societal change. In the case of PahlavT Iran, 
political motives and governmental policy were the driving force of secularization rather 
than intellectual or social belief. It is popularly believed that both modernizing PahlavT 
regimes were far ahead of the population in secularist beliefs and practices. Secularization 
in Iran is inseparable both from Westernization and centralization, although not
58 This is the most paradoxical feature of the secularist argument, as religious liberty is cited as the 
principal reason behind the separation of religion and politics. Compulsory Unveiling, the Uniform Dress 
Law and the Hat Law best exemplify this point.
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synonymous. It is often argued that politics and religion were inseparably intertwined in 
pre-modem Islam and that Islam is inherently a theocracy. In the light of the historical 
reality of the Islamic Empire, this simply does not hold. Instead one finds a dual power 
structure of religion and politics, one providing security and the other legitimacy. 
However, these societies were not secular in any modem sense, as dominant ideas took a 
religious form. In Iran, from the Safavid dynasty onwards, the ‘Olama controlled most 
education, law and social services, and had possession of religious taxes and endowments 
which ensured their economic and hence political independence. Secularized religion is a 
very important category in terms of late Shi’i development in Iran, and will be fully 
discussed in Chapter Two.
Reza Sah modelled himself on Ataturk and his reforms, and the Turkish elite 
consciously copied the model of secularization and modernization that was presented by 
Western society. The only alternative model in the first half of the twentieth century was 
the model of communist development in Russia, but the adaptation of this model was 
ruled out by the historical and geographical threat posed by Russia. Although Britain and 
Russia were equal contenders in the rivalry for supremacy in the internal political scene, 
however, increased British influence during this time ensured that the Communist model 
of development was never an option. Many Iranian intellectuals favoured the communist 
path but were suppressed. Western vocabularies of motive were adopted in the Middle 
East because the new elite had been trained in a European tradition, so secularization in 
Iran was essentially mimetic. The only reason that such models (as Lemer’s model) seem 
to fit Iranian social development at all is because of political imitation of the West and not 
some intrinsic global value of these theories. However there is a crucial difference 
between Western and Iranian secularization in that the latter was imposed by political 
decree rather than emerging automatically from economic change.
The Reza Sah period represents the most dramatic and systematic attempt to 
impose politically a specifically Western view of secularization. Secularization was 
imported and politically administered. The reform movements of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries were largely concerned with the attempt by Western-educated 
intellectuals to impose a Western pattern of secular political classification and
59 The promotion of Iran’s pre-Islamic history as the main source of national identity best exemplifies 
this point.
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organization on the religious community. However, these attempts did not achieve very 
much. It was only when secularization became an official government policy that it made 
a profound impact on society. In Iran, the aim of secularization was not to eliminate Islam 
but to limit, separate and differentiate its social function as only one source of national 
cultural and social integration. According to this view, it was necessary to differentiate the 
social order, releasing Islam from its encasement within the political, legal and education 
sectors.60 Furthermore, within the secularization thesis, the secularization of law and 
education is a fundamental requirement of the process of rationalization that prepares the 
way for capitalist development. The secular control of religious education was not 
primarily an attempt to eliminate Islam, but rather to sever religion and religious 
education from traditional values and institutions.61
The end result was of two parallel educational institutions, one religious and one 
secular, mutually antagonistic and revealing the profound intra-elite conflict among the 
military, the civilian secular elite and the religious hierarchy. In feet, in terms of its social 
impact it was fourfold: the common people who had little or no education, the religious 
personnel trained in Madresehs, the civil elite of the secular schools and the military elite 
of military academies. Ziya Gokalp’s62 observation concerning the effects of secular 
education upon Turkish society seems to be also true in the case of Iran. He observed 
that, ‘One portion of our nation is living in an ancient, another in a mediaeval, and a third 
in a modem age. How long can the life of a nation be normal with such a threefold life?’ 
The contradiction was to some extent resolved by increasing the role of secular 
educational institutions and by bringing the religious institutions under state supervision. 
With reforms in the legal sphere, Reza Sah took institutional secularization to its logical 
conclusions, namely the removal of the vestiges of power of the Sarfah and the ‘Olama. 
Although the Sarfah was severely restricted, it still retained considerable normative 
prestige and influence.63
The religious code was the legal basis of family life and therefore exerted its 
influence in most aspects of everyday life. The intention of reform was to make Iranian 
legal practices consistent with those of every ‘developing’, ‘civilized’ nation. In practice,
60 This remains the basic premise of the theory o f‘differentiation’.
61 Mirza §aleh (1372 SH/1993).
62 Berkes (1959).
63 Sayegan (1316 SH/1937).
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many of the old attitudes and customs continued, especially in the rural and 
geographically-isolated areas. The impacts of these changes were nevertheless profound: 
they represented a frontal attack on the remaining institutions of the religious order. Reza 
Sah was, however, not content with imitating the West in terms of institutional changes. 
The mimetic quality of Iranian secularization had to be carried out in detail at the personal 
level in terms of dress and habit. The modernization of dress was one aspect of the 
attempt to achieve modernization in detail It was crucial to this process to change and 
modernize the appearance of Iranian women with the anti-veiling policies of the 
government. The robe and the turban were restricted to certified ‘Olama and a Westem- 
style suit and hat was compulsory for all other civilian classes. It was for this reason that 
the ‘hat law’ was passed.64
The new Iranian not only had to think as a European but also look like a European 
too. Indeed the hat law and the unveiling policy signified, more than any other legislation, 
that secularization had to penetrate to all aspects of life. Iranian secularization differed 
from its European counterpart in two important aspects. Firstly, secularization was forced 
through as a political measure under the control of an autocratic government; 
secularization was not part of a process of economic modernization but the consequence 
of a series of difficult political choices. Secondly Iranian secularization was continuously 
mimetic in that it took Europe as its specific model of adaptation. However, the 
Constitutional Revolution and its ideals could not be indefinitely resisted. It was probable 
that some degree of de-secularization would take place since Reza Sah’s reforms had 
obviously been forced upon many sections of society against their wishes and interests. 
The imitation of Western secularization produced a number of moral and spiritual 
dilemmas that were more than superficial.
The military reforms of Reza Sah are not usually presented under the heading of 
secularization, but this was their result. Western uniforms and drills offended many of the 
‘Olama, and high-ranking army officials were usually anti-clerical. It was impossible to 
modernize without reducing the prerogatives of the ‘Olama and undermining traditions 
identified as ‘Islamic’. In Iran, the bringing of religious endowments and taxation under 
greater government control, the expansion of modem, state-controlled education, the 
adoption of secular codes especially for trade, and reforms in Islamic law and its
64 Avery (1965).
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codification were seen as necessary in order to strengthen the state in the face of Western 
incursion and internal revolts. All these measures were carried out as a matter of state 
policy and primarily as political phenomena, rather than of intellectual or social beliefs and 
practices.65 However, the role of Iranian intellectuals and reformists in promoting and 
initiating a vocabulary of reform should also be acknowledged. Such secularization from 
above was deemed necessary out of a sense of ‘pragmatism’ on the part of the 
government, in terms of acting in accordance to the ‘needs of the time’ and the country. It 
was also due to the economic transformation taking place that the old ‘religio-legal 
structures with their lack of modem or secular law and their ties to agrarian society could 
not cope with. These transformations, like secularization, had to be heavily prompted by 
governments, given the weakness of capitalist classes and the strength of the European 
economic condition and even control.’ 66
Reza Sah believed that Islam could contribute to public rejuvenation of Iran only 
by becoming a dynamic personal piety. The way in which religion had become 
institutionalized in Iran made it appear as though the question had implications for the 
whole of social existence. Hence, the two facets of the Iranian secularization each invited 
a different approach. It is noteworthy that it is this dual obligation of Islam as a personal 
religion of enlightenment and as a religion of social solidarity that is precisely the problem 
of personal religion in a lay state. Reza Sah’s reforms demonstrated that man could quite 
speedily transform institutions that had been regard as divinely- ordained and immutable. 
Under the new conditions, Islam had to compete and blend with a variety of different 
ideological perspectives that made different intellectual claims and required different types 
of commitment. The peasantry in Iran remained somewhat unaffected by these challenges 
that have been most characteristic of the urban classes, particularly the intelligentsia. To 
this extent the full impact of Reza Sah’s modernization policies in changing the social 
relations and structure of Iran seems not as far reaching as is often suggested.
In Iran, secularization was far from liberal or democratic. Although in the West 
secularism is associated with the left and liberals, in the case of government controlled 
centralization, secularization has been anti-Constitutional and anti-democratic and evoked
65 It must be pointed out that there were growing demands on the part of the intellectuals for such 
reforms ever since the Constitutional period; however, none of the measures was carried out until the 
Reza Sah period, when these measures became a matter of state policy
66 Keddie (1994), pp. 16-7.
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a religious resurgence. Reza Sah’s aim was to establish state control over religion and the 
religious classes, including controlling and limiting religious education, the involvement of 
the ‘Olama within the legal sphere, and the extent and usage of Sarfah law, and decreeing 
new forms of ‘secular’ Western dress for men and women. ‘These were all to a large 
degree questions of control and power, words that all too rarely enter the discussion of 
secularism.’67
In traditional societies, like Iran religious ideas performed an important integrative 
function by legitimizing the political, social, and economic system. Secularism or more 
precisely political secularism appeared to make no penetration of society’s beliefs or 
institutions and remained confined to a handful of people intent upon borrowing only a 
narrow range of Western military technology or bureaucratic practices. Therefore, there 
existed a wide cultural and political gulf between the relatively small modernized sector of 
society organized around new institutions and concepts and the vast majority still clinging 
to traditional beliefs and practices. Secularism was expressed not merely as a changing of 
a set of institutional relationship, but also as an ideology. However, the limits of its 
operation remained as merely the changing of a set of institutional relationship. Though in 
Iran, traditional society was beginning to show signs of disintegration, modernization had 
transformed only a very small segment of urban Iranian society.
It is difficult to agree with the assertion68 that the dominance of polity over 
religious beliefs, practices, and ecclesiastical structures in itself is a form of secularism.69
67 Ibid., p. 21.
68 such as that of Donald E. Smith (1974), p. 8.
69 Smith proposes five analytically distinct aspects of secularization:
1. Polity-separation secularization refers to the institutional separation of religion and polity (church-state 
separation) and the denial of the religious identity of the polity (non-recognition of a state religion or 
religious character of the state). Government ceases to perform its traditional functions as promoter and 
defender of the faith.
2. Polity-expansion secularization involves the expansion of the political system into areas of society 
formerly regulated by religion. The polity thus extends its jurisdiction into areas of education, law, 
economic activity, and so on, which were subject to religious norms and structures in the traditional 
system.
3. Political structure secularization refers to the transformation of values associated with the polity; 
secular notions of political community, the legitimacy of the polity, and the meaning of politics replace 
traditional religious notions in the thinking of many people.
4. Political-process secularization is the decline of political saliency and influence of religious leaders, 
religious interest groups, religious political parties, and religious issues; it also denotes the weakening of 
religious identity and ideology of the actors as a consequence of participation in the political process.
5. Polity-dominance secularization refers to a radical program of secularization by revolutionary regimes 
that recognize no area of religious autonomy. Their effort is to eliminate entirely the influence of religion 
from society or alter radically its content to bring it into line with official ideologies.
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It is not the institutional relationship between religion and state (whether or not the polity 
dominates the religious structure) that is important, but the character of the issues 
themselves that constitutes the essence of secularism. Secularism of necessity therefore 
demands the ability by the state and the individual to make that subtle psychological 
distinction between religion and politics, to be able to accept a public sphere where 
secular concepts and principles are dominant and a private sphere where religious 
principles prevail. Most studies on the process of modernization or secularization 
recognize the necessity for all systems of existence, psychological and intellectual as well 
as the political, social and the economic to undergo transformation.70 This level of change 
did not occur in Iran. Traditional beliefs, practices, and values continued both among the 
village population and the majority of urban masses, with the exception of a small urban 
minority.
Morroe Berger’s observation about the nature of secularization in Egypt under 
Nasser, seems to also apply to Iran. Berger notes that:
‘The military regime’s denial of political influence of the ulama is not 
secularism... secularism means the separation of church and state and the 
latter’s supremacy; it does not call for the state’s control of the intimate 
details of religious teaching or the harnessing of religion to the purposes of 
the government of the day. ’71
The regime’s reform of previously ‘Olama-controlled institution was carried out 
mainly for its own political purposes. Yet for all this change Iran remained an Islamic 
state, secular in part but nevertheless preserving the one vital link that connects state and 
society to God: the SarTah. The SaiTah maintained its theoretical and social primacy. 
Although the SaiTah was changed in a drastic manner and the sources from which legal 
principles can be drawn were expanded beyond its boundaries, this did not repudiate the 
theoretical or social ascendancy of the SaiTah. Scholars have generally considered the 
secularization of Islamic law to have been almost completed during the Reza Sah period 
and point to the changes in the personal status codes as the final destruction of the 
SaiTah. Yet the crucial theoretical link between the state and sacred law remained in tact. 
Although reform removed education and law from the jurisdiction of the ‘Olama to that of 
the state, however, the ‘Olama still enjoyed the sole monopoly over interpretation of the
70 Halpem (1963) & Black (1966) refer to the necessity of changing one’s psychological system and 
Smith (1970) refers to this process as polity-transvaluational secularization.
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Sarfah and continued to argue that Sari principles must govern the ‘Ommah. 
Governmental policies and ideological pronouncements can not be equated with ‘actual’ 
socioeconomic and political changes. The economic and administrative changes only 
partly altered the life and organization of Iranian society. The traditional family, the 
traditional value system and behavior patterns, and religious community remained almost 
intact.
Government coercion in order to secularize the political culture and the political 
process is of central importance in revolutionary programs of polity-dominance 
secularization. However, in the absence of secular political values, these measures are 
effective only so long as coercion is applied. This was evident in the Iranian case with the 
resurgence of religion, which led to the repudiation of the whole notion of a secular state. 
At the same time that the government was implementing policies of secularization, the 
political process was becoming not more secular but more traditional-religious as clerics 
discovered in religious symbols a powerful instrument for mass mobilization. Smith points 
out ‘it should be borne in mind, however, that this very political process in which the 
masses become involved is one of the major components of our definition of political 
modernization.’72
During the Reza Shah period the modernization of the state did entail drastic 
decline of the institutional prerogatives and social power of the Shi’i hierocracy. 
However, it did not diminish the legitimacy of the exclusive hierocratic authority of the 
‘Olama, which assured the continued financial independence of the hierocracy from the 
state. This independence was sustained by the one source of income that was inevitably 
immune from state encroachment: the voluntary payment of religious taxes to the ‘Olama. 
The institutionalization of the norm of the juristic authority of the ‘Olama enhanced by the 
evolution of the juristic norm of authority throughout the nineteenth century resulted in 
the independence of the hierocaracy from the state. The institutionalization of Shi’ism 
thus transformed the societal structure of domination in Iran. The institutionalization of 
the autonomy of the Shi’i hierocracy during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
assured its survival despite inexorable pressure from the state in the twentieth century. 
Irrespective of the erosion of clerical control over education, the major defeat of the
71 Berger (1970), p. 128.
72 Smith (1974), pp. 10-11.
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hierocracy in the legal sphere and the establishment of centralized supervision over 
religious endowments, the Howzeh ‘ElmTyeh Qom maintained the independence of 
religious institutions of learning from the state. The Shi’i hierocracy not only survived but 
withstood the challenges of the PahlavT state and triumphed with virtually exclusive 
control over religious learning and over authoritative interpretation of Shi’i Islam.
The loss of judicial and educational functions and the loss of control of religious 
endowments and land ownership seriously undermined the hierocarcy. But these 
developments also had another important consequence: The differentiation and separation 
of religious and political powers became complete and the Shi’i hierocracy became 
‘disembedded’73 form the PahlavT regime. The economic and political disenfranchisement 
of the hierocracy resulted in their social ‘disembeddedness.’ Socially there had always 
been a tendency for the upper rank of the hierocracy to intermarry, forming a highly 
endogamous group. This tendency was accentuated by the ‘Olama’s loss of social 
prestige, which greatly reduced the frequency of intermarriage between them and the 
increasingly secularized social and political elites.74 The reduction of power and the 
disengagement of the ‘Olama from the PahlavT regime contributed to their solidarity as a 
tightly knit status group in control of autonomous religious institutions, particularly the 
Howzeh ‘ElmTyeh Qom, and aided their survival and success. The PahlavT regime’s 
attempts at the separation of religion from politics or the disengagement of religion from 
political society did not mean, however, that religion became necessarily privatized or that 
it no longer played a public role. It only meant that the public locus of religion was no 
longer the state or political society, but rather civil society. In the traditional religio- 
political system, political participation was limited to a small number of individuals, 
whereas religious participation was on a mass scale, irrespective of periodical outbreaks 
of anti-clericalism. The anti-clerical policies of the PahlavT regime, the newly found locus 
of religion, and mass participation in religion enabled the Shi’i hierocracy to politicize the 
sacred symbols of religion, and find in these sacred symbols the bases of social support. In 
this sense religion contributed to the process of mass politicization by providing sacred 
symbols that acquired political significance. The Shi’i hierocracy found in these sacred 
symbols an important key to mass support and mobilization, a key that their secular rivals
73 Arjomand (1993), p. 232.
74 Ibid., p. 233.
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in the struggle for power had denied themselves. The power of sacred symbols to inspire 
mass movement and mobilization, throughout Iranian history, particularly during the 1979 
Revolution, serves as the best testimony to the continuing social power and influence of 
the ‘Olama.
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Chapter Two: The Structure of Domination and 
Legitimacy within the Cultural Logic of Shi’ism: The 
Balance Between Religion and Politics
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Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework drawing on Max 
Weber’s sociology of religion, in the analysis of the study of Shi’ism and its consequences 
in term of the political sphere. The relationship between religion and politics and their 
effect on the ‘legitimacy’ of the structure of domination are considered within Weber’s 
tripartite typology of domination.1 This chapter offers an analysis of Shi’ism in terms of 
the balance between religion and politics and their societal and institutional power, the 
discussion of which is located within a historical framework. The structure of domination 
within the cultural logic of Shi’ism constituted a major force in the dynamics of Iranian 
society and merits a comprehensive study of the formative years of Shi’i hierocracy. Shi’i 
‘Olama will be considered in the light of emergence and consolidation of an institution 
with vested interests in the enforcement of religious beliefs and norms through spiritual 
and coercive sanctions. The theoretical claim of the holders of religious authority, 
including their right to determine the political, rests on their ability to enforce such a 
claim. This ability is in turn determined by the institutionalization and social organization 
of religious authority. It is hoped that this chapter will highlight the way in which Shi’ism 
had a notable effect on political action and significantly transformed Iran’s polity.2
Weber, in the chapters of Economy and Society, deals with ‘state’ and church 
dichotomy in terms of the ultimate sources of legitimacy.3 In relation to the 
institutionalization of charisma, he mentions two fundamental sources of charismatic 
authority: the charisma of the divinely inspired and the charisma of the world. 
Furthermore religious (hierocratic) and political (temporal) charisma, seem to be equally 
fundamental, in their institutionalized form, in that one can not be reduced to the other. 
Political and hierocratic domination as the ultimate sources of legitimacy form the 
underlying basis for Weber’s typology of the varying role of religion in the charismatic 
legitimization of domination. He provides a tripartite typology, namely theocratic,
1 Weber (1968), pp. 941-956, 1158-1368.
2 Arjomand, points out that while Weber’s attention, in his substantive work, was largely devoted to 
‘economic ethics’ of world religions and their bearing on social action, Troeltsch’s classical study 
‘eloquently demonstrates, world religions can also contain “political ethics”, whose bearing on social 
action and on attitudes towards the political order can be subjected to sociological analysis.’ The study of 
Shi’i sm as a world religion clearly demonstrates this point as it had little effect on the economic 
transformation of Iran but had significant effect on the political sphere, Arjomand (1984), General 
Introduction.
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hierocratic and Caesaropapism.4 Each classification represents the relative predominance 
of one of the two autonomous charismatic types of domination: the religious or the 
political.
The Weberian theory of authority, in particular traditional and charismatic 
authority, can help to clarify the case study of the nature of authority in Shi’i Islam. The 
formation of the Shi’i branch of Islam will be considered as a dialectical outcome of the 
interaction between a pre-Islamic concept of authority and the continuation of the 
Prophetic charismatic authority. According to Weber, charisma is applied to a certain 
quality of an individual’s personality by virtue of which ‘he is considered extraordinary 
and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman or at least specifically exceptional 
powers or qualities.’5 In Weber’s typology of charismatic authority, the underlying 
process is ‘routinization’ of authority as it seeks to perpetuate the peculiarities of its order 
in an institutional format. This seems somewhat problematic in the case of Shi’ism which 
can be said to be an attempt in the reproduction and perpetual continuation of the 
Prophetic charismatic authority.
In the Sunni case, on the other hand, there was a drive towards the institutional 
preservation and perpetuation of Islam. This process was characterized by the 
‘routinization’ of social and economic life back to what Weber terms a more ‘normal’ 
situation. The emphasis being on stability and order, this entailed the accommodation and 
re-emergence of traditional elements. Consequently, some major pre-Islamic Arab 
traditions found their way into the political, social and economic development of early 
Muslim history. With the ‘routinization’ of the charismatic authority of the Prophet, the 
religious (the external organization or exoteric), the spiritual (inner or esoteric), the legal 
and the military dimensions became separated into distinct modes, figures, and institutions 
of authority. In Shi’i Islam there was an attempt towards the preservation of the Prophetic 
charismatic authority. There was a persistent tendency towards preserving the sanctity 
and the charismatic nature of the Prophet’s authority. To this extent Shi’i development 
can be viewed as an attempt in the perpetuation of charisma rather than its ‘routinization’. 
The Shi’i Imams possessed all the characteristics of the Weberian typology of charismatic 
authority. Within the Weberian framework, what constitutes the fundamental character of
3 Weber (1968), Chapter XV, ‘Political and Hierocratic Domination’, pp. 1158-1211.
4 Ibid., pp. 1159.
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different branches of Islam is not whether they are orthodox or heterodox but the 
particular position that they maintain vis-a-vis the Prophetic charismatic legacy. 
According to Weber: ‘The way in which this problem [of succession] is met, if it is met at 
all, and the charismatic community continues to exist or now begins to emerge, is of 
crucial importance for the character of the subsequent social formation.’6
It is to this extent that we hope to use Weberian sociology as a guideline. It must 
be pointed out that although a considerable number of Weberian concepts have been used, 
they remain on the whole basic sociological concepts, used for the sole purpose of 
clarifying varieties of social action, groups and organizational form. The overall 
implications of the feasibility of adopting a Weberian framework in the study of Iran, the 
shortcoming within Weber’s theory, and the criticism concerning the lack of accuracy of 
Weber’s work in dealing with non-European societies, have been deliberately dealt with in 
a brief way. The reasons for this are twofold: firstly, in order to avoid the pitfalls of 
‘grand theorizing’ whereby the actual details of the area under study are impinged upon 
by the constraints of the theory; and secondly, to provide scope for an alternative 
interpretation of particular historical events. This, however, does not imply a lack of 
methodological consistency, as the concepts that have been used are systematically 
integrated into the study.
The full extent of the effects of Reza Sah’s policies on the nature of the 
relationship between religion and politics and the consequent social change can not be 
fully examined without a comprehensive understanding of the historical development of 
the role of the ‘Olama in both pre-and post-Safavid Shi’ism. From the greater Occultation 
(940 AD), until the establishment of the Safavid dynasty, in the sixteenth century, the 
Shi’i ‘Olama were a distinct social group but did not constitute a recognized institution. 
The Safavid period marks the transition of the ‘Olama from a distinct social group to a 
hierocracy. Safavid rule may best be explained as a ‘Caesaropapist’ rule. Safavid rulers 
exercised supreme authority by virtue of their descendance from the Seventh Shi’i Imam, 
Musa Ibn Ja‘far (d. 799 AD). The Safavids ‘imported’ a number of Shi’i ‘Olama mainly 
from Lebanon. These ‘Olama were on the whole state functionaries, and treated as a 
branch of the political administration. Throughout Safavid rule, high-ranking clerical
5 Weber (1968), p. 241.
6 Ibid., p. 246.
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position was transformed ‘into hereditary family property expropriate as a source of 
income, prestige and power.’7 In the subsequent one-and-a-half centuries, the ‘Olama 
succeeded in establishing monolistic control over the religious life of the population, 
monopolizing the authoritative interpretation of doctrine, creating an autonomous 
administrative apparatus, a tax system and legal forms for the protection of ecclesiastical 
land owning.
During the Qajar period, Safavid ‘Caesaropapism’ was replaced by the consistent 
Twelver Shi’i dualism of politics and hierocratic domination. It may be argued that during 
this period, Shi’i hierocracy emerged as a ‘church’. The extent of this development was 
such that during the Qajar period, the only two legitimate institutions of domination were 
the state and the ‘Olama. The ‘Olama’s power was further strengthened by the inherent 
weakness of Qajar administration. Consequently, by the time Reza Sah ascended to the 
throne, the extent o f ‘Olama power and influence was unprecedented. Reza Sah sought to 
limit the autonomous ecclesiastic charisma of the ‘Olama, and make it subordinate to 
secular power. However, he was not able to eliminate the social and doctrinal power of 
the ‘Olama, as, by this time, the ‘Olama had developed a well-established foundation. ‘A 
fully developed ecclesiastical hierarchy, with an established body of dogmas and 
particularly well organized system, cannot be uprooted at all.’8
This chapter aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the roots of the 
prevailing relationship between religion and politics during the Reza Sah period. We start 
with an account of the doctrinal differences between Sunni and Shi’i Islam, and its 
consequences for the development of the Shi’i ‘Olama as a distinct institution. The second 
phase examines the period after the Greater Occupation, when the Shi’i ‘Olama were a 
distinct group but did not constitute a recognized institution, a hierocracy. The third 
phase considers the significance of the Safavid Period in the transition of the ‘Olama from 
a privileged group to a hierocracy. The fourth phase deals with the consolidation of 
exclusive religious authority, resulting in the emergence of the ‘Olama as a ‘church’ and 
traces the reasons for the increase in the power of the ‘Olama, during the Qajar and early 
PahlavT period. Finally, a historical and socio-political account of the period in relation to 
the ‘Olama will be provided.
7 Ibid., pp. 1162-3.
8 Ibid., p. 1175
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The Origins Of Shi’ism; The Dispute Over Succession
The aim of highlighting the actual disagreements between Sunni and Shi’i Islam in 
terms of doctrinal, theological and legal practices is to provide a better understanding of 
their socio-historic role in shaping the actual living experiences of specific groups. It must 
be pointed out that opposing trends have always existed simultaneously within both 
traditions, and within each and every school of jurisprudence. Therefore, to provide a 
generalization about Sunni or Shi’i Islam is difficult insofar as a contrary, however 
atypical, evidence can be provided to challenge the norm. This will become more evident 
later on when we come to consider the relationship between ‘Olama and politics in Iran. 
The following account is a general analysis of the doctrinal, theological and legal 
differences and the reasons for such divergence between Shi’i and Sunni Islam.
Immediately after the death of the Prophet, dispute broke out at the SaqTfeh 
assembly9 over who should succeed him. One group of Muslims, namely the Shi’a, who 
proved to be the minority, believed that the Prophet had in feet designated a successor, 
namely ‘AH, his cousin and son in law.10 The Shi’a argue that in 632 AD, the Prophet, in a 
speech delivered during his way back from his last pilgrimage to Mecca, at a place called 
the Gadir I£om,11 clearly stated that ‘he for whom I was the master, Mulla12, should hence 
have ‘AH as his master.’13 The above Hadis is commonly referred to as the ‘Hadis of 
Ghadir-eh KhorrC and is recognized as authentic by both Sunni and Shi’i scholars.14 
However, Sunni scholars disagree with the Shi’i interpretation of the word Mulla. They 
argue that in this instance it was meant as ‘friend’, rather then lord or master.15 The 
second Shi’i argument is that the Prophet had repeatedly asserted that “ AH in relation to 
me is like Harun (Aaron) in relation to Musa (Moses).’16 Furthermore, the Prophet had on 
numerous occasions praised the benevolent and distinguished characteristics of ‘AH,
9 For a detailed account of the dispute see Bohlul Afandl (1370 SH/1991).
10 AStlyanI (1362 SH/1983), p. 67.
11 Ghadir means pool. For further details see Bohlul Afandl (1370 SH/1991), & AStlyanI (1362 
SH/1983).
12 The word Mulla, like most words in Arabic has multiple meaning, including protector, patron, friend, 
companion and associate.
13 AStlyanI (1362 SH/1983), p. 67.
14 The Hadis appears as authentic ‘§afilfieh’, in the following Sunni books; 1) TarmazT, Sonan, p. 623 & 
297. 2) Nassa’T, l£a§a’e§, p. 93. 3) Hakem, Mostadrak, p. 109 & 110. 4) HeysamI, Majma‘ol-Zava’ed, p. 
106 & 104. 5) fen Hajar, §ava‘eq, p. 42. 6) Fa^r RazI, Tafslr, Verse 61 Sureh 5 (Ma'edeh).
15 This obviously does not have the same implication in relation to the question of succession.
16 AStlyanI (1362 SH/1983), p. 67.
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stressing his special place and his contributions to Islam. The Shi’a view the first reason as 
exoteric and explicit, and the second as esoteric and implicit affirmation of the rightful 
successorship o f ‘AH by the Prophet.17
According to Weber, legitimacy is acquired through ‘designation on the part of 
the original charismatic leader of his own successor and his recognition on the part of the 
followers...’18. The main Shi’i argument for the legitimacy of ‘AH successorship is his 
designation by the Prophet. The metaphysical context of the transfer of the Prophet’s 
charismatic authority to ‘AH and through him to his male descendants went directly 
against the pre-Islamic Arab notion of authority and mentality. The continuation of the 
charismatic mode of authority disrupts the resumption of ‘normal’ economic life. The 
forces of ‘routinization’ seek to terminate the charismatic mode of authority. ‘AIT s 
inherited charismatic authority differed from Prophetic authority in that it was not based 
on revelation. However, the nature of his authority was charismatic, exhorting ‘the 
authority of the extraordinary and personal gift of grace, the absolutely personal devotion 
and person confidence in revelation, heroism or other qualities of individual leadership.’19 
It must be pointed out that contrary to the Weberian characterization of the social 
relations pertaining to the charisma, the charismatic authority of the Prophet was not 
transitory and arbitrary but continued in the formation of Shi’i Islam.
The Shi’i argument starts with the premise that it is inconceivable, given God’s 
justice and benevolence, Lotf, towards humanity, that he should have left the issue of 
leadership, Imamate, undecided.20 The rationale of benevolence is the same rationale 
which necessitated the sending of God’s emissaries and Prophets. God’s benevolence 
requires that, in the absence of the emissaries and Prophets, infallible (Ma ‘§um) leaders 
should be appointed for the custodianship, Velayat, of their followers. This forms the 
basis for the Shi’i belief that the earth can never be empty of an infallible, who is the proof 
of God, Hojjatollah. Furthermore, the acceptance of the Prophecy of Mofiammad was the 
commitment to the implementation of Imamate. The principles of divine designation, 
Na$§, absolute justice, ‘Adi Moflaq, knowledge imparted directly from God, which 
encompasses ‘Knowledge by Presence’, ‘Elme Ladonm, and their prerequisite infallibility,
17 Ibid. & Bohlul Afandl (1370 SH/1991).
18 Weber (1968), p. 247.
19 Weber (1948), p. 79.
20 Tabataba’T (1348 SH/1969).
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Ismat, form the doctrinal principles of Shi’ism.21 Hence, absolute justice is the foundation 
of the Imam’s legitimate right to both political and spiritual leadership.
Some have presented the SaqTfeh dispute as merely a contention over 
personalities, but have foiled to grasp the fundamental themes that were and still are at the 
heart of the theoretical and doctrinal differences between Sunni and Shi’i Islam Such 
altercations have shaped the ongoing debate concerning the relationship between religion 
and politics. Needless to say, these theories have evolved and changed over time and in 
response to the political needs of their societies. The Shi’i case is often presented as being 
based on the personal characteristics of ‘All. However, to see Shi’ism as being based 
solely on the personality of ‘AH, is to completely over look the fundamental principles of 
the Shi’i argument. The issue of personalities, which seems to some extent to dominate 
the Shi’i argument, enters into the debate because the Shi’a maintain that only those 
individuals who were closely associated with, or related to, the Prophet could have 
possessed such qualities. These were none other than ‘All and his male descendants.22 
However, the question of descent is based not upon personalities but rather on divine 
attributes and the principles of designation, infallibility, divine knowledge and justice. The 
precondition to absolute justice is immunity from sin; thus, only the infallibles could be 
truly just. The theory of ‘E§mat of the Imam is closely linked to the most important 
element in the Shi’i political thesis, namely the indisputable necessity of absolute justice as 
a condition of rulership.
The other group of Muslims, who came to form the majority, held that the 
Prophet had deliberately left the question of his succession open, leaving it up to the 
community to decided upon the leader. This group of Muslims came to be known as 
Sunni, or those who follow the tradition, Sonna, of the Prophet. As has been mentioned 
before, many Sunni scholars and collectors of Hadis have cited the Hadis of Gadir l£om 
as authentic, but disagree with the Shi’i interpretation of it, based on the understanding of 
the word Mulla. They argue that Mulla in this context actually means ‘friend’ or ‘helper’ 
rather than ‘master’ as interpreted by the Shi’a. The true intentions of the Prophet cannot 
be established here, however; what concerns us is that it was the Sunni view which 
prevailed at the Saqifeh assembly.
21 Mozaflar Najafi (1390 SH/1970).
22 Tabataba’I (1348 SH/1969), & Muqnlyeh (1968).
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Abu Bakr, an older and distinguished member of the community, was chosen as 
the Prophet’s immediate successor. The Saqifeh affair marked the basic features of the 
procedure of the elections of the Caliph, which are Ijma, consensus, Bey’a, literally the 
clasping of hands, and ‘Ahd, the covenant under taken by the Caliph to rule in accordance 
with the provision of the Sarfah, and the community’s promise to obey him. Enayat 
argues that the Sunni argument ‘may be taken to symbolize their [Sunni] adherence to 
principles rather than personalities.’23 This argument may be looked at from a completely 
different perspective. If sucessorship is to be decided by the community, based on 
election, then the leader will be chosen on the qualities and strengths of his character. Abu 
Bakr for example was thought to be a suitable candidate for Caliphate based on his 
seniority, his standing within the community, and the fact that he was one of the 
companions of the Prophet. In this respect, the question of personality becomes the 
deciding factor in the election of the leader. The fact that a leader is elected does not 
imply that character and personality are not deciding factors in the process. On the 
contrary, they are the very premise. Furthermore, if one accepts Enayat’s argument as 
valid, it becomes applicable only if the principles of consensus are truly adhered to, which 
was not the case, as ‘consensus’ usually referred to consensus of the elite or ‘the people 
who loose and bind’, Ahlol Aqd-e val-Hal, and not the entire Muslim community.
In terms of the question of succession for the Sunni majority, the Weberian 
typification identifies some of the major issues involved. In Weberian terms, the following 
three characteristics may be said to be the distinguishing features of Sunni Islam: 1) The 
rapid routinization of charismatic authority of the Prophet; 2) The re-emergence of the 
pre-Islamic traditional Arab modes of authority, or the resumption of everyday routine 
structure of ordinary life; 3) The subdivision of the Prophet’s authority into distinct and 
separate spheres. Weber points out that ‘The original basis of recruitment is personal 
charisma. However with routinization the followers or the disciples may set up norms for 
recruitment, in particular involving training or tests of eligibility... A genuine charismatic 
leader is in a position to oppose this type of prerequisite for membership: his successor is 
not free to do so, at least if he is chosen by the administrative staff.’24 This fits the norms 
of recruitment of the Rightly Guided Caliphs as well as the Umayyads. In the norm of
23 Enayat (1982), p. 5.
24 Weber (1968), p. 249.
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recruitment, one can see the manifestation of tribal affiliation rather than Islamic precepts. 
This is particularly so during the reign of ‘Osman (644-656) where nepotism and tribal 
loyalty were most discernible.
In terms of traditionalization of authority for the Sunni majority, the significance 
of the process was in the re-emergence of traditional Arab authority rather than the case 
of charisma becoming traditionalized in its own right as Weber indicated. The selection of 
Abu Bakr was not bound to any particular stipulation of the Prophet’s authority, the 
Qoran or Hadis, but a selection based primarily within tribal affiliation and rivalries. The 
ceremony of Bey *a was the traditional mode of recognizing the authority of a tribal chief. 
‘There was a remarkable resemblance between traditional pre-Mofiammadian practice and 
the particular way in which the ‘Rightly Guided Caliphs’, especially Abu Bakr, were 
elected and their authority legitimized. It was primarily to Mofiammad as a tribal chief that 
the question of succession to his authority was addressed by the majority of Muslims. This 
was demonstrated further by the Caliphs having primarily political and administrative, as 
opposed to religious or spiritual, significance.’25 Watt maintained that Abu Bakr’s 
assumption of the title of galTfeh Rasiillolah26 had no particular religious significance. He 
concluded, ‘It is thus unlikely that the Qoran was the source from which Abu Bakr 
derived his title. It must come rather from the ordinary secular [non-Islamic] use of the 
word.’27 The acceptance of the Caliph by the community did not represent any particular 
procedure designated by the Prophet. In fact, both the ceremonies of Bey’a as well as 
fCofbeh, in which Abu Bakr accepted his responsibility as the leader, were in accordance 
with traditional Arab customs. In Weberian terms, both the ‘process’ and the ‘formality’ 
necessary ‘for the legitimacy to take on the character of an acquired right’ were derived 
from traditional Arab customs. The Prophet’s authority was divided into various spheres. 
The Caliph only partook in the political administrative authority of the Prophet and not 
the religious.28
The Shi’a challenge the pivotal principle of Ijma within the Sunni tradition, 
disputing it on the following grounds; firstly, they argue that in the election of the first 
Caliph, Abu Bakr, not all parties were consulted and therefore the assembly was not truly
25 Dabashi (1989), pp. 81-2.
26 The Caliph of the Messenger of God.
27 Watt (1968), p. 32.
28 Barthold (1359 SH/1979).
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representative of all Muslims.29 Secondly, the question of the leadership of the community 
was too vital to be left to the deliberations of individuals. The Prophet was designated by 
divine authority and it follows that his successor should also be the same. Only God is 
aware of the presence of the qualities of knowledge and infallibility and impeccability in 
individuals, and can therefore fulfil the purpose of divine revelation by making these 
individuals known to his emissaries. Furthermore, the principle of Ijma was not applied to 
the election o f the succeeding Caliphs, as Abu Bakr ‘appointed’ his next successor, ‘Omar 
Ibn Kaftab. The Shi’a argue that if, according to Sunni tradition, the Prophet himself was 
not entitled to designate a successor, then why was Abu Bakr able to appoint the next 
Caliph? After Abu Bakr, ‘Omar appointed a six-member committee to elect the next 
Caliph. After the fifth Caliph, Mo‘avTyeh Ibn Abu-Sofiyan (d. 682 AD), the Caliphate 
became hereditary, and the principle of Ijma in the election of Caliphs was completely 
neglected. These are the two main political trends in Islam. The third major political trend, 
whose followers came to be known as the ljavarej,30 was rejected by both the Sunni and 
the Shi’a in the first four decades of Islamic history. However, it must be stressed that 
Sunni and Shi’i are two very broad categories, and by no means exhaust all the various 
divisions within them. The emphasis will be on these two distinct developments, as 
relevant to our study.
The end of the reign of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs, Jjplafa ’e Rasedin, up to 
the fourth/tenth century, marks the period of the formulation of the theory of the 
Caliphate. The establishment of the Umayyads as the first Islamic dynasty (658-661 AD) 
marks the partial victory of the traditional Arab concept of authority over the charismatic 
legacy of the Prophet’s authority. Only twenty-nine years after the death of the Prophet, 
the clan from which his staunchest enemies came had assumed the leadership of the 
ummah for the period of almost ninety years. The study of this period reveals two distinct 
developments: firstly, much readiness to revise and re-think political thought in the light 
of changing circumstances by Sunni theoreticians; and secondly, that most of these 
theoreticians were high functionaries at one time or another in the administration of the
29 Sunni tradition backs up this argument. According to most Sunni historians there were only eight of 
the Prophets companions present during the election of Abu Bakr, three of whom were from the Ansar 
and five from the Ashab. There were no members of Banu Ha§em, the family of the prophet present. 
Behjat Bohlul Afandl, himself a Sunni jurist, quotes an extensive number of Sunni text which confirm 
this. Bohlul Afandl (1370 SH/1991), pp. 98-99.
30 Plural of Iptrej meaning an outsider.
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caliphate.31 These two developments may be explained by the fact that the Sunni concept 
of caliphate had from the start been devoid of all metaphysical and spiritual association, in 
contrast to the Shi’i concept of Imamate. The Four Rightly Guided Caliphs partook, to 
some extent, in the spiritual charisma of the Prophet by virtue of having been among his 
closest companions. However, contrary to the widely held misconception that any Islamic 
polity is inherently a theocracy, after the Fourth Rightly Guided Caliphs, the political and 
spiritual spheres became completely separated. From then on, the structure of the 
Caliphate can best be explained in terms of a dual power structure consisting of the 
independent body of religious advisors and jurists, forming a religious elite, and the office 
of caliphate. The ‘Olama provided religious legitimacy for the caliphate, while the 
caliphate ensured the support and the maintenance of the ‘Olama. The theoretical 
formulation of the caliphate as purely ‘governance’ occurred in the last phase of the 
classical theories of the caliphate.
Three names stand out in the history of Sunni realism: Abu’l Hasanol-MovaradI 
(d. 1058 AD), Abu Hamid Mofiammad Al-Gazah (d. I l l  AD) and Badroddlh Ibn 
Jama’e.32 MovaradI attempted to justify the caliphate as it developed historically, relying 
not only on the precepts of the Sarfah, but also on historical precedents as represented in 
the Ijma of the community.33 Gazah, writing somewhat later, was concerned with the 
preservation of the religious life of the community and, with this end in view, he 
attempted to work out a new relationship between the Caliph and the Soljan based on the 
cooperation of the former with the actual holder of power.34 Gazah declared that: 
‘Government in these days is a consequence solely of military power, and whoever he 
may be to whom the possessor of military power gives his allegiance, that person is the 
Caliph.35 However, the recognition of this last phase of the evolution of the classical
31 Ayubi (1990).
32 Enayat (1982), p. 10.
33 Ibid., pp. 10-11
34 Gazah while insisting on the necessity of an Imam admits that in his day the only method of 
appointment of the Caliph was by designation by the holder of actual power. The constitutive process was 
thus a SarT process but the constituent power was the Sol{an. In effect, therefore Gazah accepted a 
compromise, by which the validity of the government of the Sol{an was established only upon the Solfan’s 
oath of allegiance to the caliph and the caliph's appointment by the Soljan. The Solfan by his exercise of 
the constitutive authority, recognized in feet the institutional authority of the caliphate which rested 
primarily on the Islamic Sunni community, and in theory the functional authority which rested with the 
Sarfah proper. Binder (1995), pp. 236-239.
35 Gibb (1962), pp. 142-3.
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caliphate was the main achievement of Ibn Jarna’e, who declared military power as 
constituting the essence of rulership.36
In the theory of caliphate, the necessity of a powerful government to repel external 
aggressors was strongly acknowledged. This recognition provided the basis for the 
justification of tyranny in the name of religion. The position of the state was sanctified and 
became the ruling political doctrine among the majority of Muslims. According to Sunni 
jurists, the function of the caliphate was the defense of the Sarf ah, the maintenance of 
political and social order, and the preservation of the perfect community. The spiritual 
function of the Prophet was inherited not by the Caliph but by the community as whole.37 
This juristic theory became increasingly divorced from actual practice, as time went on 
and the nature of the caliphate became more absolutist. Moreover, as the gap between the 
ideal and the actual widened so did the understanding between the people and the jurists 
diminish.38 This meant that in the last resort the only remedy was an appeal to force. This 
led to the prevalent juristic theory that, although a government was founded by force, 
allegiance and obedience to it was necessary as it prevented anarchy and disorder.39
An alternative historical account of the relationship between the ‘Olama and the 
rulers in the formative years of Islamic jurisprudence is provided by ‘ Abdo 1- ‘ AzTzo 1-Badrl. 
He describes how the founders of the four legal, Feqh schools, namely, Abu Hanlfe, 
Malek, SafeT and Ibn Hanbal, as well as compilers of Prophetic sayings, Afiadis,40 such as 
Bo^arl, had all endured hardship and imprisonment rather then submitting to irreligious 
demands of the rulers.41 This, however, does not disprove the distinct realism of such 
people as Movaradl or Ibn Jamaeh. Furthermore, it does not lessen the overall impression 
of adaptability to the changing political setting gained from important Sunni treaties on 
government from the Buyid to the Mongol period. As a result of the initial flexibility of 
Sunni exponents of the theory of caliphate, it eventually reached such a point that the 
decisive value in politics appears to be security over and above justice. In Sunni thought, 
the danger of this gradual outcome had existed right from the earliest years of Islamic 
history. Immediately after the end of the era of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs, the
36 Roisenthal (1958), pp. 42-43.
37 Lambton (1956-57), pp. 125-48.
38 Ibid., p. 126-7
39 Gibb (1971), p. 20.
40 Singular Hadis.
41 Enayat (1982), p. 15.
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prestige of the ruler rested not on the successorship derived from the companionship of 
the Prophet, but merely on sheer force. The need of sheer force to establish rule through 
doctrinal legitimacy is by no means exclusive to Islamic history.
H.A.R. Gibb points to the principle of legitimate divergence of opinion on 
secondary matters of religion, Ektelaf, to argue that there was no ‘universally accepted 
doctrine of caliphate’ amongst the Sunni community. He argues, ‘The caliphate is the 
form of government which safeguards the ordinances of the Sarfah and sees that they are 
put into practice. So long as this principle is applied, there may be infinite diversities in the 
manner of its application.’42 This definition by its very nature includes within its premise 
the use of force as a legitimate tool of government. As long as the ordinances of the
V
SaiTah are put mto practice, irrespective of the means by which this is achieved, then the 
system may be termed a caliphate. If the caliphate is taken to be a secondary religious 
matter, then by defining it in such a way, its very existence negates the primary reasons 
for its esatblishment. Gibb concludes from his argument that ‘Muslim thought refuses to 
be bound by the outward formula.’43
Gibb’s argument placed within a historic perspective does not hold. The sheer 
force of the rulers was based on ‘contrived’ doctrinal legitimacy through the works of the 
jurisconsults and theologians, in the name o f ‘pragmatism’. To achieve this, rulers crushed 
independent thinking whenever it threatened the established order. Therefore Muslim 
thought has been ‘bound’ and restricted by an ‘outward formula’, namely the political 
power of the caliph which sought to eliminate any alternative system of thought. The best 
example of this is the persecution of the Shi’i community throughout Ummayyed and 
Abbassid rule. There has always been much reluctance to reassess critically the works of 
early masters such as MovaradI and Gazall. Ayubi44 argues that the subsequent 
generations of Muslims have found it increasingly difficult to distinguish between what 
was meant as ‘description’ and what was meant as ‘prescription’ in the inherited body of 
Islamic knowledge. The few who have dared to break out of this circle have consequently 
been accused of heresy. Such uncritical loyalty to the past has resulted in years of 
stagnation in Islamic political thought. Canonical stagnation resulted in Muslim 
submissiveness and lack of critical thought, justified in the name of loyalty to Islam-
42 Gibb (1962), p. 148.
43 Ibid., p. 149.
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The reasons underlying the divergence between Sunni and Shi’i Islam have been 
studied by a number of scholars from various perspectives. There are scholars such, as 
Louis Massignon,45 who stress the relationship between Shi’ism and the political 
aspirations of middle-class artisans. Contrary to this view, but also from a sociological 
perspective, Petrushevskii, a Marxist historian, views the success of Zaydi sects in the 
southern parts of the Caspian sea as being the result of the peasant rebellion against Sunni 
landed aristocracy. He also explains the appeal of Mahdism in terms of ‘the hopes of 
artisans, peasants and the poorest strata of desert dwellers for social evolution.’46 Others 
such as James Darmsteter, Henri Corbin and Hamid Algar47 interpret the Shi’a - Sunni 
divergence in terms of the encounter between Iranian and Arab cultures. Montgomery 
Watt48 stresses the social factors in the genesis of Shi’ism. He explains the growth of 
Shi’ism by pointing out that the early members of the Shi’i community came mostly from 
Southern Arabian tribes among whom the tradition of ‘semi-divine kings’ was strong. So 
Shi’ism provided an ideological basis to aid their social and psychological transition from 
nomadism to the military cast of the Islamic empire. All these accounts attempt to provide 
an understanding of Shi’ism in terms of its social implications,49 at the expense of 
neglecting Shi’i doctrine which is seen as an area for theological study. However, the frill 
social implications of a religious movement can not be comprehended if the spiritual 
dimension, which distinguishes it from other movements is neglected.
The primary principle of Sunni Islam is the sanctity of the consensus of the 
community. This is based on the Prophetic saying that ‘My community will never agree in 
error.’ The Sunni thus attribute the very infallibility, that for the Shi’a belongs to the 
Imams, to the commuity. Consensus is defined as ‘the agreement among the people who 
loose and bind.’50 The Shi’a refute the infallibility of the community.51 The unsuitability of 
Sunnis to qualify as the community as meant by the Prophet, is pointed out by the in 
relation to the misdeeds of Sunni rulers throughout the greater part of Islamic history. The 
Shi’a, however, do not dismiss consensus altogether; instead they define it in a much more
44 Ayubi (1990).
45 Cited in Marquet, (1961), p. 236.
46 Petrushevskii (1354 SH/1975), p. 283.
47 Cited in Lewis (1940), p. 24, Corbin (1971-2).
48 Watt (1961), pp. 106-10.
49 With the exception of Henri Corbin.
50 According to Imam Fa^rod-Dln ar-RazI, this group are the holders of power and position, (jazall 
however, defines Ijma as the agreement of the community in general.
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restricted way. This may be seen as their defence against intimidation by the opinion of 
the majority. For the Shi’a consensus is only valid when it includes the opinion of one of 
the infallibles, Ma ‘§umin. Consensus has been retained in Shi’i legal system, even after the 
Greater Occultation. The Shi’a believe that the earth can never be empty of the Ma ‘sum, 
which means that whenever consensus is formed among concurring scholars, there must 
have been a M a‘§um amongst them. This doctrine has provided the perfect safeguard 
against majority imposition.52
The Shi’a rejection of the concept of the consensus of the community results 
directly from their legitimist theory of succession of the Prophet. This must not be taken 
exclusively at a political level, otherwise the whole Shi’i doctrine becomes nothing more 
than a question of personalities. The esoteric dimension of Shi’ism, intertwined with Shi’i 
theosophy, explains the rationale behind Shi’ism. Truth is known only to God, the 
Prophet, and the members of his family. The worldly manifestation of Islam only reflects 
the outward truths, Haqlqat-e Zaheri. Prophet Mofiammad, as the seal of the Prophets, 
was the repository of the complete treasure of religious precepts; he, however, revealed 
only some of them, because of the unsuitability of complete revelation for that particular 
historical period. This was necessitated by the wisdom of gradualness, Hekmat AttarUi. 
Both the Inner, Bafen and Outer, Zaher, truths, Haqlqat of these undeclared precepts 
were entrusted to the Imams.53 Shi’ism came into being to preserve and gradually 
communicate the essence of Islam.54 Later in Shi’i development, the ‘Olama came to 
gradually part take in the functions of the Imams55. It was argued that these truths were 
then entrusted through the Imams to the Moftaheds, ‘So that they would progressively 
reveal them at appropriate junctures, according to their wisdom, whether by inferring the 
particular from the universal, or the relative from the absolute, or the concrete from the 
abstract.’56 According to Corbin, the distinction between Zaher and Bafen, the apparent 
and the hidden, the exoteric and the esoteric, forms the philosophical aspect of the Shi’i
51 Tabataba’T (1348 SH/1969).
52 For further detail on the concept of Ijma within the Shi’i legal system see, 
Al-£orasanI (1409 SQ/1988), pp. 68-70, & Sahabi (1344 SH/1965), pp. 114-7.
53 Mozaffar Najaff (1390 SH/1970).
54 Ibid.
55 To be further discussed later.
56 Kashif al-Ghita (1982), pp. 79-80.
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case for Imamate as the heart and truth of prophecy, Nabowvat. He calls Shi’ism ‘the 
sanctuary of Islamic esotericism.’57
Lambton argues that in the fifth and sixth century AH, Sunni political theory was 
primarily concerned with holding together the religious institution and the state, and to 
reconcile religious theory with historical precedent, which differed widely from the 
original conception of the caliphate. Shi’i theories, on the other hand, were strongly 
influenced by Hellenistic theories, and adopted the Platonic idea of the ‘philosopher 
king’.58 Hellenistic theories were transmitted and became prominent in Shi’i thought of 
this period. Consequently the adaptation of the Platonic idea of the ‘philosopher king’ to 
the Islamic ideal administrating the Sarfah under divine guidance strongly influenced Shi’i 
theory. The Shi’i theory of ruling institution was no more concerned with the question of 
power than was the Sunni. ‘At liberty to reject historical precedent, it exaggerated the 
religious element taking over and adapting the philosophy of light.’59 The Shi’a believe 
that from the creation of Adam onwards a divine light had been passed down the line of 
Prophecy to Mofiammad and through Mofiammad to his daughter Fafemeh and son-in-law 
‘AB; and then to each of the remaining eleven Imams. In fact, the light of Adam, 
Mofiammad, Fajemeh, ‘AH and the Imams was one and the same light. By virtue of this 
divine light, the Imams had been endowed with knowledge of the known and unknown 
and immunity from sin. Lambton argues, ‘With the disappearance of the last Imam in 
87360 the divine light became, in theory stationary, political theory being meanwhile 
wielded by others who were presumed to be under the guidance of the agents of the 
hidden Imam.’61 The Shi’a, unlike their Sunni counterparts, were not faced with the 
problem of providing legitimacy and justifying the state as it developed historically, almost 
from the beginning. Writing during the Occultation of the Hidden Imam, the Shi’i jurists 
did not feel the need, which Al-MovaradI had felt, to justify the state.62 During the early 
period of the Greater Occultation, Shi’i Foqaha, maintained that all temporal power, even 
a Shi’i government, in the absence of the Imam was illegitimate and unrighteous. They felt
57 Corbin (1971-2), pp. 181,186, 210, p. 254.
58 Lambton (1956-57), pp. 125-48.
59 Ibid., p. 136.
60 The Lesser Occultation.
61 Ibid.
62 Lambton (1962-64), pp. 115-36, p. 115.
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no responsibility for the conduct of political affairs, or a compulsion, as had Al-Gazall, to 
provide legitimacy for the temporal government.63
It is argued by some, mainly Western, scholars64 that the doctrine of the twelve 
infallible Imams, with particular emphasis on infallibility was not specified at the time of 
the death of the Prophet, or during early Shi’ism, but developed gradually and through 
historical evolution. Montgomery Watt, for example, argues, ‘It was only between 847 
and about 920 that Imam! Shi’ism took definite shape. It stands to reason that there could 
not be an Imam! or “Twelver” form of Shi’ism before the death of the Eleventh Imam and 
the disappearance of the Twelfth.’65 Shi’i scholars reject this, arguing that not only the 
doctrine of ‘E§mat but also the actual number of Imams had been explicitly stated by the 
Prophet himself. The following Hadis, ‘After me there shall be twelve Caliphs from the 
Qurais’, which is acknowledged in Sunni compilations of Hadis, such as Bogarts Aflkdm, 
Moslem’s §afiiheh (Al-Imareh),66 as well as the Verse of purity67 ‘And God only wishes 
to remove all abomination from you, ye members of the family, and to make you pure and 
spotless’. All of these are cited as proofs of this point. Shi’i legal and theological works 
describe the office of Imamate as the supreme leadership over the affairs of religion 
(Z)z«/sacred) and mundane life (Donya/pro fane). The Imam is the head of the Muslim 
community, the successor of the Prophet, and the guardian of all Muslim religious and 
social affairs. By the ninth century the Shi’i community was already well established both 
socially and doctrinally. A vast body of theological and legal literature existed based on 
the sayings and teachings of the Fifth68 and the Sixth Imam and to a lesser extent from
63 Ibid.
64 Such as Lambton (Ibid.), Watt & Elisah, (1969), p. 26.
65 Watt (1983), pp. 21-33, p. 21.
66 The Hadis also appears in the following Sunni compilations, Ahmad Hanbal’s Massnad, pp. 86-9, 90- 
2, Tamzadi, §ahlheh, p. 53, and Ibn Hajar, §ava‘eq, p. 113, as well as others.
67 The Holy Qoran, 33:33, Sureh XXXIII (Ahzab). It is commonly agreed by commentators of the Qoran 
that the verse refers to Mohammad, Fatemeh, ‘All, Hasan and Hoseln. In the Persian tradition they are 
referred to as the ‘Panj-Tan’.
68 The Twelve Shi’i Imams:
‘All Ibn Abu Jaleb (d. 40/661)
Hasan Ibn ‘AlIal-MoJtaba (d. 49/669)
Hoseln Ibn ‘Alial-Sahld ( d. 61/680)
‘AIT Ibnal-Hosem Zauiol-’Abedm (d. 95/713)
Mohammad Ibn ‘Allal-Baqer (d. 114/732)
Ja‘far Ibn Mohammadal-§adeq (d. 148/765)
Musa Ibn Ja‘faral-Kazem (d. 183/799)
‘All Ibn Musaal-Reza (d. 203/818)
Mohammad Ibn ‘Allal-Javad (d. 220/835)
‘All Ibn Mohammadal-HadI ( d. 254/868)
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Musaal-Kazem. These were later compiled in books and collections of Hadis by Shi’i 
scholars, that made the Shi’i community self-sufficient except in odd cases where a new 
question arose or reports conflicted or opinions regarding interpretation differed.
Furthermore Shi’i scholars argue that the term Shi’a and its usage existed at the 
time of the Prophet himself, although it is has been claimed otherwise. After the death of 
the Prophet, the Shi’i focal point became centreed around ‘All. The followers of ‘AH 
developed a specific understanding of Islam founded on the exoteric and esoteric exegesis 
of the Qoran based on ‘All’s teachings, and his interpretation of the Prophetic Sonna. The 
Shi’i Imams after ‘AH seemed more interested in the continuation of this doctrinal 
tradition rather then political power. They did not seek implicitly or explicitly to gain 
political power or partake in any intrigue or plot against the ruling Caliph. Their lack of 
interest in the political sphere can be further illustrated by the fact that, irrespective of 
imprisonment, torture and house arrest at the hand of the Caliphs of the time, they did not 
resort to violent or forceful means. Their role was mainly as interpreters of scripture, 
teachers of religious sciences and models of piety.69
The Shi’i Imams possessed all the characteristics of the Weberian typology of 
charismatic authority. The Shi’a refusal to accept the authority of the first three Caliphs 
and their emphasis on the supremacy of the Imams as infallible and designated successors 
of the Prophet was a departure from the pre-Islamic Arab practices. An examination of 
the Shi’i concept of authority reveals three distinct characteristics: 1) the perpetuation of 
the charismatic authority of the Prophet; 2) minimal influence of pre-Islamic traditional 
Arab concepts of authority; 3) the preservation of the all-inclusive charismatic authority of 
the Prophet and its prevention from segmentation into different spheres. The Shi’i Imams 
were the living embodiment of the charismatic authority of the Prophet. The leadership of 
the Imam is independent of any human recognition as it is considered to be a divine 
dispensioa Weber recognized this when he pointed out that the charismatic leader ‘does 
not derive his right from [the follower’s] will.’70 In Shi’ism the Imam is the ultimate 
theologian and judicial authority.71
Hasan Ibn ‘AlTal-’AskarT (d. 260/874)
Mofiammad Ibnal-Hasanal-Mahdlal-Montazeral-Qalm, 260-329/873-940, Lesser Occultation and 
329/940- Greater Occultation.
69 Ha’erl Yazdl, Unpublished Memoirs.
70 Weber (1948), p. 246.
71 Fakhry (1970), p. 41.
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Shi’i Islam considered itself the rightful heir to the essential doctrine of Islam and 
has sought to preserve it as a distinct religious/cultural entity. In terms of the charismatic 
authority of the Prophet, two trends developed after his death: the routinization and 
fragmentation of his authority and the transference of his authority, to ‘AH and his male 
descendants. Weber considers ‘preservation’ to occur though either traditionalization or 
routinization. The Shi’i case of Imamate may be said to be a personal preservation or 
continuation of the Prophet’s charismatic authority. The personal continuation of the 
charismatic authority of the Prophet by the Imams prevented the rapid disintegration of 
the Prophetic authority into various spheres. The Prophet is the sole source of legitimacy 
for the Imams' charismatic authority. Shi’i Islam before the Greater Occultation was a 
direct continuation of the Prophetic charismatic authority by the Imams, which prevented 
its ‘routinization’ in the Weberian sense of the word.
However, after the Greater Occulation there was no longer a legitimate claimant 
to this authority, and thus a process of routiniztaion of the Imam’s charismatic authority 
began. Following the Lesser Occultation this charismatic energy was continued and 
preserved through the doctrine of agency of the ‘Hidden Imam’. However, after the last 
agent this charismatic energy was claimed by the ‘Olama as a collective body as the 
general representatives of the Hidden Imam. The Shi’a were now faced with an attempt to 
institutionalize charisma in its pure form. In the Shi’i Imams both esoteric and exoteric 
aspects of the Prophet’s charismatic authority were preserved. After the Greater 
Occultation there was an attempt to preserve this aspect but the practicality of life had led 
to the routinization of this charismatic authority and its separation into different spheres as 
had occurred in Sunni Islam after the death of the Prophet. The ‘Olama played a crucial 
role in this process. Although they could not claim the same kind of charismatic authority 
as the Imams or as the ‘Four agents’, however, they legitimized their position as 
representatives of the Imams by virtue of their knowledge and as a collective body of 
learned individuals. In a very peculiar way Shi’i Islam developed into an institutional form 
of charismatic authority.
From the death of the Prophet until now, the Shi’i doctrine has evolved and 
advanced, and left its mark on the societies in which it has flourished. Shi’ism has been a 
major contributor in shaping social, cultural, political and ideological development in the 
Muslim world. The extent to which late Shi’ism which we have called “ Olama centred’
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Shi’ism, differed from early Tmamism’ and its consequences for the political development 
of the role of the ‘Olama is an ongoing debate, which shall be further examined. The 
historical development of Shi’ism can approximately be divided into three distinct, but 
interrelated, cycles.72 Firstly, Shi’i society during the presence of the Imams, which started 
from the death of the Prophet in the 11th year of Hejra, 632 AD and ended in the year 
329/940, with the Greater Occultation. During this period the Shi’i community had direct 
communication with the Imam except for the Twelfth Imam who communicated with the 
community through his four special deputies, Na *eb J£a§. The second cycle starts from the 
death of the last special deputy, ‘AIT Ibnal-Samari, in 940, until the establishment of the 
Safavid dynasty in 1501. This was a period of renovation and systematization of Shi’i 
legal theory and jurisprudence, through the works of Kolaynl (d. 940 AD) who is often 
referred to as the ‘Renovator’ of the tenth/fourth century, Ibn Babuya (d. 991 AD), Al- 
Mofid (d. 1022 AD), Al-Morteza (d. 1044 AD), Al-JusI (d. 1067 AD) who laid the 
foundations of ImamI rational theology and the principles of jurisprudence, 0§ulol-Feqh. 
During the thirteenth/seventh and the fourteenth/eightieth century Shi’i theology became 
cannonized, through the efforts of the great Shi’i philosopher and theologian Na§Irod-Dm 
'JusI (d. 627 AD) and Allameh Ibnol-Mojahar Al-Helll (d. 726 AD). The third cycle 
commences with the Safavid dynasty in 1501.
Ali’s rule marked the beginning of the first cycle. Twenty-five years sifter the death 
of the Prophet in the year 665, ‘All assumed the caliphate. The circumstances leading to 
‘AITs Caliphate may be best explained in the words of ‘All himself: ‘At that moment, 
nothing took me by surprise, but the crowd of people rushing to me. It advanced towards
A A
me from every side like the mane of the hyena so much so that Hasan and Hoseln were 
getting crushed and both ends of my shoulder garment were tom. They collected around 
me like a horde of sheep and goats...’73. Apart from the short rule of Al-Hasan, the other 
Shi’i Imams did not assume political leadership, and tended to abstain from politics. 
During the Iranian revolt against the Umayyads in the eighth/second century, Abu 
Moslem-e Korasanl, the leader of the rebellion, approached Imam Ja‘far Ibn 
Mofiammadal-§adeq (d. 765 AD), offering him allegiance and asking him to claim the
72 SahrestanI (1350 SH/1971), p. 122.
73 Nahjul Balagha, Sermons, letters and sayings of Imam ‘AIT Ibn Abu Tableb. ‘The sermon of Ash- 
Shaqshaqiyyeh’. The rest of the sermon deals with ‘All’s view about the first three Caliph’s rule and the 
troubles created by his opponents during his own rule, pp. 105-119.
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caliphate. Ja‘faral-§adeq refused. According to A§tlyaril, ‘not only did Ja‘faral-§adeq 
decline the offer of caliphate, but forbade all other members of his household to accept 
it.’74 In 822, Tafier Ibn Hosem, the founder of the Tahirid Dynasty and the governor of 
Korasan, removed the name of ‘Abdollah Ma’mun Ibn Harunal-Rasld the seventh 
Abbassid Caliph from the prayer sermon.75 He then sought allegiance with the Shi’i Imam 
of the time, Mofiammad Ibn ‘All Al-Javad (d. 835 AD), who refused, and did not allow 
his name to be placed in the sermon. Consequently Tafier Ibn Hosem placed the name of 
one of the sons of the Seventh Shi’i Imam Musa Ibn Ja‘far in the sermon.76 The Alawids 
of Tabarestan ruled most parts of Mazandaran and Gtlan in the northern parts of Iran, 
between 864-928. The Alawids also attempted to seek allegiance with the Shi’i Imam ‘All 
Ibn Mofiammad Al-HadI (d. 868 AD) and Hasan Ibn ‘AH Al-’Askari (d. 874 AD) and 
both refused. The Buyid dynasty (928-1041 AD) were a Shi’i dynasty, and thirteen years 
of their rule coincided with the life of the Twelfth Imam, before the Greater Occultation, 
and there was no attempt on the part of the Twelfth Imam to seek political power or 
recognition by the Buyids.77
According to Shi’i history and tradition the Twelfth Imam was bom in the year 
868, and from 873 he went into hiding fearing for his life and safety. The period between 
873-940 is known as the period of the Lesser Occultation, Geybat-e §ogra. During this 
period the Imam communicated with the Shi’i community through his four special 
deputies, Na ’eb who were ‘Osman Ibn-SaTd, Mofiammad Ibn ‘Osman, Hosem Ibn 
Rufi-e Nowba^tT, and ‘AH Ibn Mofiammad Al-Saman. The special deputies of the Twelfth 
Imam, during the Lesser Occultation, acted by his direct appointment and made no claim 
to political leadership on his behalf or in his stead.78 In 940, the Imam is reported to have 
given the following letter to his fourth and last special delegate, ‘All Ibn Al-Samari. The 
letter reads:
‘Oh ‘All Ibn Mofiammad Al-Samarl hear this, may God increase the reward of 
your brethren at the time of your death. You will die in six days’ time. Hence, 
sort out your affairs. Do not choose any other person as your successor. The 
Greater Occultation is nigh. There shall be no manifestation [of the Imam]
74 AStlyanI (1362 SH/1983), pp. 87-8.
75 The name of the reigning Caliph, was mentioned in the sermon after each prayer, particularly after the 
Friday prayer, as the ‘leader of the faithful’, whose obedience was obligatory for every [Sunni] Muslim.
76 AStTyanI (1362 SH/1983), p. 109 & Mo‘m (1358 SH/1979), p. 1075.
77 Ibid., p. 51 & 158.
78 Sachedina (1981), pp. 86-99.
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until a time ordained by God, [which will be] after the passing of time, the 
hardening of hearts and the increase of injustice upon the earth. Soon there 
shall be those among the Shi’a who will claim to have seen me. Beware, 
whoever claims to have seen me before the revolt of SofyanI, and the ethereal 
roar of thunder, is lying and claiming falsehood upon me. There is no power 
or majesty except that of God.’79
This letter marks the commencement of the Greater Occultation, Geybat-e Kobra, 
and adamantly rejects any claim by any group or individual to be representative of the 
Twelfth Imam.
Post-Occultation Shi’ism and its Consequences for the ‘Olama
With the Greater Occupation, the first cycle, during which the Shi’i Imams were 
among the community and accessible to them, came to an end. Contrary to what is often 
assumed, the main framework of the Shi’i thought, as a distinct and audible doctrine, took 
shape within the first cycle of Shi’i development, and not after the Greater Occultation. 
The dedication to the furtherance of knowledge and Islamic science became particularly 
marked from the time of the Fifth and Sixth Imams, Mofiammad Ibn ‘All Al-Baqer (d. 732 
AD), and Ja‘far Ibn Mofiammadal-§adeq (d. 765 AD). Twelver Shi’ism developed a 
distinct doctrine and system of jurisprudence under the leadership of the Fifth and Sixth 
Imam. As previously mentioned, the Imams were presented with numerous opportunities 
and offers of allegiance by various groups, who had seized power by force, often in the 
name of the Household of the Prophet, Ahlol-BaTt, and which they declined.80
Aijomand argues that ‘Al-Baqir and Al-Sadiq’s disapproval of armed rebellion 
signified the subsistence of this worldly eschatological miUenniumism and its replacement 
by religious legalism of Al-Baqir and a quietistic mystical piety of Al-Sadiq. Al-Sadiq’s 
injunction to the Shi’a to transact with the rest of the Muslims and enter the services of 
non-Shi’i governments signified the acceptance of the world.’81 It must be pointed out 
that the Shi’i legalism which developed had as its basis the inherent illegitimate rule of the 
Caliph, and was thus fundamentally different in its approach to its Sunni counterpart. The 
quietistic mystical piety of Al-§adeq did not signify an acceptance of the nature of the rule 
of the Caliph. The question was not the acceptance or the negation of the world, but 
rather, the unjust nature of political rule, which remained a fundamental concept of the
79 JabarsI (1335 SH/1956), p. 168 & MajlesI (1362 SH/1984), p. 928.
80 Ja‘farl LangarudI (1368 SH/1988), p. 46.
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Shi’i doctrine. The permissibility o f ‘entering the service of non-Shi’i government’ did not 
negate the unjust and thus illegitimate nature of that government. As long as a fallible 
assumed rule at the expense of an infallible, that government was fundamentally 
illegitimate. The government was illegitimate to the extent that it claimed to be based on 
Islamic principles, and to be the administrative apparatus of Islam. Therefore it can not be 
argued that the Fifth and the Sixth Imams, through ‘legalism’ and ‘quietisitc mystical 
piety’, sought a more pragmatic and thus ‘accommodatory’ theory of Shi’ism, as did the 
Shi’i ‘Olama in later years, which marked their acceptance of the world. Shi’i legal theory 
was centred around the praxis of ‘unjust’ political rule, which was taken as a priori and 
did not need to be repeatedly mentioned. Furthermore, Shi’i scholars argue that the 
emphasis on doctrinal expansion does not signify a change in the Shi’i approach. Even 
‘Alfs primary concern was not political leadership, as substantiated by ‘AlTs refusal to 
accept the allegiance of ‘Abbas Ibn ‘Abdol Mojaleb and Abu Sofyan during the Saqifeh 
[BanI §adeq] assembly.82
The period commencing with the Greater Occultation until the establishment of a 
Shi’i state by the Safavids in the sixteenth century, marks the formative years of the 
development and expansions of Shi’i doctrine. This period witnessed the rise of Shi’i 
doctors of law, and further specialization of Shi’i jurisprudence. The foundation of Shi’i 
jurisprudence, Feqh, is based on four principal codices, known as ‘O^ul Arba ’eh.,8S These 
four books compromise of Kolani’s (d. 940 AD), 0§ulol-Kafi, Ibn Babuyeh’s (d. 991 
AD), Man-La-Yafizarol FaqJh, §e% JusFs (d. 1067 AD), Esteb§ar and Tahzib. The 
‘Four Principles’ are derived from 400 treaties on Afiadif* of the Shi’i Imams, often 
written during the lifetime of the particular Imam.85 These three scholars systematized 
these 400 treatises into four principle codices, which form the basis of Shi’i legal theory 
and jurisprudence.86 During the Il-Khanid period Shi’i theology became cannonized 
through the efforts of the great Shi’i philosopher and theologian Na§irod-Dm rJusI (d. 627
81 Aijomand (1984), pp. 101 -2.
82 Bohlul Afandl (1370 SH/1991), pp. 98-100.
83 In Persian, the Four Principles are referred to as ‘Cahar Asl’.
84 Plural of Hadis, narrated traditions relating to deeds and utterances of the Prophet and the Imams. The 
Sunni definition of Hadis includes the Prophet and his companions.
85 An index to these four hundred treatises was compiled by Ibn Gazaerl.
86 Mo‘ih (1358 SH/1979), p. 10548.
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H). The work of Na§irod-Dm TusT was continued by his student Allameh Ibn Al-Mofahar 
Al-Helll (d. 726 H), and his son Fa^rod-Dm Mofiammad Al-HllI (d. 771 H).87
Aijomand argues that the pre-Safavid Shi’ism showed two distinct features of 
development. On the one hand, the development of ‘urban’ intellectual Shi’ism, on the 
other hand the development o f ‘undisciplined’, ‘extremist’ Shi’ism based on devotionalism 
towards the Imams.88 The analytic division imposed by Aijomand seems to be influenced 
by the works of Max Weber and Ernest Gellner and the historical reassessment of ‘Shi’i 
modernists’89 who emphasize the rational aspect of Shi’ism with a complete negation of 
its mystical and esoteric character. However, these two aspects are not always as separate 
and clear-cut as is suggested here. The rational side of Shi’ism is deeply imbedded within 
its esoteric principles, precisely because of the doctrinal basis of Shi’ism, as discussed 
earlier. Therefore, ‘rational Shi’ism’ cannot completely negate ‘devotional Shi’ism’ 
without questioning the very prerequisite of Shi’i doctrine, namely infallibility. Esoteric 
Shi’ism and its popular manifestation, ‘devotional Shi’ism’, provide a safeguard against 
the acquired privileges of the theologians as only the Imams are worthy of devotion. 
Furthermore, after the Greater Occultation, Shi’i ‘Olama were turned to for matters of 
religious guidance, so the ‘rational’ work of these scholars was publicly reflected through 
the advice they provided for the Shi’i community. Aijomand’s interpretation of early 
Shi’ism is heavily influenced by recent developments in the spread of ‘rational’ [political] 
Shi’ism, which seeks to rid Shi’ism of all its esoteric basis, and the inferring outcome of 
which is the innovatory concept of the ‘Rule of the Jurist’ or Velayat-i Faqih.
According to Kohlberg, early pre-Occultation Shi’ism was fundamentally 
distinguished by the recognition of the injustice and inherent illegitimacy of temporal rule, 
and the recognition of the Imam as the ‘right ruler’. During the tenth century AD various 
Shi’i theologians and jurists elaborated Shi’i juristic literature in such a way as to make it 
as flexible as that of the Sunni counterpart, thus attributing hitherto non-existent rights 
and privileges to themselves.90 After the Greater Occultation, the ultimate repository of
87 A§tlyanl (1362 SH/1983), p. 527.
88 Aijomand (1984), p. 31.
89 For example ‘AIT SariattT, the ideologue of the Islamic Revolution and Najaf AbadI (1361 SH/1982), p.
12. Najaf AbadI rejects Hoseln’s foreknowledge of his faith and reconstructs the drama through ‘ordinary 
and natural causes’. He tries to impose a ‘rationalistic’ framework on the episode of Karbala and thus 
challenges the concept of the ‘knowledge of the Imam’ and esoteric Shi’i interpretation of the episode.
90 Kohlberg (1976).
90
the law was absent, and the Shi’i community had no means of direct access to the Imam, 
which had two major consequences. ‘Firstly, the clerical class became the medial 
expositors of the law. Secondly, the denial of any immediate threat to de facto power (the 
legitimate ruler being absent) rendered possible a variety of approaches to the government 
of the day.’91 Only the Imam of the Age is able to fully implement the Sarfah; in his 
absence all politics is devoid of legitimacy, and certain functions of the Imam are thus 
considered lapsed, Saqef.
Sarifol-Morteza92 and Mofiammad Ibn Hasanal-TusI93 were responsible for major 
contributions to Shi’i jurisprudence in the tenth century, and they both affirm the theory 
of lapsing, Soquf. The executive functions of the Imam during the period of the Greater 
Occultation remain inoperable until the return of the Imam, who will fully and rightfully 
implement the Sarfah. Calder argues that the doctrines of Occultation attest a denial of 
political legitimacy as well as an abstention from active political opposition.94 In the 
absence of the Hidden Imam, no temporal rule has any claim to legitimacy. Through 
gradual appropriation, the ‘Olama had come to assume some of the ‘lapsed’ functions of 
the Imam. In practice, however, the function of the ‘Olama as defined by the theory of 
jurisprudence did not cover all aspects of government. Their executive powers did not 
cover the maintaining of order or the defence of the country.
In the major works of jurisprudence up to the Sixth century, the principles of 
governance are discussed only twice, once under a just and rightful So If an and once under 
an unjust ruler. The recognition of the fact that any government during the Occultation 
was considered illegitimate did not prevent some kind of modus vivendi,95 varying from 
support for the relatively, ‘just ruler’, to disassociation and dissimulation, ‘TaqTyeh’ under 
unjust and hostile rulers. In this way, practical support was offered, and cooperation was 
established with acknowledged illegitimate temporal power. Some ‘Olama thought it 
preferable, ‘Mostdfiab ’ and some even obligatory, ‘ Vajeb ’ to work for and support a 
relatively just governor, and ‘undesirable’ but permissible, ‘Ja ’e z to work for a relatively 
unjust ruler.96 It was through the ability to define and classify governments as ‘just’ or
91 Calder (1982), pp. 2-20, p. 4.
92 Sarifol-Morteza (1374 SH/1995), pp. 40-41.
93 Al-TuesI (1965), p. 64.
94 Calder (1982), pp. 2-20, p. 4.
95 Ibid.
96 Madelung (1980).
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‘unjust’ and the conditions under which it was Vajeb or Mostafiab, Makruh preferable to 
abstain, or Ja ’ez, to work with them, and when and which government to support, that 
the ‘Olama were able to exert real influence and pressure on governmental politics. 
Although ultimately the just rule can only be the Imam, however, the degree of ‘relative 
justice’ of a government, as assessed by the ‘Olama as the general representatives of the 
Imam, is the deciding factor as to whether it is Mostafiab, Makruh, Ja ’ez or Vajeb to 
cooperate with such a government Madelung introduces the concept of ‘derivative, 
functional legitimacy’97 in his study of Sarifol-Morteza's treaties. He argues that a ruler 
may be considered just if he recognizes the Imams, administer their commands, and rules 
by the Sarfah. Madelung, refers to the junction of the ‘just ruler’ as ‘derivative, functional 
legitimacy’. This is a helpful concept in clarifying the concept of ‘relative justice’, while 
acknowledging that legitimacy belongs primarily and intrinsically to the Imams.
If one accepts that the doctrine of Occultation affirmed a denial of political 
legitimacy, then the fact that the Twelfth Imam had not assumed a political role before his 
Occultation meant that the Occultation had more serious consequences in terms of the 
‘non-political’ functions of the Imam. Furthermore, there is no reason to suggest that 
post-Occultation Shi’ism entailed a particularly marked abstinence from political 
opposition, as compared to pre-Occultation Shi’ism. Political abstinence had been the 
practice of Shi’i Imams from the seventh century onwards. Calder has rightly pointed out 
the concept of ‘illegitimacy’ of temporal rule within the Shi’i doctrine. However he has 
failed to make the following analytical distinction: within the Shi’i doctrine, the concept of 
illegitimacy of temporal rule is applicable to a government which claims to be Islamic, or 
partaking in the spiritual charisma of the Prophet, by any other person than the Imams. 
This does not necessarily mean that any government is inherently illegitimate. The political 
consequences of the Occultation are often stressed without considering its spiritual and 
religious consequences.
The historical unfolding of Shi’i jurisprudence departed from the original doctrine, 
as the executive functions of the Imam were gradually re-expressed and ‘re-invented’ in 
various ways as ‘rightfully’ belonging to the Foqaha. The tradition most quoted as 
support for the justification of the authority and leadership of the ‘Olama in the absence of
97 Madelung (1980), p. 30.
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the Imam is based on two Afiadis, but with a particular emphasis on the second. The first 
Hadis states:
[The Sixth Imam, Ja‘far Ibn Mofiammad, known as Al-§adeq said:] ‘The 
‘Olama are the inheritors of the Prophet. Therefore be aware from whom 
you obtain your knowledge.’98
The second Hadis, known as the tradition of ‘Omar Ibn Hanzaleh, states that the 
Imam, upon being asked whether Muslims were permitted to take their disputes over 
debts and inheritance rights to the temporal rulers, answered quoting the Qoranic verse 
(4:6) in which those who ‘go for judgment’ to falsehood, Jagut, are admonished. The 
exact wording of the Hadis is as follows:
“ Omar Ibn Hanzaleh said: “I asked Abu ‘Abdollah [Al-§adeq] if two groups 
among the Shi’a have a dispute over a debt or inheritance is it permissible 
[Halai] for them to refer to the official judge of the Caliph for a verdict?”
Imam §adeq replied: “If someone refers to them [the official judges] it is like 
referring to falsehood and Satan.” I asked: “So what must they do in order to 
resolve their disputes?” Imam §adeq answered: “They must look and search 
for someone who has narrated our Hadis, and has accurate knowledge and 
precise execution of all that which is permissible and that which is forbidden in 
our doctrine, and ask him. They must refer to such a person to judge between 
them, as I have chosen such a person from among you. They must accept his 
judgment, for if they do not they have rejected the judgment of God, and 
rejected us. If someone rejects us, then they have rejected God, and this is the 
same as polytheism and idolatry”...’ 99
The Imam was then asked, what if there were different verdicts based on different 
Hadis ascribed to the Imams? He is reported to have made the following reply: ‘Then the 
opinion of the most just and learned should be taken.’ Ibn Hanzaleh then asked, ‘What if 
all judges are equally just and learned?’ ‘In that case’, the Imam answered, ‘one should 
look into the Afiadis which are attributed to us, accepting that which enjoys consensus of 
our followers [A$ftab], and rejecting the one which is narrated by only a few [witnesses], 
as that which is the subject of consensus should not be doubted.’100 In this Hadis, there is 
no mention of arriving at a verdict through independent reasoning or Ijtehad, only the 
importance of consensus based on Afiadis is stressed. Furthermore, there is no mention of 
any particular group who has sole monopoly over reported traditions.
98 Kolaynl (1348 SH/1969), p. 32.
99 Ibid., p. 67, Hadis, no. 10.
100 Ibid., pp. 87-88.
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Coulson maintains that a transition took place in Shi’ism after the Greater 
Occultation of the Twelfth Imam from a more restricted form to a more flexible version. 
He argues that as a result of the Occultation of the Imam, the exposition of law has been 
the task of qualified scholars, Mojtaheds. However, as much they may have been regarded 
as the deputies of the Imam and working under his influence, their use of human reason, 
‘Aqel, to determine the law has been accepted as necessary and legitimate. ‘Inevitably, 
therefore, the concept of probable rules of law, Zan-e Mo ‘fabar, and the authoritative 
criterion of consensus have been recognized by the Ithna-Asharites [Twelver Shi’a] and 
their system is certainly not without its variant scholastic opinions.’101 Two points need to 
be emphasized: Firstly, his account of early Shi’ism is not entirely accurate, as there were 
only four specific deputies, Na ’eb Ijd§, after the Occultation, and as the letter of the 
Twelfth Imam to his last special deputy clearly specifies, no one individual or group could 
claim legitimacy as the deputy of the Imam, or claim to have had communication with 
him. However, the ‘Olama came to gradually assume the position of general deputy, 
Na ’eb ‘Am, of the Imam, and the reasons for this development will be discussed later. The 
‘Olama’s claim to being the general deputy of the Imam is not recognized as legitimate by 
all members of the Shi’i community. Secondly, even if one accepts Coulson’s account of 
early Shi’ism as accurate, one question still remains: whether the transition from that form 
to a more flexible version took place merely by force of circumstances or whether the 
fundamental principles of Twelver Shi’ism contained the possibility for this change?
Enayat views this development as a sequel to the Shi’i case for the Imamate.102 
The argument is as follows: if the Imams are charged with the duty of guiding the 
Muslims after the end of the ‘cycle of revelation’, the ‘Olama and Mojtaheds are charged 
with the duty of guiding the Muslims after the end of the ‘cycle of Imamah’. The 
difference of course is that the ‘Olama do not, and cannot, partake of the quality of 
‘E§mat of the Imams. Thus, the logic of the theory of Imamate was elaborated to 
encompass the ‘Olama. The ‘Olama have extended the Shi’i concept of authority to be 
inclusive of themselves. It is claimed that the chain of authority leads from the Divine to 
the Prophet and to the Imams, and thence from the Imams to the ‘Olama. The logic 
applied here negates the first premise of the Shi’i doctrine: ‘Epnat of the Imam is a priori
101 Coulson (1978), pp. 10-78.
102 Enayat (1982), p. 5.
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to his justice, knowledge, and supreme spiritual and political leadership of the community.
It was the ‘E§mat of the Imams which set them aside from rest of humanity. If the 
fundamental quality of ‘E§mat is missing then the rest of the argument of Imamate does 
not hold. Furthermore, the last letter of the Twelfth Imam that is accepted as authentic by 
all Shi’i ‘Olama clearly rejects claims to a privileged position by any group or individual. 
The ‘Olama claim their privileged position by virtue of their knowledge, but within the 
Shi’i doctrine any knowledge other than ‘Elme Ladonni, which belongs solely to an . 
infallible, is not considered as substantiating such a claim. It may thus be argued that the 
claims of the ‘Olama do not have doctrinal basis, but rather sociopolitical ones.
By the sixteenth century, the assumption that the ‘Olama and Mojtaheds are 
charged with the duty of guiding the Muslims after the end of the ‘cycle of Imamah’ had 
became more or less generally accepted. This resulted in what we have termed 
terminological innovation, Bed'ate LogavT, whereby the Foqaha were now recognized as 
Na’eb ‘Am of the Imam.103 The only executive function of the Imam, which was not 
considered as transferable to the Foqaha, was that of Jahad for the sake of expansion. 
The elaboration of the theory of general delegation reflected the consolidation of clerical 
authority within certain spheres of life. In the tenth and eleventh century, the theory of 
general delegation referred primarily to judicial authority, as the executive functions of the 
Imam were considered lapsed, Saqef. In the subsequent period, between the eleventh and 
sixteenth century, the ‘Olama came to gradually assume most of the exclusivist duties of 
the Imam. These included the control of canonical taxes, IComs and Zakat, and defensive, 
Jahad. One important consequence of the doctrine of ‘general delegation’, was the 
financial independence of the Shi’i ‘Olama from the state, in terms of their acquired right 
to collect and administer the religious taxes of {Corns and Zakat. The Sunni ‘Olama, 
however, did not acknowledge the continual validity of {Corns as applicable and only 
recognized the governmental collection of Zakat.
Another aspect which is particular to Shi’ism and is derived from the acceptance 
of the principle of Ijtehad is the office of Marja ‘ Taqlid. The Marfa ‘ is the highest 
religious authority whose ruling and opinions should be accepted by all members of the 
Shi’i community. The concept of imitation Taqlid of a Mojtahed [one who practices 
Ijtehad] as incumbent upon the believers, was first explicitly expressed in the works of
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Hasan Ibn Yusef Ibn Mofahhar Al-HeUf Al-‘AlIameh (d. 1325 AD), and is indispensable 
from the growth of power and prestige of the ‘Olama in later years. However, this office 
did not exist in Twelver Shi’ism until the middle of the ninetieth century. It was 
introduced by Se%: Morteza An§aff (d. 1864 AD), whereby the most learned of the 
‘Olama was recognized as worthy of being imitated by all members of the Shi’i 
community in his spiritual pronouncements. This move centralized the hitherto pluralistic 
system of scholarship and spiritual guidance in Shi’ism. The believers were urged to 
follow and imitate the example of a Mojtahed, and to act in accordance to their opinions 
and rulings. The obligation of the Shi’a to follow a Mojtahed is also based on their duty of 
loyalty and obedience to the Hidden Imam, which is transferred to his representatives, 
namely the ‘Olama.104 The lay follower or imitator, Moqalled, must pay his contribution 
of canonical taxes to the Marfa‘ Taqlid. Spiritual centralization was soon followed by 
financial centralization. Thus a growing proportion of the donations of the faithful, known 
as the Imam’s share, Sahmiyeh Imam, made previously to the local and provincial clergy 
were now paid to the Marfa‘ Taqlid. It was the result of this spiritual and financial 
centralization that enabled subsequent ‘Olama to lead mass movements, which will be 
fully discussed later. The ‘construction’ of the concept of Marfa ‘ Taqlid presents another 
example of the working of the mundane forces in religious affairs;105 it also demonstrates 
the gradual acquisition of extra powers by the ‘Olama, as ascribed to them by themselves.
The Shi’i ‘Olama did not recognize the Sar 1 legitimacy of the government, and, as 
‘Na ’eb ‘Am ’ Imam, made themselves his executors and thus they focused on religious 
finances. In particular, they were able to justify their monopoly of goms, which became 
their primary source of income. The financial independence of the Shi’i ‘Olama from the 
government made admissible a certain degree of opposition and resistance, which were 
absent among Sunni clerics, as they were much more tied to and restricted by the 
government.106 Furthermore, among the Shi’i ‘Olama the recognition of a frilly qualified 
Faqih was dependent on the strength of his public following, and the subsequent financial 
support. In so far as the Shi’i ‘Olama were dependent on public opinion for recognition
103 Elisah (1969), p. 26.
104 Elisah (1969), p. 26.
105 Enayat (1982), p. 162.
106 Calder (1982), pp. 2-20, p. 5.
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and financial support, to this extent they were bounded by public opinion.107 Thus, the 
‘Olama frequently followed as well as led public opinion. The theory of the Faqlh as the 
rightfid representative and executor in the absence of the Imam, and the recognition of 
governmental power as illegitimate, did not prevent the emergence of a variety of 
accomodatory theories and the emergence of various approaches to political power. The 
Shi’i ‘Olama were influential both before, during and sifter the Safavid period, but 
although they never claimed to have created an ideal Sar‘1 government,108 and the 
potential for the rule of the jurist implicit in the theory of general delegation was rarely 
stressed.
The accommodatory theory of Shi’i jurisprudence sought to solve the practical 
problem of establishing a modus vivendi with actual governments, and to this extent 
deviated from what is often referred to as ‘Shi’i idealism’109 and to contain many features 
o f ‘Sunni pragmatism’. The original Shi’i doctrine or ‘Shi’i idealism’ does not lend itself 
to flexibility or practical re-evaluation, according to the needs of the time. However, the 
accommodatory theory of jurisprudence as developed by the ‘Olama throughout the 
centuries after the Greater Occultation allowed for ‘constructive’ political theory to take 
precedence over the esoteric doctrine of Shi’ism. It was based on the assumption that 
during the Occultation the governing inception would not be synonymous with the 
religious one. The structural ground for the debate was the acceptance of the 
implementation of the Sarfah by a qualified Faqlh, which made accommodation possible, 
and represented the decisive right of the ‘Olama to oppose, resist or to influence. 
However, it must be pointed out that the Occultation of the Imam and the theory of the 
inherent injustice of temporal rule until his return led to a separation of the Shi’i ‘Olama 
into two distinct categories, those ‘Olama who piously withdrew from the political sphere, 
viewing it as unjust and inherently illegitimate in the absence of the Imam, and those who 
actively endeavoured to subjugate political power. This development occurred after the 
Greater Occultation, continued throughout the Safavid, Qajar and PahlavT periods, and 
even exists among the ‘Olama today.110
107 Lambton (1962-64), pp. 115-36, p. 118.
108 Until the Islamic Republic of Iran, this could be viewed as the eventual and decisive outcome of the 
potential for the rule of the jurist implicit in the theory o f‘general delegation’.
109 See Enayat (1982), & Calder (1980).
110 DulatabadT makes an important distinction between ‘worldly ‘Olama’, DonyavT, and ‘spiritual 
‘Olama’, Ma‘naVT or Ahle Mana. He describes the ‘worldly ‘Olama’, as ‘those whose quest for worldly
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Arjomand rejects the concept of the inherent illegitimacy of temporal rule. He 
argues that ‘the development of ImamI Shi’ism into a sectarian religion within the Islamic 
body politic entailed a de facto depoliticization of the conception of political leadership, 
the Imamate. The gradual delimitation of the religious sphere by the corpus of the 
religious literature on theology and jurisprudence, by omission, relegated temporal rule to 
the sphere of the profane. The sublimation of the mahdistic tenet in the doctrine of 
Occultation assured the continual secularity of the political sphere to the end of time.’111 
In Shi’ism the Greater Occultation accentuated the divorce between Imamate and political 
rule, and further enhanced the differentiation of the religious and political sphere. 
Aijomand argues that, with the development of systematized jurisprudence, Imamate 
became a purely theological topic and its practical implications diminished. Thus the 
importance of Imamate as a topic of public law was greatly reduced and Imamate became 
a topic in sacred history. However, philosophical treatments of the topic of Imamate 
became more rigorous and more elaborate. After the Greater Occultation, Imamate 
became distinct from mundane politics.112
The conceptualization of Imamate by Kolaym gave rise to a metahistorical utopia 
of divine guidance through the Imams. However, the properties of this ‘Shi’i’ utopia as 
opposed to the utopia of the golden age of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, were such that, 
while the former provided for the pursuit of a theocracy, the latter was unsuitable as a 
basis for the sacralization of the political sphere and of political action. The unabridged 
gap between dogma and political reality made idealistic theological abstraction rather than 
legal positivism the distinctive mark of the Shi’i doctrine of Imamate.113 Aijomand 
proposes that Imamate was integrated into the Shi’i theological system and not into Shi’i 
jurisprudence, and thus this enabled the jurists to develop a political theory. It was not 
until the thirteenth/seventh century that the topic finally appeared in Shi’i jurisprudence. 
The distinctiveness of Twelver Shi’ism is in the ‘secularization’ of politics and the 
‘separation and reciprocal independence of the theological and political spheres’. 114
domination, RIyasat Ma‘-abl, outweighs their religious aspects, who intermingle with state functionaries, 
hold religious court and gain large fortunes. He describes the ‘spiritual ‘Olama’, as ‘those who have no 
relations with state functionaries, who do not interfere in the administration of the law and avoid worldly 
luxuries.’ DulatabadT (1371 SH/1992), pp. 50-54 & 134.
111 Arjomand (1984), p. 260.
112 Ibid., pp. 36-7.
113 Ibid., pp. 37-8.
114 Scarcia (1975), pp. 118-19.
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However, it could also be argued that the development of post-Occultation 
jurisprudence resulted in not only the ‘secularization’ of politics but also in the 
‘politicization’ of Imamate. Thereby the ‘Olama justified their involvement in political 
sphere through the ‘innovation’ of the concept of ‘general delegation’, in the absence of 
the Imam. Aijomand’s argument assumes a separation between Shi’i theological system 
and Shi’i jurisprudence. Nevertheless, if and when the metaphysical and esoteric basis of 
Imamate were reduced to ‘sacred history’, the ‘fallible’ ‘Olama came to assume and 
perform the exclusive functions of the ‘infallible’ Imam, deriving their authority from this 
very ‘sacred history’. Therefore the separation between ‘scared history’ and 
‘jurisprudence’ could not have occurred completely. It may be argued that in as much as 
politics was secularized, religion was politicized. Furthermore, if it is argued that there 
occurred a shift in emphasis from ‘this worldly eschatological millenniumism’ to ‘religious 
legalism and quietisitc mystical piety’ from the time of the Fifth and the Sixth Imams, 
when the foundations of Shi’i jurisprudence were laid, then how can the Imamate not 
have been ‘integrated into Shi’i jurisprudence’ by the Imams themselves? One may argue 
that, due to the fact that the Imams [with the exception of ‘All and short rule of Hasan] 
did not assume political leadership, in effect a ‘separation and reciprocal independence of 
the theological and political spheres’ had occurred early on in Shi’ism. However, this was 
as much a characteristic of pre-Occultation as it was of Post-Occultation Shi’ism, and is 
by no means because of the ability of the Shi’i ‘Olama to develop a political theory. What 
the ‘Olama did achieve was in effect the sacralization of the profane by means of basing 
their political aspirations on a religious premise.
Aijomand criticizes Calder’s concept of ‘illegitimacy’. He argues that a group of 
Western scholars writing about nineteenth century Iran state their arguments in general 
terms without any reference to Shi’i juristic writings from the earlier periods, or for that 
matter from the nineteenth century. Calder’s work is vitiated by non-sequitur allegations 
of inevitable illegitimacy of de facto powers and an anachronistic bias in the interpretation 
of the earlier periods. ‘The Occultation of the Twelfth Imam does inaugurate a period in 
which divinely inspired and infallible authority in religion and in political leadership can 
not be obtained. But while appreciative of the gradual establishment of valid opinion, 
Zan-e Mo'fabar, as the relevant criterion for legitimacy of legal norms during the 
occultation, Calder fails to note the inevitable change in the criterion of legitimacy of 
political authority which is the exact logical parallel of the change in the criterion of
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legitimacy of religio-legal authority. Calder has studied Shi’i jurisprudence, but his notion 
of ‘legitimacy’ is doubtless not a category of Shi’i law. Calder’s assumption is that if the 
Shi’i theory of historical Imamate of ‘AH and his descendants were positive public law of 
the period of occultation - i.e, if it were tantamount to modem Constitutional theory - 
temporal rulers would be illegitimate until the end of time. As has been pointed out the 
assumption is false.115
There is need for clarification of two different concepts, which although 
interrelated are not the same thing. Firstly, inherent ‘illegitimacy of political rule’ within 
Shi’i doctrine refers to illegitimacy to claim ‘Islamic rule’ during the presence or the 
Occultation of an Imam. In other words, a claim on the part of any ruler, other than the 
Twelve Imams, to be the supreme spiritual and political leader of the Muslim community 
is illegitimate - i.e. If the claim is made on Islamic basis as was the claim of the Caliphs. 
This does not mean, as Calder claims that any political rule is inherently illegitimate. It is 
illegitimate only as far as it entails a religious claim. It is precisely for this very reason that 
the ‘Olama’s claim to being ‘Na ’eb ‘Am? of the Imam, which is the perquisite for their 
increased political involvement, is an innovation. Secondly, as Aijomand correctly pointed 
out, the notion of ‘legitimacy’ is not a category of Shi’i law, but, the relative justice of 
temporal rule is, as only the rule of an Infallible is absolutely just, which is the premise for 
the arguments of illegitimacy. It may be concluded that while any assertion on the part of 
a ruler, other than the Twelve Imams, to supreme spiritual and political leadership of the 
Muslim community is illegitimate, in the presence or absence of the Imam, however, the 
criterion of Justice is still applicable, be it only in relative terms, to temporal rule in 
general. Thus political rule must be judged in relation to its level of justice, and to this 
extent the concept of illegitimacy is an inherent part o f Shi’i jurisprudence.
The second cycle of Shi’i development (940-1945), can be further divided into 
two distinct parts. Part one (940-1051), which lasted about six centuries, is distinct from 
the second phase, in that during this period the Shi’i community lived as a minority group 
under Sunni rule. Like most minority groups in history, the Shi’a faced persecution at the 
hands of often hostile governments, with a few minor exceptions of local or Shi’i -friendly 
rule such as that of the Seljuk ruler Malek Sah (1072-1104) who ruled over Iran, Greater
115 Aijomand (1984), p. 280.
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Syria (Samat) and parts of Iraq (Bemol-Nafirem),116 and Soljan Mofiammad Karazmsah 
(1199-1220), who removed the name of Na§er the 35th Abassid Caliph from the sermon 
and replaced it with one of the descendants of Hosem Ibn ‘AH, the third Shi’i Imam,117 
and Soljan Mofiammad (1303- 1316), who converted to Shi’ism. The only other short 
episode of Shi’i rule before the Safavids was that of the Sarbedaran (1335-1386).
The revolt of the Sarbedaran in the eastern part of Iran, Korasan, is said to have 
been the precursor of the Safavid Dynasty. The rule of the Sarbedaran, like the Safavids 
after them, was based on the Sufi concept of the ‘guide’ and the ‘disciple’. The 
Sarbedaran were explicitly anti-Sunni, and their aim was the augmentation and 
development of the Shi’i message. The leaders of the Sarbedaran movement had ongoing 
correspondence with Shi’i ‘Olama outside Iran, in particular in the Jabalol-Amel region of 
Southern Lebanon. Some of these ‘Olama were invited to l£orasan to educate the people 
and popularize the Shi’i doctrine. Se3£ Samsod-Dm Mofiammad MakkI, known as Sahid-e 
Awal118 (d. 1384 AD) sent his famous book Al-Lom’at ud-Damesqiyeh to Soljan 
Mo‘ayed Sarbedari, so that his Fatvas could be used as a basis of emulation for the 
growing Shi’i community in Iran Al-Lom ’at ud-Damesqiyeh is one of the most renowned 
books of the Imam! tradition and is still being taught in theological schools throughout the 
Shi’i world.119
During part one of the second cycle of Shi’i development, prior to the 
establishment of the Safavid dynasty, the Shi’i community lived under Sunni rule. Thus 
the cardinal tenets of Shi’i jurisprudence evolved largely under Sunni rulers. The case of 
the cooperation with the government was more clear cut, although Sunni rulers were 
considered as strictly illegitimate. It was, however, considered permissible to take office 
as long as it was possible to implement Shi’i law and to protect the community. The laws 
were applied on behalf of the Imam and not the ruler.120 The acknowledgment of the 
legitimacy of de facto power has been a prominent feature of Sunni political thinking.121 
Conversely, the denial of legitimacy has been the distinguishing feature of Twelver Shi’i
116 Mo‘Ih (1358 SH/1979), p. 780, & AStlyanI (1362 SH/1983), p. 527.
117 Mo‘m (1358 SH/1979), pp. 487-88, &. AStlyanI (1362 SH/1983), pp. 400-2.
118 The First Martyr.
119 AStiyanl (1362 SH/1983), p. 601-2.
120 Binder (1965).
121 See for example articles by Gibb (1962).
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jurisprudence.122 This is certainly true of early Shi’i history, however, after the Greater 
Occultation, Shi’i jurists no less than their Sunni counterparts, were concerned to provide, 
within the structure of the Sarfah means of accommodation with de facto powers. So 
much so that by the Qajar period the works of some Shi’i ‘Olama were almost identical to 
their Sunni counterparts, as we shall go on to discuss.
The Shi’a had achieved political responsibility relatively late in its development, 
and had not, therefore, in its formative period concerned itself with the problem of 
government and the administration of the community. Hence, the development of 
accommodatory theories occurred much earlier in the Sunni world than within the Shi’i. 
The reasons for this are twofold: firstly, the Shi’a, before the advent of the Safavid 
dynasty, for most parts had lived as a persecuted minority under Sunni rule which was 
viewed as tyrannical and illegitimate; secondly, the concept of the Imamate meant that the 
Imam was the upholder of the divine law, although his right to political power had been 
usurped, and thus the intricate elaboration of divine law was the task of the Imam and not 
the clerical class as was the case in the Sunni world. However, after the Occultation, the 
Shi’i ‘Olama came to assume this role as discussed previously. The establishment of the 
Safavid dynasty marks the beginning of part two of the second cycle, where Shi’ism was 
declared the national religion which posed new and more complex problems of authority 
for the ‘Olama.
Safavid Caesaropapism, and the Consolidation of a 
Hierocracy
In 1499, §ah Isma‘Il, the great grandson of Se% §afiod-Dm Ardabffi the leader of 
the safaviyeh Sufi order, led a revolt in Iran, backed by his disciples. His followers were 
known as Qzelbas (Red-heads) as they wore red turbans with twelve stripes, symbolizing 
their allegiance to the Twelve Imams. In 1501, Sah Isma‘Il ascended the throne in Tabriz, 
which was made the capital city, and proclaimed Twelver Shi’ism the official national 
religion of Iran. Sah Isma‘Il not only united the totality of Iranian territory, but also united 
Iran’s population through a single creed, namely Shi’ism. Many Iranian historians view 
the Safavid period as indivisible from Iranian national identity.123 The most significant 
aspect of this declaration was that it ensured Iranian national sovereignty against the
122 See for example, Keddie (1972), Eliash (1969), Calder (1980), and Lambton (1962-64).
123 AStlyanI (1362 SH/1983), pp. 667-9
102
encroachment and aggression of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Solfans considered 
themselves as Amir-Al-Mo ’memn, the Commander of the Faithful, of the entire Muslim 
world, and viewed allegiance of every Muslim to the Solfan as obligatory.’124 The 
declaration of Shi’ism as the official religion of Iran helped reaffirm the distinctiveness of 
Iranian culture and its socio-historic roots.
As had been the case under the short rule of the Sarbedaran,125 during the Safavids 
many Shi’i jurisconsultants were invited to Iran from Jabalol-Amel, Lebanon.126 During 
the Safavid period, the ‘Olama remained on the whole state functionaries and the 
consolidation of Shi’ism within Iran was treated as a branch of political administration. 
The ‘Olama were professionals providing technicalities and assistance to the state, but 
remained under its political control. The Safavids based their claim to rule on decent from 
the Imam Musa and direct appointment from God, employing the title, Zellollah, the 
shadow of God, like Sunni rulers before them. This claim challenged the ‘Olamas’ 
prerogative as representatives of the Imam, and posed a problem in terms of legitimacy of 
the ruler, the Safavid claim was based on decent from the Imams. Many ‘Olama however 
cooperated with the Safavids, as the establishment of Shi’ism as the official state religion 
rectified both the faith and their own position.127 For the first time, Shi’i ‘Olama 
participated in the organization of the state, and major changes occurred in their 
relationship with temporal power. However, the fundamental Imam! theory remained 
unaffected by these changes. Also, for the first time, the security of the state was bound 
up with Shi’ism, and unorthodoxy was severely dealt with. During the Safavid period, 
adherence to religion became synonymous with loyalty to the state. Religious and 
temporal power combined forces to suppress heresy.128 The ‘Olama owed much of their 
power and prestige to the support of Shi’i kings. The ‘Olama who cooperated with the
124 Ibid.
125 The rule of the Sarbedaran lasted for forty-six years.
126 The most renowned Shi’i scholars of the Safavid period were: Hoseln Ibn ‘Amoll, Mofiammad 
‘AmolT, known as SeT^ ; Bahai (d. 1622 AD), Mmnofiammad Baqer Ibn Mofiammad EstarabadI known as 
MTrdamad (d. 1630 AD), ZeTnod-DTn ‘Abu’l Hasan ‘All Ibnal-HoseTn known as Mofiaqeq-e KerkI (d. 
1533 AD), Mofiammad Baqer MajlesI (d. 1698 AD), Mofiammad TaqI MajlesI (d. 1659 AD), Molla 
Mofisen Feyz KaSanI (d. 1680 AD) and Mofiammad Ibn Ibrahim known as §adrod-Dln SlrazT, Molla 
§adra (d. 1640 AD). Mo‘m (1358 SH/1979), p. 300, pp. 989-990, p. 2068, p. 1911, p. 1904, p. 1905, p. 
1910, & AStlyanI (1362 SH/1983), p. 698.
127 Savory (1980), p. 93.
128 Savory (1980), p. 30.
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state were severely criticized for their worldly involvements by thinkers such as §adrod- 
Dln STrazT, known as Molla §adra.
During the Safavid period, the government kept a large measure of control over 
the ‘Olama through the office of adr\ later known as Molla Bast. The ‘§adr' made the 
principal appointments, supervised the management of important endowments, Awqaf, 
and looked after the privileges of the seyyeds.129 The office of §adr was a powerful 
position and its main task was to stamp out heresy. In every big town, the Se%ol-Islam730 
and the Imam Jom ‘eh131 of the main mosque were state appointed.132 In the Safavid 
administration and bureaucracy, the ‘Olama played an important part but only as state 
officials. During this period, some managed to acquire great wealth. The jurisdiction of 
the Sarfah was not extended at the expense of ‘Orf, civil and arbitrary despotism, rather 
the reverse.133 The Safavid ‘Olama rarely, with some exceptions, spoke out against the 
injustice of the rulers.134 Overall, they supported the Safavids as the Safavids supported 
them. Also to some extent they viewed the government as ‘more legitimate’ than other 
non-Shi’i, non-Seyyed governments. The Safavids were viewed as preferential, based on 
their genealogical claim and their allegiance to the Imams.135
Primarily, the role of the ‘Olama in Safavid administration was very much as 
official functionaries. In the later Safavid period as the state weakened, the Mojtaheds 
gained more power and domination in religious affairs. Increased power was accompanied 
by an accumulation in wealth and influence, not only from holding state offices but also 
from acquisition of endowed land. It would be over-simplistic to assume that during the 
Safavid period there existed a single and commonly-accepted view on the relationship of 
religion and state. An examination of this period reveals a diversity of opinion. There was 
the ‘original’ or fundamental Shi’i jurisprudential theory, which maintained that only the 
Imam is the just and legitimate ruler and that all others are usurpers and unjust. There was
129 The descendants of the prophet.
130 The office of §adr was replaced by the office of Sel^ol-Islam.
131 The leader of the Friday prayers, and the official link between the government and the ‘Olama.
132 Bagley (1971), pp. 1-22.
133 Ibid., p. 5.
134 Lambton (1956-57), pp. 125-48, pp. 131-2.
135 The Safavid Sahs used such titles as ‘Bandeh Sah Velayat’, the slave of the king of ‘successorship of 
the Prophet’, i.e. Imam ‘AIT. The literal meaning of ‘ValF is to be a friend, to be near, to govern, to 
administer, to manage, to rule, to have power, authority or to command. In the Shi’i usage of the word, all 
the above meanings are portrayed and embodied in the person of ‘AIT and the eleven successive Imams in 
relation to the Prophet.
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the theory that the ruler who defended Shi’ism and carried the sword for the exercise of 
justice had a conditional authority on the basis that he recognized the superiority of the 
Imams. Also there was the view that jurists and princes must cooperate in order to ensure 
the welfare, protection and righteousness of the people. This last view seems to have been 
the dominant one, and one which is echoed in the works of Mofiammad Baqer MajlesI136 
(d. 1699 AD), who held the powerful position of §e%ol-Islam:
‘Know that justice, Adi, of kings and princes, Omara, is one of the greatest 
things conducive to the well-being of man. The justice and righteousness of 
kings and princes is the cause of the righteousness of all people... It is related 
by a reliable source that the Prophet said, “There are two classes, §enf, in my 
community such that if they are corrupt, my community is also corrupt.” The 
two classes are the Foqaha [jurists] and the Omara [princes].’137
Using this argument as his basis, MajlesI discerns the necessity of cooperation of 
the ‘Olama with temporal power, and thus recognizes the interdependence of religion and 
de facto government. From Majlesfs referral to rulers ‘as kings who follow the true 
religion’ it can be deduced that his theory applied only to Shi’i rulers. MajlesI viewed the 
first duty of the ruler as the defence of the Imam! faith. The view expressed by MajlesI can 
be interpreted in two ways: as a strand of thought, which had existed alongside the 
original Shi’i theory of temporal power, or as a direct response to the advent of a 
powerful Shi’i state, which for the first time had allowed the Shi’i ‘Olama to participate 
fully in its administration.138 The Hadis ‘Kings have sovereignty over the people and ‘Elm 
[people who posses knowledge, namely the ‘Olama] have sovereignty over them 
[kings],’139 takes the above Hadis to its full conclusion. The ‘Olama possess the 
knowledge of definition of justice, and to this extent hold ‘sovereignty over kings.’ 
Abdulaziz Sachedina, comparing a Hadis as reported by Al-JusI and MajlesI, points out 
the subtle shifts in meaning which occurred in the collections of late Safavid scholars such 
as MajlesI. Al-JusI reports that the Twelfth Imam said, ‘I am proof, Hojja, to you all’, 
clearly meaning the community as a whole. MajlesI reports the Hadis with the change,
136 MajlesI was one of the great Safavid Mojtaheds, and is famous for compilation of Shi’i ftadls 
literature in his celebrated work Baharol Anvar, (1362 SH/1984).
137 This 1-IadlS is attributed to the Prophet and first appears in the work Harranl, a fourth century 
theologian.
138 Martin (1989), p. 18.
139 MajlesI (1362 SH/1984), p. 49.
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‘and I am the Hojja to them’, implying that the Mojtahed stand between the Imam and the 
community as a kind of mediator.140
The question over the legitimacy of the state was an issue which had already been 
faced by the Shi’i ‘Olama, in the early formative period and particularly during the Safavid 
period. The theoretical negation of the legitimacy of temporal power in the absence of the 
Imam was not accepted by all ‘Olama; nevertheless, it was a potent concept that could not 
be ignored. It was effectively and powerfully used by the ‘Olama whenever a ruler dared 
to countermand their will. Like other doctrinal obstacles facing the ‘Olama, the road had 
already been paved for overcoming this particular one, by the teachings of such 
‘unquestionable authorities as §e% Tusi and Ibn Idris’.141 Both recognized not only the 
admissibility of working with temporal powers, but also the possibility of a just ruler 
(although not ultimately just) in the absence of the Imam. This position was further 
developed during the Safavid period. However, it also received fierce opposition from 
such scholars as §e% Ibrahim Ghatifi, who fundamentally rejected temporal rule. It may 
be useful in further clarifying the position of those ‘Olama who saw as permissible the 
cooperation with temporal governments under certain conditions to quote a statement by 
an influential figure of the Safavid period Molla Mofiammad Baqer, known as Mofiaqeq-e 
Sabzehvari, (d. 1679 AD):
‘No time is devoid of the existence of the Imam, but in certain periods the 
Imam is absent from the eyes of human beings for reasons and expediencies, 
but even the world is proposing thanks to the emanation of his existence.
Now in this period, when the Master of the Age is absent, if there is no just 
and judicious king to administer and rule this world, the affairs will end in 
chaos and disintegration, and life will become impossible for everybody. But it 
is inevitable and imperative, for people [to be ruled by] a king who will rule 
with justice142 and follow the practice and tradition of the Imams.’143
140 Sachedina (1981).
141 Enayat (1982), p. 173.
142 According to Mofiaqeq-e Sabzehvari, the conditions for the ‘just king’ are as follows: 1) He must 
follow the tradition of the Imam. 2) He must repel oppressors. 3) He must protect his subjects who are the 
trustees of God Almighty. 4) He must keep every subject in his deserved status. 5) He must safe guard the 
faithful from the threat of infidel aggression and domination. 6) He must disseminate the word of the 
Sarfah. 7) He must empower the people to piety and religiosity. 8) He must refrain from coveting the 
belongings of his subjects and from making their persons and belongings the instrument of sin and 
lasciviousness. 9) He must enjoy in the good and forbid evil. 10) He must maintain the safety of high 
ways and frontiers. It is interesting to note that this stance is very similar to the Sunni theory of the 
obligations of the Caliph.
143 Sabzehvari (no date), Rowzatol Anvar-e 'Abbassl, p. 9.
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During the Safavid period, Shi’i religious officials were, like their Sunni 
counterparts, incorporated in the bureaucratic institution of the state. The religious 
institution was subordinate to the political institution. However, not all Shi’i ‘Olama 
functioned as state officials. A section of the ‘Olama refrained from any political 
involvement, regarding all governments unjust during the absence of the Imam. This 
section was regard by the people as a refuge against the injustice, of the state. Lambton 
argues that neither group appears to have seriously considered the position and 
relationship between the religious and political institution.144 She maintains that no 
‘specific’ treatises were written on the subject. This, however, does not signify that 
neither group had given serious thought to the relationship between religion and the state. 
The position of each group is clearly marked by its involvement and non-involvement in 
political affairs. Those who cooperated with the state sought an accommodatory theory 
legitimizing their involvement as well as the political power of the government, not all that 
different from their Sunni counterparts, with only one exception: the recognition of the 
‘ultimate’ authority of the Imam. The second group remained strictly faithful to the 
primary Shi’i concept of authority, and thus in the absence of the Imam abstained from 
political involvement or theoretical legitimization.
The Safavids based their claim to legitimacy on their descendence from the 
Seventh Imam. However, they were not completely independent of the ‘Olama, as the 
confirmation of their legitimacy was dependent on the ‘Olama as the perpetuators of Shi’i 
doctrine. Consequently, their claim to legitimacy was not strictly autonomous. In this 
respect, the Shi’i ‘Olama performed the same function of providing doctrinal legitimacy to 
the state as had their Sunni counterparts from the first century after Hejra. In return for 
the safety and ‘relative justice’ provided by the king, the ‘Olama recognized his power as 
legitimate. The Weberian term ‘Caesaropapism’, or the complete subordination of priestly 
to secular power, may be an accurate definition of Safavid rule. Weber defines 
caesaropapist rule in the following way:
‘Caesaropapist government treats ecclesiastic affairs simply as a branch of 
political administration. Gods and saints are deities of the state; their worship 
is a state affair... If the political official does not fulfil these religious 
obligations himself, merely with the assistance of the priestly professional 
these technicalities will be put into the hands of a priesthood, which is
144 Lambton (1962-64), pp. 115-36, p. 116.
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politically controlled. The state-maintained priesthood lacks economic 
autonomy, property and an independent administrative apparatus. All official 
priestly acts are supervised by the state. There is no specifically clerical way of 
life, apart from some technical training for ritual functions, and hence also 
non-specifically priestly education. Hierocratic charisma is degraded to the 
level of mere administrative technique. Moreover, caesaropapist nobility 
transforms the high-ranking priestly positions into hereditary family property 
expropriatable as a source of income, prestige and power.145 .... As a 
legitimizing power hierocray is almost indispensable (and especially) to the 
caesaropapist ruler.’146
In the Safavid attempt of creating religious uniformity and suppressing 
‘unorthodoxy’, the ‘Olama’s role was of crucial importance. In Weberian terminology, 
‘hierocracy is the incomparable means of domesticating the subjects in things great and 
little. The domesticating role of hierocracy is even greater with regard to internal 
control.’147 The Safavids had built up and sustained the body of Shi’i ‘Olama, and to this 
extent exercised great control over them. However, the Safavids were not able to prevent 
all independent thought. The Akban schools148 greatly criticized the ‘worldliness’ of the 
Mojtaheds; their controversy with the dominant 0§ull School went on for two centuries. 
The long-standing interest of Iranians in philosophy seems to have been greatly stimulated 
by the philosophical elements in Shi’i doctrine. While philosophy was in decline and 
stagnation in other parts of the Muslim world, there was a ‘flowering’ of Iranian 
philosophy, vis-a-vis Shi’i philosophy or what Corbin refers to as ‘theosophy’, namely, 
the ‘EsraqT School of ‘Illumination’. Molla §adra, §adrod-Dm Slrazi (d. 1640 AD), for 
example, wrote many books which have been of major importance to Islamic philosophy. 
In his only book in Persian iSeh A§V he rigorously criticizes the ‘worldly ‘Olama’, and 
rejects their premise of ‘worldly involvement’. However, it may be concluded that the 
Safavid period marks the transition of the ‘Olama from a distinct social group to a 
hierocracy.
After the collapse of the Safavid empire in 1722, the members of the Shi’i 
hierocracy were forced to subsist on their own, totally independent of the state. The 
science of jurisprudence and practice of analytical reasoning to derive legal norms, Ijtehad 
was adopted explicitly around the beginning of the fourteenth century. The adaptation of
145 Weber (1968), pp. 1162-3.
146 Ibid., pp. 1161-2.
147 Ibid., pp. 1175-6.
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the principle of Ijtehad constituted an intellectual revolution in medieval Shi’ism. It 
greatly enhanced the juristic authority of the Shi’i ‘Olama. This was further strengthened 
through the Shi’ism of the Safavid period, which may be termed the ‘Shi’ism of the 
Mojtahecf. The revival of the Akbarf school towards the end of the seventeen century, 
marked a resistance to this particular brand of Safavid Shi’ism, as well as to the growth of 
hierocartic power of the Mojtaheds in Iran.149 In the last decades of the eighteenth and the 
whole of the nineteenth centuries, the reaffirmation of the principle of Ijtehad resulted in 
the enhancement and furtherance of the power and the independence of the Shi’i ‘Olama. 
Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, the religious institution was not only 
economically independent but controlled the religious life of over ninety per cent of the 
people of Iran.150 Consequently, by the Qajar period, a shift in the balance between 
secular and religious power had occurred in such a way that religious was no longer 
subordinate to the political but they were mutually interdependent.151 Politics and religion 
formed a mutually interdependent dual power structure.
The Emergence of an Independent Shi9i Hierocracy
The interval between the Safavid and Qajar period was a testing time for Shi’ism. 
It was probably also then that loyalty to Shi’ism became to some extent identified with 
Iranian national life, and Shi’i beliefs and practice left a deep impact on national life.152 
The Safavids were succeeded by the Afsharid dynasty. Its founder, Nader Sah, was a 
Sunni, and attempted to rid Iran of all antecedent Shi’i influences. Nader Sah presented a 
bill consisting of five amendments to Iranian notables and tribal chieftains, as a pre­
condition for his acceptance of the throne. The notables accepted. It is of interest to 
consider Nader Sah’s five amendments, as his conditions were of significance for the 
newly Shi’i Iran. The five conditions were as follows:
1) Iranians must let go of their views concerning the people of Ahle Sonnah 
[to accept the Sunni doctrine as valid].
2) The Shi’a, while performing the pilgrimage, Haj, must accept one of the 
‘Four Schools’ of Sunni Feqh [Hanafi, Safe’!, MalekI and Hanball] and
148 The role of the AkbarTs will be dealt with in detail later. The founder of the school was Mofiammad 
Amin Astarabadl (d. 1033/1623). Strothmann, & Rypak (1934), pp. 249- 302.
149 Arjomand (1988), p. 13.
150 Ibid., p. 14.
151 The resulting compromise between secular and religious power may vary greatly, and actual 
distribution of power may shift without any formal modification of the compromise.
152 AStlyanI (1362 SH/1983), pp. 667-9 & Bagley (1971), pp. 1-22 & pp. 5-6.
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join them in performing the circumambulation of the Ka‘be, which is 
four-sided, each side being set apart for one of the ‘Four Schools’. 
[Accept one of the ‘Four Schools’ and its rites in performing the 
pilgrimage. Prior to this, the Ottomans did not allow Iranians to take 
part in the annual pilgrimage, as the Shi’a were not considered Muslims]
3) A pilgrim leader, Amir ul-Haj, should be elected from Iran to lead the 
Iranian pilgrims. The Ottomans should treat Iranians pilgrims in exactly 
the same manner as other pilgrims.
4) There should be an exchange of hostages between Iran and the Ottoman 
Empire.
5) There should be an exchange of representatives between Iran and the 
Ottoman Empire.
This proposal was also presented to the Ottomans. They accepted four of Nader’s 
amendments, but rejected the acceptance of Twelver Shi’ism as one of the branches of 
Islam, as they considered Shi’ism an innovation and heretical.153 Nader attempted to rid 
Iran of all preceding Shi’i influences and reverse the process stared by the Safavid. Nader 
was intent on destroying and uprooting the Qzelbas. Consequently, this led to his murder 
at the hands of the Qzelbas in 1747. It is suggested that Nader’s murder, as well as having 
political motives, had an overriding religious one.154 The Zand dynasty succeeded the 
Afsharids and ruled Iran from 1749-1794. During this period, the ‘Olama had little 
influence and no direct involvement in matters of governance. The abortive attempts of 
Nader Sah to deinstitutionalize Shi’ism and confiscate Shi’i >4wga/helped give impetus to 
counter-claims to power by the Mojtaheds. In part, this was reflected in the successful 
struggle of the 0§ull school of thought over the Akbari.155 However, they had already 
secured a well-established basis within society, and managed to survive both Nader Sah’s 
anti-Shi’a policies and the Zand dynasty, and emerged with hitherto unprecedented power 
and privilege during the Qajar period.
The reasons for a shift in the balance between secular and religious power by the 
Qajar period consist of doctrinal, financial and institutional changes in internal structure of 
Shi’i hierocracy, as well as socio-political and economic changes in the nature of the 
government. The independence of the ‘Olama from the state are viewed156 as being the 
consequence of the following internal structural changes: the development of the theory
153 AStlyanI (1362 SH/1983), p. 730, & Mo‘m (1358 SH/1979), pp. 2088-89.
154 AStlyanI (1362 SH/1983), pp. 733-4.
155 Keddie (1981), pp. 23-5.
156 See for Example, Arjomand (1988) & (1984), Martin (1989), and Enayat (1982).
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of ijtehad; the revival and ascendancy of the 0§uH school of thought, which is seen as a 
prerequisite for the financial independence of the ‘Olama, through the authorization of the 
collection of religious taxes as representatives of the Imam; the consolidation of the 
theories of Marfa ‘ Taqlld; and the enhanced independence of the ‘Olama by the fact that 
the major Shi’i theological schools were based in the holy cites of Iraq, outside the 
jurisdiction of the Iranian government. This was further strengthened by the weak and 
ineffective nature of Qajar rule. For example, the Qajars had inherited the offices of 
Se%ol-Islam and Imam Jom ‘eh from the Safavids, but due to the inherent weakness of 
Qajar administration, they did not exercise the same institutional control over the ‘Olama 
as the Safavids did. In addition, the position of Moftaheds had gained doctrinal strength 
through the triumph of the 0§ull school over the Akbarf school, which occurred in the 
eighteenth century.157
Furthermore, during the various wars with Russia, the Shi’i ‘Olama were called 
upon to mobilize support for the government as the only cohesive and hegemonic power 
beyond regional, communal, and tribal loyalty was loyalty to Shi’i Islam. Consequently by 
the Qajar period, as a result of the development of the theory of Ijtehad, the ascendancy 
of the 0§ull school, the financial independence of the ‘Olama, and the consolidation of the 
theories of Marfa ‘ TaqlTd, a dual conception of political and religious functions had 
developed, whereby the ‘Olama had assumed independent control of the Qajars. The 
impact of these institutional developments, combined with the lack of internal instability 
and ineffective Qajar administration led to the development of the “ Olama-state’ dual­
power structure, which characterized the Qajar period.
The upper ranks of the ‘Olama consisted of Moftaheds who enjoyed tremendous 
power and prestige during the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries. 
Although the ‘Olama are referred to as the religious institution, the extent of their 
organization into a hierarchical system of authority should not be exaggerated. There was 
no formal hierarchy of authority among the Moftaheds, and the lower clerics could be 
differentiated by the patronage of various Moftaheds and the extent of their learning and 
piety. However, this is not to say that no system of hierarchy existed amongst the 
Moftaheds. Those in the shrine cities of Ottoman Iraq [Atabat] held pre-eminence, while 
in Iran those in Tehran looked upon themselves as taking prominence over their
157 Algar (1969), p. 6.
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colleagues in the provinces.158 Theoretically, a Moftahed was supposed to embody 
impeccable character and extensive knowledge. In practice, however, many Moftaheds 
inherited their office.159 As a result of the indistinct and informal organization of the Shi’i 
‘Olama, they often failed to act as a unified body, except on rare occasions. The pre­
eminence of the Moftaheds during the Qajar period was a direct consequence of the 
ascendancy of the 0§ull school of thought. It will be helpful for our purposes to consider 
the basic differences between the Akbaff and 0§ull schools.
The Akbaff school was founded by Mofiammad Amin AstarabadI (d.1627 AD),160 
and dominated religious learning until the beginning of the Zand period. With the 
emergence of Mofiammad Baqer Vafild BehbahanI, the Akbaris were decisively defeated. 
The principles of the 0§ull jurisprudence were laid down by Mofiammad Baqer BehbahanI 
(1705-1803), and later modified by SeU^  Morteza An§aff (1801-1864). The ground was 
then prepared for men such as Mlrza QomI (d. 1815 AD), Molla Mofiammad Kazem 
£orasam (d. 1911 AD), and Mohammad Hoseih Na’M  (d. 1936 AD). In fact, Akbaff 
ascendancy was to such a point that there was no mention of important Moftaheds in the 
history of Shi’i law until the middle of the eighteenth century. The Akbaffs rejected the 
cardinal role of the Moftahed as incompatible with the authority of the Imam, and 
considered the use of Iftehad161 reprehensible. They also rejected the concept of Taqtld162, 
arguing that all believers are followers and thus Moghled163 of the Imam, and only the 
Fourteen Infallibles are worthy of imitation. They relied exclusively on guidance through 
interpretations of the traditions of the Imams. According to Bayat, the Akbaff doctrine 
was formulated partly as a response to the power acquired by the Moftaheds during the 
Safavid period.164
The 0§ulTs derived their name from the principles, 0§ul, of jurisprudence used by 
the Mojtahed in arriving at their independent deduction of the law, Iftehad. The four 
principles, ‘Adi Arba'e, of jurisprudence are: Qoran, Sonna, Ifma [of other Mojtaheds], 
and reason ‘Aqel. The principal basis of the 0§ulT doctrine is the capability and primacy of
158 Hardinge to Salisbury, no. 58, & May 1897, FO 539/76, no. 74.
159 Martin (1989), p. 13.
160 Strothmann & Rypak (1934), pp. 249- 302.
161 Independent legal judgment, effort or ability to deduce rules from sources.
162 Imitation of authorities in canonical matters, Mojtaheds.
163 One who imitates.
164 Bayat (1982), pp. 21-2.
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reason, secondary only to the Qoran and Sonna, to discern the rules of the Saff ah. This 
0§ull premise establishes the basis for the necessity of Ijtehad, and the refusal to accept 
uncritically the contents of the four principal codices165 of Shi’i tradition. The 0§uhs 
maintain that, through the supremacy of reason, a more accurate criterion for ascertaining 
the authenticity of attributed sayings of the Prophet and Imams can be devised. Finally, 
the 0§ulls prohibit the imitation of deceased authorities to ensure the abiding dynamism of 
Ijtehad. The practice of Ijtehad based on the 0§ulol-Feqh was given precedents over 
tradition, and thus a more significant role was attributed to the interpretation of the 
Moftahed.166 Ijtehad is viewed as obligatory on the part of the Moftahed, as Taqlid is on 
the part of the Moqalled.
The science of 0§ulol-Feqh, the principles or theory of jurisprudence, reached 
new peaks in the nineteenth century. This science had cultivated subtle argumentative 
skills among the Shi’i clerics. The growing tension between the 0§uU and the Akbaris, 
which had existed since the eighteenth century, continued. The 0§ulT doctrine produced a 
concept of orthodoxy pivoted on and expounded by the Mojtaheds. The ‘Olama held the 
sole monopoly of not only interpretation but also the very definition of orthodoxy. The 
0§uHs were dominant throughout the Qajar period, strengthening the position of the 
Mojtahed not only against temporal power but also in the elimination of dissent.167 The 
principle of Ijtehad in Shi’i jurisprudence is a potentially revolutionary stance in the face 
of temporal power, as it allows for doctrinal flexibility in unforeseen circumstances. Only 
in Shi’ism is Ijtehad the logical and essential concurrent of the creed.168
Enayat believes that the principles of Twelver Shi’ism allowed for such a 
development. ‘We believe that the doctrine of Imamate is as much part of the Shi’i 
concept of law as the necessity of Ijtehad. It was thanks to the 0§ulls that the logical and 
indefeasible connection between the Imamate and Ijtehad was demonstrated with force 
and clarity. The ‘Olama of all persuasions already enjoyed great influence among the 
masses as spiritual leaders, judges, administrators of Awqaf [endowments], and even 
landowners, traders and moneylenders. What they still needed in order to stand up to the 
despotic monarchy of the Qajars, without impairing the supremacy of the Sarfah, was a
165 By Kolaynl, Sei^ Saduq and Selfc Tusl.
166 Algar (1969), pp. 33-6.
167 Bayat (1982).
168 Motahhart (1341 SH/1962).
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political theory formulating the principles of representation and government accountability 
in the categories of Shi’i jurisprudence.’169 This argument does not provide a satisfactory 
basis for its assumption, namely the ‘indefeasible connection between the Imamate and 
Ijtehad\ It is true that the 0§ull school triumphed over the Akbaff, but one can not simply 
deduce from this that the 0§ull ascendancy was somehow inherent in the principles of 
Shi’i belief.
The ‘Olama had acquired sole monopoly over interpretation of doctrine more so 
with the ascendancy of the 0§ull School. This elitism enabled them to ‘re-interpret’ or 
‘rethink’ certain concepts in order not only to legitimize their involvement in political and 
temporal affairs, but their role as representatives of the Imam and therefore custodians of 
religion. It may be argued that this development was very much an innovation within Shi’i 
thought, in so far as it brought it closer to Sunni Islam in that it legitimized the authority 
on a ‘fallible’ in the affairs of religion. This trend actually refutes the primary principle of 
Shi’ism, which is the need for infallibility and Imamate, and comes frill circle back to the 
very point which distinguished the two communities at the outset. However, the principle 
of Ijtehad and Ijma as restricted to the consensus of the Moftahed has ensured far greater 
power for the Shi’i ‘Olama than their Sunni counterpart. The claim to hold supreme 
religious authority is as illegitimate within the Shi’i doctrine is the claim to hold supreme 
political power during the absence of the Imam. However, the ‘Olama as the propagators 
of doctrine legitimized their monoploy of religious authority based on the concept of 
deputyship of the Imam, thus partaking in the spiritual charisma of the Imam.
The way in which the ‘Olama provided or, one can even say, ‘invented’ a religious 
basis to support their actions is best demonstrated by the ‘Olama’s involvement in the 
Constitutional movement. Both Constitutionalist and anti Constitutionalist ‘Olama 
provided arguments based on Islamic precepts to support their particular stance. Na’ihl, 
for example, regarding the necessity of support for the Constitutional movement, argues 
on the basis of the concept of ‘obligatory preliminary’ the adoption of a constitution 
becomes obligatory for Muslims when it is a precondition for their welfare, security and 
progress.170 The Sunni argument holds that public interest, Ma§laH9 should always prevail 
over the preferences of jurisconsultants. The Shi’a refute the concept of Ma§laHe in
169 Enayat (1982), p. 170.
170 NaTnl (1334 SH/1955), pp. 74-5.
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favour of ‘obligatory preliminary’. The concept of ‘obligatory preliminary’ enables them 
to devise laws for which there are no previous canonical licence, which is viewed by the 
Akbaris as innovatory. SeU: Fazllollah Nun rejected the notion of constitution as the 
sovereignty of the people. He argued that sovereignty belonged to Allah alone, and at his 
will was successively relinquished to the Prophet, to the Imams, and finally to those 
learned enough to render judgment in the matters of law [Mojtaheds]. Thus, there is no 
place in this arrangement for the masses to exercise their sovereignty. As can be seen both 
the consituionalist camp171 and the anti constituionalist172 presented their arguments 
within an Islamic framework, and through religious rhetoric, to provide justification for 
their actions.173
The level of political involvement on part of the Shi’i ‘Olama in the Constitutional 
Revolution was unmatched among their contemporary counterparts in Ottoman Turkey or 
Egypt. The increased political participation of Shi’i ‘Olama is highlighted by their 
involvement in the Constitutional Revolution . According to Afimad KasravT (d. 1946 
AD), the Shi’i ‘Olama, by rectitude of their belief in the exclusive legitimacy of the 
temporal and spiritual rule of the Imams, have always been opposed to temporal power in 
the absence of the Imam.174 It is interesting to note that KasravT somewhat negates his 
own argument by his detailed description of the role of many of the ‘Olama in the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1906. Hamid Algar, although from a diametrically opposed 
premise, arrives at the same conclusion as KasravT. He writes: ‘In the new situation [after 
the establishment of Qajar rule] a political theory to accommodate the state within the 
system of belief was still not developed. Such a theory was probably impossible: The 
‘Olama, having established their position as the de facto regents of the Imam, could not 
then have allotted the monarchy a similar position. Without such a position, the monarchy 
was bound to be regarded as illegitimate.’175
The triumph of the 0§ulT school had significant consequences for Shi’i political 
thought and the social role of the Moftahed, the implications of which can hardly be
171 Such as Molla Mofiammad Kazem £orasam, Haj MTrza HoseTn £alffi Tehran!, Selk ‘Abdollah 
Mazandarani, and Selk Mofiammad HoseTn Na’TnT [in Iraq], Seyyed Mofiammad §adeq Jabataba’T, 
Seyyed ‘Abdollah BehbahanI [in Iran].
172 Such as Nur! [Iran] and Mofiammad Kazem YazdT [Iraq].
173 Adamlyat (1355 SH/1976).
174 KasravT (1348 SH/1969), p. 11.
175 Algar (1969), p. 22.
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overstated. The right of Ijtehad and the authority of reason encouraged a more flexible 
approach to the application of jurisprudence to emerging social problems. The acceptance 
of the validity of probable knowledge, Zan-e Mo‘fabar, and the permissibility of actions 
not specifically forbidden by the sources also helped this. The consequent reassertion of 
the status and the role of the Mojtahed provided more scope for the involvement of the 
‘Olama in political and temporal affairs. However, it must be pointed out that it would be 
far too simplistic to portray the 0§ulls as logical and ‘progressive’ and the Akbaris as 
traditional and ‘reactionary’. In fact, many features of the Akbari doctrine, such as their 
stance against the privileged position of the Mojtaheds were strongly anti-elitist. 
Furthermore, it could be argued that the Akbaris remained closer to the esoteric and 
spiritual side of Shi’ism. Their distrust of ‘fallible’ and limited human reason can be 
viewed as an extension of the logic of Imamate. If the secret truth of Islam can only be 
found in the mundus imaginalis, then God, the Prophet and the members of his house (the 
Imams) only know its full truth. Hence, when the cycle of the Twelve Imams was 
completed, so was the doctrine of the wisdom of gradualness, Hekmate TadrTji, and all 
that was required was revealed. This assumption forms the basis for Akbari emphasis on 
the Imams as the only source of imitation, TaqlTd.
The Akbaris repudiate the 0§uK claims. Firstly, they reject reason and consensus, 
on the grounds of fallibility of all non-Mz ‘§ums (non-Infallibles). They argue that all 
individuals are at the same level of mediocrity, and only worthy of being imitators, 
Moqalled, of the Prophet and Imams. They condemn Ijtehad as the product of arbitrary 
probable knowledge, Zann, in favour of definite knowledge, ‘Elme Qaf% of the Imam. 
While the 0§uEs allow for judicial innovation through their endorsement of the validity of 
probable knowledge to deduce canonical rules, whenever access to ‘definite knowledge’ 
proves impossible, the Akbaris reject this. Instead of Ijtehad, the Akbaris regard the 
collection of the sayings and traditions of the Imams as an adequate and complete model 
of imitation for all Muslims. It is obligatory for every Muslim, even the ordinary, ‘AmmT 
Muslim, to know and follow the example of the Imams. The Akbari tradition places the 
onus of knowledge upon the individual rather than the sole monopoly of a specific group. 
The 0§ulls maintain that any act is presumed permissible except when explicitly forbidden 
by the SafPah. For the Akbaris this is unacceptable, as they view all knowledge as 
unreliable, except that which is conveyed by the Imam, and that whenever an act is not 
explicitly permitted by the Sarfah one should refrain from it. Furthermore, the Akbaris
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differ from the 0§ulls in accepting the imitation of deceased authorities. They argue that 
the truth of a proposition is not affected by the death of its narrator, but rather its basis; 
the ruling of past ‘Olama should only be rejected if they are the products of their own 
arbitrary rulings rather than ‘definite knowledge.’176
In the middle of the nineteenth century, a process of re-thinking occurred in Shi’i 
traditional attitudes. Enayat calls this ‘the new phase of Shi’i dynamism.’177 The outcome 
of this rethinking changed some of the political features of Shi’ism, turning it ‘from an 
elitist, esoteric and passive sect into a mass movement animated by democratic ideals, and 
contempt for innate privilege.’178 Enayat views the importance of this rethinking in its 
ability to determine political behaviour. However, it must be pointed out that in terms of 
reducing the elitist aspect, this did not occur as widely as it is believed. The ‘Olama still 
held the exclusive right of ‘legitimate’ interpretation of the doctrine, combined with their 
knowledge of Arabic, which was lacking in the general population. Their political activism 
did not negate their claim to esoteric knowledge or privileges based upon that knowledge. 
It was now simply of secondary importance to their temporal position. This resulted in the 
decline of the overall role of the ‘Olama as spiritual leaders as their involvement in 
temporal affairs increased.
The concept of Ijtehad monopolized Islamic knowledge as the sole preserve of the 
Moftahed. The introduction of the concept of Marfa‘ Taqlid, created passivity and 
ignorance amongst the people, in that people had a passive relationship to their beliefs, in 
so much as they relied upon the ‘Olama to tell them what is prohibited and what is 
allowed. In so much as Iftehad encouraged the growth of analytic and critical reasoning 
amongst the Shi’i ‘Olama, it prohibited it amongst the mass of people, as their thinking 
was done for them by the Marfa * Taqlid. This ignorance was the cause of their passivity; 
it also was the very root of the religious domination of the ‘Olama, which they guarded 
possessively. Undoubtedly, during this period, there was a revival in the political features 
of Shi’ism; however, the extent to which the relationship of the people to their belief, 
political access and to the ‘Olama actually changed is debatable. Contrary to what has 
been proposed by Enayat, we hold that the ascendancy of the 0§ull school added to the 
elitist,nature of Shi’ism, in that it created a new elite within the Shi’i doctrine, namely the
176 l£orasam (1306 SH/1888), pp. 30-6.
177 Enayat (1982), p. 163.
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Mojtaheds. This period certainly marks the growth of political activity on the part of the 
‘Olama, as well doctrinal justification necessitated by this involvement. It also highlights 
the special place of the ‘Olama in Iran, the power and prestige conferred upon them by a 
combination of spiritual, social, political and financial functions. Furthermore, the 
increased political involvement of the ‘Olama is by no means synonymous with mass 
participation of the Shi’a in the political sphere, as is often suggested.
The jurisprudential domination of the 0§uU school must not be mistaken for the 
acceptance of their doctrine by all members of the Shi’i community, the authority of the 
Moftahed was not accepted by all. Furthermore the Shi’a do not have any council or 
individual who sets doctrine for the future. The remarks about the ascendancy of the 0§ull 
School refer to general trend and not unanimous opinions. There were, of course, other 
‘Olama in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who held varying opinions than those 
held by the majority. Se% Morteza An§ari (1799-1864), the leading Shi’i jurist of the 
nineteenth century, showed a marked reluctance in commenting on politics, and 
questioned the deputyship of the Moftahed as it could not be decisively deduced from the 
sources.179 Hence, it can be seen that the domination of any of these systems of thought 
did not depend upon the influence that religion in general exerted upon the life of people, 
or unanimity of opinion. However, the manner in which social domination was organized 
varied greatly, which had consequences for the course of religious development. In light 
of the 0§ull triumph, towards the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the 
nineteenth century there was a resurgence of Sufism and the Ne‘matollahI order in 
particular gained a large following. The Sufi concept of the Se% or the Plr180 directly 
challenges the position and authority of the ‘Olama, and the Moftaheds in particular. 
Sufism was often crushed in the name of heresy by the Shi’i orthodoxy. The persecution 
of the Nemtullahi order in the early nineteenth century by Faffi ‘AH Sah provides an 
interesting example of the collaboration of the ‘Olama and the state. The ‘Olama managed 
to persuade the Sah that the Nemtullahi order directly threatened and undermined the 
Sarfah. Mofiammad ‘AH BehbahanI, the son of Mofiammad Baqer BehbahanI, was an
178 Ibid., p. 164
179 Arjomand (1984), pp. 236-7.
180 The Sufi concept of the ‘Guide’ or ‘Master’, is based on a chain of authority known as Selseleh, 
which is usually traced back to the Prophet through one of the Imams, mostly ‘AIT. This is generally true 
of most Sufi orders with the exceptions of the ‘Nafcsebandf who trace their Selseleh back to Abu Bakr.
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influential figure in the arrest of Ma‘§um ‘All Sah, the PJr of the Nemtullahi order, and 
many of his followers in KermanShah.181 The Sah, who was not personally hostile to 
Sufism, suppressed the movement. Concerning this incident Malcolm explains:
‘They [the ‘Olama] have always succeeded in convincing his [the Sah’s] 
judgement that the established religion was necessary to support the state, and 
that nothing could be more dangerous than the progress of a spirit of 
infidelity, which by unsettling men’s minds was calculated to throw them into 
a state of doubt and ferment.’182
This illustrates the way in which political power can offer exceeding support to the 
hierocracy ‘by providing the brachium secular for the annihilations of heretics.’183 
Furthermore, ‘As a rule, priestly charisma compromised with the secular power most of 
the time tacitly but sometimes also through a concordat. Thus the spheres of control were 
mutually guaranteed, each power was permitted to exert certain influences in the other’s 
realm in order to minimize collision of interest... These compromises also committed the 
two powers to mutual existence. The secular ruler makes available to the priest the 
external means of enforcement for the maintenance of their power. In return priests offer 
their religious sanctions in support of the ruler’s legitimacy and for the domestication of 
the subjects.’184 This incident clearly demonstrates that the ‘Olama did not only not view 
the state as illegitimate but perceived their interests as intertwined with that of the state. 
The persecution of the Sufis and the Babis emphasis the contingency of ‘orthodox 
religion’ as defined and expounded by the ‘Olama and the state. ‘Orthodoxy’ helped to 
bestow legitimacy and thus political stability, but it depended on the coercive power of 
the state to enforce it.
It may be useful to examine some of the views of certain ‘Olama on the 
relationship between religion and state during this period. Seyyed Ja‘far Ibn Esfiaq Darabi, 
BorujerdI Kasfi (d. 1850 AD), in his treatise entitled Tofifatol-Moluk,185 argues that 
during the Occultation of the Imam, the two functions of Imamate, religious and temporal 
sovereignty pass to two groups, the ‘Olama and the rulers, who act as the deputies of the
The Sufi concept of the §elk has an implicit claim in the authority and charisma of the Prophet, which 
poses an alternative to the ‘Olama’s claim to being the general representative of the Imam.
181 Bamdad (1348 SH/1969), pp. 423, & Mo‘in (1358 SH/1979), p. 1999.
182 Malcolm (1829), p. 414.
183 Weber (1968), p. 1175.
184 Ibid., pp. 1161-2.
185 Cited in Noqabaol BaSar, p. 241, as cited in Enayat (1982). Kalfi also discuss the extent of the justice 
of the ruler, and the ‘Olama’s role in defining justice, Ibid.
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Imam. ‘The Mojtaheds and the rulers both hold the same office, that of the Imamate, 
transferred to them from the Imam through the deputyship, niyabat, and consisting of two 
pillars, Rokn, knowledge of Prophetic matters which is called religion and the 
implementation of the same in the course of imposing order on the world, called kingship 
or sovereignty.’186 In the absence of the Imam, the authority of the ‘Olama and the power 
of the sovereign are intertwined, and it is in the interests of both to maintain this 
consensus. Kasfi maintains that the ‘Olama and the rulers are each a special deputy, Na 'eb 
of the Imam, the ‘Olama in the matter of knowledge, and the rulers in the matters 
of the sword. One condition for both functions is justice. This theory provides religious 
legitimization for the ruler only in the temporal sphere and does not confer any religious 
authority upon him. This line of argument, based on the separation of powers of the 
Imam, has also been prevalent in earlier Shi’i theologians such as QomI and MajlesI.
The interdependence of the two functions of the Imam, and therefore the mutual 
dependence of the ‘Olama and the rulers in his absence, is also stressed by Se% Fazllollah 
Nun (1840-1909): ‘During the periods when the government, Dawlat, and the leadership 
of the community, Mellat, was fixed in one person, as in the time of the Prophet, the duty 
of regulating the affairs of the community, ‘Omum-e ‘Ammeh, was in the charge of one 
person. Now, through the exigencies of divine ordinances, each of these duties is in 
separate hands so it is the responsibility of each with the assistance of the other to guard 
and preserve the religion and the world of the worshipers, Din va Donyayeh ‘Obada, so 
that the roots of Islam may be protected in the absence of the Imam.’188 Nuri, in the 
tradition of MajlesI, QomI and KaSfi, views the application of religious principles and the 
wielding of power, in the absence of the Imam to be the duty of the ‘Olama and the ruler. 
Concerning this he writes: ‘In truth these two are supplementary and complementary to 
one another, and the foundation of Islam depends on them. Without these two Islamic 
precepts, that is, deputyship in the affairs of prophecy, Niyabat dar Omiir-e Nabaviyeh, 
and worldly rule, Salfanat, religion would collapse.’189 He goes on to say that the two 
groups that sustain and maintain religion, namely the ‘Olama and the Solfans, are 
responsible for justice and righteousness of the community. However, in this
186 As quoted in Arjomand (1984), p. 226.
187 The fourth deputy was the seal of the ‘Special deputies of the Imam’.
188 Nuri (1893) & (1362 SH/1983), pp. 61-2, & Malekzadeh (1327 SH/1948), pp. 215-9.
189 Ibid.
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interpretation, ultimate authority seems to lie with the ‘Olama, as the expounders of 
religion and the definers of justice. To this extent the legitimacy of the government is 
decided by the ‘Olama, as they are the ones who can judge the extent of its relative 
justice. Furthermore, since Imamate had been deprived of its political role, there was a 
particular emphasis on the religious aspect; the ‘Olama as ‘deputies’ of the Imam had 
‘inherited’ this tradition. Now that the government was a Twelver Shi’a one, the ‘Olama, 
as the representatives of Imam, had a particular influence upon the political realm in terms 
of providing legitimacy.
The work of Molla Afimad Naraql190 (d. 1829 AD), who is said to have first 
formulated the concept of the ‘Velayat Faqih’, rule of the jurist, later developed by 
Komeynl, cannot be left unmentioned. He poses the question of the extent or limits of the 
power of the Faqlh, Tafidid velyatol-Faqih. Quoting various Afiadis, in particular one by 
the third Shi’i Imam, HoseTn, ‘The complete affairs of the community are in the hands of 
the just and devote ‘Olama’. Naraql, arrives at the conclusion that the powers of the 
Prophet and the Imam belong to the ‘Olama during the Occultation. He views the limits of 
the powers of the Faqih as synonymous with those of the Prophet and the Imams. Based 
on the Hadis, ‘Kings have sovereignty over the people and ‘Elm has sovereignty over 
them [kings],’191 Naraql argues that, the second has *Veldya’ over the first. In this way he 
attributes both political and religious supremacy to the Faqih, arriving at the 
‘contradictory premise’ of the ‘ Velayat Faqih 192
A view which was particularly close to Sunni conclusions, on the necessity of 
coercive power and obligation of obedience, is to be found in the work of Mofiammad 
Raft Tabajabaal, known as Nezamol-Islam Tabrm. In his treatise Hoquqe Doval va 
Melall,193 written in 1887, he makes a distinction between a ruler who is a pretender to 
the Imamate and who must not be helped, and a just and rightful ruler, Ahlol Haq, who 
must be obeyed. However, he concludes that the Soljan must in any case be obeyed: ‘The 
Prophet himself said, “Obedience to the Soljan is obligatory, and whoever disobeys the 
Soljan, disobeys God.” For power is necessary to protect the country and its people.’ This 
can not be done except by a government. For this reason, people must not delay in paying
190 Naraql (1990).
191 MajlesI (1362 SH/1984), pp. 49.
192 Ha’erlYazdi (1995).
193 Tabalabaal(1356 SH/1977).
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their taxes and other duties for the well-being of the country. The order, peace and the 
progress of the society depends upon the payment of taxes, MalJyat, and their payment is 
an act of devotion, J'a ‘at.19*
It must be pointed out that none of these theories had a consensus among the 
‘Olama or was completely accepted by the state. One can find, in the nineteenth century, a 
diversity of opinion among the ‘Olama on the nature of their relationship with the state as 
well as concerning the authority of the Moftahed. However, by the end of the nineteenth 
century, before the major impact of Western ideas, there appears to have been an 
‘approximate consensus on the practical relations between religion and the state.’195 It 
was approved and commonly accepted that the ‘Olama and the state must cooperate for 
the well being of the country, Islam and the people. In terms of the separation of functions 
of the ‘Olama and the Sah, it was the ‘Olama who held ultimate authority. The Sah was 
expected to uphold and protect the tenets of the Sarfah, and only to this extent was he 
not treated as illegitimate or unjust. The ‘Olama, having established themselves as the 
deputies of the Imam and the upholders of Sarfah, had the right of definition as to what 
was acceptable and what was not. Thus, they held the exclusive right of defining when the 
Sah was acting according to or against the Sarfah.
This dual partnership between the Sah and the ‘Olama had existed in Iran in earlier 
times when Iran was under Sunni rule. Martin thus argues that the concept of partnership 
of religion and state, which is reflected in some of the accomodatory theories of Qajar 
times, may have been derived from a traditional consensus, established in the medieval 
period when Iran was under Sunni rule.196 This is also reflected in the views of Bagley,197 
who suggests that the dual power structure of religion and politics and the idea of the 
cooperation of government and the clergy has it roots in the pre-Islamic culture of Iran. 
The clergy have always been an important class in Iranian society, even during Iran’s pre- 
Islamic history. In addition, justice was a main theme in Iranian thought in both pre- 
Islamic and Islamic Iran. The saying that ‘Religion and Empire are brothers’, is ascribed 
to the Sassanid king Ardeslr Pakan.
194 Ibid.
195 Martin (1989), pp. 30-31.
196 Ibid. p. 33.
197 Bagley (1971), p. 1.
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The question which now needs to be addressed is whether the changes which 
occurred during these one and a half centuries, vis-a-vis the reaffirmation of the principle 
of Ijtehad which resulted in the enhancement and furtherance of power, institutional and 
financial independence of the Shi’i ‘Olama, meant that the Qajar ‘Olama could effectively 
be termed a ‘church’? Aijomand argues that ‘... “church” as the living extension of 
Incarnation and the mystical body of Christ is too specifically Christian to be helpful in 
comparative sociology.’198 Bearing this in mind, we still believe that it will be useful to 
consider Weber’s definition of a ‘church’, and see to what extent his characteristics are 
applicable to the Shi’i ‘Olama. This will help to further clarify the transition of the ‘Olama 
from a distinct but non-institutional group to a powerful and independent institution. 
Weber distinguishes four features as characterizing the emergence of a church out of a 
Hierocracy:
1) *The rise o f professional priesthood removed from the world with salaries,
promotions, professional duties and distinctive way of life. *
The basis for the development of the Shi’i ‘Olama as a distinct institution can said to have 
occurred during the Safavid period. During the next one-and-a-half centuries, the 
consolidation of the ‘Olama into an autonomous institution monopolizing the 
authoritative interpretation of Shi’i doctrine occurred, whereby the ‘Olama succeeded in 
establishing a monolistic control over the religious lives of the population. The financial 
independence of the ‘Olama was a simultaneous development, through the authorization 
of religious taxes as representatives and on behalf of the Imam. The concept of the 
collection of the Imam’s share as a part of the religious taxes of IComs was introduced, 
now collectable by the ‘Olama on ‘behalf of the Imam. It must be pointed out that the 
‘Olama were to this extent dependent on the faithful for their financial independence from 
the state. With popularization of the concept of TaqlTd, the faithful paid their religious 
taxes to the Marfa \  The Marfa‘ would then allocate a certain sum to be paid to the 
follab.199 The distinct way of life is a Christian characteristic of priesthood which is not 
applicable to Islam, although the piety of many ‘Olama was judged by the public on the 
extent of the simplicity of their lives, and their non-involvement in political matters.
2) ‘Claim to universal domination, that means, hierocracy must at least have
overcome household, sib and tribal ties, and o f a church in the fu ll sense o f the
198 Arjomand (1984), General Introduction.
199 SelV ‘Abdol-Karlm Ha’erT YazdT is said to have paid his Tollab 1 Qeran a week.
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word we speak only when ethnic and national barriers have been eliminated, 
hence after the levelling of all non-religious distinctions
During the Safavid period, belief in religion was synonymous with loyalty to the state. The 
period after the Safavid fall was a testing ground for Iran’s loyalty to Shi’ism. The 
distinctness of the Shi’i doctrine is viewed by many scholars as significant in the national 
life of Iran, setting it aside from its Arab neighbors. It was during this period that loyalty 
to Shi’ism became to some extent identified with Iran’s national life. Shi’i beliefs and 
practices had left a deep and lasting impact on the national life of Iran. By the Qajar 
period, the only cohesive power beyond regional, communal and tribal loyalty was loyalty 
to Shi’i Islam.
3) 'Dogma and rites (Kultus) must have been rationalizedrecorded in Holy 
Scriptures, provided with commentaries, and turned into objects o f a systematic 
education, as distinct from mere training in technical skills.9
Twelver Shi’ism developed a distinct doctrine and system of jurisprudence under the 
leadership of the fifth Mofiammadal-Baqer (d. 733 AD) and sixth Ja‘faral-§adeq (d. (765 
AD). By the ninth century, the Shi’i community was already well established both socially 
and doctrinally. A vast body of theological and legal literature existed - quoting from the 
Fifth and the Sixth Imam, and to a lesser extent from Musaal-Kazem, compiled in books 
and collections by Shi’i scholars - that made the Shi’i community self-sufficient except in 
odd cases where a new question arose or reports conflicted or opinions regarding 
interpretation differed.
4) *All those features must occur in some kind compulsory organization. For 
the decisive fact is the separation o f charisma from the person and its linkage 
with the institution and particularly with the office. Sociologically the church 
differs from the sect by considering itself the trustee of a “trust fund99 of 
eternal blessings that are offered to everyone. In one word the church is the 
bearer and trustee o f an office charisma, not a community of personally 
charismatic individuals, like the sect.9200
Although the ‘Olama are referred to as the religious institution, however, the extent of
their organization into a hierarchical system of authority should not be exaggerated. There
was no formal hierarchy of authority among the Mojtaheds, and the lower clerics could be
differentiated by the patronage of various Mojtaheds and the extent of their learning and
piety. However, this is not to say that a system of hierarchy did not exist amongst the
200 Weber (1968), p. 1164.
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Mojtaheds.201 Those in the shrine cities of Ottoman Iraq (Atabat) held pre-eminence, 
while in Iran those in Tehran looked upon themselves as taking prominence over their 
colleagues in the provinces.202 It could be argued that, with the ascendancy of the 0§uh 
School with its emphasis on Ijtehad and Taqtid, religious charismatic authority came to be 
assumed by the body of Mojtaheds. Furthermore, with the theory of Na 'eb ‘Am of the 
Imam, the ‘Olama became the ‘trustee of a trust fund’ of eternal blessings.’
It may effectively be argued that the term ‘church’ can loosely but accurately be 
applied to the ‘Olama during the Qajar period. There is a distinctive patterns of 
development of Shi’i ‘Olama from the time of the Greater Occultation until the period 
under study. After the Greater Occultation until the establishment of the Safavid dynasty, 
the Shi’i ‘Olama were a distinct social group but did not constitute a recognized 
institution, a hierocracy. The Safavid period marks the transition of the ‘Olama from a 
distinct social group to a hierocracy. The eventual consolidation of the Shi’i ‘Olama as a 
‘church’, occurred in the nineteenth century. During this period, the religious, judicial and 
educational institutions fell within the sphere of control of the ‘Olama. Simultaneously, as 
in the Sunni world, a number of treatises on political ethics and political theory were 
written by Shi’i jurists to legitimize this division. These works emphasized the 
interdependence of religion and kingship, and the importance of cooperation between 
religion and politics. Reza §ah ascended the throne in a country where this dual power 
structure had already taken firm roots. His policy of centralization was the antithesis of 
this dual structure of authority. Reza Sah was thus faced with a rival power structure, and 
made every effort to ensure its displacement. Consequently, the ‘Olama were 
irreconcilably alienated from the PahlavT State. The centralizing polices of Reza Sah 
devastated the clerical institution foundations of power, and to some extent lessened their 
cultural influence. However, one aspect of the traditional role of the ‘Olama which 
survived and was in fact strengthened, was their role as ‘the refuge from the oppression of 
tyrants and governmental officials’. This was one of the reasons for the continued 
influence, importance and popularity of the ‘Olama. Although many of their ‘public’ and 
political functions were removed from them, this did not reduce the importance of the
201 Theoretically, a Mojtahed is supposed to embody impeccable character extensive knowledge. In 
practice however, many Mojtahed inherited their office.
202 Hardinge to Salisbury, no. 58, & May 1897, FO 539/76, no. 74.
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Marfa ‘ Taqlid or the Ma ‘navi 'Olama03 or the extent of their power and influence over 
the lives of many Iranians. During the reign of Reza Sah, the institutional separation of 
religious and political powers became virtually complete; however, the internal structure 
of Iranian society was slower to change and the influence of the ‘Olama over the masses 
stayed almost intact.
203 DulatabadT makes an important distinction between ‘worldly ‘Olama’ (Donyavl) and ‘spiritual 
‘Olama’ (Ma‘navT or Ahle Mana). He describes the ‘worldly ‘Olama’
as ‘those whose quest for worldly domination, RIyasat Ma‘-abT, outweighs their religious aspects, who 
intermingle with state functionaries, hold religious court and gain large fortunes.’ He describes the 
‘spiritual ‘Olama’ as ‘those who have no relations with state functionaries, who do not interfere in the 
administration of the law and avoid worldly luxuries.’ DulatabadT (1371 SH/1992), pp. 50-54 & 134. 
‘Olama’ as ‘those who have no relations with state functionaries, who do not interfere in the 
administration of the law and avoid worldly luxuries.’ DulatabadT (1371 SH/1992), pp. 50-54 & 134.
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Chapter Three: Educational Reform and the Demise of
‘Olama Power
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Introduction
This chapter aims to examine the introduction of the new education system in Iran 
as a microcosm of the diminishing power of the ‘Olama. Education will be looked at 
within the larger framework of social processes and change during the reign of Reza Sah. 
The role of education in the shaping of modem Iran has been largely neglected. Scholars 
have given comparatively little attention to the part played by the introduction of 
‘Westem-style’ education system both as a catalyst for change and as an element itself 
subject to change. The study of the Reza Sah period whether in terms of modernization, 
Westernization, secularization, or simply ‘development’ has focused largely on political 
change and its impact on social, economic, administrative and intellectual affairs. The 
importance and contribution of education is yet to be recognized and fully appreciated. 
The transformation of the education system and the role of education are of paramount 
importance, as we shall attempt to argue in this chapter.
State authorization, sponsorship, funding and control of mass education first 
developed in Western Europe and later became a central feature of a highly 
institutionalized model of national development.1 European states became engaged in 
authorizing, funding and managing mass schools as a part of an endeavour to construct a 
unified polity. Within such polity, individuals were expected to find their primary identity 
with the nation.2 The education reforms of the Reza Sah period should be placed within 
the larger framework of his attempts to emulate the Western model of the nation-state and 
sponsored mass schooling as an institutional component. Mass education was evoked as a 
means of removing internal obstacles such as the power of the ‘Olama, tribal chieftains, 
and elite classes with a vested interest in a decentralized Iran. Mass state-controlled 
education was an indispensable factor in the development of a centralized state structure 
and the reconstruction of a sense of national identity based on Iran’s pre-Islamic past.
The introduction of the new education system and the consequential reduction of 
the power of the ‘Olama operated at two levels: firstly, in its most direct and immediate 
effect of the removal of the function of education and educational funds from the hands of 
the ‘Olama to that of the state; secondly, and by far the most significant in terms of
1 Ramirez & Boli (1987), p. 2.
2 Ibid., p. 3
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diminishing the influence of the ‘Olama in the long run, was the political socialization of 
the individual based on a value system alien to that of the native culture. The new 
education system through the ‘import’ of cultural values assisted the process of 
legitimization of other social changes, which were to be introduced. Education was the 
most potent force for Iran’s cohesion as a nation, a force simultaneously capable of 
diminishing allegiance to Islam and weakening regional and ethnic ties and loyalties. The 
new schools promoted loyalty to the nation over and above all other ‘sub-loyalties’. 
Through the new education system Reza Sah hoped to achieve the eventual breakdown of 
religious and regional loyalties and replace them with loyalty to the king and country.
The ‘Olama were intolerant of any change likely to prejudice their values let alone 
their status. It was not surprising that the most adamant opponents to the new education 
system were the ‘Olama. Although they could not deny the backwardness of Iran as 
measured against the material progress and strength of the West, they viewed the new 
education system as innovation, Bed’a, and innovation as un-Islamic. Resistance to 
change was seen as a religious obligation. The Prophet is alleged to have said: ‘The worst 
things are those that are novelties, every novelty is an innovation, Bed’a, every innovation 
is an error and every error leads to hell fire.’3 The Islamic world did not need to follow 
the same ‘road of progress’ as that of the West. Islamic traditions contained all that was 
required for a progressive society. Iran’s progress did not depend on ‘blind imitation’ of 
the West but on return to ‘true Islamic values’ and Islam’s glorious past.
Mass sentiment seems to have reflected and supported clerical attitudes. The 
following assessment by a British observer who travelled extensively in Iran early in the 
nineteenth century confirms this:
‘It is not easy to describe persons who fill no office, receive no 
appointment, who have no specific duties but who are called from their 
superior learning, piety and virtue by the silent but unanimous suffrage of 
the inhabitants..., to be their guides in religion and their protectors against 
the violence and oppression of their rulers and who receive from those by 
whose feeling they are elevated a respect and duty which leads the 
proudest king to join the popular voice.’4
The analyst Reza Qoh Hedayat writes: ‘The decrees of the ‘Olama had preference 
over those of the Sah... Had the Sah felt compelled to oppose their policies the people
3 Lewis (1953), pp. 52.
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would have toppled the monarchy.’5 Other travellers6 of the same period as well as later 
scholars7 have made very similar observations.
In the second half of the century in Iran as well as other parts of the Muslim 
world, the acknowledgment that Western education was vital for the achievement of 
progress became widespread. The intensity of this process was accelerated by the 
emergence of a new group of Western-educated thinkers. Education was viewed as one of 
the main ‘secrets’ of the success of the Western world. As Bernard Lewis has noted,8 this 
view was common at the end of the nineteenth century among Middle Eastern explorers 
of Europe. It was thought that political freedom was the secret source of Western power 
and success, the ‘Aladdin’s lamp with which the East might conjure up the genie of 
progress and win the fabulous treasures of the gorgeous and mysterious Occident.’9 For 
the European educated intellectuals,10 the imitation of the Western system of education 
was no longer ‘an innovation’ equivalent to an ‘error’ but rather the very road to 
salvation. Western-educated intellectuals, though not entirely divorced from their Iranian 
heritage, found inspiration for their views on education primarily in the West. Their 
writings show traces of eighteenth-century French thought on education influenced by 
theories such as those of Rousseau, Condorcet and Pestalozzi. Some also betray the 
influence of the ‘founding fathers’ of the United States - Thomas Jefferson, James 
Madison, John Hancock, and John Adams - who held that freedom and illiteracy were 
irreconcilable. Others reflect Adam Smith on the economic importance of education. 
However, given the prevalent religious ambiance and their own traditional upbringing, 
they often sought to accommodate both Western ideals and Islam. Some Muslim 
intellectuals viewed the expansion of education as the prerequisite of freedom, others as 
its inevitable outcome. Both groups viewed progress, freedom, and education as 
interrelated and inseparable. Education was considered as the social foundation for the 
formation of a modem nation state.
4 Malcolm (1829), p. 432.
5 Hedayat (1339 SH/1960), p. 674.
6 Browne (1926), pp. 370-71, Curzon (1892), & Wills (1891).
7 Algar (1969).
8 Lewis (1966), p. 47.
9 Ibid.
10 ‘Intellectuals’ is a term, which is not easily defined. The way the term is used in this context may be 
best described through Raymond Aron’s Definition of intellectuals as ‘experts and men of letters’ and 
those of the ‘inner circle’ who ‘live by and for the exercise of the intellect’. Aron (1957).
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Many educational reforms of the PahlavT period had their roots in the 
Constitutional period. During the Reza Sah period these processes were intensified and 
accelerated. To be able to further discuss the impact of the changes introduced in the 
education system by Reza Sah and its consequences for the ‘Olama, the education system 
prior to the reign of Reza Sah needs to be considered. In this chapter the role of 
intellectuals in promoting the need for a modem education system, the early experiments 
in modem education, the education reform during the Constitutional period, and finally 
education as a microcosm of the demise of clerical power during the reign of Reza Sah 
will be considered.
The Role of Intellectuals in Promoting Educational Reform
Iranian intellectuals like their counterparts in other parts of the Middle East 
viewed Western style education as the ‘cure’ for all the ills of their societies and people. 
The West was viewed as a desirable model of imitation for ‘progress’ and ‘development’. 
The West had progressed while the Islamic world had stagnated. The key to this progress 
was education. The source of Western strength was its freedom and the precondition of 
freedom was in turn education. The Japanese victory over Russia (1904-1905) and the 
rapid pace of Japanese modernization had inspired Muslim intellectuals and reinstalled 
their confidence in the ability of the East to equal and eventually surpass the West. ‘Only 
by virtue of education has the old Japanese nation, which for thousands of years lived in 
darkness and deprivation, came to enjoy such a prominent position.’ 11
Iranian intellectuals tended to be optimistic concerning ‘copying’ successful 
foreign education systems in the hope that other social, economic, and political processes 
would ‘automatically’ follow. This optimism derived partly from an assumption that it 
would be much easier to ‘transplant’ education systems than political and economic 
institutions. The spread of education was seen as paving the way for future reforms, 
making them socially more acceptable. Education was seen as a separate entity which was 
not subject to social, economic and political structures, and thus capable of being 
‘shipped-out’ almost like a crate of industrial products from developed countries to 
underdeveloped countries.12 Schools were often referred to by educationalist intellectuals
11 Malekzadeh (1327 SH/1948), pp. 152-3.
12 Menashri (1992), pp. 44-45.
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as ‘factories for producing human beings.’13 Schools were compared to industrial 
factories; as factories take in raw materials and turn out products, schools take in 
‘ignorant children and turn out engineers and accomplished thinkers.’ Setting up several 
of these factories would ‘help Iran to advance by three hundred years in the space of three 
months.’14
The pro-modem education arguments were often presented in an Islamic guise 
and terminology, a method employed on the part of the intellectuals to counteract 
opposition of the ‘Olama and to win over public opinion.15 The intellectuals did not 
openly reject traditional religious knowledge, as they could not have instantaneously 
opposed the hierocratic institution given their socio-historic milieu. It was, however, 
obvious that the traditional concept of knowledge was regarded as having little relevance 
or value in the modem world. Their definition of knowledge was very much a European 
one in terms of ‘applied scientific technological knowledge’ and progress in terms of the 
extent of the domination and control of nature. If they were to win the support of the 
general public, they needed to demonstrate that the new style of education was not 
contradictory but in fact complementary to Islamic beliefs and principles. Malkom Kan 
(1833-1908),16 the most forthright spokesman and critic of the old education system and 
the ‘Olama, wrote: ‘Those most hostile to the ordering of the country, the education and 
liberty of the people are the ‘Olama, the fanatic grundys.’17 The religious establishment’s 
ideological opposition to the new education system hindered its social progress.
The attempts of the intellectuals to promote the new education system as being in­
line with the Islamic precept of the ‘search for knowledge’ Jalebol ‘elm, failed to convince
13 Malekzadeh (1327 SH/1948), pp. 152-3.
14 Ibid.
15 The same approach was used for promoting the ideals of Constitutionalism; see Adamlyat (1355 
SH/1976).
16 Malkom was bom to an Armenian family from Julfa. His father had converted to Islam, presumably 
for practical reasons. At the age of ten he left for Paris, and with the recommendation of Amlr-Kablf, 
studied political science. He returned to Iran in 1851 and entered government service and worked as a 
teacher and translator at the newly established Darol-Fonun (1852) and as a personal interpreter to the 
Sah from 1856. In 1863 he was exiled to Baghdad on the account of being ‘irreligious’ and then to 
Istanbul where, as a result of Sepahsalar’s patronage, he was able to submit his reform projects to the 
government. He returned and was appointed advisor to Sepahsalar (then the Prime Minister) and was 
elevated to the ranks of nobility. He was later appointed as the ambassador to London and dismissed due 
to his involvement in a financial scandal. He remained in Europe until he was appointed as as the 
ambassador to Rome in 1902. For more information on Malkom see Algar (1973).
17 DulatabadT (1371 SH/1992), pp. 44-46, 180-81.
132
the ‘Olama. The ‘Olama remained the most adamant opponents of the new education.18 
Even to those ‘Olama who supported the constitution, the new educational system often 
remained ‘the tantamount of irreligiousity.’19 The ‘Olama acknowledged the importance 
of education in general but regarded the new education system as dangerous to the 
Muslim civilization and to their own status in society. The danger that the new education 
system posed for the ‘Olama was twofold: firstly, they would no longer have control over 
financial as well as Constitutional matters pertaining to education, which was detrimental 
to their status. The teachers of Maktab traditional religious elementary schools stood to 
lose an important source of income. Furthermore the removal of religious endowments 
from the jurisdiction of the ‘Olama was a blow to their financial autonomy. Secondly, the 
new curriculum based on the European model nurtured an imported value system, which 
would in the long run reduce religious loyalties and consequently erode the influence of 
the ‘Olama within society.
The intellectuals were very critical of the traditional system of education. The 
traditional religious elementary schools, Maktab, were viewed as inadequate. It was 
argued that the students were not prepared for any useful occupations in life and the 
syllabus was totally irrelevant to the country’s needs.20 The schoolteachers, Alfunds, were 
usually lower-ranking clergy lacking in education and pedagogical training themselves. 
The intellectuals criticized the traditional schooling system as stagnant and incapable of 
facing up to the challenges of the modem world. The failure of the traditional school 
system was viewed as twofold: firstly, the system of traditional schooling reflected the 
distorted social perception on the part of the religious and the political establishment 
valuing lineage above merit; secondly, for its own inherent demerits, which will be 
discussed later.
The traditional school system reinforced social traditions valuing lineage over and 
above merit. The political establishment, whose interests were served by the 
reinforcement of this value system, neglected educational reform. The inherent demerits 
of the traditional system were viewed as being in three major areas: the curriculum, the 
method of instruction and quality of teaching. The curriculum was thought to be irrelevant 
and out-moded. The method of teaching was viewed as uncritical and non-analytic. It was
18 For a more detailed discussion of the above see MafiallatT (1346 SH/1967), pp. 12-15.
19 Bap Qajar (1356 SH/1977), pp. 76-79.
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based on memorizing, and asking questions was discouraged. The teachers were often of 
little education themselves.21 Mehdl Qoll Hedayat wrote of his own teacher: ‘May God 
rest his soul. He was so illiterate that we, his students, had to correct his mistakes!’22 The 
‘new educationalist’ argued that instead of instilling beliefs and fostering good manners 
schools should prepare students for productive participation in building a new Iran. Such 
zealous support for Westem-style education undoubtedly contributed to the spread of 
modernism but at the same time stimulated fierce opposition by the ‘Olama.
Malkom Kan was among the Iranian intellectuals who viewed education as the 
principal precondition of freedom and progress. His thoughts were particularly influential 
in the promotion of the modem education system. Malkom was well acquainted with the 
thoughts and lifestyle of the West, which he inspired to imitate in Iran. He was in feet the 
first advocate of comprehensive change as one can learn from his first treatise published in 
the late 1850’s entitled The Book o f Reforms, Daftare Tanzimat. One can trace influences 
of both Darwinism and of eighteenth-century humanism in the works of Malkom Kan. In 
his treatise Principles o f Humanism, 0§iil-e AdamTyat,23 he speaks of the three stages in 
the development in nature; inanimate, animal, and human. Malkom argues that man’s 
ability to rise from the animal stage to that of humanity depends on acquiring knowledge. 
As long as people did not ‘enjoy the enlightenment of knowledge they could not elevate 
themselves to the stage of humanism.’24 There seems to be a certain degree of Kantian 
influence in the works of Malkom too. He distinguishes three other stages in the 
development of human civilization - religious, philosophical and scientific - which can be 
said to be parallel to childhood, adolescence, and maturity. To achieve the highest level, 
societies, just like individuals, must acquire knowledge.25
The educationalists emphasized the importance of education for the community as 
a whole rather than just for the individual. Malkom argued that: ‘The strength of states
20 Qasemi-Puya (1377 SH/1998), pp. 89-92.
21 Ibid., and Hedayat (1344 SH/1966).
22 Ibid., p. 10.
23 One can find similar lines of argument in terms of ‘human progression’ in traditional Persian 
literature, such as the works of Jalalod-DIn Mofiammad Bal^ T [Rumi]. Rumi speaks of the human’s 
ability to progress from vegetable to animal to human and finally the ‘perfect man’. The fundamental 
difference lies in the concept of knowledge. One can deduce from Malkom’s work that his concept of 
knowledge is an ‘instrumental’ concept in terms of applied scientific knowledge and technological 
progress. It is within his definition of knowledge that one can see direct influences of Western thought.
24 Malkom Kan [NaZemol Dowleh] (1324 SH/1945), pp. 232-34 & 238-44.
25 Ibid.
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today depends more and more on the knowledge and education of their people. In the 
past the power of the Arab Empire was based on the qualifications and characteristics of 
its leaders. Today, the strength of the French government, however, is the result of the 
education of its people. In our days a situation such as that which existed during the Arab 
Empire is no longer sufficient. We must now have a state like France and England. Such a 
state can exist only after providing education for the public at large.’26 It must be pointed 
out that Malkom’s thinking was not free from contradictions. He often changed his line of 
argument ‘according to the audience he was addressing.’27 For example, it was not 
sufficiently clear whether he regarded the spread of education as a prerequisite for a 
Constitutional regime or as its inevitable outcome. This, however, did not detract from his 
determining influence. Furthermore his views can not be taken as representing those of 
the advocates of modem education, although they were very influential in shaping some 
of these arguments.
Intellectuals in the second half of the nineteenth century stressed the interrelation 
of education, freedom, and progress. It was only through the adoption of Western 
education that Iran could equal the achievements of the West. The military might of 
Europe impressed the Middle East the most. Thus, it was only natural for the intellectuals 
to stress education as a means to promote military power. Malkom wrote, ‘The strength 
of Europe derives from a thousand sorts of different instruments. Failure to adopt each 
and every one of them will make it impossible to have armies as the Europeans have. The 
instruments social, economic, and political all depend on education.’28 He goes on to say, 
‘In the days of our great Caliphs, the strength of states stemmed from the number of their 
troops but today in India 30,000 British rule over 150 million Asians. This is so because in 
the past states fought each other with the strength of their arms; now they fight with the 
power of science.’29
Nineteenth-century Iranian intellectuals usually had first-hand experience of the 
West. In the West they were exposed to the spirit of revolution and nationalism that 
dominated nineteen-century Europe. They were particularly struck by the concepts of 
freedom, liberty of the individual, supremacy of law, limits of royal power, the power of
26 Ibid., pp. 92-3.
27 Algar (1969), p. 189.
28 Malkom Ipm [Nazemol Dowleh] (1324 SH/1945), p. 91.
29 Ibid.
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parliament, the separation of religion, the state and education, all of which were lacking in 
their own country. Returning foreign graduates attempted to put into practice all that they 
had witnessed in the West. They felt an urge to make their newfound views public. ‘They 
thought of themselves as the new apostles, spreading the message of science, liberty and 
progress.’30 This is not to Say that they all had the same perception of Western civilization 
or wanted to imitate it in every respect. However, they were all impressed by what they 
had seen and wanted their country to benefit from it. Their efforts did not have far 
reaching implications, as we shall go on to discuss.
The ability of the intellectuals to appeal to public opinion let alone attract them to 
their cause, was severely limited.31 Despite the relative growth of the reading public, 
Mehdl QoS Hedayat remarks: ‘Of books we have enough; what we lack are readers, the 
customers are illiterate.’32 This point can be clearly seen throughout Iranian history. The 
Tobacco revolt and events of the Constitutional Revolution33 are prime examples. In both 
instances, when it came to mobilizing mass support, it was the ‘Olama and not the 
intellectuals who were the driving force. The intellectuals remained divorced from the 
masses. Their contribution was limited to the views of the upper classes and sections of 
the political establishment. There is a tendency in works about education to often over­
emphasize the role of intellectuals and understate the role of government as instruments of 
social change. Although scholars often stress intellectual trends, the pragmatic and 
governmental impetus to bring about reform was far more important in terms of its effect 
on societal change than the role of intellectuals. This was particularly so in the case of 
Pahlavl Iran, where political motives and governmental policy were the driving force of 
educational reform rather than the intellectuals or social belief. Some of the educational 
reforms that the intellectuals hoped to achieve through the spread of ideas, Reza Sah 
achieved through decree.
Early Experiments with Modern Education
The first attempts to obtain the benefits of Western education were made by 
sending Iranian students to European universities. At around the same time similar steps 
were also being taken in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. The first Iranian students left
30 Bayat (1982), p. 134.
31 Menashri (1992), p. 74.
32 Hedayat (1344 SH/1966), p. 192.
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Iran in 1811, making them among the first Middle Eastern students to do so. State- 
sponsored programs for students abroad were undertaken during three periods. The first 
period lasted from 1811-1815. The second period ran from 1845-1847. The third period 
from 1848-1896, which coincided with the first years of the reign of Na§erod-Dm Sah.34 
In addition to the state-sponsored group, some other people left to study in Europe 
privately mostly, from the nobility and elite families in the second half of the century. 
Belonging to the power elite, they were usually supported by the government to some 
extent and chose their field of study either on the advice of prominent political figures,35 
or on the strength of their family’s evaluation of the future needs of the country. The field 
of study of government-sponsored students was decided for them according to the 
directives from the court as the need for potential manpower arose. In the early stages, 
most received military training or took up subjects that were useful to the army, such as 
engineering and mathematics. Medical study too was mainly for service in the army. Very 
few studied liberal or social sciences.36
The careers of returning graduates had two characteristics: firstly, they were 
elevated relatively quickly to prominent positions; secondly, their position had little to do 
with the field of their study. The frequency of government and court appointments for 
graduates reflected the importance attached to the value of European-style education and 
in turn cultivated the interest of young people in studying abroad. Studying abroad offered 
graduates professional and social prestige. It must be pointed out, however, that given the 
social background of graduates, they would have been guaranteed prestigious careers in 
any case. Nevertheless education and in particular Western education became increasingly 
important. Gradually, even upper-class families came to believe that the careers of their 
sons had to be underpinned with educational qualification. Consequently, a European 
education initially undertaken for the sake of qualification soon became an important 
means of securing social prestige. Although most European-educated graduates occupied 
positions that were unrelated to their academic background, they were, through their 
involvement in the country’s social, political, and economic life, able to contribute 
significantly to the overall process of modernization. This new educated group played a
33 Also during the 1979 Revolution.
34 Qaseml-Puya (1377 SH/1998).
35 Malkom I£an for example decided to study political science on the advice of AmTr-Kablr. For further 
details please see Algar (1973), p. 16.
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central role in the nineteenth century reforms and liberal movements leading to the 
Constitutional Revolution. Although they were unsuccessful in mobilizing mass support 
for their new ideologies, they were successful in influencing individual politicians to carry 
out reforms and in turning the socio-economic elite against the regime.
The First Institute of Higher Education
The first institute of higher education in Iran was the Darol-Fonun, which was 
inaugurated on 28 December 1851. Its establishment was the natural outgrowth of the 
motives and expectations that had led to the dispatch of students to Europe earlier on. Its 
main aim was to make available Western technology to Iranians. The Darol-Fonun was 
the first educational establishment to be set up by the political rather than the religious 
establishment in Iran. It was also the first institution to teach modem Western science.37 
The Darol-Fonun was a polytechnic, designed to teach upper-class young men Western 
technology and science, thus preparing them for senior appointments in the army and 
administration. Amir-Kablf was the initiator and the driving force behind the establishment 
of Darol-Fonun. The name and curriculum were modelled on a comparable school first 
opened in Istanbul in 1845. The Russian38 model of similar schools had also influenced his 
vision for the Darol-Fonun, as had the reforms of Mohammad ‘Ah Pasa in Egypt in 
particular, and the establishment of a medical school in Cairo was also influential.39 The 
recognition of the need for modem education in Iran must be viewed within the overall 
processes of change that were occurring through out the Middle East.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the graduates of Darol-Fonun, 
together with the foreign graduates, played a significant role in the growth of liberal 
movements in Iran. For half a century, Darol-Fonun was the only institution of higher 
education in Iran40 and remained the most important one. The importance and significance 
of Darol-Fonun lay in a number of factors: 1) Most important was the very initiative by 
the government to set up a school to teach modem science which was independent of the 
‘Olama. This turned it into the cornerstone of modem education in Iran. 2) Darol-Fonun
36 Ibid.
37 QasemT-PQya (1377 SH/1998), pp. 135-7.
For further details about the Darol-Fonun see: Avery (1965).
38 Amlr-Kabir had traveled to Russia in the 1820s and the Russian education system had left a lasting 
impression on him.
39 QasemT-Puya (1377 SH/1998), pp. 125-140.
40 Until the establishment of Tehran University.
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trained relatively large cadres of Iranians giving them some expertise in their particular 
field of study and generally acquainting them with Western culture and language. 3) The 
graduates in turn promoted modem education, whether through propagating their views 
or by setting up new schools. 4) Darol-Fonun served itself as a centre where public 
lectures and discussions were held. Its printing press published not only official 
newspapers and textbooks but also translations of Western literature and scientific 
journals.41
The foreign graduates and the graduates of the Darol-Fonun were the driving 
force behind the first newspapers in the mid-nineteenth century, and behind the expansion 
of the press in the following decades. They published the most important newspapers and 
were both their main writers and principal readers.42 The newspapers published abroad by 
Iranian expatriates in the 1870 reflected political development and took a firm stand for 
Constitutionalism. These papers could afford to be more radical and outspoken as they 
were not subject to censorship. Another avenue for challenging the political situation in 
Iran through literary opinion was translation and original critical writing, both of which 
owed a great deal to the graduates. In the last quarter of the century there appeared many 
original books of political and social criticism. In the last quarter of the century their urge 
to publish was complemented by a growing desire to read. The reading public fed on 
political treatise, periodicals and newspapers. Banned publications were smuggled into the 
country and read widely, and not just in the close circles to which they were primarily 
addressed. They were even circulated at the court.43 According to Browne, on the eve of 
the Constitutional Revolution some newspapers printed a few thousand copies of each 
issue and these were circulated amongst readers.44
Opposition to Darol-Fonun came mainly from the ‘Olama. They opposed the very 
act of the setting up of schools outside the realms of their control and resented the 
teaching of modem subjects.45 The new schools were an intrusion into their traditional 
domain, hitherto exclusively their own. In an attempt to appease the ‘Olama the founders 
incorporated religious studies into the curriculum and held public prayers at the school. 
Their efforts failed to pacify the ‘Olama. Having failed to prevent its establishment, the
41 Menashri (1992), p. 74.
42 Qaseml-Puya (1377 SH/1998), pp. 106-109.
43 Browne (1914), p. 25-6.
44 Ibid.
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‘Olama appealed to the Sah not to support a school bound to cultivate ‘anti-monarchical 
philosophies’. The RoSdTyeh School in Tabriz for example, was stormed and destroyed by 
a mob of Jollab and its founder Hasan Rosdlyeh suffered Takpr,46 Also Yafiya 
DulatabadT, the headmaster of four schools, wrote of numerous threats to his life by the 
‘Olama in his memoirs.47 Their pressure increased with the spread of liberal movements in 
the Ottoman Empire and the approval of a Constitution there in 1876. Furthermore their 
opposition was further intensified with the growth of liberal movements in Iran towards 
the end of the century. This opposition to ‘new education’ on the part of the ‘Olama 
continued into the Reza Sah period, where all these processes were intensified and 
pursued as a matter of state policy.
General opposition to modem education revolved around two principal 
arguments. One was the view of the ‘Olama that the Western impact on education and 
through education on the community was harmful to Iran in general and to Islam in 
particular. They accused the European powers of wishing to turn the students away from 
Islam in order to place them under their own influence and thus advance their imperialist 
interests in Iran. The second argument questioned the contribution of new education to 
society in general and to studies abroad in particular. According to this argument, the 
graduates did not contribute much to the advance of Iran as most of them ended up in 
administrative positions and helped to maintain the status quo.48 The sending of students 
abroad, the establishment of Darol-Fonun, and the new elementary schools signified two 
major innovations: firstly for the first time in Iran there was a deliberate, even methodical, 
attempt to learn from the West; secondly and perhaps more importantly, the state 
assumed responsibility for education for the first time instead of the religious 
establishment. This was particularly significant in terms of the balance of power between 
hierocratic and political structures of domination, in a country where religious institutions 
controlled much of education and social welfare. State control of institutions which were 
hitherto under religious control seemed necessary to introduce modernization and 
centralizing changes.
45 DulatabadT (1371 SH/1992), pp. 262-79, 307-9.
46 The RoSdTyeh School was one of the first ‘modem’ or ‘new’ schools to have been established in Iran. 
For further details on the school please see RoSdlyeh (1362 SH /1983), and Qaseml-Puya (1377 SH/1998), 
pp. 188-214.
47 DulatabadT (1371 SH/1992), pp. 180-184.
48 Mustowfi (1360 SH/1981), p. 125.
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The Constitutional period, commencing from the ratification of the Constitution in 
1906 to the 1921 coup, was an era of relative liberalism. It was an interlude between two 
periods of autocracy. The intellectuals attempted to promote their reform programmess 
during this period. These intervals of diminishing control were too short and besieged 
with instability, social tension and economic upheaval to allow reform to be of any 
significant resolution. During this period the advocates of educational reform placed 
particular emphasis on elementary education. Elementary schooling was viewed as a 
prerequisite for a Constitutional regime. It was argued that elementary schooling was an 
essential condition for the building of a modem state, for social and economic progress 
and for expanding and improving higher education. The educational legislation of the 
period reflected such thinking.49
The Supplementary Constitutional Law of 1907 established the legal basis for 
education to be free and for schools to be removed from clerical control. The 
Fundamental Law of Education of 1911 set forth with great clarity the conceptual 
framework of the educational system. It dealt with elementary education and particular 
stress was placed on how to bring the children of lower-class families into schools and 
how to make the education programme uniform throughout the country. Compulsory free 
primary education was seen as the only means of achieving greater social and political 
justice. The law specified that each village and urban quarter must have a school50 and 
those state schools should primarily serve the poor.51 Wealthy families from towns were 
made responsible for the upkeep of urban schools, rural landlords for village schools.52 
Unlike the initial preferences for military studies in the nineteenth century, the 1911 
students sent abroad favoured education and science. Studies abroad had hitherto been 
considered as a tool for military advancement and were now conceived as an instrument 
for educational reform.53 In contrast to the past Majles, members now insisted that 
preference be given to students from lower-class and provincial background. The law 
concerning the criteria for the selection of student candidates insisted that all must be
49 Qaseml-Puya (1377 SH/1998), pp. 234-283.
50 As specified in Article 19 of supplementary Constitutional law of 1911, Majmu‘eh-e Qavanln-e Majles 
Suraye MellT. Initially each Majles was elected for two years and later for four years.
51 As specified in Article 25 of supplementary Constitutional law of 1911.
52 As specified in Article 22-24 of supplementary Constitutional law of 1911.
53 Qaseml-Puya (1377 SH/1998), pp. 262-267.
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[men] from poorer families, Foqara, bachelors and between 15-30 years of age.54 All had 
to pass a competitive government examination to show that they possessed the necessary 
academic qualities. About one hundred and fifty candidates competed for thirty 
scholarships, another indicator of the growing demand for higher education. These 
conditions reflect clearly the over-optimistic liberal aspirations of the Majles members and 
the stark realities of the country. If candidates from poorer families could be found at all, 
they were unlikely to have acquired the level of education necessary to enable them to 
pass the rigid government examination. In reality most of the students sent abroad were 
sons of upper-class families.
The educational laws of the Constitutional period became a precedent for similar 
laws under Reza §ah. The Medical law, Qanun-e Jebabat, of 1911, for example, made 
the practice of medicine conditional on acquiring modem medical training. During the 
Reza Sah period the practice of law and of teaching were restricted to graduates of 
modem universities. Subsequently, both lawyers and schoolteachers were mostly from 
amongst the ‘Olama with traditional religious training. The new laws removed their hold 
over these professions and paved the way for the modernization of Iran. The widely-held 
expectation that the Constitutional Revolution would lead to immediate advancement in 
education did not materialize. During this period, important advances were made, such as 
defining and incorporating the overall objectives of the education system into legislation. 
These objectives were free and compulsory education, a uniform system of education, 
opportunities for lower-class children and children from the provinces, and making certain 
occupations conditional on an appropriate modem education.55 Furthermore it was during 
this period that the foundations for the Ministry of Education were laid. The problem at 
hand was the actual implementation of these policies. It was not until the Reza Sah period 
that some of these policies were implemented and the ideas of the early years of the 
century were actualized.
Reza Sah believed that the progress of Iran depended on the adoption of Western 
technological achievements and on the ‘selective borrowing’ of certain Western cultural 
values, social, economic and political institutions. A modem educational system was the 
primary and vital requirement for the purpose of achieving all three goals. Education was
54 Ibid.
55 Such as the practice of medicine, law and teaching.
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viewed as necessary for the ‘rapid’ advancement of the nation. The Sah’s personal 
interests shaped educational policies in all their aspects. His approach to education was 
primarily utilitarian; he considered education as a pragmatic means of advancing his 
policies. Education was only valuable if it contributed to the stability of the state and the 
social adaptation of the individual to it. Accordingly, importance was placed on the 
society as a whole rather than the individual to be educated. The function of education 
was viewed as integrating the individual into society, and not to develop his particular 
personality - in other words, to create uniformity rather than individuality. The gap 
between these two approaches runs through much of modem education theory in the 
West.56 One side viewed ‘man’ and ‘his’ individuality as the object of education; the other 
sought to form a citizen loyal to his nation and state. For Reza Sah the matter was simple: 
the citizen must be totally subordinate to the state and education was nothing if it was not 
the means to create loyal citizens.
v
Education Reforms Introduced by Reza Sah and its 
Consequences for the ‘Olama
Reza Sah thought of education as the most potent force for Iran’s cohesion as a 
nation, a force simultaneously capable of diminishing allegiance to Islam and weakening 
regional and ethnic ties and loyalties. The schools were to promote patriotism, Mlhan- 
ParsJ, loyalty to the nation, national unity, Vafidat-e-Melll, and national independence, 
Esteqlal-e-Melll. Fostering a uniform educational programme which promoted the above 
ideas was seen as vital in bringing the constituent elements of Iranian society together. 
Education was viewed as the only long-term plan which would help to consolidate the 
authority of Reza Sah. In studying the proclamations of Reza Sah and TabaJaba’I, one can 
see that even as early as 1921 such views were clearly set forth. Jabataba’I states: ‘It is 
essential for the character, the spiritual foundation and the feelings of our young people to 
be developed and advanced by means of a national patriotic education so that our sons 
[will be] willing to sacrifice their lives for their homeland.’57
In highly centralized countries, education becomes a state function and a means of 
attaining identity, unity and developing a sense of patriotism, devotion and national
56 Dewey (1916).
57 Mustowfi (1360 SH/1981), pp. 218-19. Also cited in DulatabadT (1371 SH/1992), pp. 235-236. The 
Proclamation was issued on 26 February 1921.
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responsibility. It was the hope of the Reza Sah government to achieve such results 
through the new educational system. The establishment of a unified education system was 
attempted very early on, in fact as early as 1922. The new Iranian education system was 
modelled on the French system. In 1922 the government had already formed the Supreme 
Council of Education, Sowraye ‘Aliy-e Amozes, which was responsible for outlining a 
unified education policy. The year 1925 saw the formation of the Department of Public 
Education, Edareh Amiizese ‘Omuml, in the Ministry of Education to supervise its 
implementation. In the mid-1920s, a uniform syllabus was prepared for elementary and 
secondary schools (for boys and girls) and was made mandatory for all schools. Private 
schools were also accountable to the ministry and had to follow the official programme. 
In 1928, all foreign schools were compelled by a decree to use the official syllabus up to 
the fourth grade, and Farsi was to be the only language of instruction. Also, in 1928 all 
school textbooks for all regions was standardized. In 1937 the government nationalized 
all foreign elementary schools and in 1939 all secondary schools as well. In the same year, 
a new modified series of textbooks was published for all subjects in all elementary and 
secondary schools.58
The standardization of the textbooks was designed specifically to fit the regime’s 
aims and need.59 The textbook emphasized the standard elements of a ‘national 
education’, which were language, literature, history and geojgraphy, as well as music and 
folklore.60 To create uniformity and centralization by overcoming Iran’s ethnic and 
linguistic pluralism, special emphasis was laid on the knowledge of Farsi. Farsi was taught 
only in the correct standard pronunciation to avoid local and regional dialects. In the 
teaching of history a great deal of emphasis was placed on Iran’s pre-Islamic past and the 
‘glory of the Persian Empire’. The Achaemenial period was particularly stressed. 
Instructions in geography attempted to invoke a sense of Iran as a unified homeland and 
to stress a bond linking all various regions irrespective of their individual differences. 
Regional differences and hence regional loyalties were to become secondary to being 
Iranian and loyal to king and country. Literature, especially poetry, and Iranian art were 
likewise emphasized. Physical education and paramilitary training - typical of nationalist
58 Sadiq (1931), pp. 49-50 & Arasteh (1969), pp. 76-77.
59 Sadiq (1931), p. 53 & Banani (1961), pp. 94-95.
60 Sadiq (1931).
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education - were also promoted.61 In 1935 Reza Sah instructed the newly-established 
Academy for the Persian Language, Farhangestan, to ‘cleanse’ Farsi of Arabic-borrowed 
words and replace them with ‘pure’ Farsi words. This was a somewhat limited emulation 
of Kemal Ataturk’s policy of replacing the Arabic alphabet with Latin script in 1928 in 
Turkey. At the same time, an Archaeological Museum and an Academy of Arts was 
established as a tribute to Iran’s pre-Islamic past.62
The importance of education for the further development of Iran, a continuing 
theme from the nineteenth century, was of central importance in shaping the educational 
policies of Reza Sah. The Sah related his own views on education in an interview with 
Rosita Forbes.63 In answer to a question as to whether it was advisable to educate the best 
men in Europe he said:
‘It would be much better to educate them here in the country where they 
are going to live and with whose progress they must be inevitably 
concerned. But we have not yet the necessary machinery. We need all sorts 
of technical experts and these must for the moment be trained in Europe, 
but I hope the young men we send to France and Italy will realize that 
civilization is different for every country. I don’t want to turn the Persian 
into a bad copy of a European. That is not necessary for he has mighty 
traditions behind him. I mean to make my countrymen the best possible 
Persians. They need not be particularly Western or particularly Eastern.
Each country has a mould of its own, which should be developed and 
improved until it turns out a citizen who is not a replica of anyone else but 
an individual, sure of himself and proud of his nationality. The Persian 
character has got to be hardened. For too long my countrymen have relied 
on others. I want to teach them their own value so that they may be 
independent in mind and action.’64
The link between education and the promotion of the ideals of nationalism are 
clear in the above statement. There seem to exist in the Sah’s speeches an underlying 
ambivalence and moral dilemma, a dilemma of wanting to assimilate Western cultural 
values without the total loss of Iranian identity. The Western model was desirable to the 
extent that it was viewed as advanced and progressive. On the other hand, a sense of 
Persian heritage and national pride meant that complete Westernization was undesirable.
61 Menashri (1992), pp. 95-6.
62 Banani (1961), p. 98.
63 Forbes (1931), pp. 182-87.
64 Ibid.
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Banishment of clerics from their traditional hold over education and the 
administration of justice signified more than a mere mitigation of the activities of the 
religious establishment. Primarily it marked the decline of a dual-power structure 
prevalent in Iran for over two centuries. It deprived many clerics in the education and 
judicial system of their livelihood. Their influence was further curtailed as reorganization 
of religious endowments was undertaken in order to find money for the educational 
expansion; the endowments had been overseen under the Ministry of Education from its 
inception by the second Majles in 1911. The Higher Council of Education, which was set 
up in 1921, included in its terms of reference the discussion of using vaqf, endowments, 
for the support of state schools.65 Furthermore it signified a decrease in traditional aspects 
of social life. Changes in the judicial and education system paved the way for further 
social change. In particular through the adoption of a Westem-style education, the next 
generation of Iranians experienced a fundamental change not only in the classroom but 
also in their norms and values.
Reza Sah was more concerned with fully establishing his monopoly of power 
rather than with conducting an ideological campaign against Islam. This implied reducing 
the influence of the ‘Olama in all aspects of social life and confinig them to matters of 
faith and ritual. In his Safamameh-e [Travelbook to] Mazandaran, Reza Sah relates that 
during his Premiership, he met someone who presented himself as a Se%ol-Islam. Reza 
Sah then inquired about the level education necessary to attain such a position. He 
answered: ‘Throughout Iran, the primary condition for being a Sel^ol-Islam is ignomace. 
Therefore, I, who cannot read or write, am more a Se%ol-Islam than any real Se%ol- 
Islam!’ He added that even though the ‘Olama are themselves illiterate, they can still 
manage to turn popular ignorance to their advantage.66 ‘Implicit in Reza Sah’s 
educational reform was his determination to undermine the influence of the religious 
classes. Education had been their province until the Constitutional movement. 
Secularization and Westernisation went together. The emphasis on sport and quasi­
military drilling was the antithesis of the old discipline of the robe.’67 The Sah was well 
aware of the extent of clerical power and the threat of their challenge [potential and 
actual] to his reforms. ‘Abdollah RazI, editor of the periodical Rastakjz, Resurrection, in
65 Farrok [Mo‘ta§amol Salfaneh] (1347 SH/1968), p. 255-6.
66 PahlavT (1305 SH/1927), pp. 54-55.
67 Avery (1965), p. 284.
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an article published shortly after Reza Sah’s coronation proposes that the root of Iran’s 
problem is not military or political weakness but rather the corruption and the power of 
the ‘Olama.68 In another article in the same periodical, it is argued that only through 
‘education and action’ can the power of the ‘Olama be counteracted.69
The §ah realized the extent of popular support enjoyed by the ‘Olama, and he 
managed to maintain good relations with them as long as he was Prime Minister and until 
he had obtained his monopoly of power. Reza Sah wanted religion in Iran to take a place 
similar to that prevailing in the Christian West at the time. To achieve this goal, the Sah 
launched a comprehensive educational effort. One key factor in reducing the power base 
of the religious establishment was removing education (and the courts) from its 
monopoly. The new system of education was to serve as a conduit for the spread of new 
ideas in society. He believed that the influence of the ‘Olama was largely based on the 
ignorance of the people at large. With this aim he began to ‘educate Iran’. 70
Efforts were made on the part of the government to substantially reduce the 
number of the old-style religious-run Maktab and Madreseh students. Efforts were made 
to cut down the number of Jollab and thus to reduce the reservoir of future religious 
functionaries. Also there was to be a uniform and government-regulated exam, which the 
Jollab had to pass in order to be awarded their particular rank.71 In 1925 the new 
conscription law did not cancel the exemption of Jollab from the services, but army and 
police officers carried out frequent inspections and enlisted many whom they did not 
consider ‘genuine’ Jollab. This caused much resentment among the ‘Olama. In effect, the 
new policies caused a drastic fall in the number of Jollab. In the meantime, the new 
system of education was expanded. These policies were introduced in the hope of 
achieving the goal of making the new generation of Iranians less strongly attached to the 
‘Olama and to reduce their power and influence. The changeover from traditional to the 
new education, which had begun in the nineteenth century, was now significantly 
accelerated with a concurrent decline in the number of Maktab students. In 1924 the 
Supreme Council of Education laid down for the first time conditions (both pedagogical 
and sanitary) for opening Maktab. New Maktab could only be opened with the approval
68 RazI, (1925), pp. 34-5.
69 Rastafclz, September (1925), pp. 2-3.
70 Menashri (1992), p. 100.
71 MakkI (1369 SH/1991), p. 251.
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of the minister o f education. Table 1 compares the decline of Maktab and Madreseh 
students with public school attendance in selected years between 1924 and 1945. Since 
the data are based on government sources, it is possible that the public school figures are 
overstated and the Maktab and Madreseh figures fall short o f reality.72
Table 1. Students in Maktab and Madreseh compared with public schools in selected years between 1924- 
1925 to 1941-1942.
Students in Public 
Elementary and
Secondary Schools
Maktab Students Jollab
Year NO. % NO. % NO. %
1924-1925 59,339 46.6 22,929 63.8 4.879 88.2
1929-1930 127,546 100.0 35,931 100.0 5,532 100.0
1935-1936 193,271 151.5 60,008 167.0 4,004 72.4
1936-1937 231,119 181.2 55,645 154.9 2,935 53.1
1939-1940 290,118 227.5 54,069 150.5 2,373 42.9
1940-1941 314,173 246.3 51,922 144.5 1,341 22.2
1941-1942 315,355 247.2 37,289 103.8 784 14.2
72 Menashri (1992), p. 102, figures computed by the author, based on: SBB/MA, Dowran-e Pahlavl, 
Tehran: Markaz-e Amar, 2535[1976/7], 35-55; VAP, GozareS-e Amuze§, Document 284 in MAM; Kaeje- 
NurT.
Chart 1. Shows the decline in the number of Maktab students and Jollab as compared with the number of 
students in public and elementary schools in the years between 1924 and 1942. The percentages are based 
on and compared to the years 1929-1930._________________________________________________________
□  Students in Public Elementry and 
Secondary Schools
■  Maktab Students
□  Tollab
Reza Sah, as well as attempting to eliminate the traditional school system, also 
sought to limit Islamic studies in the new schools. The number of classroom hours 
dedicated to Islam and Arabic were reduced and substituted with the natural sciences (in 
high school), and music, and painting were also added. It is interesting to note that the 
Madreseh, having lost the Maktab as their recruiting ground, eventually succeeded in 
attracting graduates from the new schools.73 In assessing the success of Reza Sah’s 
policies o f secularizing the education system, David Menashri writes:
‘All in all, given popular devotion to religion and the strength of the Shi’i 
establishment, secularization in the school system and through it in other 
areas of life was a considerable achievement. But much of the hope for 
making education a lever for secularization necessarily depened on its 
expansion to include most if not all of the school-age population. The fact 
that at that time education still remained the privilege of a tiny minority 
precluded such results. More importantly the religious devotion even o f  
the graduates o f the new schools remained very much alive. Secularization 
efforts notwithstanding, the inherent strength of the Shi’i sentiments in Iran 
made it possible for Islam to remain Iran’s cohesive element even under 
Reza Sah.’74
J U U
□  Students in Public 
Elementry and 
Secondary 
Schools
■  Maktab Students
□  Tollab
1924- 1939-
1940
1929- 1935-
1936
1941-
1942
151.5 227.5 246.3 247.2
150.5 103.8
73 Sadiq (1931), & Avery (1965), pp. 275-6.
74 Menashri (1992), p. 104.
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It may also be added that although the education and legal policies did in fact limit 
the influence of the ‘Olama over the public sphere, their power over the masses remained 
intact. Strong religious sentiment, coupled with the role of the ‘Olama as it had evolved in 
Shi’i Iran, ensured the ‘Olama of their privileged role as the ‘custodians of the believers’. 
The augmentation of the new education system was viewed as bringing the country closer 
to Western ways and ideals. The new range of subjects taught in schools was with the 
intention of giving an added impetus to Westernization. The tendency towards 
Westernization was paramount in all aspects of Reza Sah’s education policy. It aimed to 
adopt Western science and technology, ‘selectively’ appropriate some Western cultural 
values, and to borrow Western social and economic structures. The regime enjoyed the 
support of intellectuals in its education policies, some of whom interestingly enough came 
from an ‘Olama family background. Most influential among them were Taqlzadeh, Afimad 
KasravT, Hosern Kazemzadeh, ‘All DastI, and Mo§tafa ‘Adi. The fiercest opposition to the 
new schools came from the ‘Olama, who viewed the process as weakening Islamic 
principles and beliefs.
The Sah, in his address to students sent abroad in 1930, made it clear that the 
purpose of sending them abroad at public expense was not only for them to acquire 
knowledge but also to acquaint them with Western culture. He said that if it was simply a 
question of their receiving foreign education, ‘We could have engaged foreign instructors 
to teach in Iran. Our chief aim is that you should receive a moral education, for we note 
that Western countries have acquired a high standing as a result of their thorough moral 
education.’ Turning to the Minister of Education he went on, ‘You should take care to 
select countries which pay proper attention to moral education and you should send 
students there.’75 The Sah in a speech to the first group of students to be sent by him to 
France said that they [the students] might think it strange that a monarchy should send its 
students to a republic to be educated. In the Sah’s view, the reason was that they were to 
acquire the ‘French sense of patriotism and keep it deep in [their] hearts.’76 The important 
lesson for the students was to learn a sense of patriotism and loyalty to the nation-state as 
was seen to be the case in Europe. Upon their return the students were expected to serve 
their country and its ruler. The Sah insisted on sending the Crown Prince to study at a
75 Farrok [Mo‘ta§amol Sal$aneh] (1347 SH/1968), pp. 233-4.
76 Wilber (1975), p. 135.
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European school. He is reported to have said at the time of his son’s departure: ‘It is very 
hard for me to part with my beloved son but one must think of the country. Iran needs 
educated and enlightened rulers. We, the old and ignorant, must go.’77
The Iranian education system was modelled on the French, and French was the 
main foreign language taught in Iran. The majority of the earlier students who were sent 
abroad were sent to France. There was, however, a gradual increase in the number of 
students going to England, Germany, and later to the United States. The percentage for 
the United States rose significantly after World War II. The government allotted the field 
of study of the students to be sent abroad; in return, the government would provide 
graduates with jobs for a period consistent with the length of their study. A survey 
conducted by the Institute for Social Research at Tehran University shows that out of 176 
graduates, 27.3 per cent studied medicine, 25.6 per cent studied chemistry, physics, 
and/or mathematics, 19.9 per cent studied engineering, 19.9 per cent studied arts and 
social sciences, 7.3 per cent studied agriculture. The survey included teacher-trainees in 
the above categories.78 When one compares these figures with the occupations of the 
graduates, it becomes clear that very few entered the field of their speciality. The survey 
of 176 students shows that 52.2 per cent were appointed to the civil service, the 
municipalities, or government-owned firms, 31.8 per cent were employed by Tehran 
University, 12.5 per cent taught at the Tehran Teachers’ Seminar or other schools, 1.2 per 
cent entered the profession of their field of study and 2.3 per cent did not answer the 
questions on the survey about occupation.79 If there were not an adequate offer of a 
position within six months of their return, they would be free to make their own 
arrangements. The government attempted to allocate jobs to students relevant to their 
field of study. In practice, graduates ended up in occupations not directly related to their 
expertise and felt that the government owed them a ‘respectable’ position.
An additional feature of the new system of education was the encouragement of 
the education of girls at all levels. Under the traditional system, the number o f girls in 
school had been very small. This is partly because, in more privileged families who could 
afford to educate their daughters at all, girls tended to be educated at home. They were
77 Arfa (1964), p. 226.
78 The survey of the Institute for Social Research, University of Tehran, 1974. Moradi-Negad and Sarlatl 
(1353 SH/1974), p. 27.
79 Ibid., p. 70.
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taught by either a private tutor or their fathers. It was not considered appropriate or 
culturally acceptable for women to go out of the house to attend a maktab. In private 
maktabs, however, boys and girls of the same household often studied together. Although 
technically a woman could become a Mojtahed, none was recognized as a Marfa ‘ Taqtid. 
80 The first non missionary girl’s schools were opened during the Constitutional 
Revolution, such as Namus in 1907, and the Ecole Franco-Persane in 1908, and Women’s 
Associations were active in expanding education for girls.81 On the whole education of 
women was very limited during this period. It was not until 1935 that girls were admitted 
to institutions of higher education. In the same year elementary education became 
coeducational.82
The education of girls was highly favoured by the intellectuals and educationalists, 
and fiercely opposed and criticized by the ‘Olama. The education of women was viewed 
by educationalists and intellectuals as the path of progress.83 Reza Sah himself saw a 
direct link between the education of girls and the process of Westernization. In 1934 on 
his visit to Turkey, the Sah was so impressed with the expansion of girls’ education there 
that he said to his ambassador in Istanbul that it was essential for Iran to imitate the Turks 
in advancing the education for girls. In January 1936 in a ceremony held at the training 
college for women teachers to mark the abolishing of the veil, the Sah stressed the 
importance of expanding education for girls. The Sah added that ‘Because of our 
women’s custom to wear the veil, due to ignorance and illiteracy, the Europeans have 
always taunted and despised us.’84 The Sah viewed the situation as changing only if the 
veil was discarded and women educated.
Table 2 shows the enrolment of girls as compared to boys at elementary and 
secondary schools from 1922 to 1942. Enrolment rose faster for girls than for boys. As 
can be seen from the table, the increase in the attendance of girls was quite substantial as 
compared with the pre-Reza Sah era.
80 Fischer (1978), pp. 189-215.
81 QasemT-Puya (1377 SH/1998), pp. 356-7.
82 Bayat (1978), pp. 295-308.
83 Sadiq (1931), pp. 115-16.
84 Hekmat (1355 SH/1976), p. 88-97 also quoted by MakkT (1369 SH/1991), pp. 258-9.
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Table 2. Expansion of elementary and secondary education according to sex in 1922-3 to 1941-285
Year Total no. of 
students
GIRLS BOYS
NO. % of
students
NO. % of
students
1922-1923 44,819 7,592 16.9 37,227 83.1
1926-1927 60,337 18,084 30.0 42,253 70.0
1930-1931 137,504 31,477 22.9 106,027 77.1
1934-1935 183,204 45,542 24.9 137,662 75.1
1941-1942 315,355 88,195 28.0 227,160 72.0
In 1934, girls were admitted for the first time to the Tehran Seminar for high 
school teachers. The admission o f female students aroused fierce clerical opposition. The 
director o f the school, ‘Isa §adeq, came under direct attack by the ‘Olama. To the threats 
against him he is reported to have said: ‘The time when the ‘Olama decided which way 
this country was moving has gone forever.’86 Forty years later in an interview with David 
Menashri, he acknowledged that only the support o f the Sah had made it possible to 
overcome the ‘Olama’s opposition.87 Tehran University did not admit its first female 
students until five years later in 1940/41.
85 Ibid., pp. 108-110, figures computed by the author based on: SBB/MA, Dowran-e PahlavT, 33-55; 
VAP, GozareS-e Amuzes, Document 284 in MAM; Kaeje-NurT.
86 Ibid., pp. 88-97.
87 Menashri (1992), pp. 108.
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Chart 2. Shows the percentage of boys and girls students between the years 1922 and 1942.
□  Girls 
■ Boys
u -
1922-1923 1926-1927 1930-1931 1934-1935 1941-1942
□  Girls 16.9 30 22.9 24.9 28
■  Boys 83.1 70 77.1 75.1 72
Irrespective of some of the liberal aspirations for the new education system, the 
Sah’s own concept was both totalitarian and pragmatic. The purpose o f education was 
not only to provide knowledge for the ‘sake of knowledge’ but to ‘nurture’ loyal, 
obedient and self-sacrificing citizens willing to sacrifice their individual life for the greater 
cause, for the Ab va Ifake vafan, the water and soil o f the homeland. The philosophy of  
education and issues o f the state’s moral right to place the stamp of such education on its 
citizens were no concern of his. His confidence that he was leading the nation along the 
right path was sufficient. Accordingly schools were to inculcate ‘self evident’ values and 
simple principles but not to encourage critical thinking likely to undermine the students’ 
faith in the justice o f the regime. Education was seen as a combination of indoctrination, 
imparting views, and censorship withholding harmful information.88 Intellectuals and 
liberals tended towards democratic aspiration and opposed the imposition o f a certain set 
of values, and advocated critical thinking and individual understanding in education. 
However these differences were not clearly expressed during this period; instead most 
preferred to keep their arguments in consonance with the Sah’s. Many educationalists 
preferred to work for the improvement of education prior to its expansion. They were all 
critical of the fact that education was almost entirely academic, turning out graduates that 
were only fit for administrative posts. This being so, during this period little effort was
88 For further analysis o f the role o f education please see Dewey (1916), p. 4-6 & Locke (1989), p. 50.
154
made to improve the quality of education. The emphasis was placed instead on expanding 
education and moulding it to serve and benefit the aims of the regime.
Reza Sah was a determined defender of vocational education. He viewed manual 
work as most valuable. He had hoped to correct Iran’s technical backwardness through 
education. Actual policy followed this overall line. The Ministries of industry, roads, war, 
agriculture, health, communication, finances and mines each set up various vocational 
schools and technical colleges with the immediate aim of training potential employees. 
The first non-departmental polytechnic was founded in 1922. From 1923 onwards, every 
concession to a foreign company was made conditional on its providing professional 
technical instruction to Iranian students and workers. In order to attract more students, 
technical schools annulled tuition fees from 1926. Despite these efforts the standards 
remained low and they developed at a much slower pace than academic schools. This was 
partly due to the low social esteem of manual work and hence vocational education. The 
technical schools lacked the social prestige of academic schools. Vocational education 
seemed a contradiction in terms: manual work was taught in workshops and out in the 
fields; schools were there to escape from such prospects.89
The increase in the spread of the ideals of nationalism, secularism, Westernization 
and loyalty to the state was best served through the expansion of elementary schooling.90 
The role o f elementary schooling is seen as an important factor in the way in which the 
individual’s sense of political awareness forms the basis for future elaboration of opinions, 
attitudes, concepts and eventual behaviour ‘in the entire area that we call citizenship.’91 
The process of socialization through schooling becomes somewhat harder to assess when 
one attempts to evaluate the level of education which promotes economic growth.92 
Studies in this field suggest that conditions for economic growth necessitate a shift from 
elementary to secondary education when the former has come to embody some ten per 
cent of the total population. If this line of argument is to be accepted, than even from the 
point of view of economic growth elementary schools ought to have had priority under 
Reza Sah. This was in fact the case during the Reza Sah period. The Sah stated: ‘We must 
first and foremost teach our workers and farmers to read and write; only then we can
89 Menashri (1992), pp.111-113.
90 For further analysis of the process of political socialization in young children see: Hess & Easton 
(1975), pp.304-16. & (1962), pp.257-265.
91 Ibid., p. 261.
155
move on to higher education.’93 Taqizadeh, one of the most prominent supporters of this 
view, in a lecture at the American school for girls summed up his views as follows: 
‘Progress, civilization, independence, salvation, freedom and nationalism all depend on 
elementary education.’94
Development again contradicted ideological preferences. Although some 
important initiatives were taken to improve elementary schooling, the onus remained with 
higher education. The policies were a consequence of the growing demand for skilled 
labour to implement reform programmes and to accommodate the expanding bureaucracy. 
As a result, the growth of higher education was far more rapid than that of elementary 
education. The Iranian intellectuals viewed the expansion of schooling as a means of 
bridging all social inequality between classes, urban and rural, capital and province, and 
even, for some, between men and women. The Prime Minister’s manifesto after the 1921 
coup stated that education must not be limited to the ‘oppressive elite’; it should be 
bestowed on everybody, including the village population.95 During the Reza Sah period, 
this theme was incessant in the declarations of politicians and intellectuals alike. Many 
also expressed hopes for higher education becoming more accessible to the 
underprivileged.
In practical terms the most important step taken by the government was the decree 
of 16 May 1927 declaring that the education of all state schools was free for the needy. In 
addition, in places where there were private schools, state schools were to admit only 
children from low-income families. However, there still remained a sharp contrast 
between the hopes and aspirations of intellectuals and educationalists, and the actual 
developments. Very few children from lower social classes made it into schools. 
Education in villages, where more than 65 per cent of Iranians lived at the time, remained 
as restricted as before, as did education in provincial towns. This was due partly to lack of 
facilities and partly to elite opposition to mass education. The ‘Olama opposed the new 
educational system and discouraged people from sending their children to school from the 
fear that they would be indoctrinated with ‘corrupt’ and ‘anti-Islamic’ beliefs. The low 
success rate of the spread of education was not only the result of the ineffectiveness of
92 For various assessments please see Haribson & Myers (1964), pp. 23-48.
93 Arfa (1964).
94 Taqizadeh (1351 SH/1972).
95 DGlatabadI (1371 SH/1992), pp. 235-6.
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government policies but also due to cultural and traditional obstacles and prejudices 
towards a new educational system. In terms o f mass appeal, the fact that it was not 
endorsed by the ‘Olama deterred many from sending their children to school.
Table 3. Growth of elementary and secondary school compared with that o f the population, in years 1922 
to 1941.96
YEAR Estimated population 
(in thousands)
No. of students in state 
elementary and 
secondary schools
No. o f students as % 
of total population
1922-1923 9,500 44,819 0.47
1926-1927 10,900 60,337 0.55
1931-1932 11,000 138,567 1.26
1936-1937 12,000 231,119 1.93
1940-1941 13,000 314,173 2.41
Chart 3. Shows the number o f students as percentage of total population between the years 1922 and 
1941.
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The question of enabling the children of lower-income families was often 
advocated. Liberal members o f the Majles frequently urged that when applicants had 
similar qualifications, preference should be given to poorer students. They argued that the 
affluent families would and could afford to send their children abroad even without 
government grants. Lower-class students were likely to contribute more to society after 
their return by taking up useful occupations, whereas the rich would usually join the 
family business or seek government office for the sake o f prestige only. Taqizadeh, one 
the advocates o f sending poorer students abroad in articles written in 1926 and 1928,
96 Menashri (1992), p. 121, Figures Computed by the author based on: Sbb/Ma, Dowran-e PahlavT, 
Tehran: Markaz-e Amar, 2535 [1976/7], 35-55; Vap, Gozares-e Amuzes, Document 284 in MAM; Kaeje- 
NurT.
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spoke of the money of the poorest taxpayers being used to finance the study of rich boys 
abroad. He argued that upper-class parents viewed studying abroad as nothing more than 
a good investment with high prospects on return.97
The survey of the Institute for Social Research at Tehran University examined the 
occupation o f the fathers o f 176 out o f 640 students and found: 32.7 per cent were high- 
ranking officials, 16.8 per cent were businessmen, 13.3 per cent were professionals, 11.7 
per cent were landlords, 7.1 per cent had professions not requiring higher education such 
as builders, wholesalers, shopkeepers, 5.7 per cent were clerics, 4.1 per cent were 
politicians and 3.6 per cent served in the armed forces. Out o f the 176 students asked 18 
gave two occupations and one gave three. Nearly all o f the students were those who were 
sent out under the 1928 law. The 5 per cent marked as ‘other’ represent those who did
98not answer the survey.
Chart 4. Shows father’s occupation of 176 out of 640 students.______________________________________
□  High ranking officials
■  Businessmen
□  Professionals
□  Landlords
□  Professions not requiring higher education such 
as builders, wholesalers, shopkeepers
□  Cleric
■  Politicians
■  Armed forces
■  Others
The survey concluded that most students were from upper-class backgrounds. The 
results o f the survey seem to support Taqizadeh’s claim that the project served to
97 Taqizadeh (1928).
98 The survey o f the Institute for Social Research, University of Tehran, 1974. MoradT-Negad and SarTatT 
(1353 SH/1974), p. 20.
■  5.0%  ■  3 .6%
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preserve the supremacy of the upper classes rather than to provide new opportunities for 
social mobility.
Much was also said about the need to include students from the provinces in the 
groups sent abroad. It was hoped that the gaps between the centre and periphery would 
be minimized and this would help to close social gaps. Removing the differences between 
the centre and peripheiy was viewed as the hallmark of a modem society that would 
contribute to the country’s modernization. According to the survey of the Institute for 
Social Research at Tehran University, out of the 176 students 59.1 per cent were bom in 
Tehran, 21 per cent in the eight next largest cities, 18.2 per cent were bom elsewhere and 
1.7 per cent were bom abroad." Out of the 640, students only a few dozen came from 
small cities. More significantly, many candidates from the provinces did not return home 
and resided in the Capital where they had better career opportunities. Not only did the 
project fail in bridging social gaps but also it actually removed the very few local high 
school graduates from the provinces.100 Out of the 176 graduates, 69.4 per cent obtained 
Ph.D. or M.D. degrees.101 Not surprisingly, there was not a single woman among the 
students sent abroad under the 1928 programme. Also there were no women in any 
institution of higher education at the time. A proposal by NTyaa’T Nun in 1929 to allow 
women to benefit from the new law was rejected by the Majles. In 1933, there were some 
fifty Iranian women at European high schools and universities but most o f them were not 
Muslim.102
Tehran University was established in 1935 with great expectations for the overall 
progression and development of education. Tehran University, like other modem 
institutions in developing countries, was created from above rather than being an outcome 
of the socio-historic process. It was believed that by imitating Western educational 
structures, their technical progress could be reproduced in Iran. Iranian educationalists 
were optimistic that the foundation of the university would by itself further Iran’s efforts 
towards the achievements o f the West. The feet that the emergence of Western 
universities, as all other institutions, was not the cause of progress but rather to a large
99 Ibid., p. 18.
100 Zablh (1966), p. 64.
101 The survey of the Institute for Social Research, University of Tehran, 1974. MoradT-Negad and 
SarTatl (1353 SH/1974),p. 17.
102 Tabataba’T (1933).
159
degree the consequence of the social conditions of their growth103 was completely 
ignored. In the words of Flexner, ‘A university like all other human institutions is an 
expansion of the age as well as an influence operating upon both the present and 
future.’104
The issue of the university’s academic achievement was a central theme in the 
public debate. The government proclaimed to be in favour of the autonomy of the 
university. However, in practice, it did much to ensure that the administrative staff o f the 
university would yield to its demands. This reflected the contradictory attempt o f the 
government to initiate Western academic patterns, while on the other hand, keeping intact 
the modus operandi of the regime. Although the law granted the university independence, 
there was still room left for ministerial interference. The power to engage and promote 
academic staff, to admit students, and to elect the president and deans were the 
prerogative of the university. However, the language of the law notwithstanding, the 
nature o f the regime dictated considerable limitations. In fact, throughout the reign of 
Reza Sah, the university did not have any formal independence granted to it by the law.
A decision of significant importance was the incorporation of theology in the 
university. This was an attempt to bureaucratize the body of the ‘Olama and bring it under 
state control, a concept hitherto altogether alien to Shi’i Islam, although common in Sunni 
countries. The ‘Olama considered the faculty of theology as yet another threat to Islam 
and their positions. The power of the religious establishment was then extremely limited 
and they were not in a position to fundamentally challenge the Sah’s autocratic rule as had 
been the case with the previous Sahs. The Prime Minister and the Minister of Education 
fiercely rejected their indictment that the university would jeopardize Islamic principles. In 
the Majles debate both emphasized that the government’s policy was to integrate Western 
science with the values of Islam, and not to harm them. Tehran University was created by 
a political decision at a time when the Iranian educational system was not yet ready for it. 
The major problem with the university was ‘blind’ imitation of Western theories and 
methods without any attempt to adapt them to the needs of the country. In reference to 
this Banani wrote: ‘Such intellectual short-sightedness, coupled with the attendant vices
103 Ben-David & Zloczower (1962), pp. 45-84.
104 F lexner (1930), p . 3.
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of exclusiveness, jealousy, social and personal rivalries, and political ambitions, prevented 
the university from attaining a high academic standing.’105
Reza Sah viewed the educational system in terms of a twofold process: a means of 
supplying the framework for his modernization policies and equally as an instrument of 
state propaganda and means of support for the regime and its policies. The educational 
system was singled out by foreign observers as one of Reza Sah’s M ures. The American 
Overseas Consultants Incorporated reported the following in 1949 regarding the Iranian 
education system:
‘The principal point of the weakness in the educational structure o f Iran is 
its educational philosophy. The existing school system has been relatively 
successful in accomplishing the apparent aims of its founders three 
quarters of a century ago, which were to produce a distinguished 
intellectual elite and to establish an instrument by which the thoughts and 
actions of the common people might be efficiently manipulated. The 
existing system is anachronistic and unsatisfactory because of a changed 
social philosophy rather than because of technical M ure of the schools.
The nation’s education system has M ed to meet the needs of modem Iran.
The educational philosophy and the technical details o f the school system 
are largely a copy of the traditional French system, characterized by 
extreme centralization and administration. Authoritarian methodology, 
theoretical rather than practical studies, stereotyped and overloaded 
curricula, and a policy of eliminating rather than salvaging students who do 
not meet the arbitrary and rather artificial standards of academic 
excellence.’106
Arthur Milspaugh, the American financial advisor, made a very similar 
observation: ‘We shall approach the educational part of the plan [of the reconstruction of 
Iran] with the knowledge that the Persians need fundamental and many-sided 
rehabilitation... what the situation calls for primarily is not formal schooling. The prime 
need is for emotional adjustment and moral regeneration. The country requires a thorough 
physical and spiritual cleansing.’107 From this observation, one may infer that people’s 
thoughts and actions were not efficiently manipulated, and the ideologies of the Reza Sah 
regime had M ed to penetrate into mass consciousness, particularly so among ethnic 
minorities and nomadic tribes. Furthermore, despite various attempts to weaken the 
institutional basis of hierocracatic domination, religion still remained the cohesive element
105 Banani (1961), p. 100.
106 Overseas Consultants, Inc. report on the Seven Year development Plan for the Plan Organization of 
the Imperial Government of Iran, pp. 20, 82-84.
107 Millspaugh (1946), p. 249.
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in society. Religious sentiment surpassed all other loyalties. Although the ‘Olama had lost 
their traditional hold over education, their power base was not substantially diminished. 
Their hold over the devoted Shi’i population remained intact.
This was not simply a policy failure but also had to do with the still limited scope 
of education, which prevented new ideas from reaching the masses. Where there existed 
scope for education, the influence o f the ‘Olama, which was much stronger than any 
government policy, prevented and limited it. Unlike Ataturk, Reza Sah’s reforms did not 
destroy the old institutions and values but rather built new ones alongside the old. In 
Turkey, such unrelenting policies worked, as the hold of Sunni ‘Olama over the general 
public was not o f the nature o f the hold o f the Shi’i ‘Olama in Iran. The Sah realized this 
as he realized the potential dangers of attempting to totally uproot religious and 
traditional values. Reza Sah’s educational policy did achieve some of its long-term plans: 
the infrastructure for a national school system was put into place, the traditional 
elementary schools were almost eliminated, and the concept of the new education, the 
vision of earlier intellectuals, was finally implemented. Furthermore ‘Olama control of 
education was ended and the government put forward explicit educational policies and 
proposed practical ways of implementing them. It is interesting to note that during this 
period, characterized by the rapid replacement o f the traditional school system of Maktab 
and madreseh and the implementation o f modem educational institutions, the Howzeh 
‘Elmlyeh Qom was established and began to flourish. The Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh is a 
conglomerate of educational institutions in which learned teachers teach Islamic sciences. 
The school was established just at the time of Reza Sah’s consolidation of power. It is 
somewhat ironic that the Reza Sah period, often characterized by educational 
secularization, should coincide with the establishment of one of the most important Shi’i 
theological schools. The importance of centres of religious learning, particularly the 
Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom, did not diminish even when the ruling elite began to monopolize 
educational institutions. The establishment of Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom was vital for the 
continuation of the hierocratic challenge to the state. It is for this reason that the Howzeh 
‘Elmlyeh Qom is o f particular importance and merits a separate and thorough study. We 
shall go on to consider the Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom in Chapter Six.
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Chapter Four: Judicial Reform and its Consequences
for the ‘Olama
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Introduction
The adaptation of a Western style legal system had far-reaching effects on the 
fabric of Iranian society. This was inevitable, as the ‘transplanting’ of social institutions 
from one society to a totally different one would bring with it inherent value systems. The 
new system of codified and accessible laws specified not only the obligations of the 
individual as a believer in the case of Sari‘ah law but also the rights o f the individual. The 
legal reforms of Reza Sah were the result of an ongoing process from the time of the 
Constitutional Revolution. The Constitutional period was a time of great liberal 
aspirations and attempts to apply the principles of democracy to Iran. One of the main 
aims of the Constitutionalists was the establishment o f an independent judiciary and legal 
system, a system which would specify the rights of the individual as a citizen and would 
ensure equality for all before the law.
This marked a major change from the concept of the individual within Sari‘ah law. 
In the SarVah, the basis of the rights of an individual are the ‘obligations and duties of a 
believer’. These ‘rights’ are confined within the realm of ‘permissible’ and ‘non- 
permissible’ actions. The laws concerning ‘rights’ are derived from ‘permissible’ actions 
and the laws concerning punishment are derived from ‘non-permissible’ actions. 
According to the SarVah individuals are subject to the law of God. As discussed earlier 
the ‘Olama had come to present themselves as not only the representatives but also the 
legitimate executors of these laws, and thus as the ‘guardian’ of the believers. The people 
were not only ‘servants o f God’, ‘Abdollah, and subject to His laws but were also 
subjects to the ‘Olama’s interpretation of the laws of God. Thus, there was a fundamental 
break from the notion of the individual as a believer in the SarVah law and the individual 
as a citizen in the new legal system.
Weber maintained that in Islam there is an absence of rational law, and this leads 
him to distinguish arbitrary laws from legal judgments that are derived logically from 
general and formal rules of law. The term ‘arbitrary law’ appears in Weber’s comparative 
sociology with reference to the SarVah. The SarVah is an ‘extra legal system’ as it is 
based on transcendence and divine revelation. For Weber, the main weakness of the 
SarVah lies in its ‘transcendental’ and a-historic nature, one that is outside society, and 
that the believer cannot but implement. Weber considered the SarVah as unstable and 
inflexible. ‘Qazi justice was unstable; sacred justice was inherently inflexible and could not
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be readily extended systematically to meet new cases and situations.’1 Thus in Islam one 
of the missing components necessary for capitalist development was a systematic and 
formal legislation and ‘rational’ legal system.
It should be noted that the SarJ'ah functions within ‘social relations and 
interpretative articulations.’2 The Sari1 ah should in feet be open to reinterpretation within 
determinate socio-historic conditions. The SarVah is based upon divine revelation, but its 
laws are not divinely ascribed but humanly constructed and therefore open to 
reconstruction in accordance with the needs of the time. Ideally the SarVah should be 
open and accessible to the Muslim community as a whole. However, the ‘Olama had 
come to assume an autonomous institutional monopoly of legitimate interpretation of 
Shi’i doctrine and had succeeded in establishing a monopolistic control over the religious 
lives of the population. The SarVah should be immanent in different levels of activity in 
Muslim society under the form of ‘contractualism’. Contractualism, according to 
Hodgson, is characteristic of Sari‘ah and of Islamic society in general.3 It may be argued 
that Islam was an attempt at creating an egalitarian community of the faithful in 
opposition to the tribal and town centred hierarchies of seventh-century Arabia. ‘This 
egalitarianism, an insistence that all men are on the same level before God, is a 
fundamental presupposition running through SarVah discourse and is conventionally 
considered a hallmark of Islam itself”4 However, Sar‘ law had become inaccessible to the 
uneducated masses as it was highly complex, unsystematic and in a foreign language 
[Arabic]. People were ignorant of their rights and had to depend upon the ‘Olama. As 
long as the ‘Olama controlled education and the law, they continued their domination by 
incapacitating the people through their capricious rulings.5
During the reign of Reza Sah, the Constitutional provisions proclaiming Shi’i 
Islam as the official state religion and designation of the Sah as the defender of the faith 
were never altered. In practice, however, the power o f the ‘Olama was greatly 
undermined. The ‘Olama, who had shared anti-Western nationalist aspirations with other 
Iranians, now became increasingly suspicious of this new form of nationalism with its
1 Turner (1992), p. 48.
2 Messick (1993).
3 Hodgon (1974).
4 Messick (1993), p. 154.
5 Akhavi (1980).
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increased tendencies toward secularism.6 Secularization expressed itself in a number of 
different ways. One of its most significant manifestations was the confiscation of clerical 
vaqf or religious endowments, with consequential loss of wealth, power and independence 
by the clergy. These endowments were transferred to the Ministry of Education, and the 
few clergy retained in the administration of vaqf became state functionaries.7
Similar in effect, in terms of the reduction of the power of the ‘Olama, was the 
reform of the judicial system along the lines of Western legal system. Secular or 
customary law, ‘Orf9 had long existed in Iran but as subordinate to Islamic law, SarVah. 
During the Reza Sah period the balance was reversed and the competence of religious law 
attenuated. Reza Sah was not contemptuous or hostile to religion as such; he was only 
indifferent and opposed to it when religious leaders blocked his modernization plans and 
were in a position to compromise the whole movement unless curtailed in power.8 Reza 
Sah’s main point of attack against the religious classes was in the sphere of the law. 
Attacking them here deprived them of their chief social function and principal source of 
legitimate revenue.9 ‘The Molla’s powers were not completely tangible, yet it permeated 
the fibre of Iranian society. Their function as interpreters of the law meant that they had to 
validate the most vital acts of men: marriage, divorce, testimonies, deeds of trust and 
possession, transfer of property, and commercial contracts.’10
In Iran prior to the Reza Sah period there existed two systems of law, ‘Orf or 
customary law and SarVah or religious law. The SarVah, a system of canon law, had 
jurisdiction in matters of personal status, and ‘Orf, a customary law of a more secular 
order, was supposed to operate in cases involving the state.11 Owing to the instability of 
the state in the nineteenth century, however, the SarVah had acquired nearly all legal 
authority and (Orf law had ceased to develop. This left judicial authority almost entirely 
tied to religious authorities and made the isolation and defeat of their power extremely 
difficult.12
The opponents of the ‘Olama had first to build up an alternative system of law
6 Young (1966), p. 137.
7 Ibid., pp. 45-55.
8 Ibid., p. 55.
9 Avery (1965), p. 284.
10 Ibid., p. 286.
11 Sayegan (1316 SH/1937), Ja‘fan LangarudI (no date), Avery (1965), & Banani (1961).
12 Avery (1965), p. 286.
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before progressing towards disestablishing the religious body. ‘This is what Reza Sah 
proceeded to do while it was intended that secular education and nationalist propaganda 
in which pre-Islamic Iran was the model, would weaken the people’s religious loyalty to 
the institution they had been bound to resort to for their law. To weaken and destroy this 
religious emotion would have taken far longer than the new order [Reza Sah’s regime] 
was given.’13 Reza Sah accelerated the political, social and institutional growth that had 
been slowly mounting for more than half a century since the Constitutional Revolution of 
1906. The impact of the West on Iran before the Reza Sah period was more in terms of an 
ideological influence. During Reza Sah’s reign, Western ideologies were subject to 
national modification while wholehearted efforts were made to Westernize the face of 
Iran.14 The basis o f Reza Sah’s power was derived from two sources: an aroused spirit of 
nationalism, and central state control. Also equally as important was the favourable 
international situation in the building of Reza Sah’s Iran.
The legal reforms introduced during the Reza Sah period were motivated by two 
factors: firstly, nationalistic considerations to abolish the system of capitulation; secondly, 
an attempt to create a central and state-controlled legal system. The consequential 
outcome of both was the fundamental reduction of the power of the ‘Olama. It is often 
argued that judicial reforms were not carried out with the intention of reducing the power 
of the ‘Olama.15 The outcome of these reforms, however, was a decline in ‘Olama power 
and influence over the legal sphere. Thus it may be said that although the intention of 
reform was not secularization, secularization was the inevitable result. As discussed in the 
introduction and Chapter Two, political authority o f the ‘Olama is one of the subjects of 
polemics in clerical circles. It is a topic heavily debated and as yet no final conclusion has 
been reached. The difference of opinion between those ‘Olama who favoured political 
involvement and those who preferred abstinence has been dealt with in detail in the 
Introduction and Chapter Two, and does not merit a repeat of the argument. It is 
sufficient to say that there is general consensus among the ‘Olama that the administration 
of justice is unequivocally their exclusive privilege as learned men of religious law .16
13 Ibid., p. 286.
14 Banani (1961), pp. 31-32.
15 Ja‘farT Langarudl, Interview, (5.1.1997), IbrahTmzadeh, Interview, (3.1.1997), Nazeh, Interview, 
(14.12.1996).
16 Ibid., pp. 55-108. This is also confirmed by Sayegan (1316 SH/1937), and §adr [§adrol ASraf] (1364 
SH/1983).
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In the Sunni world, as in the case of Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, the ‘Olama 
reacted far less to the modernization attempts of their governments than their Iranian Shi’i 
counterparts for the following reasons: 1) The Sunni ‘Olama had less economic 
independence and strength than the Iranian ‘Olama and nineteenth-century centralizing 
governments like those of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt and Tunisia were able to whittle 
away much of what remained. 2) The leaders of non-Iranian ‘Olama lived in capital cities 
where their governments could pressure and control them whereas Iran’s ‘Olama 
leadership resided in Shi’i shrine cities in Iraq uncontrolled by Iran’s government. 3) The 
ideological basis for the ‘Olama’s political claims, developed in the seventeenth and even 
more so in the eighteenth century, was now widely believed in Iran. This ideological basis 
enabled the ‘Olama to fully participate in the Constitutional movement, as ‘legitimate’ 
rivals to the ‘tyrannical’ rule of the Sah in the nineteenth century as inheritors of the 
charisma of the Imam. Finally the concept of Taqtid ensured a wide network of control 
for the ‘Olama, even in the remotest parts of the country, the local Molla, being the link 
between the people and their Mary a ‘ TaqlTd.
Also centralization as suggested by the cases of Egypt and the Ottoman Empire 
was a necessary prelude to modernization. Iran was difficult to centralize due to its 
distance from world economic centres, the strength o f its nomadic tribes and its 
geographical vastness. ‘Qajar Iran remained largely decentralized, which encouraged 
continued power and ideological hegemony of the ‘Olama. In the absence of government 
strength or armed force the ‘Olama could help block attempts at educational, legal, and 
economic Westernization.’17 It was not until the centralizing government o f Reza Sah that 
‘Olama’s power was seriously challenged and their influence reduced.
The doctrinal basis for the position o f the ‘Olama is a fundamental factor, which 
cannot be overlooked. Socio-political factors alone cannot fully elucidate the extent of the 
‘Olama’s political influence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In feet without the 
prior development towards a doctrinal premise that gave the ‘Olama political and moral 
claims against the government, it is hard to comprehend the ‘Olama’s numerous political 
successes. Whether or not the idea that the Mojtahed partakes in the charisma of the 
Imams had prior doctrinal justification, and whether or not the idea that temporal 
governments lack legitimacy had a long history, many of the ‘Olama and their lay
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followers came to believe in both, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when 
temporal rulers were increasingly compared to the Ummayyed killers of the martyred 
Imam Hosem.18
‘Even those who did not speak or think o f government illegitimacy or o f the 
Mojtahed partaking in the Twelfth Imam’s charisma tended to have more confidence in 
the ‘Olama than in the temporal government. This does not mean that there were no 
significant anti-‘Olama or anti-clerical feelings. In part, the ‘Olama’s anti-despotic claims 
were believed because oppression by the secular rulers was known while what the ‘Olama 
would do was unknown.’19 It is also interesting to note the way in which Shi’i doctrine 
was used to justify the ‘Olama’s position. The political situation of the Imam’s 
Occultation which originally helped the Shi’a to enter into doubtful (even Sunni) 
governments, had evolved to the point that a formerly Shi’i government not guided and 
controlled by the ‘Olama was considered immoral as was service in it.
With reforms in the legal sphere, Reza Sah took institutional secularization to its 
logical conclusions: namely, the removed of the vestiges of the Sari‘ah and the ‘Olama. 
Although the SarVah was severely restricted, it still retained considerable normative 
prestige and influence. The religious code was the legal basis of family life and therefore 
exerted its influence in most aspects of everyday life. The intention of reform was to make 
Iranian legal practices consistent with those of every ‘developing’, ‘civilized’ nation. In 
practice, many o f the old attitudes and customs continued, especially in the rural and 
geographically isolated areas. The impact of these changes was nevertheless profound: it 
represented a frontal attack on the remaining institutions of the religious order.
In this chapter, the following points will be considered: 1) The traditional legal 
system and the early reforms attempted prior to the Constitutional Revolution. 2) Legal 
reform during the Constitutional period, the importance of this period for subsequent 
reforms and the significance of the ‘Olama’s increased involvement in politics. 3) Legal 
reforms introduced by Reza Sah, the motivations behind these reforms, and the
17Keddie(1981),p.26.
18 Algar (1969), p. 26. Imam HoseTn is the third Imam of the Shi’i. He was the grandson of the prophet, 
who was massacred, along with his family at the hands of the Ummayyed caliph Yazid. He is a central 
figure in Shi’i sm, representing justice, devotion, bravery and martyrdom. The anniversary of his 
martyrdom is commemorated every year, and plays an important and pivotal role in Shi’i ideology. It 
represents the triumph of truth over falsehood and is the basis for the revolutionary tendencies of Shi’i 
sm.
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consequential reduction of the power of the ‘Olama.
Early Judicial Reform and ‘Olama Opposition Prior to the 
Constitutional Revolution
In Iran, ever since the advent of Islam, the judicial system consisted of two 
branches, the ‘O if or customary law, administered by the civil authorities, and the Sar ‘ or 
religious law, administered by the ‘Olama. The ‘O rf law dealt with criminal cases, 
including offences against the state. The Sar‘ law dealt with cases of a personal or 
commercial nature. Although the two branches were theoretically separate, their 
jurisdiction often overlapped.20 ‘Or/Taw was based on precedent and customs, and varied 
greatly from one city to another. A Hakim or governor in the cities and a Kadkoda or 
village head in the villages administered the ‘Orf system. 21 There was no written code, 
which left an offender at the mercy of the ruling official. The ‘Orf system, however, was 
not completely lacking in safeguards against the abuse of justice.22 Each province 
including Tehran had a Divan-e adliyyeh or Office o f Justice, which was in effect a court 
of equity. These Divans were supervised by the Governor General in the provinces and by 
the sovereign in the capital. The court in Tehran was theoretically the highest court of 
appeal. It was uncommon for the Sah to officiate there; instead, a deputy Amir-e Divan or 
chief of the office acted on his behalf.23
Theoretically the right of appeal existed, in practice, however; it was difficult to 
appeal to a governor against a city magistrate or to the Sah against the governor. This 
was one reason why most people preferred to refer their disputes to the Sar ‘ courts. It 
was also not uncommon for the civil authorities themselves to designate difficult cases to 
the religious court.24 Due to the inaccessibility and the complex nature of Sar ‘ law, similar 
problems persisted in the religious courts. The fate of the applicant depended solely on the 
arbitrary rulings o f the Mojtahed who often issued contradictory sentences based on their 
own personal interest.25 As discussed earlier, Sar1 or SarVah law was based on Shi’i 
Feqh. It derived its tenets from the Qoran, the Sonna, Ijma, and the pronouncement of
19 Keddie (1981), p. 26.
20 Benjamine (1887), pp. 439-40.
21 Nashat (1981), p. 42.
22 Ibid., p. 43.
23 Benjamine (1887), pp. 439-440.
24 Nashat (1981), p. 44.
25 Sayegan (1316 SH/1937).
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the leading Mojtaheds of each period. Over the years a vast body of elaborate regulations 
had accumulated concerning every conceivable aspect of daily life. Yet, despite this 
elaborate and explicit body o f law, Sar‘ tribunals were severely debilitated by their lack of 
executive power, as they were dependent on civil authorities to execute their decisions.26
Sayegan points out the ways in which Sar* law, as it stood, was not adequate in 
facing the demands of the time. ‘During the fourteen centuries of its development, Feqh 
had become increasingly heterogeneous and complex to the extent that it was only 
comprehended by a handful o f religious scholars, among whom even a fewer number had 
the suitability as specified by the SarVah - namely honesty, and piety, combined with 
wisdom, and knowledge - to carry out the task. Since very few possessed all these 
qualities, the administration o f justice had fallen into the hands o f those who were neither 
pious nor wise, but used their privileged position for their own personal interest and gain, 
and had little regard for the welfare of the people.27 Furthermore, the world had 
developed and advanced in such a way that Feqh was no longer adequate in dealing with 
the needs o f the people. Without a doubt one can derive from Feqh, due to its 
inexhaustible and vast nature, a ruling for every situation. However the ‘permissible’ or 
‘non-permissible’ ruling of a Faqih does not meet the requirements of the modem world. 
The rights and obligations of an individual are not clearly and comprehensively set out.’28 
The unsystematic and uncodified nature o f Feqh made it more susceptible to misuse. The 
understanding of Feqh had become the exclusive monopoly of a handful of individuals, 
which meant that people did not have an independent understanding of their own rights or 
any way of ensuring that what were said to be their rights were accurate. A dual system, 
controlled by two basically adverse and rival forces, the civil authority on the one hand, 
and the religious authority on the other, did not seem the most efficient instrument for 
rendering personal justice. This dual system contained the inherent possibility of conflict 
between the civil and religious classes within it.29
During the reign of Na§erod-Dm Sah, an attempt to reorganize the judicial system 
was made. After the Sah was persuaded that SarVah law as a code and of itself did not 
need improving upon, the fault being in inconsistency of execution and failure to meet
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 44.
28 Avery (1965), p. 91.
29 Ibid., p. 92
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modem contingencies, he ordered that a committee should be formed to revise the code in 
the light of modem requirements and lay down contemporary rules for its execution and 
administration.30 The Sah was carefiil in legal matters to seek advisors from among those 
laymen who were familiar with the jargon of the ‘Olama and were also on good terms 
with them. Respectively, ‘the Sah’s position was tolerated and sanctioned by the Shi’i 
religious institution, in such a way that a delicate balance of mutual goodwill and support 
had to be maintained.’31
V
The Ministry of Justice was created in 1858 when Na§erod-Din Sah, in an attempt 
to improve conditions, had divided the affairs of government among six ministries. This 
creation however remained theoretical and in name only. In 1853 an ordinance was issued 
proclaiming the superiority of the DTvan-e ‘AdlTyeh A ‘zam, the High Court of Justice, 
over all other Divans. Nevertheless the trial o f foreign subjects was relegated to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and not to the DTvan-e ‘AdlTyeh A ‘zam. The Minister of 
Justice was to be no more than a supervisor of the high court. The creation of this
V V
ministry was typical of the reforms during Na§erod-Dm Sah. The Sah’s private secretary, 
Ammod-Dowleh, affirmed that the Sah, whose knowledge of things Western was lacking, 
had tried with the help of others equally ignorant of the West to introduce Westem-style 
institutions into the country.32 Mlrza Hoseih Kan was appointed Minister of Justice, 
pensions and religious endowments on 23 December 1870. During his ten months in 
office, he attempted to provide the country with independent tribunals and a unified code 
of law. He set new standards for law enforcement, and emphasized equality of all before 
the law. Also, he tried to enhance the authority of the central government by creating 
greater central control in the judicial process.33
A new weekly newspaper Vaqaye ‘ ‘AdlTyeh, Judiciary News, was founded by the 
Ministry of Justice to report on administrative reforms and new regulations decreed by the 
ministry. The most important announcement in the first issue of the newspaper concerned 
the division of the High Court o f Justice into four specialized courts which consisted of: 
1) A court o f investigation to receive petitions, discriminate between right and wrong, and 
report in writing to the Minister of Justice. 2) A legislative court to draw up regulations
30 Farmanfarmayan (1341 SH/1962), pp. 19-20.
31 Nashat (1981), p. 43.
32 Ibid., p. 45.
33 F.O. 60/351, W. T. Thompson To Granville, 15 October 1873.
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equally applicable to every case and to all classes. 3) A criminal court to investigate cases 
of assault, identify the culprit and nature of the offence, and deal with the decision issued 
by the judge. 4) An execution court to carry out all decisions proceeding from the 
Ministry of Justice.34
A
According to W. T. Thompson, the British minister in Tehran, Murza Hoseln Kan 
intended to formulate laws pronouncing the equality of all Iranian citizens, Muslims as 
well as all other religious minorities.35 It seems unlikely that this was the sole intended 
function of the legislative court. Its impact, apart from the favourable reaction it had on 
liberal European governments, would have been negligible since the proportion of 
religious minorities in Iran was very small.36 Nashat argued that the intended function of 
this court, like the Ottoman predecessors upon which it was undoubtedly modelled, was 
much greater. It was intended to assure the right of the central government to legislate. 
Also, implicit in its creation was a closer control of the ‘Olama by the central government, 
since the former were active in running the SarVah courts.37
Previously the government had indirectly through the ‘O rf system participated in 
implementing the rulings of the Sar ‘ courts, but did not have any jurisdiction over these 
courts. Under the new system, successfully implemented, the government would have 
been the active partner in the running of the judiciary. Although the creation of the new 
courts did not seem to have gone beyond the planning stage, the implied threat in Mrrza 
Hosem Kan’s attempt which would have undermined ‘Olama power did not escape their 
attention. This might well have constituted the beginning of their apprehension of Mrrza 
Hoseln ]£an and his policies, which met with increasing hostility and opposition from this 
powerful group.38
Mrrza Hoseln Kan, like other reformers, was well aware of the extent of the 
‘Olama’s hold over public opinion and never opposed them openly. On certain occasions, 
in order to ensure the support of the ‘Olama, he even tried to win their friendship. 
Concerning the ‘Olama, there seemed to be a distinct difference between his private
34 Houtum-Schindler places this number at 125,000 out of a total population of seven million. 
Encyclopedia Britannica, (10), S.V. ‘Persia’, 3: 619 & Sayegan (1316 SH/1937), pp. 30-33.
35 F.O. 60/351, 15 October 1873, W.T. Thompson to Granville.
36 Algar (1969), p. 13.
37 Sayegan (1316 SH/1937), p. 29.
38 Nashat (1981), p. 47.
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opinion and his public one.39 In a letter to an intimate friend, he expressed his real view of 
‘Olama. From this, one can detect a distinct desire to reduce the power of the ‘Olama to 
the private sphere. He wrote, ‘I believe that the Mollas should be entrusted with all 
matters that pertain to them such as leading the prayer, preaching, performing marriage 
and divorce ceremonies, answering religious questions, and the like, so long as that does 
not contradict the interests of the state.’40
A significant bill concerning judicial reform, which evoked ‘Olama hostility, was 
the Code of the Tanzimat-e Hasaneh [the beneficent reorganization] promulgated in 
1875.41 The code was essentially concerned with reform of taxation and conscription but 
also dealt with judicial reform. It created a five-member council that included a 
representative from the Ministry o f Justice whose task was to ‘supervise the affairs o f the 
subjects.’42 The role of the ‘five-member council’ was specified in the appendix to the 
code as follows: ‘Whatever happens in the province be it a dispute, an argument of a Sar 7 
[religious] or non-Sari [non-religious] nature, or disagreement concerning property, it 
should be referred to the council o f Tanzimat. The governor should bring forth to the 
council whomever the members should demand.’43 The Judicial authority o f the ‘Orf 
courts was transferred to the Majles- Tanzimat, attempting to complete the process begun 
with the Act of 1872 which transferred to the sovereign the power to impose the death 
penalty. The Tanzimat code did not explicitly interfere with the function o f the Sari'ah 
courts; it did, however, try to exert indirect control over them. The code stated:
Whatever the verdict of the Sar‘ court, the Majles-Tanzimat will issue the order 
for its execution to be carried out by the governor. If by any chance the defendant or 
plaintiff should produce another ruling after the Sar* courts have passed a verdict, it 
would not be binding. However, if at the beginning of the litigation, each side should 
produce a ruling in his favour then the Majles would refer them to a third court. If both 
sides should disagree over the jurisdiction of that court or there should be any difficulty in 
assigning a third court, then the case will be reviewed by the Majles.44
The SarVah courts never had the power of execution and in theory at least the
39 This was characteristic of other reformist of the time such as Malkem Kan, for example.
40 Ibid., pp. 47-8.
41 MTrza Hosem l£an to Mostasarol Dowleh, (8 October 1865), Adamlyat Collection, Tehran.
42 Ketab£eh Tanzlmat-e Hasanlyeh Dowlat ‘AlTyeh va Mafiruseh-e Iran, p. 9
43 Ibid., p. 9.
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TamzTmat Code did not deprive the ‘Olama of any of their prerogative. Nevertheless, the 
‘Olama opposed the code, and recognized it as attempt to impose tighter central control 
over the judiciary in general and the Sar' courts in particular. Futhermore, Article 43 of 
the Code brought some of the vaqf properties [religious endowments] under the control 
of the Majles. This was of particular concern to the ‘Olama, as the vaqf properties were a 
principal source of the power and economic independence of the ‘Olama. Any attempt on 
the part o f the government to loosen the ‘Olama’s hold over these properties was bound 
to evoke their hostility.45
The ‘Olama were supported in their opposition by the governors, who were 
equally resentful of the central government’s curtailment of their power. The combined 
resistance o f these two powerful groups proved disastrous. Consequently, the Sah and 
MTrza Hosem ICan abruptly abandoned the Tanzimat Code.46 During this period the 
secularization of the law was pursued with tact, since changes in the legal system were 
bound to affect the ‘Olama, who fiercely opposed any reform that might infringe upon 
their privileges. Also, the impact o f the changes introduced in terms of reducing the 
power and hold of the ‘Olama over the administration of law was minimal. In terms of 
assessing the contribution of MTrza Hosem Ifan, it may be said that his attempts to codify 
the law objectively set an important precedent that found fulfilment in the Civil Code of 
1911.47
In Iran, from the advent o f Islam until the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-6, 
the administration of legal matters was the exclusive monopoly of the ‘Olama. They 
exercised control over the religious, judicial and educational institutions, so much so that, 
by the nineteenth century, the consolidation of dualistic power structure of politics and 
hierocratic domination was complete. The exclusive hold of the ‘Olama over the legal 
sphere meant that not only the government but also the entire nation was dependent upon 
them as the ‘administrators of justice’. Decentralized and ineffective Qajar administration 
encouraged the continual power and ideological hegemony of the ‘Olama. In the absence 
o f government strength or armed forces the ‘Olama could effectively block attempts at 
not only legal but also educational and economic reform. Reforms during this period
44 Ibid., p. 9.
45 Ibid., p. 11.
46 Nashat (1981), p. 53.
47 Ibid., p. 55.
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remained sporadic and conservative in nature. The power and prestige of the ‘Olama was 
never directly challenged.
Early Judicial Reform and ‘Olama Opposition During the 
Constitutional Period
The Constitutional period of 1905-1911 depicts a remarkable demonstration of the 
overlap of the boundaries o f religion and politics in Iran. The ‘Olama played a key role in 
the Constitutional movement. The ‘Olama’s involvement in a movement which almost all 
scholars48 unanimously agree to have been an ‘imported Western concept’, namely 
Constitutionalism, is somewhat surprising. The Constitutional period saw the participation 
of ‘Olama in political matters in an unprecedented way. The extent of political activism of 
the nineteenth century ‘Olama stands in sharp contrast to the participation o f the ‘Olama 
in the Safavid state administrations as subordinates to secular officials.49 The Safavid 
‘Olama were tar more intent on elaborating doctrinal matters and their political 
involvement was not as ‘opponents of the government’ but rather as state administrators. 
In contrast, the nineteenth century ‘Olama were far more politically active, and their 
‘activism’ was in terms of a ‘rival legitimate authority’ against the ‘tyranny of the 
government’.50 During the nineteenth century, the ‘Olama, having realized their social 
force, had managed to successfully argue their role as the Sarparast or VafT, guardian of 
the believers. In doing so they had come to partake, even if partially, in the Velaya of the 
Imam. This formed the doctrinal basis for their claim to ‘legitimate authority’ or in 
Weberian terms part-taking in the charismatic authority of the Imam.
By the time of the Constitutional Revolution, the ‘Olama had come to resume an 
active political role, articulate grievances and lead the struggle against the Sah. In 1905-6 
Mozaffarod-Dm Sah finally agreed to grant a Constitution. After the initial victory of the 
Constitutionalists the Sah, with the help of Russian forces, defeated them. His triumph 
however was short-lived and in turn converted to defeat. In 1909 Mozaffarod-Dm Sah 
departed from the throne in favour of the more docile Afimad Sah. This allowed the 
Constitutionalists more room for manoeuvre.51 The weak and ineffective rule of A&nad
48 Sayegan (1316 SH/1937), p. 32. Also see Akhavi (1980), Hairi (1977), Adamlyat (1355 SH/1976), and 
Banani (1961).
49 Algar (1969).
50 Akhavi (1980), P, 25.
51 §adr [§adrol ASraf] (1364 SH/1983), pp. 174-5.
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Sah during 1909-1921 led to anarchic conditions in Iran. During this period the clergy 
were not unified in their response to the difficulties which faced Iran.
The division amongst the clerics over the support for the Constitutionalist 
movement rested on different perceptions of the concept of sovereignty.52 The pro­
monarchist faction, led by the eminent Se% Fazllollah Nuri objected to the idea that 
sovereignty ultimately reposed in the nation. His rationale rested on the grounds that 
sovereignty belongs to Allah alone and at his will was successively relinquished to the 
Prophet, the Imams, and finally to those learned enough to render judgment in matters of 
law, Mojtaheds. There was no place in this arrangement for the masses to exercise their 
sovereignty. On the other side were Seyyed Mohammad TabaJaba’I, ‘Abdollah Behbaham, 
and Hasan Modarres. They, in collaboration with secular reformists, succeeded in drafting 
Article 35 of the Supplementary Fundamental Law, which stated: ‘Sovereignty is a trust 
confined by the people to the person of the King.’53
During the Constitutional Revolution, there developed two distinct approaches 
among the ‘Olama, the pro-Constitutionalists, Masroufeh ]£ahan54, and anti- 
Constitutionalists, Masrofie fyahan55. The most renowned and, some argue, influential 
pro-Constitutionalist among the ‘Olama is said to have been Se% Mohammad Hosem 
NaThL Na’im was a first-rank Mojtahed residing in Iraq. His book Tanbifiol-Omma va 
Tanzlhol-Mella56 echoes the views of most of the pro-Constitutionalists ‘Olama. Na’M  
cooperated closely with other Masroufeh lyah ‘Olama in Najaf [Iraq] ^ d  often dictated 
or oversaw the telegraphs and declarations which were issued on behalf of the Masroufeh 
£ahan. He also represented the ‘Olama in meetings with the British in Iraq.57
The trend of thought among the ‘Olama during the Constitutional period can be 
divided into the following two categories: 1) Conservative religious reformist such as Seflj: 
Fazllollah Nuri, Se% ‘ Abdol-NabI Nuri and many others. These groups at best demanded
52 Akhavi (1980), p. 26.
53 Ibid., p. 26.
54 Some of the better-known Masroufeh gah ‘Olama were: Molla Mohammad Kazem £orasanI, Haj 
MTrza Hosem £allll Tehran!, Sel^ ‘Abdollah MazandaranT, and SelV Mohammad Hosem Na’TnT [in Iraq], 
Seyyed Mohammad §adeq Jabataba’T, and Seyyed ‘Abdollah BehbahanI [in Iran].
55 The Masrofie gahan ‘Olama included: seyyed Mohammad Kazem Yazd! [Iraq], and Sel^ Fazllollah 
Nuri in [Iran], who supported Masroufeh-e-Masrofe, a parliamentary system based on and governed by 
the Sari‘ah.
56 Na’im (1334 SH/1955).
57 Mo‘menI (1372 SH/1993), p. 257.
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a house of justice, Edalat l£aneh, and at their worst closely cooperated with the rulers 
who were entirely anti-Constitutional. In this camp there was also another group of those 
who were reluctant to openly and explicitly interfere in politics and state affairs except 
under urgent circumstances. The best example of this group of ‘Olama is Seyyed 
Mofiammad Kazem Tabataba’T-Yazdl. 2) Religious compromisers such as KorasanI, 
MazandaranT, Behbaham, Na’M  and with a more liberal attitude, Seyyed Mofiammad 
Tabafaba’I. 58
The first group advocated a type of reform which should occur within the 
framework of Islamic law, the defence of which was unquestionably their duty [within a 
framework where the leadership of the ‘Olama as representatives of the Imam was fully 
acknowledged and accepted].59 Since they did not find the Constitutional reforms in 
conformity with that line, they declared it heresy and saw it as their religious duty to 
support Mofiammad ‘AH Sah’s anti-Constitutional regime and to identify themselves 
mainly with such groups as the royalist conservative merchants and so on.60 The second 
type of ‘Olama were those who rose against the tyrannical rule which existed in Iran. 
They supported the Constitutional movement. Due to their inability to read French or 
English, the ‘Olama did not have access to the original writings of European liberals and 
had to rely on Arabic and Persian secondary sources. ‘Continued and conscious efforts 
were made in Iran by modem liberal thinkers to keep the ‘Olama unaware of the conflict 
between modem political institutions and Islam. The liberal modernizers needed the 
‘Olama’s support because the ‘Olama were the only influential element among the 
national bourgeoisie as well as the masses. On the other hand, they also wanted the 
‘Olama uninformed because otherwise they would not have enjoyed the ‘Olama’s 
support.’61
Baqer Mo‘mem argues that the ‘Olama joined the ranks of the Constitutionalists 
for the following reasons: necessity, internal and personal relations, social pressure, the 
prospects of acquiring wealth, and the maintenance of social influence and prestige. He 
gives the following example. ‘The semi-enlightened ‘Olama have shown their weakness 
and have realized that their time [of power, prestige and influence] has come to an end.
58 Hairi (1977), p. 235.
59 Rezvanl(1348 SH/1969), p. 235.
60 Hairi (1977), p. 236.
61 Ibid., p. 237.
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They have comprehended that the decline in their power is final and have stopped their 
pretense of amenity with the people.’62 In spite of their various motives for participation 
in the Constitutional Revolution, the Constitutionalist ‘Olama had become convinced that 
the existing tyrannical regime should be overthrown even at the cost of ‘borrowing’ 
certain concepts from the West. Some of them such as TabaJaba’I, fully realized that 
Constitutionalism deprives the ‘Olama of their traditional privileges, such as the 
administration of justice. He is reported to have said to ‘Ammo 1-Do wleh that, ‘By the 
establishment of the Majles and ‘Edalatkane, house of justice, we ‘Olama would lose our 
prestige but we both are old; do establish a good name by establishing the Majles.’63 Also, 
an official British document shows that ‘On the occasion of the discussion of the Courts 
o f Justice, he ffabaJabaT] expressed some doubt, perhaps not without a touch of grim 
humour, as to whether there would be anything left for the Mollahs to do after the 
institution of these courts.’64 But in order to defeat the tyranny that was facing the 
country, TabaJaba’I resolutely supported the establishment of a Constitutional regime.65
Both groups of ‘Olama advocated their views in the name of Islam and as 
‘defenders of the faith’. The first group, however, rose against the new system of 
government because they saw it as being un-Islamic without making any attempt to 
reconcile it with Islam. The Constitutionalists on the other hand, attempted to reconcile 
the principles o f Constitutionalism with the tenets of Islam, as they saw no pretext 
whatsoever to support the old regime. In their reconciliation they confined themselves 
only to religious justification. This was the main point of difference between the two types 
of ‘Olama involved in the Revolution. 66
Adanuyat points out that the ‘Olama were made familiar with the principles and 
concepts of Constitutionalism by the Western-educated intellectual reformists and those 
who had contact with Western thought. ‘Constitutionalism or the sovereignty of the 
nation is one of the principal aspects of the Western civil society. The intellectuals and 
reformists who had come into contact with Western thought had become strong 
advocates of Constitutionalism. From then on a section of ‘enlightened ‘Olama’ had come
62 Mo‘menI (1372 SH/1993), p. 321.
63 KasravT (1353 SH/1974), p. 76.
64 FO 416/33, Memorandum Respecting Debate in the Persian National Assembly, Qulhak, July 12, 
1907, Enclosure in Spring-Rice’s Letter to Grey, Qulhak, July 16,1907, No. 140 (147).
65 Hairi (1977), p. 238.
66 Ibid., p. 238.
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to support Constitutionalism and to provide logical and doctrinal reasons for their 
support.’67 Adaimyat quotes Seyyed Mofiammad Tabataba’I as having said: ‘We had not 
seen Constitutionalism for ourselves but we had heard from those who had visited 
countries with a constitution that their constitution was the basis for security and the 
progress of their countries. Thus we developed a love and yearning to develop a 
constitution in our country.’68
Adaimyat maintains that although it may be argued that the tradition of rational 
philosophy which is the basis of Ijtehad in Shi’ism and Iranian mysticism were both 
contributing factors in proving the right intellectual atmosphere for the acceptance of 
Constitutional principles, the concept of Constitutionalism itself however, does not have 
any basis in the SarVah nor was it invented by the ‘Olama. ‘It would appear that the 
changes which occurred in Iran, like those in other ‘static Islamic’ countries, came about 
as a result of contact with the West.’69 Iran’s intellectual heritage enabled the ‘Olama to 
accept these Western concepts and re-evaluate doctrinal teachings in accordance with the 
needs o f the time.70 The ‘enlightened ‘Olama’ supported the Constitutional movement and 
provided SarVah based justifications to validate their adherence to Constitutionalism. 
Their support gave an added impetus to the movement.71 ‘The ‘reactionary ‘Olama’, who 
were bound by traditional thought, viewed Constitutionalism as un-Islamic and 
contradictory to the Sari'ah. The SarVah was presented as being preordained and not 
subject to change. If the constitution were to be based on and determined by the SarVah 
then it would have become the ‘sovereignty of the Mojtahed’, rather than the ‘sovereignty 
of the people’ which makes the concept of a constitution all together redundant.’72
Despite fierce opposition of the ‘anti-Constitutionalist’ ‘Olama, the 
Constitutionalist movement triumphed. Most Iranian scholars seem to agree in that while 
the British were pro-Constitution, the Russians were opposed to it.73 In 1324/1906 an 
order, Farman, was given by Mozaffarod-Dm Sah to establish a parliament, Majles, and 
in the same year the first session of the Iranian National Consultative Assembly, Majles-e
67 Ibid., p. 225.
68 Adamlyat (1355 SH/1976), p. 226.
69 Ibid., p. 225.
70 Ibid., p. 225.
71 Ibid., p. 227.
72 Ibid., p. 228
73 See for example KasravT (1353 SH/1974), p. 291, & DavanT (1360 SH/1981), p. 136.
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Sowray-e Melti Iran, took place and the Fundamental law was drafted and passed through 
the Majles.74 As we shall see in the first two Articles of the Constitution, the power and 
influence o f the ‘Olama remained intact. In actuality the ‘pro-Constitutionalist’ ‘Olama 
succeeded in ensuring that their privileges were maintained and their interests well 
represented within the Constitution. Their involvement proved more fruitful in 
safeguarding their interests, than the resisting opposition of the ‘anti-Constitutionalist’ 
‘Olama.75
In 1325/1907, the Majles passed the final additions to the Fundamental law, 
Qanun-e Assasi. According to the Second Fundamental, five members of the ‘Olama had 
the right to foresee and veto any bill before its presentation to the Majles?6 Prior to and 
even after the first Majles, all legal matters were carried out by the ‘Olama. Before the 
Constitutional Revolution, there were only four ministries which dealt with the affairs of 
the government. These consisted of the Ministry of Interior, the Foreign Ministry, the 
Ministry of War and the Ministry of Finance (treasury). The ‘Olama dealt with all judicial 
matters apart form matters pertaining to the interests of the state. In solving personal 
disputes, the ‘Olama charged one tenth of the money involved from the guilty party and 
one-twentieth from the victorious party for a speedy verdict. Otherwise there were great 
delays in issuing a verdict. At times the verdict was completely reversed depending on 
which side offered greater financial rewards.77
For the purposes o f clarifying the extent o f the ‘Olama’s judicial power, it will be 
helpful to consider a letter by Mofiammad Kazem KorasanI and §e% ‘Abdollah 
MazandaranT to the Majles, regarding the Second Fundamental.78 The letter reads:
‘The honorable nominees of the the supervisory council [consisting of twenty 
members of the ‘Olama]79... The responsibilities of the chosen five who will 
reside over and above, as well as becoming members of, the Majles in both an 
advisory and supervisory capacity80 are to ensure that the laws passed and 
those which will come to pass, are in complete accordance with the entirety of 
the ordinances of the Sarfah. However, matters pertaining to finance and the
74 AStlyanl (1362 SH/1983), p. 854.
75 Ibid., p. 258.
76 Ibid., p. 133-4, & Kasravl(1353 SH/1974), p. 361.
77 Mo§addeq (1365 SH/1986), pp. 27-8.
78 The addition concerning the five member council of the ‘Olama.
79 The leading Mojtaheds presented the name of twenty ‘Olama to the Majles. The Majles then choose 
five people to form the five-member council.
80 The supervisory council preserved the right to veto any clause or bill which they regard as against the 
interests of Islam and harmful for the Muslims.
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treasury are excluded from this, such matters are the responsibility of the 
government Judicial laws concerning murder, Qisas, the appropriate sentence 
and punishment to be inflicted, Hodud, and whatever else is the within the 
range of the responsibilities of a jurisconsultant81 must be referred to a just 
Mojtahed The only role o f the government in legal matters is to refer such 
cases to a Mojtahed and act accordingly in implementing the exact dictum of 
the Mojtahed82 The ruling of the Mojtahed is absolute and binding.’83
After the first Majles in accordance to the second Article of the Additions to the 
Fundamental Law 1325/1907, a five-member council from among the ‘Olama were 
selected as advisors to the Majles. The council strongly opposed the setting up of the 
Ministry of Justice and the majority of proposed judicial reforms. The ‘Olama viewed all 
judicial matters to be their sole monopoly and viewed the government as mere executors. 
In fact, the council interfered with and was an obstacle to any reform, which it viewed as 
a threat to the vested interest o f the ‘Olama. The power and influence of the clergy is 
clearly reflected in the following Articles of the Constitution:
Article 1
The official religion of Iran is Islam of the true sect of Ja‘fanyeh Isna Asariyeh [Twelver 
Shi’a]. The Sah must profess and protect this frith.
Article 2
The Majles which has been formed with the blessings of the Imam ‘A§r [Imam of the 
time, the Twelfth Imam in Occupation] may God speed his appearance by the grace of His 
Majesty the Sah, by the vigilance of the Islamic ‘Olama, may God increase their example, 
and by the Iranian nation, may at no time legitimate laws that are contradictory to the 
sacred laws of Islam.... [It is self-evident that it is the responsibility of the ‘Olama to 
determine and judge such contradictions. Therefore it is officially decreed that in each 
legislative session a council of no less than five men, comprised of Mojtaheds and devout 
Foqaha, who are also aware of the needs of the time, be nominated by the ‘Olama.]84 The 
Majles shall accept this board as full members. It is their duty to study all legislative 
proposals and if they find any that contradicts the sacred laws of Islam, they shall reject it. 
The decision of the council is binding and final. This provision of the constitution is
81 This is a vague statement, which is in fret an indefinite definition of power for the ‘Olama.
82 By this definition the government is only the executor of a verdict and does not have any control over 
the verdict or the procedures by which it was issued.
83 Asnade Ketab^aneh Majles Suraye MellT Asnad. Majles va Ruhanlyat, pp. 13-15, Document number 
5. The letter was written in 1328/ 1910.
84 This Provision for a Supervisory council, although never altered, was completely ignored by Reza Sah.
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unalterable until the coming of the Imam ‘A$r, may God speed His appearance.
Article 18
All sciences and crafts may be freely learned and taught except those that are forbidden by 
the SarVah.
Article 20
All publications with the exception of heretical books and literature harmful to Islam can 
be freely circulated and censorship over them is forbidden.85
Furthermore, the autonomy and power of the ‘Olama can be elucidated by a close 
examination of articles 144-149, of the first Civil Code, promulgated in 1911. The extent 
of the power of the ‘Olama is clearly reflected in the following articles.
Article 144
Matters pertaining to the SarVah are those delineated and prescribed by the laws of Islam. 
Article 145
The state courts of law shall refer the following cases to the Sari‘ah courts of the 
Mojtaheds:
1) When a dispute is caused by ignorance of the provisions of the SarVah.
2) Matters pertaining to marriage and divorce.
3) In absentia sentences involving SarVah jurisdiction.
4) Cases involving the declaration of bankruptcy, the confiscation of property, of persons 
whom refuse to pay their debts and injunction of restriction.
5) When the solution of the dispute is possible only by recourse to witness and/or by 
oath.
6) When legal writs issued by the SarVah courts are ambiguous, vague, or contradictory.
7) When the dispute pertains the principles of vaqf, will, or guardianship.
8) When the appointment of the trustee of Vaqf, a Sari‘ah supervisor, or legal guardian 
is involved.
Article 146
When there is a dispute over whether a case fells under the SarVah or the ‘Orf it may not
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be referred to a state court of law without the agreement of a Mojtahed.
Article 147
If the courts of SarVah insist that the dispute involves a case described in Article 4 of this 
law namely that the state law on the matter is non-existent, incomplete, or contradictory, 
the Ministry o f Justice has no right to examine the case, even if both parties to the dispute 
agree to such examination. In such a case the dispute must be referred to the council o f 
Mojtaheds.
Article 148
In all SarVah cases except those described in Article 145 of this law, the state courts may 
exercise jurisdiction if both parties agree to such jurisdiction. Otherwise they must be 
referred to SarVah courts.
Article 149
The state courts may not hear appeals from the verdicts of SarVah courts. Such appeals 
must be referred to the council of Mojtaheds
The control of the legal sphere had proved particularly lucrative for the ‘Olama. 
The money the ‘Olama received from fees charged on legal documents and contacts was 
one of their most significant sources o f income. One area which was particularly lucrative, 
was the administration of government S a ri business, which in Tehran usually passed to 
one particular Mojtahed87 Furthermore, the ‘Olama paid literally no tax to the state as 
income from J£oms, and Zakdt was not taxable. Many of the ‘Olama were major 
landowners but were exempt from paying land tax. In 1903, the Governor General o f 
Mashad told Hardinge, the British consul there: ‘Non of the Mojtaheds who were among 
the chief landowners in the country paid a twentieth of the revenue that could be justly 
demanded of them.’88 On the whole the ‘Olama were exempt from state persecution and 
the arbitrary levies o f money exacted by high officials.89 It was not surprising that the 
‘Olama were resolutely opposed to legal reform.
The foundations for reform in the sphere of the law were laid during the 
Constitutional period but were only frilly actualized and operationalized by Reza Sah. As
85 Qanun-e AsasT va Motammam-e An, pp. 27-9.
86 Majmu‘eh-e QavanTn-e Mowzu‘-e va Mow§awabat-e Majles, Second Session, 1906-11, pp. 467-68.
87 Kerman! [Nazemol Islam] (1362 SH/1983), p. 20.
88 FO 60/665, Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 26, 3.3.1903.
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mentioned earlier, each province including Tehran had a Divan-e ‘Adliyeh or office of 
justice, which was in effect a court of equity. In 1907 the Divan-e ‘Adliyeh of Tehran was 
reorganized into the following courts o f law: 1) Court o f First Instance, 2) Court of 
Movable and Immovable properties, 3) Criminal Court [which was further divided into 
two courts, one dealing with first-degree murder and the other with all other crimes 
against persons or property], and 4) Court of Appeal.
The reorganization o f the 'Adliyeh was not supplemented by a law regarding 
procedures of legal administration. The ‘Adliyeh had ‘no code, no regulatory 
organization, and no established administration, and judges had no fixed income.’90 
Theoretically, when a judge was allocated to a particular case a sum of money was 
specified. In practice, however, the old custom o f receiving a certain percentage from 
both sides of a dispute was still prevalent.91 It is interesting to note that although judges 
were now part of the public sphere as employees of the government and no longer part of 
the private sphere as private individuals, nonetheless this custom still prevailed. 92
In 1909, §adrol ASraf became the First Deputy to the Chief Justice o f the Criminal 
Court. He wrote in his memoirs that at the time there were no codes of procedure for 
conducting preliminary investigations or determining sentences. Conducting of 
investigation, which was the responsibility of the Prosecuting Attorney, was placed in the 
hand of the members o f the Criminal Court.93 The passing of a verdict and the appropriate 
sentence rested on the individual opinion of a particular judge, which was often derived 
from the practices of ‘Orf law.94 In the same year, Moslrod Dowleh, the Minister of 
Justice, passed an injunction concerning criminal investigations, which was derived from 
European codes o f investigation procedure and laws o f determining sentences. ‘This laid 
the groundwork for familiarizing the members of the Criminal Court with procedures 
based on written laws.’95
The pace of legal reform was very slow and almost any attempt at legal reform 
faced ‘Olama opposition. ‘The lack of progress in the court system stemmed from ‘Olama
89 Kerman! [Nazemol Islam] (1362 SH/1983), p. 254.
90 Matm-Daftan (1342 SH/1945), p. 8.
91 §adr [§adrol Asraf] (1364 SH/1983), pp. 174-5.
92 Ja‘far! LangarudI, Interview, (5.1.1997).
93 The members of the Criminal Court consisted of Chief Justice, First Deputy, Second Deputy, three 
other member Judges and two secretaries, who sat in court.
94 §adr [§adrol A§raf| (1364 SH/1983), pp. 174-5.
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opposition. Both ‘Constitutionalist’ and ‘anti-Constitutionalist’ ‘Olama were opposed to 
legal reform. They did not recognize other judges or alternative legal systems as 
legitimate. The ‘Olama viewed only Sar ‘ judges as competent authorities. Any other basis 
of law was seen as inappropriate and unsuitable. Mosifod Dowleh, faced with ‘Olama 
opposition, was insistent on appointing only ‘enlightened’ ‘Olama to head the new courts 
of law, he wanted people who would be able to resist the threat of the ‘reactionary’ 
members of the ‘Olama.’ 96
One of the most vocal and outspoken ‘Olama and a member of the ‘Supervisory 
Council of Five’,97 against legal reform was Hasan Moddares. Moddares was adamant to 
stop any bill through the Majles that may encroach upon the power and influence of the 
‘Olama within the legal sphere. Seyyed Hasan Moddares was popular and influential 
amongst the people and is reported to have been decisive in bringing down unpopular 
cabinets. During the second Majles (1329/1911), Mosifod Dowleh attempted to pass a 
legal reform bill [code of legal procedures] through the Majles. The bill was rejected, the 
strongest opponent to the bill being Moddares. Mosifod Dowleh refiised to return to the 
Majles until the bill was passed. Moddares opposed the bill on the grounds that only a 
Mojtahed is entitled to sit in judgment. Mosifod Dowleh was convinced that accepting 
this condition was a complete negation of the basis of legal reform and thus §adrol ASraf 
was asked to act as a special envoy between Moddares and Mosifod Dowleh in an 
attempt to arrange negotiation procedures.98
§adrol Asraf reports the following conversation between Moddares and Mosifod 
Dowleh: ‘Mosifod Dowleh told Moddares “If you do not accept this bill [code of legal 
procedures], then the administration o f justice will be restricted to and at the mercy of the 
‘Olama who pass contradictory and arbitrary judgments [based on their own discretion 
rather than on a codified set of laws]. This will result in European governments imposing 
their laws upon us.” Mosifod Dowleh’s utterance made Moddares rather agitated and 
distraught and he replied, “You Westernized people have become bewitched by the 
Europeans. Now you even propose to impose European laws upon us! My only duty [as a 
Muslim and a Mojtahed and thus, Sarparast, guardian, of the believers] is to reject any
95 Ibid., p. 175.
96 Ibid., p. 175.
97 The ‘Olama who presided over the Majles.
98 Ibid., pp. 174-7.
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law that I believe to be contradictoiy to the tenets of the holy SarVah” ’"
Moddares was of the opinion that the ‘Olama should sit in judgment in all cases. 
He agreed to give his approval only on the condition that a further eight articles be added 
to the beginning of the proposed bill. The added articles ensured that the ‘Olama could 
maintain their power and influence in legal matters. Mosifod Dowleh’s aim was to restrict 
the ‘Olama’s jurisdiction to specifically religious matters such as births, deaths, marriages 
and divorce. In particular, he endeavoured to limit the extent of the ‘Olama’s interference 
in legal matters pertaining to the state, such as state concessions and monopolies. Initially 
Mosifod Dowleh refiised to agree to the eight articles suggested by Moddares. He viewed 
the acceptance of these articles as resulting in the reduction of the power of the 1Adliyeh. 
‘The ‘Adliyeh would simply become the recipient of formal legal complaints which would 
then have to be referred to the ‘Olama. Consequently, the ‘Adliyeh would be devoid of 
any real executive power.’100 Eventually, after much negotiation, a compromise was 
reached. Mosifod Dowleh agreed to the additional eight articles and Moddares decided to 
accept the bill. The bill for the reform of legal procedures was passed by the second 
Majles with the power of the ‘Olama still intact.101
§adrol Asraf was appointed as a special envoy between Mosifod Dowleh and the 
‘Olama. The ‘Olama were requested to select and present a council of their most suitable 
members to the ‘Adliyeh. The ‘Olama could not reach a consensus on the selection of the 
council members and consequently no council was presented. ‘Mosifod Dowleh used the 
situation to his own advantage by referring only strictly SarVah cases to the ‘Olama. All 
other cases were dealt with by the 'Adliyeh.’102 All attempts at legal reform were severely 
restrained by the ‘Olama whose primary requisite was to preserve their own dominance 
and supremacy.
Prior to presentation of ‘the legal procedures bill’ to the Majles a French Jurist 
Adolph Pemi was employed as an advisor to assist in the preparation of the Penal Code. 
He completed his task by the end of 1911.103 In January 1912 the first penal code ever 
promulgated in Iran was submitted to the Majles for approval. Consisting of 506 articles,
99 Ibid., pp. 211-212.
100 Ibid., p. 213.
101 Ibid., p. 213-4, & Sayegan (1316 SH/1937), pp. 32-33.
102 §adr [§adrol Asraf] (1364 SH/1983), p. 214.
103 Ibid., p. 213, & Banani (1961), p. 38.
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this code was the first attempt to graft the Napoleonic Code upon the body of the Sarfah 
in Iran.104 ‘It was signed by three first-rank Mojtaheds, who testified that it was 
acceptable by the standards of the SarVah and its new features did not violate the 
precepts of Islam.’105 It is significant that three leading Mojtaheds should not object to a 
French jurist preparing a code of law for Iran. However, what is even more notable is the 
implicit admission by the Mojtaheds that the legal concepts of the West might be added to 
Islamic precepts.
Disintegration, anarchy, civil unrest, threat of foreign invasion, powerful clergy, 
and tribal unrest characterized the period 1905-1921. The Constitutionalists believed that 
all problems feeing Iran could be solved through the establishment of a Constitutional 
government. It was a period of great aspiration and endeavour towards reform, which 
meet with fierce ‘Olama opposition every step of the way. The Constitutional period laid 
the groundwork for many of the reforms of Reza Sah.106 The task before Reza Sah was 
great: he not only had to provide internal security but also had to rid himself of all other 
rival power threats. Furthermore, Reza Sah ascended the throne in a country where a dual 
power structure o f politics and hierocratic domination had already taken firm roots. His 
policy of centralization was the antithesis to this dual structure of authority. Reza Sah was 
thus faced with a rival power structure and made every effort to ensure its displacement. 
Consequently the ‘Olama were irreconcilably alienated from the PahlavT State. The 
centralizing policies of Reza Sah devastated the clerical institution foundations o f power 
and to some extent lessened their cultural influence.
Judicial Reform During the Reign of Reza Sah and its 
Consequence for the ‘Olama
Reza Sah’s legal reforms must be placed within the overall process of reform 
motivated by a desire to modernize Iran as well as to consolidate his own position. His 
consolidation of power could not be completed without efforts to change the Qajar legacy 
of dual power structure of politics and hierocratic domination. In the legal sphere, his first 
objective was to abolish the system of capitulation. He realized that as long as Iran did not 
have a judicial system based along Western lines, the abolition of capitulation might
104 Ibid., p. 38, & Avery (1965), p. 151.
105 0§ul-e Mofiakemat-e Jaza’T, p. 172.
106 Menashri (1992).
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attract adverse publicity in Europe; therefore he proceeded speedily with his plans to 
reform the legal system. The system of capitulation, justified by the plea that the subjects 
of foreign powers could not be exposed to the Iranian legal system, was a lingering 
memorial to former foreign influence and an affront to Iranian nationhood. Reza Sah was 
anxious to abolish capitulation and therefore the speed with which he began legal reforms 
was not aimed solely at the ‘Olama but was rather the prelude to throwing off other 
nation’s extra-territorial rights.107
Reza Sah’s second objective was motivated by a desire to create a centralized, 
uniform and systematic legal system under the control of the central government, thereby 
consolidating his own position. The need for reform arose entirely out of the needs of the 
country at the time. ‘If Iran was to be accepted as an independent nation state in the 
international arena it required an internationally recognized and accepted legal system. 
The old legal system was inadequate in meeting the current needs of the country. Iran’s 
increased interaction with the world necessitated certain legal reforms, which were non­
existent in the old system. An example of this is the total lack of provisions concerning 
commercial and international commercial law, in Sar ‘ or '0 / / law.’108
In 1924 and 1926, experimental commercial and penal codes were introduced.109 
In 1927, the old Ministry of Justice was dissolved and in April of the same year new 
personnel, many of whom had received European education, took over the administration 
of the new Ministry of Justice from the former clerical officials. On this occasion Reza 
Sah reminded the new officials that a country was judged by the quality of its laws. In the 
same year, ‘All Akbar Davar110 became the Minister of Justice and immediately proceeded
107 ‘AqelT (1369 SH/1990). Similar views are expressed by Ibrahimzadeh, Interview, (3.1. 1997), 
Sayegan (1316 SH/1937), Banani (1961), & Avery (1965), p. 289.
108 Ibrahlmzadeh, Interview, (3.1.1997).
109 Matm-Daftan (1342 SH/1945), pp. 69-164.
110 Akbar Davar was bom in 1885, the son of a third ranking Qajar courtier. His preliminary studies 
were with private tutors in Farsi, Arabic, mathematics, geography and history. He then attended one of 
only four schools in Tehran [‘ElmTyeh, Qajar and JarbTyat], Dar ul-Fonun, and studied medicine. After 
four years of studying medicine he switched to humanities and graduated eight years later. During 
Mofiammad ‘AIT Sah’s reign he joined the Democrat party and became an activist. At the age of 24 he 
entered the ministry of Justice and attained a high executive position. He also co-operated with Seyyed 
Zlya’ol Dm Tabataba’T in the publication of his newspaper Sharq. He then left Iran for Switzerland to 
further his studies. There he obtained a degree in political science and law and in 1921 he finished his 
doctorate. He stayed in Europe for the total of eleven years. During his years abroad he was active against 
the 1919 Agreement. In 1921 he returned to Iran. He had close ties with Reza I£an and in 1922 with Reza 
Ipin’s help he was nominated as a delegate from Varamin. During his deputyship he published a 
newspaper called ‘mardeh azadeh’ [freeman], the first issue was published on the 28 January 1923. He
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to dissolve the entire existing legal sector. On 14 February 1927, ‘AH Akbar Davar 
presented a bill to the Majles specifying his intended reforms. The bill was passed 
forthwith and Davar gained the backing of the Majles to move on with his legal reforms. 
He was given full authority to reform the existing legal system. Addressing the Majles 
deputies, Davar stated:
‘Highly esteemed members of the National Assembly, I am sure that all 
honoured members will certify that public opinion, the opinion of the 
Majles and the resolution of the government has always been in favour of 
reforming the legal system. If the Minister of Justice is not given executive 
powers by the Majles, then no reform will be possible. The following 
needs instantaneous and prompt attention. Firstly, the Minister of Justice is 
to be allowed to set up special commissions composed of educated 
professionals and area specialists in order to draft the necessary reforms to 
the legal system and to ascertain their applicability in practice. Once this 
has been carried out the suggested reforms will be presented to the Majles.
The mentioned commissions are to be disolved four months after 
completion. However, if the commission does not suggest further reforms 
for the regeneration of and employment within the Ministry o f Justice, no 
further reforms will be carried out. Secondly, the Minister of Justice is to 
be authorized to appoint persons whom he deems suitable regardless of 
whether they have held previous government posts or not. The above- 
mentioned executive rights o f the Minster o f Justice are to be valid for the 
period of four months.’111
On 25 April 1927, the new Ministry of Justice was established. The Sah and his 
government officials assembled in the BerelTyan Palace. After the Sah’s introductory 
speech about the importance of the new ministry and the rule of law, the newly appointed 
judges were presented with their royal orders, Forman. Davar also gave a speech 
concerning the new structure and administration of the new ministry and swore to Reza 
Sah that ‘Iran would soon have a legal system equal to those of the progressive 
nations.’112 In specifying the administrative superiority o f the new system, Davar 
mentioned the following in his speech:
‘In the previous system a number of judges were required to preside over 
one court, which was somewhat inefficient. Now only one judge is
then set up the radical party. In the fifth Majles of 1924 he was re-elected from Lar. In the 1924 
republican debate, Davar was in the anti republican camp. In 1926 Davar became the minister of trade 
and during this time he set up the commercial school. Ibid., p. 91. In 1927 Davar became the Minster of 
Justice, In 1933 he became the treasury minister. In 1937 following a severe verbal attack by Reza Sah 
and committed suicide by taking opium dissolved in alcohol. ‘AqelT (1369 SH/1990), pp. 15-16, 91 & 
105-6.
111 tAqelI(1369 SH/1990), pp. 106-108.
112 Ibid., pp. 141-2.
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required to preside over a court. Previously the Supreme Court had only 
two administrative branches whereas now it has four. In the provinces, we 
have further subdivided the Provincial Court of Appeal into two ‘mobile’
Courts of Appeal and two ‘fixed’ Courts of Appeal. In Tehran a new court 
has been set up, known as the ‘Negotiation Room’. This new addition 
ensures further efficiency in resolving disputes for, if the presiding judge is 
unable to resolve a dispute, then it is referred to the ‘Negotiation Room’ 
for further investigation. We have set up the Municipal Small Claims 
Court, consisting of eight administrative branches. The municipality of 
Tehran is divided into nine districts, each with their own Small Claims 
Court. The financial limit of these courts is set between 20 and 400 
Tomans. In the previous system there was only one administrative office 
for all types of courts, whereas now each type of court has its own 
administrative office. Previously there was only one executive office which 
carried out sentences throughout the country; now each branch of the legal 
system, has its own executive office. In the previous system, only four 
provinces had their own Court of Appeal, Azarbayejan, Fars, Korasan, and 
Kerman, but now Hamadan and Esfehan also have their own courts of 
appeal. Previously there were ten provincial courts in the following 
provinces Rast, Hamadan, Kermanshah, Arak, Tabriz, Mashad, Slraz, 
I^ozestan, Kerman and Barforus; now there are thirty- five courts which 
cover most o f the provinces. Furthermore, in the previous system the 
bureau for the registration of documents only existed in Rast and Esfehan 
but now almost each province has its own bureau.’113
Concerning the distinguishing features of the new legal system Davar mentions the 
following:
‘The new administrative structure of the Ministry of Justice is such that all 
its employees are honourable and virtuous and have some knowledge of 
the new sciences. The Ministry acts in accordance with the Civil law of 
Iran which recognizes governance and adjudication as solely within the 
jurisdiction of the central government. The execution and implementation 
of the laws which govern the country are the duty of the Ministry of 
Justice. Furthermore, the right to issue legal rulings has been removed 
from ‘Olama [Sar‘] outside of the Ministry of Justice to ensure the 
dominion of the Ministry within the legal sphere. Only those ‘Olama who 
are official employees o f the Ministry have the right to function within 
their specified duties. The Ministry of Justice has now a canonized code of 
law which serves as a guideline forjudges. Judges can no longer base their 
ruling on Islamic jurisprudence \Feqh] but must act in accordance with the 
new statute. The setting up of criminal courts has helped in dealing with 
specifically criminal offences in accordance with the new penal code 
[instead of Hodud\ . The compulsory documentation of land has been 
added to the statute in order to prevent unnecessary and fraudulent claims.
This ensures that once a piece of land has been registered any other party 
cannot counter claim it. The setting up of a bureau for official document
113 Ibid., pp. 141-143.
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and notary public’s offices prevents unnecessary disputes which could be 
time-consuming and expensive for the courts. The law of ‘passing of time’ 
ensures that if land holdings have been within a particular family for the 
last forty years no previous documents claming ownership are valid.’114
On 18 May 1927, Davar asked for a further extension of four months, which was 
passed by the Majles with the exception of Mofiammad Mo§addeq who opposed the 
motion.115 In the same year a Supreme disciplinary court was set up to deal with judicial 
offences and Mofisen §adrol Asraf was appointed as its head. In 1928, Davar as the head 
of the commission within the Ministry of Justice, presented the Majles with the first 
volume of the civil code as well as a judicial reorganization bill establishing the hierarchy 
o f courts. In May 1928, the government abolished capitulations. On 25 November 1928, 
on 30 April, and 3 November, 1929, and on 17 April and 3 November, 1930, the Majles 
passed bills empowering the Ministry of Justice to put into practice the newly proposed 
laws for a temporary trial period. The new laws were executed as soon as the Judiciary 
Committee of the Majles had approved them. Then, after any shortcomings that came to 
light in practice had been corrected, the Ministry of Justice was to submit the bill to the 
whole body of the Majles for permanent enactment. The same practice was continued 
throughout the eighth session of the Majles.116
In 1928, Davar designed a special uniform dress code forjudges, which coincided 
with the law of Uniform Dress. Only a few SarVah judges were exempt from this law. 
The ‘Olama who were given judicial positions in Davar’s new ministry were Seyyed ‘All 
Behbahanl, Habibollah Amozegar, Mostasarol-Molk, Movarrelpd-Dowleh, ‘All Qoll 
Hedayat, Haq Nevis, and Davod PTr Nlya.117 The following ‘Olama were required to de- 
robe in accordance with the uniform dress code forjudges: MTrza Reza Na’im Tabataba’I, 
Mofisen §adrol-Asraf, Seyyed Mofiammad Faterm QomI, Seyyed Na§rollah A^avT 
[TaqavT], Se% Mofiammad ‘Abdo, Mofiammad Reza VojdanT, Jamal A^avi, and MTrza 
Tafier Tonekabom. In the same year the bill for the official registration o f documents was 
passed by the Majles. This bill was first drafted in the 100-day cabinet o f Seyyed ZTya’o- 
DTn Tabataba’I in 1921. However, it was not implemented until 1928. Davar, influenced 
by European law, made substantial changes to the bill. He used his jurisdiction to ensure
114 Ibid., pp. 141-144.
115 Ibid., pp. 168-69.
116 Ibid., pp. 168-80.
117 Ibid., pp. 184-85.
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that the means for the implementation of the bill were provided and bureaus were set up 
all over the country for the official registration of documents. Davar, after passing the 
Official Registration of Documents law in order to win the support of the ‘Olama and 
lessen their opposition, allowed some of the more distinguished ‘Olama to set up notary 
public offices and bureaus for the registration of marriage and divorce.118
According to Avery,119 1928 was the year o f the attack on the outworks of the 
religious legal fabric. After 1906, efforts had been made to introduce a new Civil Code 
and in 1910 an Attorney General had been appointed. In 1911 Mosifod Dowleh’s 
government established a new Ministry of Justice and a Civil Code was published, 
declared to be experimental and conceived with cautious regard for Article 2 of the 
Fundamental Law, whereby no legislation contrary to the SarVah was to be enacted. A 
commercial Code had appeared in 1915, but by then lack of trained secular lawyers had 
already dictated a pause in these legal reforms. They were not resumed until 1928. The 
1928 law concerning the registration of documents and property was a vital blow to the 
position of the clergy in the judiciary system. It took away the monopoly of the SarVah 
courts over the registration of legal documents, marriage and divorce, which were the 
most important functions of the courts as well as by far the largest source of legitimate 
revenue for the Mojtaheds and lower clergy. Many members of the ‘Olama were forced to 
abandon the robe and seek secular employment. In feet many members of the new courts 
were ‘disrobed ‘Olama’.120
By 1929, Davar was able to introduce certain administrative changes and the 
following courts were set up: Commercial Court, Supreme Disciplinary Court, Criminal 
Court, and the bureau for the registration of documents. Also registration of land and
118 The ‘Olama who were allowed to set up notary public offices and bureaus for the registration of 
marriage and divorce were: Haj Imam Jom‘e l£oT, Seyyed Mofiammad BehbahanI, Seyyed Mofiammad 
Reza AfjeT, Selk Mofiammad Javad Sarfatzadeh, SeiV Had! Malekabadl, Seyyed Mofiammad Baqer 
Majid HowzT, Haj Bafirol ‘Olume Rasti, Sel^ Baha’addin Nuri, Seyyed Mofiammad Borujerdi, MTrza 
Mofiammad Hosem So§tan. The following ‘Olama ware given permission to set up such offices in 
Tehran: Sel^ Abu’l Ghasem TowysekanT, Selk Mofiammad Nuri, Seyyed ‘AIT AraqI, Seyyed ‘AH Akbar 
Ayatollah zadeh, Seyyed §adeq Rast! GllanI, Sel^ Ramazan ‘AIT phalli! Arab!], Sel^ Mofiammad TaqI 
ZanjanT, Seyyed Isma‘Tl Enayat, Seyyed Hasem ‘A§§ar, Seyyed Mofiammad Baqer IrvanT, Seik ‘Abdol 
Hosem NajmabadI, Selk Isma‘tl NajmabadT, Selk Abu Ja’far KermanT, Seyyed ‘All QomT, Seifc 
Mofiammad Reza Jaleqani Re±van, SeiV Mofiammad Amin £ woT, Selk Mofiammad TaqI Tehran!, 
Seyyed ‘Abdollah JaleqanT, Selk Nurod-DTn Kermanshahl, Abu’l Hasan SarIfol-‘01ama’, Seyyed 
Mafimud Taqavl LariJanT, Seyyed Ja‘far A§el, Sel^ Afimad TaffesT, and Musa Javan.
‘Aqell (1369 SH/1990), pp. 185-6.
119 Avery (1965).
120 §adr [§adrol ASral] (1364 SH/1983), p. 291.
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property became law. In less than two years the foundations of the Ministry of Justice had 
been firmly established. Also in 1929 the Ministry of Justice followed the first volume of 
the Civil Code with two concluding volumes, but with the matter o f capitulation out of 
the way the Majles finally proved more reluctant. Twice the bills were rejected.121 It was 
not until 26 January and 30 October 1935 that the Majles finally approved the second and 
third volumes of the Civil Code.122 Banani argues that in effect this code was the 
secularization o f the SarVah, ‘In parts dealing with general subjects [for example the first 
ten Articles], it was a verbatim translation of the civil code of France. But in matters of 
personal status it was a codification, simplification, and unification of the Sari‘ah.’123 On 
17 March 1932, the Majles enacted a law requiring that the registration of legal 
documents, of ownership and other transactions concerning property were to be carried 
out in secular state courts only.124 An experimental version of this law had been operative 
since 1929.
During his ministership Davar had managed to establish the School of Law with 
the cooperation of the Minister of Education Mofiammad Tadaayon. The School of Law 
was assimilated with the existing School of Economic and Political Science and the new 
Supreme School of Law was founded. Students would graduate after four years with a 
certificate in legal and administrative sciences. The entry requirements were a good high- 
school diploma and the passing of the entrance examination. The graduates of the school 
were employed as Rank One judges in the capital and Rank Two judges in the 
provinces.125 Some of the school’s top graduates were dispatched to Europe for further 
studies. Some of the reforms of Davar were as follows: specifying the jurisdiction of the 
Minister of Justice, the law of official registration of documents, the law of ranking of 
judges, the law of implementing sentences, the first draft of the civil code consisting of 
955 articles, the law of court martial, the law of governmental tribunal court, drafting of 
the commercial and penal code, the setting up of Sari‘ah courts, the setting up of tribunal 
courts for disciplining members o f the judiciary, establishing notary public offices and 
bureaus for the official registration of documents, marriage and divorce, and the
121 Matm-DaftarT (1342 SH/1945), pp. 13-14.
122 Sayegan (1316 SH/1937), pp. 36.
123 Banani (1961), & Avery (1965), p. 71.
124 Law of registration of documents, 1932, in the Majmu‘eh-e QavanTn-e Mowzu‘-e va Mow§awabat-e 
Majles, Section 8, pp. 90-132.
125 There was a total of eleven ranks in the judiciary.
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abrogation of slavery. In total Davar presented the Majles with well over 120 bills, most 
of which were passed as law and implemented. In 1929 the basic internal structure of the 
Ministry of Justice was almost complete and has changed very little since. The chart on 
the next page illustrates the internal structure of the Ministry of Justice.
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Davar was also behind the changes to Articles 81 and 82 of the Supplementary Section of 
the Fundamental Law, which maintained the independence of the judiciary. The new 
interpretation gave him power to change members o f the judiciary. Article 81 stated that 
‘No member of the judiciary can be removed from his position temporarily or permanently 
without trial and proof of guilt, unless he resigns.’ Article 82 stated that, ‘The changing of 
the position of a member of the judiciary is not possible without his consent.’ In 1931 a 
clarification clause was added to the above Articles. ‘What is meant by Article 82 is that it 
is not possible to transfer a member of the judiciary without his consent from a legal post 
to an administrative post or to the Public Prosecution sector. However, it does not mean 
that a member of the judiciary cannot be moved from his post to a similar post of equal 
ranking. Those members o f the judiciary who, according to the above, have been 
transferred to a new post and fail to comply are considered as committing sedition and 
will be prosecuted by the regulatory body and sentenced accordingly.’126
It is worth mentioning here that Davar was the mastermind behind the transfer of 
the post of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces from Afimad Sah to Reza Kan. He 
was also behind the changing of three Articles of the Supplement to the Fundamental 
Law, which enabled the transfer of the monarchy from the Qajars to Reza Ipin PahlavT. 
Davar played a crucial role in abolishing the Qajar monarchy and helping to establish the 
Pahalvi dynasty. In 1925, he was able to bring about this change through the Constituent 
Assembly, which was endowed with the power to amend and make changes to the 
Fundamental Law.127 When presenting the proposed changes to the Majles he made the 
following speech: ‘Delegates o f the National Assembly... for the welfare o f the people of 
Iran I propose that the Qajar dynasty should be abolished and replaced by a provisional 
government under the leadership of Reza l£an PahlavT.* On 31 October 1925, the Majles 
passed the following Act: ‘ Majles Sowraye MellJ, in the name of the welfare of the nation, 
declares the end of the Qajar Monarchy and bestows the provisional government, within 
the bounds of the Constitution and laws of the land, to Reza Kan PahlavT. The final 
reform of the government shall be decided by a constituent assembly which shall convene 
for the revision of Articles 36, 37, 38 and 40 of the Supplements to the Constitution.’128
126 ‘Aqell (1369 SH/1990), pp. 202-203.
127 MakkI (1369 SH/1991), p. 488 & ‘Aqell (1369 SH/1990), pp. 86-88.
128 Ibid., pp. 71-2.
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In December 1925 the National Constituent Assembly met in Tehran and revised 
the following Articles: 36, 37 and 38 of the Supplementary Law. Article 36 was changed 
to the following: ‘In the name o f the people: The National Constituent Assembly herewith 
entrusts the Constitutional monarchy of Iran to His Royal Highness Reza Sah PahlavT, 
which shall remain in his male lineage generation after generation.’ Article 37 stated: ‘The 
throne shall pass to the eldest son of the Sah who must be of complete Iranian descent. In 
case that there is no male heir, the Sah himself shall choose his successor, who in turn 
shall be approved by the Majles. Whereupon the Sah is endowed with a male heir, he will 
become Crown Prince. No member of the house of Qajars can ever become a pretender to 
the throne.’ Article 38 was amended to: ‘The crown Prince is not to assume the throne 
until he has reached the foil age o f twenty-one. In case the heir apparent is a minor, the 
Majles is to elect a regent provided that he is not of Qajar descent.’129 Furthermore, the 
Sah, heir apparent and the regent must each take an oath on the Constitution before the 
Majles as specified by Article 39 of the Supplementary Law. On 15 December 1925, Reza 
Sah returned to the National Constituent Assembly to sign the oath of office, which read:
‘I take God almighty as my witness and swear on the Holy Qoran and all 
that is sacred before God, that I should dedicate all my strength to the 
independence of Iran, the integrity o f the realm and the rights of the 
people. I shall preserve the foundations of the Constitution and shall work 
for the country in full conformity with it. I shall propagate and protect the 
Ja‘fari [Shi’a] faith. Standing in the presence of Allah, who watches over 
all my deeds and actions, I promise to strive for the happiness and glory of 
Iran and Iranians. I shall have no other intention but the progress and well­
being of Iran, its people and the government. To this end I implore the 
assistance of Allah and the spiritual benevolence of the Prophet, the Imams 
and the teachers of Islam [‘Olama] in achieving my tasks.’
Then rising from the royal chair, he picked up the Qoran in both hands, raised it high 
above his head then kissed it twice and placed it upon the table.130 The Constituent 
Assembly consisted o f272 members and out of these 269 delegates voted in favour of the 
above change. Three abstained.131
Until 1936 the nature of legal reforms was temporary and experimental; from then
129 MakkT (1369 SH/1991), p. 586.
130 Ibid., p. 14.
131 Ibid., p. 13.
The ‘Olama present in the Constituent Assembly were: §elk Mofiammad Yazdl Nadusand, Seyyed Abu’l 
Qasem KaSanT, §eT^  Zlya’o-Dm Klyanuri, MTrza Sahab KermanT, Seyyed Mofiammad Tadaayon,
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on the reform of the judiciary system reached a turning point. Before Davar there were no 
regulatory laws or specified requirements for legal representation. Davar created a 
condition that whoever wanted to practise law had to have a certificate o f approval from 
the Ministry of Justice. Only those who had three years’ experience or a degree in law 
from Iran or abroad could become legal representatives upon passing an entrance exam.132 
Davar set up the Central Investigatory Council, consisting of members of the judiciary, 
ministers, and government employees. A Council delegate and a military official would be 
sent for inspection of the different administrative branches of the Ministry of Justice 
throughout the country. In this way the power of the central government as a regulatory 
body was established. It could be argued that the permanent Westernization of the 
judiciary system dates back to the law concerning the employment of judges enacted on 
27 December 1936. The law set the following employment qualifications forjudges, thus 
eliminating many members of the ‘Olama from the judiciary: 1) [All judges must hold] a 
degree from Tehran university Faculty of Law or a foreign university, attesting to three 
years or more of legal studies. 2) Former judges o f the Ministry of Justice who do not 
hold such a degree must pass special examinations in Iranian and foreign law in order to 
remain in the employment of the Ministry, and at any rate may not rise above the rank of 
six on a promotion scale of eleven ranks.133
Avery points out that by 1936 Reza Sah had met every form of opposition from 
the clergy and had emerged from the contest in absolute triumph. There was then no more 
prudence.134 As a result of the 1932 law concerning the negotiations of documents 
relating to property transaction and other matters, which was to be dealt with exclusively 
by state secular courts and lawyers, ‘The Mollas had been sufficiently humbled for final 
steps to be taken. Many of them had already abandoned the turban and donned a Western 
style suit to become notaries in order to avoid destitution. New regulations of this kind 
made it impossible for many clerics to gain a living unless they too became secular. 
Accordingly, by the end of 1936, Iran was legally almost entirely emancipated from 
religion.’135
Ayatollah Slrazi, Selfc: Mohammad ‘All Tehran!, MTr?a Hasem AStlyanI and Seyyed Mohammad 
BehbahanT. Makkl(1369 SH/1991), p. 487.
132 ‘Aqel! (1369 SH/1990), pp. 188-89.
133 Majmu‘eh-e Qavanm-e Mowzu‘-e va Mow§awabat-e Majles, Section 10, pp. 98-100.
134 Avery (1965), p. 291.
135 Ibid., p. 291.
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According to Ebrahunzadeh, however, the law of employment of judges was not 
enacted in order to reduce the power and influence of the ‘Olama, although in practice it 
did. The law was more concerned with systematization and centralization of the judiciary, 
as well as bringing it under central government control. The law was necessitated by the 
need ‘to establish a modem judiciary which required educated personnel. The two 
processes were inseparable.’136 Furthermore, Iran’s civil code was based directly on one 
o f the books o f Shi’i Feqh and has very few foreign influences. In feet the code was 
drafted with the help of the ‘Olama. Laws without prior existence were based mostly on 
Belgian and French law; for example the codification of Penal Code was derived from 
Belgian and French law. As far as possible Davar tried not to contradict the Sari‘ah and 
in all the commissions which were set up members of the ‘Olama were present.137
‘The intention behind the law of 1936 was not an attack on Islamic 
principles; rather it was an attempt to stop the interference of unqualified 
people in the guise o f Islam. Without doubt one of the aims [of legal 
reform] was to reduce the level of interference of the ‘so called ‘Olama’, 
who had neither suitability nor competent authority to interfere in legal 
matters. The administration of the Ministry of Justice did take on a 
European form but in terms o f content it remained true to the tenets of 
Islam. A number of qualified ‘Olama were requested to assist the Ministry 
and to safeguard Islamic ideals. In the specified period [1925-1941] not all 
the members of the Ministry of Justice were European-educated: some had 
received traditional theological education in Najaf and Qom. Such people 
as Mofisen §adrol-Asra£ Seyyed Kazem *A§§ar, Seyyed Fajeml Qoim and 
Mofiammad Sorurey are to name but a few.’138
The law of 1936 placed the authority of assessing the suitability of judges in the 
hands of the government. ‘Centralized regulation meant that the judicial system was less 
prone to the misappropriation o f justice by the arbitrary rulings o f those who placed 
personal interests above the interests of the people.’139 The new reform did not jeopardize 
the position of the ‘enlightened ‘Olama’ who not only remained within the Ministry but 
also continued to be influential However, some of the ‘so-called ‘Olama’ who were 
ignorant and misused their power and ‘status of the robe’ were made redundant.140
Avery and Banani view the 1936 law as marking the permanent Westernization of
136 IbrShimzadeh, Interview, (3.1.1997).
137 ‘Aqell (1369 SH/1990), pp. 186-9.
138 AlamutI, Interview, (12 .1.1997).
139 Sayegan (1316 SH/1937), p. 32.
140 Ibrahnnzadeh, Interview, (3.1.1997).
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the judicial system. Ebrahlmzadeh, AlamutI and Shaygan point out three perspicacious but 
fundamental and significant points, which seemed to have been overlooked by both Avery 
and Banani. 1) A definitive distinction is made between ‘enlightened9, educated and 
qualified ‘Olama and the ‘so-called ‘Olama’ who were viewed as ignorant and abusive of 
their power and position. 2) Bringing in regulations reduced the power of the latter type 
o f ‘Olama and to some extent stopped the abuse of justice in the name of Islam. This 
however is in itself threatening to the ‘Olama ‘as an institution’, in that it takes away their 
power of ‘self-governance’ and places it under the control of the central government. 3) 
The priority of the government in regulating the requirements and qualification of judges 
does not negate Islamic principles; rather it reduces the autonomy of the ‘Olama in the 
legal sphere as a ‘self-regulating’ and ‘self-governing’ body. This threatened the balance 
between the dual power structure of politics and hierocratic domination. The political 
now exerted control over the regulatory rights of the hierocratic, in a sphere long- 
established as within its jurisdiction and control, namely the legal sphere. Only if one 
accepts the position that the ‘Olama are the ‘guardians o f the faith’ and that the reduction 
of their power is synonymous and inseparable from Islam per se, can one argue that the 
law of 1936 negated Islamic principles.
The 1936 law did have secularizing effects in that it took away the autonomy of 
the ‘Olama in the legal sphere. However, it did not totally eliminate ‘Olama participation 
in the Ministry of Justice, nor can it be viewed as an attack upon the tenets of Islam. What 
was clear from the beginning of Reza Sah’s reforms was that ultimately the autonomy of 
the ‘Olama in legal matters would be inevitably reduced in the course o f establishing 
central government control. From 1937 to 1939 various laws regulating the practice of 
attorneys and legal experts were enacted. In 1939 a law concerning bankruptcy was 
promulgated.141 The final and permanent version of the Civil Code was being studied in 
the judiciary and legislative committees of the Majles throughout its eleventh session and 
on 16 September 1939, it was passed in 789 Articles by the entire body of the Majles}*2 
The Civil Code differed specifically from the long series of provisional codes enacted 
since 1911143 in that it allowed greater jurisdiction to lower courts, it increased the 
powers of the state attorney and prosecutors, it provided for the first-time special
141 Matm-Daftarl (1342 SH/1945), p. 16.
142 Majmu‘eh-e Qavanm-e Mowzu‘-e va Mow§awabat-e Majles, 11th Session, 1937-39, pp. 94-257.
143 Which has been dealt with earlier.
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procedure for the trial of foreign nationals, and it introduced a scale of priorities designed 
to minimize hardship or loss due to court processes. The Civil Code also applied to 
commercial cases unless otherwise specified.144 Also in 1940, 378 articles were added to 
the Civil Code, defining the rights of the state in matters of inheritance and the probating 
of wills.145
For nearly ten years after the rise of Reza Sah a process o f attrition diminished the 
power of the ‘Olama. In 1922 the state courts were given partial appellate jurisdiction 
over the SarVah courts and this jurisdiction was further expanded in 1926.146 One feature 
of the Sari‘ah was its sanction to pronounce sentence on the strength of sworn witness 
alone. Large numbers of cases, when nothing but circumstantial evidence could be found, 
were decided by Sari‘ah courts, by the simple administration of the Qoranic oath to a 
witness. This procedure was considered incompatible with Western codes and in 1929 the 
Majles enacted a law forbidding it.147
On 30 November 1931, the Majles approved a law redefining the status and 
jurisdiction of the SarVah courts as special courts.148 If we compare this to Article 144 of 
the code of 1911,149 we can see that it had defined the jurisdiction of the SarVah courts as 
matters ‘delineated and prescribed by the laws of Islam’.150 Whereas Article 2 of the new 
law stated that ‘SarVah courts are formed to judge such cases as are defined within their 
jurisdiction by laws of the realm. No cases may be referred to a SarVah court without 
authorization from state courts and the office of the Attorney General.’151
The area of jurisdiction of the Sarfah courts was narrowed and defined in Article 
7 of the law to include only disputes involving the principle of marriage and divorce, and 
the appointment of trustees and guardians. In the latter cases all actions of the Sari‘ah 
courts were subject to the concurrence and supervision of the Attorney General. Article 8 
o f the law forbade the SarVah courts from pronouncing sentences. Their verdicts were to 
be sent to the state court that had referred the case to them to be pronounced by the 
court. In case of appeal by the defendant the state court could view the verdict o f the
144 Matw-Daftan (1342 SH/1945), p. 17.
145 Majmu‘eh-e Qavanm-e Mowzu‘-e va Mow§awabat-e Majles, 12th Session, 1939-41, pp. 3-62.
146 Ibid., 4th Session, 1921-23, pp. 116-18, & Fifth Session, 1923-25, pp. 62-5.
147 Ibid., 7th Session, 1929-31, pp. 86-88.
148 Ibid., 8th Session, 1931-33, pp. 154-60.
149 For the full text of Article 144 please refer to p. 183.
150 Majmu‘eh-e Qavanm-e Mowzu‘-e va Mow§awabat-e Majles, 2nd Session, 1906-11, pp. 4467.
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SarVah. The provisions of this law were made retroactive to 5 January 1929, in all cases 
pending before SarVah courts [Article 17], thereby removing a large number of cases 
from those courts.152
Both the Civil Code and the Penal Code reflected the influence of Western 
judiciary models. Banani gives the following example: Article 5 of the Civil Code of 1939 
provides that, ‘the court must pass judgment on each case in accordance with specific 
article of the code and not based on generalities,’ which was designed to prevent the 
judiciary branch from interfering with other branches of government. He maintains that 
Article 5 of the Civil Code of 1939 was a direct copy of Article 5 of the French civil code 
and Article 127 of the French penal code.153 However, it should be stated that, although 
the Civil Code revealed many European influences, it also embodied many of the tenets of 
SarVah law.
‘Indeed the rules embodied in the Civil Code were the subject of traditions 
dating back to the advent of Islam.... The committee drafting the civil code 
was composed of leading Shi’i jurists as well as lawyers well versed in 
other systems of law. They adopted the rules most prevalent amongst Shi’i 
jurists and rendered them into Articles and sections. Parts of the code, e.g. 
rules dealing with obligation, were modelled after the French civil code, 
but even here the contents were those of the Shi’i law adopted into that 
format.’ 154
The organization of the county courts [Baks] was based on those of the French 
model. Similarly, the office and powers of the Attorney General were duplicated from the 
French model. Furthermore, the Attorney General’s duties were defined in the French 
manner.155 Additional examples of the extent of imitation of the French system are to be 
found in the qualifications and ranks prescribed for attorneys of law and legal experts in 
the laws covering forcible expropriation and in the procedure laid down by law for 
defence, pronouncement of sentence and appeal.156 Like the civil and penal codes, the 
organization of the court system in Iran followed the French pattern.
‘If the reorganization of the Ministry of Justice in 1936 removed the final vestiges 
of authority from the clergy in such a way as to make no provision for SarVah courts, the
151 Ibid., 8th Session, 1931-33, p. 154.
152 Ibid., pp. 156-59.
153 Banani (1961), p. 72.
154 Taleghany (1995), p. xix.
155 Matm-Daftan (1342 SH/1945), pp. 19,23,33-34, 161-62, 174.
156 Ibid., pp. 194-244,245-59,296-301,459-509.
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Civil and Penal Codes of 1939 and 1940 finally left no room for SarVah law at all.’157 The 
Penal Code of 1926 set the trend for the disregard o f SarVah provisions. Furthermore, the 
Penal Code of 1926 introduced a number of Western concepts into Iranian law for the 
first time. Banani gives the following examples: the SarVah law was vague on the subject 
of insane criminals, article 38-41 of the Code exempted the insane from punishment. 
Article 222 of the same law defined instances of theft, not recognized as such by the 
SarVah. Article 276 represented another Western innovation by defining instances of poor , 
sanitation, cruelty to animals, and the use of obscene language, as well as traffic violation, 
as offences against the law.158
So far we have looked at the motivation behind Reza Sah’s legal reforms, the 
reforms introduced, and the consequence of these reforms in regards to the ‘Olama’s 
position in the legal system. One other factor remains to be considered: whether the 
administration of these reforms was an admission of the inadequacy of the Islamic legal 
system or a re-evaluation and re-codification of the tenets of Islamic jurisprudence to 
meet the needs of the time? The legal reforms of Reza Sah were a part of a greater 
attempt at developing a modem nation state. The creation of a modem legal institution 
was a necessary and fundamental part of this process. To ensure the supremacy of the 
state in the legal sphere, it had to be institutionalized, centralized, and brought under 
government regulation. The monopoly of such an institution could not be placed in the 
hands of a rival and potentially dangerous group with a large mass following - namely the 
‘Olama. The setting up of a government regulated legal system was a rudimentary 
prerequisite for the creation of a modem state, and to ensure its internal supremacy. Also, 
internationally Iran needed a codified set of laws to be able to enter into commercial and 
economic interaction with other nations on an equal footing. As mentioned earlier, the 
need to abolish the system of capitulation was the major driving force behind Reza Sah’s 
legal reforms. The reforms were motivated by the need to be independent o f foreign 
influences as well as to be recognized internationally as a modem state.
The removal of the administration of justice from the ‘Olama was a necessary 
outcome of the legal reforms. The reforms were not introduced as part of a premeditated 
and deliberate attempt aimed at diminishing ‘Olama power. The centralizing nature o f the
157 Banani (1961), p. 79.
158 Ibid, pp. 79-80
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state made it impossible for any other rival power to remain autonomous.159 Furthermore, 
the ‘indubitable’ hold of the ‘Olama over the legal sphere meant that a great deal of 
injustice went unchallenged as there was no regulatory body, and the ‘Olama were not 
accountable to anybody but themselves. The ‘Olama viewed the rights o f‘judgment’ to be 
exclusively theirs. Any attempt to regulate or compel them to follow rules and regulations 
was presented as an attack on Islam, whereas in fact it was an attack on the personal 
interests of the ‘Olama.160
‘Their excuse was that Feqh was self-sufficient and that its existence 
negated the need for any other legal system. No other legal system was 
viewed as legitimate. Only Feqh could be termed ‘law’. It was for this 
reason that the passing of any bill [dealing with legal reform] proved 
extremely difficult in the Majles. People who knew the weakness of 
character of the ‘Olama, as well as the changing needs of the time, were 
determined to remove the Sar‘ law from the clasp of the ‘Olama. They 
attempted to make Sar ‘ law accessible and comprehensible to the mass of 
people. To remove the ‘Olama from the legal sphere was very hard to 
achieve. Historically they had exercised exclusive control over the lives 
and property of the people. This [legal reform] was a great point of 
contention between the reactionaries and the reformists. ’161
Islamic jurisprudence as it stood, highly complex, uncodified and inaccessible, was 
not fully functional in specifying civil or international rights. However, ‘without a doubt, 
due to the expanse and vast nature of Feqh law, one could find within it the basis for any 
new law. In fact, a law could be found from Feqh to apply to any situation that may 
possibly arise. The needs of the time necessitated such a move.’162 Islamic jurisprudence 
provided a basis for the development of new laws to deal with the new needs of the 
society. This is not an illustration of ‘an unspoken admission of the inadequacy of the 
social institutions of Islam for our time,’163 but rather an indication of the adaptability of 
these laws. For example, as we have seen in the case of the Civil Code, Islamic principles 
permeated the European format and persisted to be significant. The changes in the legal
159 Ibrahimzadeh, Interview, (3.1.1997).
160 Sayegan (1316 SH/1937), p. 32.
161 Ibid., pp. 31-2.
162 Ibid.
163 Banani (1961), p. 68.
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system were not so much an attack on Islam or an admission of the inadequacy of the 
SarVah, but rather the dwindling of the power of a traditionally very powerful group - 
namely the ‘Olama - through the institutional expansion of the central government.
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Chapter Five: The Military History of the PahlavT 
Dynasty: Military-Led Modernization and its 
Consequences for the ‘Olama
207
Introduction
The military history of the Pahlavl dynasty is integral to understanding not only the 
dynasty’s origin, but also the origin of the modem Iranian State’s evolution and role in its 
internal, regional and international setting.1 Reza l£an achieved political power through a 
military coup in 1921, and the army remained a key component throughout the PahlavT 
period. The army played a significant role in the modernization policies of Reza Sah and 
was at the very heart of the centralized state that he sought to build.2 Reza Sah used the 
army as the driving force of his policies as a focus of nationalism and as an instrument of 
implementing cultural change and innovation. The Iranian military model was based on 
‘authoritarian-personal control’3 and revolved around the personality of Reza Sah. Hence 
the personal rise to power of Reza Kan was directly linked to the prominence and 
importance of the army throughout this period. In other words, Reza Kans personal 
ascendancy within and through the army was directly linked to military domination within 
society at large.
The characteristics of military-led modernization, in the Middle East have received 
some academic attention4, although the military as an institution5 has received 
considerably little attention. This is particularly so in the case of Iran. The military in the 
Middle East is considered to be an important actual or potential source of change within 
these societies. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a number of Middle 
Eastern rulers, in their efforts to emulate Western-style modernization and at the same 
time resist the military encroachment of Europe, attempted to form armies along 
European lines. Military reform led to consequent reforms in other areas of state and 
society; reform of education to supply trained soldiers and bureaucrats, o f taxation to 
provide finances for the army, of administration to mobilize the resources of the state,6
1 Lenczowski (1980), pp. 222-40.
2 Cronin (1997), p. 222.
3 Janowitz (1964), pp. 10-11, classifies ‘civil-military’ models in the Middle East into five types: 
Authoritarian-personal control, authoritarian mass party, democratic-competitive and semi competitive 
systems, civil-military coalition, and military oligarchy. Iran seems to best-fit the ‘authoritarian-personal 
control’ model, which may help to explain the crisis that came about in the 1926 when Reza Sah was no 
longer directly involved with the command of the army.
4 See for example, Khuri (1967), pp. 9-27, Janowitz (1964), & (1965), & Johnson (1968).
5 Khuri provides the following set of classification of military institutions in the Middle East: (1) the 
nation-building model, (2) the struggle-for-independence model, (3) the peasants and minorities- 
dominated model, (4) the tribal based model. Khuri (1967).
6 Cronin (1997), p. 2.
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and legislative reform to deal with conscription and other legal matters relating to the 
military. The needs of the army in many instances actually dictated the direction and form 
of other reform programmes.
The development o f the military and the consequential ‘militarism’7 of the PahlavT 
regime had a considerable effect on socio-political development in Iran. The military 
began to permeate every level of society in an unprecedented way. During this period the 
army remained at the forefront of social change, as a focus of ‘nationalism’ and as an 
instrument of implementing cultural change and innovation.8 With the aid of the army 
Reza Sah ascended the throne, achieved national unification, established central authority 
and created a ‘pseudo’-sense of national pride as the defender of Iran against foreign 
forces. 9 In fact as early as 1926, the victory of the military over civil and political life was 
almost complete. This development was to have significant consequences op the nature o f 
the relationship between the state and society in Iran.
‘Militarism’ in other countries, particularly Germany and Japan, is seen as part of a 
process of transition from agrarian feudal structures and modes of political behaviour to 
industrial capitalist ones, or as an outgrowth of the crisis of monopoly capitalism. In the 
debate concerning militarism in the West, it was seen not just as a problem of military 
influence in politics and society but also in terms of a developmental model of modem 
society. The question was not merely when and under what conditions militarism could be 
seen to exist, but also when and under what circumstances it would disappear. The 
fundamental disagreement between liberal critics of militarism on the one hand and the 
Marxists on the other was that many liberals had associated militarism with pre-industrial 
regimes and believed that it would disappear while liberal capitalism was frilly developed. 
The Marxists regarded all pre-socialist societies as militaristic, and militarism would 
disappear only after the advent of socialism. Neither Marx nor Engels had accorded the 
concept of militarism much importance in their interpretation of human history and were 
not very systematic about defining it.
7 Militarism as a social system, an organizational format, which as referred to in the works of Khuri and 
Obermeyer (1974), p. 79, as ‘military ethnography’.
8 Cronin (1997), p. 222.
9 Most of the campaigns of the army during this period were internal, aimed at establishing the authority 
of the central government.
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The question which needs to be addressed is the extent to which this analysis of 
‘militarism’ can be applied to Iran in terms of a transition from a pre-industrial to a 
‘Westernized’ pattern of social and political organization. There was considerable 
reluctance in the 1960’s to use the term ‘militarism’10 with reference to non-Western 
societies. American political scientists and sociologists in particular preferred to speak of 
civil-military relations. The tendency was very marked amongst non-Marxist social 
scientists.11 However this should not deter us from using the concept of militarism if we 
are talking about historically comparable phenomenon and it helps us to clarify this issue. 
The other issue of militarism in non-Western countries is the extent to which the military 
is a modernizing force. The attempt to establish modem institutions and organization has 
been most successful in the military field. The military organizations of these countries 
had been taken from the Western model, and thus to some scholars this represented 
political modernization and in many ways almost ideal types of industrial and secularized 
enterprise.12
The role o f the army in shaping the attitudes toward modernity in other spheres of 
life needs to be examined. According to Pye, the army was one of the most modernized of 
the alternative agencies in transitional societies. Armies in these societies were best 
equipped to initiate and channel social and political change. This was indeed a departure 
from the traditional Western critique o f the militaiy: the military as the enemy o f liberal 
values. However Pye’s concern with the militaiy must be placed within the broader 
context of evolutionary theories of society. The question of whether or not the military 
was a vital pacemaker in the process of modernization is a controversial one. The 
advocates o f this theory are deeply rooted in the evolutionary notions concerning the 
development of industrial capitalism and liberal parliamentarism, which had become 
deeply ingrained in Western political and economic thought. However, this self-image of 
the West cannot be understood without reference to an implicit or explicit concern for the 
future of the non-Western world.
Morris Janowitz13 views militarism in terms of the contribution made by the 
professional military to different patterns of domestic politics. Samuel Huntington took up
10 Martin & Stem (1984).
11 Ibid.
12 Pye (1968),
13 Janowitz (1964).
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the opposite position in 1968.14 As pointed out by Finer, ‘Huntington was as sensitive to 
the importance of social and organizational characteristics of the military as Janowitz was 
to those of the society.’15 These were the two main names around which the debate on 
civil-military relations in non-Western countries was focused and differed from the 
concept of militarism developed in the 1960s. Morris Janowitz’s approach to 
modernization had important implications for his analysis of the role of the military in 
traditional societies. He was considerate of the importance o f the role o f religious values 
in peasant societies and new nations. Janowitz views the role of traditional religion as 
paramount in this kind of society and its sociological implications essential for 
understanding the structure of these societies. One such structural feature which is central 
to the organization of a peasant society rests on the linkage between vast masses of rural 
population and a small urban elite that manage societal institutions. He argues that there is 
a widespread notion that the military is technocratic in orientation and concerned with 
modernization. Such views ignore the fact that the military is also concerned with 
legitimate authority and with historical national traditions. Hence one must not overlook 
the impact of neo-traditionalism on the military. Janowitz concludes that the military 
operates at each level of political intervention, including the take over of political power, 
as incomplete agents of political change.
Huntington differs from Janowitz in the following way; Huntington argues that it 
is not enough to attempt to explain military intervention in politics primarily by reference 
to the internal structure of the military or the social background of the officers doing the 
intervening. For Huntington, the most important causes of military intervention in politics 
are not military but political and reflect not the social organization of the military 
establishment but the political and institutional structure of society.16 Huntington’s 
approach is more of a social-structural approach to the question of militarism. He also 
operated within the broad framework of modernization theory. However, he does not see 
non-Western countries as developing towards a better state of affairs but rather towards 
political decay. To what extent could the military in Iran be said to have been an agent of 
social change or a conservative and reactionary force? The analyses of the role of the 
military are varied; some argue that the military has foiled to contribute to economic and
14 Huntington (1968).
15 Finer (1977), p. 217.
16 Huntington (1968).
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political change and has opposed modernization,17 while others view the military as the 
vanguard of nationalism and social reform.18
The importance of military intervention in politics lies in its relationship to 
development and development processes. This affects the extent to which the role of the 
military was in terms of internal repression or that of international guardianship. In Iran, 
military involvement in the political process was legitimized as a method of attaining 
social goals such as internal security and development oriented change. Gradual 
development programmes were rejected in favour of more focused and determined efforts 
that had greater promise for limited but immediate benefits. It was seen as the duty of the 
military to carry out an intensive programme of national advancement. Military-led 
development altered existing interclass relations and traditional patterns. One other 
argument is that the military is not a modernizing sector but rather a developmental one; 
in so far as the military is autonomous, its concerns are nation building, highway 
construction, national communication networks and so on rather than consumerism and 
modernization. Military-led development promotes forms of developmentalism that may 
move towards heavy industry and even agriculture rather than towards automobiles and 
television sets.19
The history o f the PahlavT dynasty illustrates how the organizational format o f the 
Iranian military arose out of the social conditions prevalent in Iran and the same time 
came to dominate and shape both political process and social change throughout this 
period. This particular institution became the modernizing force in political development, 
economic management, social stability, and national integration.20 The military intervened, 
maintained, integrated and was at the forefront of the modernization policies of the state. 
The following study of the military will be from the perspective of the changes in the 
internal structure of Iran, the creation of a new elite, and its consequent value system. The
17 Nordlinger (1970), pp. 1131.
18 Halpem (1963).
19 Fidel (1975).
20 The primary concerns of the analyst in this field are with such problems as: Is the military a 
modernizing force or is it retrogressive? Is the military a more efficient organization than civilian 
regimes? Is the military more interested in its own power rather than national development and 
modernization? Under what circumstances does the military tend to intervene in the political process and 
civilian regimes, and what are some of the means and consequences of military intervention? In this 
chapter most of these themes will be considered, however, the focal point is the analysis of the military as 
an institution.
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effects of ‘militarism’ and centralization on the traditional elite, in particular the ‘Olama 
and the tribes, will be considered.
This chapter aims to interpret the role and function of the military against the 
background of Iran’s political economy. The role of the military will be considered not 
from an internal perspective in terms of the relationship between the soldier and his 
organization but rather from an external aspect of civil-military relations. Iran’s military 
development will be approached in terms of the strategy for development and legitimacy 
of discipline. The extent of the influence of the military upon society in terms of social and 
political institutions will be examined, with emphasis on the concept of institution building 
and legitimacy. Furthermore, the nation building functions of the military and the 
connection between nation building and compulsory military service will also be 
considered. Military service functioned as an essential contribution to political institutions. 
Military service has been linked at least symbolically to citizenship in modem states. Civil- 
military relations are political issues as they centre on the maintenance of balance between 
civil authority and military power. Hence, our aim is to study the general differences of 
the tension between the military and social forces normatively as well as empirically. The 
role of the militaiy will be considered historically only in so far as it helps to clarify its role 
as an institution, and a set of social relations within the overall structure of society.
Prior to the PahlavT period Iran did not possess a unified national army and 
experienced for the first time a ‘military institution’. The formal distinction between 
military and civilian institutions, therefore, remained external to Iranian social relations. 
The boundary between military and civilian subcultures and military dominance of 
domestic policy was completely novel to Iranian society. This chapter aims to view the 
history of the creation of the military in terms of the process of ‘institution building’ and 
the consequent effects of the dominance of this institution on the ‘traditional elite’. This 
will be done within the overall framework of this thesis, with particular reference to the 
process of modernization, and the reduction o f the power of the ‘Olama. It is hoped that, 
by the analysis of the military, the interrelatedness of the reforms introduced in this period 
as a part o f an overall effort of ‘institution building’ within the framework of state 
centralization will become clear.
In order to demonstrate the significance in the growth and the role of the army in 
the Pahalvi period, the first section will provide a brief account of the military history of
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the Qajar period. Section Two will deal with the attempts of Reza Kan, in the years 1921- 
1926, to construct a modem, unified, central, national army. A brief account of the role 
played by Britain and Russia in this period will also be given. Section Three will be 
concerned with the effects of implementing universal military conscription, the rise of 
consequent popular opposition, and the role played by the ‘Olama in this movement. 
Section Four will look at civil-military relations and the way in which Iranian society was 
‘militarized,’ with particular reference to tribal disarmament.
The Army during the Qajar Period
Prior to the PahlavT period, Iran did not have a central standing army. Ever since 
the Achaemenian times, the rulers had felt safer with separate units of armed forces which 
enabled them to play one group against another and hence prevent the concentration of 
power.21 In fact the idea of a single unified army was without precedent in Iranian 
history.22 Throughout the Qajar period, continuous efforts were made to create a standing 
army based on the European model with foreign help.23 Military modernization seemed to 
be a constant preoccupation of the Qajars, not unlike their contemporaries in the Middle 
East. The key to European progress was considered to be a strong and centralized 
military. The reformists argued that if Iran were to progress and achieve national cohesion 
and independence, then its military must be modernized. European military superiority 
was both a threat to Iran as well as a desirable model to be emulated.
The Qajar rulers had considered the idea o f creating a modem military as early as 
1812 and again in 1827, after the two disastrous wars with Russia. The wars resulted in 
considerable loss of Iranian territory and demonstrated the superiority of European 
military strength. The first attempt to initiate some form of militaiy reform was made by 
‘Abbas Mirza, the heir apparent to Faffi ‘All Sah (1797-1835).24 However, as with many 
other attempts at reform during this period, ‘Abbas Mlrza’s measures were prevented by 
court intrigue from achieving much success.25 During the reign of Na§erod-Dm Sah 
(1848-96), two further attempts were made to create a unified standing army based on 
European lines. The first was under Amur-Kablr (1848-51) with the aid o f Austrian and
21 Banani (1961), p. 52.
22 Bahar [Malekol So’ara] (1357 SH/1978).
23 Cronin (1992), p. 4.
24 Kazemzadeh (1956), pp. 351-363.
25 Ladfnl (1326 SH/1947), pp. 16-22.
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Italian officers. Amlr-Kabir introduced the Bumceh26system of recruitment and set up the 
Darol-Fonun, the first institution of higher education in Iran which included military
   A
education in its curriculum. The second attempt at reform was under Mlrza Hosem I£an 
Mosiirod Dowleh, engaging the help of Austrian and Russian instructors.27
The armed forces of Iran at the end of the Qajar period consisted of the provincial 
and tribal levies, the palace guards, the Central Brigade, the Cossack Brigade, the 
Gendarmerie, and the South Persian Rifles. A Ministry of War existed, but only in name. 
There was no effective centralization of power or chain of command. There were no 
training programmes, no order of battle, no table of arms and no uniforms among the 
tribal units.28 The provincial and tribal levies served under their own tribal chiefs supplied 
their own horses, arms and equipment.29 The tribal chiefs were subsidized by means of tax 
deduction to maintain a certain number of armed men at the disposal of the Government. 
The majority of these men were only mobilized for specific operations and usually served 
exclusively in their own districts.30 This meant that these tribal levies were most effective 
in defending their own territory and less effective in other parts. Although they had little 
formal military training, they were very apt at handling arms, as they were accustomed to 
doing so from childhood.
The Palace Guards were a ceremonial regiment o f full-time soldiers. In the earlier 
part of the nineteenth century they made up the core of the Qajar forces. The Palace 
Guards served as the Sah’s main weapon against rebellious princes. At the turn of the
26 The Buniceh law had been passed by MTrza Taq! l£an, AmTr-KabTr, Prime Minister to Na§erod-Din 
Sah, in 1842 AD, (1206H). This law assessed each district and province of Iran at so many ‘Buniceh’ 
units, and for each ‘Bunideh’ unit the Government was authorised to demand one soldier. The provinces 
were subdivided into districts, each of which was suppose to furnish one regiment. The precise method of 
calculating men available was to carry out a survey of the number of ploughs required to keep an area 
under cultivation, and to take one man per plough as available for military service. This law also laid 
down the standards required for a recruit and the quotas of infantry, cavalry, artillery that could be 
demanded under the BunTdeh law from each province. Mo§addeq (1365 SH/1986), pp. 30-31. ‘The formal 
procedure of recruiting was as follows: as for as possible men were to be taken from districts in 
accordance with their assessment under the BunlSeh law. If the army required fewer men than the 
assessment stipulated, recruits were to be chosen by lot, if more, the numbers might be made up by men 
of the same district, but in that case those who brought them forward have to stand security for them. The 
latter, or the elders and the headmen of the village would have to pay compensation if their nominees 
deserted any army equipment or weaponry was lost. Recruits had to be Muslim; Iranian subjects; between 
18 and 30 years of age, medically fit and not opium takers.’ Cronin (1992), p. 214.
27 Nashat (1982).
28 Banani (1961), p. 52.
29 Tousi (1988), p. 217. Also cited in Cronin (1992), p. 10.
30 Ibid.
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century, they lost their favoured position to the Cossack Brigade.31 The Cossack Brigade, 
originally a parade ground cavalry unit of five hundred men, was created during the reign 
of Na§erod-Dm Sah (1848-96).32 The Cossack Brigade was organized by Russian officers 
and, despite its relatively small size, became one of the most effective military units during 
the Qajar period, and formed the nucleus of Reza Sah’s new army. The Cossacks played a 
fatefiil and important role during the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911.33 After the 
Russian Revolution of 1917, and the temporary collapse of Russian influence in Iran, the 
command of the Cossack brigade passed into Iranian hands. Reza Sah came into 
prominence through the ranks of the Cossacks and used it as a stepping stone in his rise to
34power.
The Gendarmerie was an internal security force created by the Constitutional 
government (1909-1911) after the deposition of Mofiammad ‘All Sah (1906-9) with the 
help of Swedish instructors and commanders. The formation of the Gendarmerie 
embodied the hopes and aspirations of Iranian reformists to build a strong central state, 
with the army at its core as the driving force o f modernization. The Gendarmerie 
continued to be the focal point around which reformists hoped to modernize, centralize 
and reconstruct the Iranian State. ‘For these elements the national territory of Iran, 
represented and embedded by the Majles, was rapidly becoming a primary focus of loyalty 
and source o f identity, superseding older foci of family, tribe or sect.’35 This concept 
underlined the recognition and a move towards creating a central state backed with the 
ideology of nationalism.
The South Persian Rifles was a British-officered force, set up under the Sepahsalar 
Agreement of August 1916. This force was organized in the Southern province of Fars by 
the British officer Sir Percy Sykes. It served primarily as an instrument of British policy in 
Iran.36 The role of the South Persian Rifles as an institution was marginal to Iranian
31 Banani (1961), p. 52.
32‘Na§erod-DTn Sah was the first Persian ruler to visit the West. During his second European trip in 
1878, Na§erod-D!n Sah passed through Transcaucasia which teemed with Russians troops after the 
recently concluded war with Turkey. The Sah was everywhere escorted by a detachment of Cossacks 
whose smart appearance, bright uniforms and fine horsemanship appealed to him to such an extent that 
he expressed to the Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, Viceroy of the Caucasus, his desire to institute a 
similar cavalry in his own country’. Kazemzadeh (1956), pp. 351-363.
33 Kazemzadeh (1956), p. 351.
34 Banani (1961), p. 53.
35 Cronin (1992), p. 9.
36 For a detailed discussion of the South Persian Rifles See, Safiri (1976).
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efforts to construct a national army, and will not be discussed in depth. In 1919, after the 
agreement between Vo§uqod-Dowleh and the British, it was proposed that the number of 
SPR was to be increased to 11, 000 men in total, but the Majles did not ratify this.37 The 
SPR consisted of 5,400 Iranian soldiers, 47 British officers, 190 Iranian Officers, 256 
second ranking British and Indian officers. The total budget of the SPR was 3,500,000 
Toman.38 After the disintegration of the SPR in 1921, a third of the force [1,500] which in 
E§fehan joined Colonel Mofiammad TaqI Kan Pesyan in Mashad,39 which will be further 
discussed later. The Cossacks consisted of 7,856 Iranian soldiers commanded by 56 
Russian officers, 66 second ranking Russian officers and 202 Iranian officers. The annual 
budget of the Cossacks was 1,915,000 Toman.40 The Gendarmerie consisted of 8,400 
men including Swedish officers, and its annual budget was 3,500,000 Tomans.41 The 
Central Brigade consisted of 2 foreign officers, one Swedish and one Polish, 126 Iranian 
officers, and 1,924 soldiers. The method of recruitment for the Central Brigade was based 
on the Buniceh system. Its annual budget was 900,000 Rials.42 A committee was set up by 
the British and the Iranians in order to negotiate the creation of a central unified army, 
which was to amalgamate all the existing military forces in Iran, with the estimated annual 
budget of 15,000,000 Toman. However this plan was not carried out at the time.43
By the end o f the Qajar rule, Iran faced financial bankruptcy and a disintegrating 
central authority. Most Reformists and participants in the Constitutional Revolution 
agreed that the way forward for Iran was the creation of a strong state, the prerequisite of 
which was militaiy modernization. Military modernization was still, as it had been for 
most part of the previous century, a fundamental and pivotal part of the overall plan o f 
reform. The major objective of the Reformists of the second Majles (1909-11) was that of 
‘state- building’. This period marked the political recognition of the concept of a central 
state and national loyalty, and attempts to carry out this theoretical concept and to ground 
it at a more concrete and practical level In practice, however, it achieved little, as the 
institutional infrastructures needed were absent. An attempt at creating a central standing
37 Ibid., p. 168.
38 Bahar [Malekol So’ara] (1357 SH/1978), pp. 47-8.
39 MakkI (1369 SH/1991), p. 459.
40 Bahar [Malekol So’ara] (1357 SH/1978), p. 47.
41 Ibid.
42 Qa’em MaqamI (1355 SH/1966), pp. 160-1.
43 Bahar [Malekol So’ara] (1357 SH/1978), pp. 47-8.
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army was one step towards institutional building required for the creation of an effective 
central state.
To conclude, it may be said that during the Qajar period the army did not undergo 
any successful modernization, but was subject to the same process of disintegration as 
other branches of the Qajar administration. Plans to create a unified standing national 
army failed due to deficiency of financial resources, lack of equipment and adequate 
training, absence of the social and political institutions required to establish and sustain 
the army, general weakness and ineffectiveness of the central government and domestic 
hostility. Attempts at reform were exasperated by domestic hostility and effectively 
destroyed by a coalition of forces opposed to modernization, including court factions, 
Qajar notables, the ‘Olama, tribal chieftains and European powers. The Qajar regular 
army was finally disbanded in 1921. This army, despite all its shortcomings and 
inefficiencies, had managed to linger on through the Constitutional Revolution, the First 
World War and the coup of Seyyed ZIya’ and Reza I£an, which found its focus in the 
Cossack Brigade and the Government Gendarmerie.
The Construction of the Army and the Rise of Reza K£n to 
Power
The reasons for the survival o f the Government Gendarmerie and the Cossack 
Brigade were that, as institutions, they made few demands on the wider structures of state 
and society. It was not necessary to raise new taxes for their maintenance as Russia and 
Britain largely financed them. Their imperial patrons also supported their survival in the 
face of domestic opposition. Also, both forces remained small and depended on voluntary 
recruitment, thus avoiding strains and discontentment resulting from imposed 
conscription. Finally, many of the officer corps of the Gendarmerie and to a lesser extent 
the Cossack Brigade had been privately educated abroad, as there were few Iranian 
military institutions of education.44
The Cossack Brigade
The Cossack Brigade was established during the reign of Na§erod-Dui Sah who, 
after his second trip to Europe, was so impressed by the Russian Cossacks that he decided 
to set up a similar cavalry unit in Iran. In the 1880, the Cossack Brigade constituted the
44 Cronin (1997), p. 8.
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only regular cavalry in Iran.45 Since its establishment, the Cossack Brigade was 
considered by both the Russians and the Iranians as a tool by means of which Russian 
influence was maintained and expanded in Iran. The appointment of the Russian officers 
of the Brigade was carried out entirely by the Caucasian military authorities. The Sah and 
the Iranian Government had no control whatsoever over the appointment of these 
officers. The Russian officers of the Cossack Brigade viewed the furtherance of Russian 
interests in Iran as being intrinsically linked to the defence and continuance o f Qajar 
absolutism. The Sah was dependent on the Brigade for the maintenance of internal 
security, order in the capital and defence of the monarchy. In 1896, after the assassination 
of Na§erod-Dm Sah, the Cossack brigade was responsible for safeguarding the dynasty 
and ensuring the succession of Muzaffarod-Dih Sah.46
‘Despite its royalist and pro-Russian character the Brigade remained 
passive during the revolutionary events of 1905-6. Its capacity to intervene 
had been considerably weakened by its financial difficulties; more 
importantly there appears to have been some sympathy within the ranks for 
the demand for a National Assembly. Undoubtedly the leading role played 
by the ‘Olama in the Constitutional movement deeply impressed the 
overwhelmingly Muslim Iranian personnel o f the Brigade. At the end of 
1905, the commandant, Colonel Chemozoubov, told Major Douglas, the 
British military attachd, that he was doubtful about the loyalty of his men 
and that any appeal to them by the members of the religious classes would 
probably carry more weight than orders from his officers. He also 
expressed the opinion that his men could refuse to fire on a mob 
accompanied by the Mollas,’47
The growth of the Government Gendarmerie from 1912 gave a new impetus to 
the Russian pressure for the increase of the number of Cossack Brigade. The rivalry 
between these two forces represented to a certain extent the rivalry between Britain and 
Russia in Iran. By 1914, the Russian officers openly refused to acknowledge any 
allegiance to the Iranian government, stating that they were officers of the Tsar. Thus the 
sole function of the Brigade had become that o f a Russian agency. All members o f the 
Brigade enjoyed open Russian protection.48 The World War had made its impact on the 
Cossack Brigade as it had done on the Gendarmerie. In the pre-war years, the Brigade 
was financed from the revenue of Northern customs; from November 1914, however, it
45 KaZemzadeh (1956), pp. 351-63.
46 Ibid.
47 Cronin (1997), p. 59.
48 Ibid., pp. 62-3.
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became entirely Russian funded. The Russian government gave a monthly allowance of 
4,850 roubles to the brigade, on the condition that it would eventually be refunded by the
t 49Iranian government.
During the inter-war period the Cossack Brigade did not play a significant political 
role unlike its rival the Gendarmerie. The major operations undertaken by the Cossack 
Division in 1920 was the campaign against the Jangatis, led by of Mlrza Kowcak Kan50 
and their Bolshevik allies in Gillan.51 The campaign both brought Starroselky to the height 
of power and then, a little later, provided the British with the opportunity of getting rid of 
the Russian officers all together.’52 Irrespective of their role in the defeat Mlrza Kowcak 
Kan, the British had come to conclude that the Cossacks were both too weak and too 
scattered to be able to play a stabilizing role in any effective way. On 5 August 1916 the 
British, Russian ministers and the Iranian government reached an agreement to create two 
forces, the expanded Cossack Division in the northern territories and the South Persian 
Rifles in the south. Tehran was to have an additional force. The Russian Revolution had a 
profound effect upon the Cossack Division. The new Bolshevik government refused to 
recognise the force in any way and recalled all Russian officers.53 In early 1918 the 
Cossack Division embarked upon a new and active period as a result of two 
complementary developments: Britain’s assumption of the financial and political 
sponsorship of the Division, and the seizure of command by a ‘white’ Russian officer, 
Colonel Starroselsky.54
Initially Britain had intended to provide financial support for the duration of the 
war, but the internal insecurity and fear of newly established Soviet power prolonged the 
support. It was in Britain’s interest to have the Division under its sphere of influence, a 
force that had been the instrument of Russian interests in Iran since its establishment. The 
British continued their support until Curzon vetoed it in May 1920.55 Norman, the new 
Minster in Iran, was anxious that the division should continue to receive British financial
49 Townley to Grey, 28.12.1914, FO371/2077/87668.
50 Mlrza Kowcak Kan [Younis] was bom in 1298/1880, he was a talabeh [theological student] before his 
uprising. He set up the movement ‘unity of Islam’ with the aim of expelling all imperialist forces from 
Iran. During World War one he set up an autonomous government in Gllan in Northern Iran. Most 
Iranian historians refer to him as a defender of freedom and a democrat. Mo‘m (1358 SH/1979), p. 1619.
51 Bahar [Malekol So’ara] (1357 SH/1978), p. 167.
52 Cronin (1997), p. 7.
53 Marling to FO, 23.1. 1918, F0371/3264/14692
54 Cronin (1997), pp. 68.
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support as he had extracted a pledge from Moslrod Dowleh, the new Prime Minister, that 
he would dismiss Russian officers now no longer useful to British objectives as soon as 
his government was strong enough-56 The Division thus enjoyed British financial support 
until the British took direct control in autumn 1920.57
The British were by now the principal patrons of the Division. Many of the Tsarist 
officers resented the taking-over by the British of the Division traditionally regarded as 
theirs. The signing of the Anglo-Persian Agreement in August 1919 made this conflict 
more acute. The Agreement excluded Russia permanently from Iran and provided Britain 
with a sole monopoly and influence over the Iranian government. The Division was to 
become a part of a new uniformed force under the command of the British. The Division 
would in effect disappear and with it the hope that Russia would one day reassert its 
influence in Iran. Both Russian and Iranian officers were opposed to the Agreement as it 
took away from the Iranian government the traditional possibility of playing off the 
Russians against the British to further its own interests.58 These were the historical 
circumstances which brought the Gendarmerie and the Cossack Division together.
The Government Gendarmerie
The second Majles (1909-11) established the Government Gendarmerie. Its 
formation marked the principal attempt by the Constitutional government to set up a 
modem standing army, answerable to Iranian authorities. The Constitutionalists 
recognized the need for a unified, centralized, and efficient military force, in establishing 
and implementing the authority of the central government throughout Iran. The central 
role of the army as the driving force for other reforms was fully realized. A modem 
standing army under, the control of the government would not only provide the necessary 
stability to cany out reform, but would also form the first step towards the materialization 
of the nationalist ideal o f a unified national territory and its defence. The political 
upheavals of the Constitutional period brought into focus the difficulties resulting from 
the central government’s lack of reliable armed forces. The Cossack Brigade had proved 
themselves anti-Constitutionalists by their role in the overthrow of the Majles in 1908.
55 Curzon to Norman, 9.11.1920, PO371/4914/C10901/267/34.
56 Norman to FO, April 1920, FO371/4927/C7570/7570/34.
57 FO371/4914/C10901/267/34.
58 The former rivalry between Britain and Russia was a major element in Iran’s preservation of its formal 
independence.
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The Constitutional government, once established in 1908, found itself without effective 
and reliable military force. In 1910 a Democrat-supported government was formed under 
Mustowfiol-Mamalek and the construction of the Government Gendarmerie began. The 
Democrats had publicly announced the objectives behind such a force as providing 
internal security, effecting financial reform, centralizing the power of the government and 
expelling foreign forces.59 The establishment of the Government Gendarmerie was 
embedded in a general programme of reform.
The initial setting-up of the Government Gendarmerie was partly in response to 
British pressure, and in its early years the force enjoyed British support. Initially the 
Russian authorities were not hostile towards the force. The later success o f the 
Gendarmerie in the North of Iran in particular provoked Russian suspicions. The 
Gendarmerie was established after Iranian authorities had consulted Britain and Russia 
and obtained their consent. At the time no limit had been set on the number or the 
territorial range of the force. The Iranian government had hoped the Gendarmes would be 
allowed to carry out their duties throughout Iran. The Russians, however, had designs on 
increasing the number of the Cossack Brigade and allowing them exclusive control of the 
northern territories while the Gendarmes would have control of the southern and neutral 
zones. Thus contributing to the likelihood of the country’s ultimate partition.
By the late 1920s the Gendarmerie had become a considerable political force in 
Iran, so much so that by 1921 certain elements within the force were involved with the 
plans o f the 1921 coup, headed by Seyyed ZTya’o-Dm Tabataba’I and Reza Kan. Seyyed 
Zlya’ enjoyed British support and was renowned for his Anglophile tendencies as well as 
being a moderate reformer.60 He had managed to cultivate a relationship with individual 
gendarmes and supported the Gendarmerie in his newspaper Ra'd  (Thunder). Seyyed 
Zlya’o-Dm TabatabaT had expressed a desire to reorganize the Gendarmerie and the 
police and to introduce into their ranks some British officers to work with the Swedes. He 
had also proposed to bring some of the South Persian Rifles to Tehran and to amalgamate 
them into the Gendarmerie.61 Greater contact was established between the Gendarmerie
59 For further detail cm the history and formation of the Government Gendarmerie see: Qa’em MaqamI 
(1355 SH/1966), Cronin (1997), & Cronin (1992).
60 Norman to Curzon, 7.12.1920, F0371/4915/C13222/267/34.
61 Norman to Curzon, 26.11.1920, FQ371/4915/C13222/267/34.
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and the Cossack Division after the dismissal of the Russian officers and the unofficial 
attachment of Smyth to the Cossack Division at Qazvlh.
The co-operation of the Gendarmerie and the Cossacks may seem somewhat 
surprising given the history of rivalry between the two forces; however during 1919-20 
they agreed on joint action. This may be explained by their common opposition to the 
proposals of the Anglo-Persian Military Commission and the Anglo-Persian Agreement, 
the terms of which the British were most eager to have ratified by the Majles and 
honoured by the Iranian government.63 Opposition to British control provided a common 
sympathy between the forces and was perhaps the first step towards successful 
collaboration in the execution of the coup of 1921. However, it must be pointed out that 
the coup’s success was also very much dependent on the British support it receive. The 
British support of the coup aided, if not entirely determined, the success of the coup. The 
pre-coup government of Sepahdar did in feet make an attempt to use the Gendarmerie to 
defend the government. When the Cossacks were camped at Kara], a short distance from 
Tehran, Sepahdar suggested to Gleerup that he should lead his men out in an effort to 
prevent the Cossacks from entering the Capital. The British, who were in favour of the 
coup, and were able to rely on their protege Gleerup to secure the neutrality of the force, 
obstructed this proposal.64
The Coup d’Etat of 1921 and the Creation of the P a h la v l 
Dynasty
Towards the end of the Qajar period Iran faced internal disorder, Harjo Mar}, in 
every comer. The threat of full-scale civil war and disintegration was imminent. There 
was no internal security and bandits ran wild. Political parties and political opportunists 
were at war with each other. This was further complicated by the distinctive ethnic and
62 Norman to Curzon, 25.1.1921, F0371/6400/E1188/2/34. ‘British officer (Lieutenant-Colonel Smyth) 
who has for the past two months or so been unofficially and almost secretly working among the Cossacks, 
with the result that their efficiency has been greatly increased.’
63 The British agreement to finance a military force in Iran was in the hope that in return the Iranians 
Majles would ratify the Anglo-Persian Agreement. For example, at the end of 1919, Vo§uqod-Dowleh, 
then Prime Minister, implored Sir Percy Cox to keep financing the Cossacks, for stoppage in payment 
would seriously prejudice the position of the cabinet and the satisfactory establishment of the Anglo- 
Persian Agreement. The main concern of the British cabinet in 1920 in regard to the continuation of 
financial support for the reorganization of Iranian forces seems to be the following: ‘the Mejliss must be 
summoned, the elections completed, and the Anglo-Persian Agreement submitted to it and pronounced 
upon before the end of this year’. Extracts from the minutes of the cabinet meeting held on November 3rd 
[cabinet 59] Minute (4), 4.11.1920, FO371/4914/cl0912.
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geographical make up of Iran. The lack of stable central government combined with the 
ethnic and geographical component, internal upheavals and the power-play between the 
British and the Russians had resulted in total disorder and chaos in Iran. In 1334/1915 the 
‘committee for retribution’, KomTteh MoJazat, had begun a reign of terror in Tehran, 
which lasted until 1338/1919.65 They were fiercely anti-British and any Iranians suspected 
of being ‘anglophile’ or having such tendencies were killed. On Vo§uqod-Dowleh’s 
orders, the committee members were identified and arrested.66 In almost every part of Iran 
there were rebellions and uprising against the central government.67 In short, ‘Iran was 
faced with the threat of decentralization and disintegration.’ 68
Concerning the general political situation in Iran towards the end of Afimad Sah’s 
reign, ‘Abdollah Bahrain! the chief of the security forces of Azarbayejan, writes the 
following:
‘Iran was in total disarray. In the centre [Tehran] the prevalent atmosphere 
was tense, the affairs of the country were lacerated and disorganized. In 
the provinces there were numerous disturbances and rebellions. The 
treasury was empty. There was no central unified army in the real sense of 
the word. Afimad Sah was lured by the temptations of Europe and wanted 
to taste the pleasures of Paris once every couple of days. Toward the end 
of his reign all efforts were concentrated on acquiring as much money as 
he possibly could in order to escape Iran. Numerous cabinets rose and fell 
for no apparent reason within a short space of time. People anticipated a 
great occurrence. However, the exact nature of it was unknown to them.
The affairs o f the country and the conditions prevailing resembled the last 
days of Sah Soltan Hosem §afavT [before his downfall]. The people had 
lost their confidence in the government and the politicians. The 
intellectuals and the politicians on the other hand attempted to obtain as 
much personal gain from the prevalent chaotic conditions as possible. They 
used every opportunity to further themselves. ... Some of the Democrats 
and the ‘old’ freedom-seekers attempted to put an end to this turmoil and
64 Norman to Curzon, 1.3. 1921, FO371/6403/E4926/2/34.
65 The members of the committee were, Abu’l Failzade, Mon§izade, MeSkat, Emadol Kotab, MTrza ‘AIT 
Akbar £an ArdaqT, RaSidol Soltan, Karim Davatgar, Ehsanol-llah I£an, Hosem Laleh, Seyyed Morteza 
Akbar I£an and a few others.
66 Bahar [Malekol So’ara] (1357 SH/1978), p. 32.
67 In close approximitity of the capital in Kasan there were: Nayyeb HoseTn KasI and his son Masallah 
Kan Sardar KasI. In Azarbayejan: Ipyabanl. In Mazandam and Gillan: Amir Mo’ayyed Kuhl and MTrza 
KowCak Kan. In £orasan: Mohammad TaqT Pesyan [Colonel Mofiammad TaqI £an]. In Reza’Iyeh and 
Kordestan: Slmltqu and ‘Obeldollah [§elk ‘Abdollah] Kord. In £ vozestan: Selk £az‘al and the 
Ba t^Tyarls. In E§fehan: Rajab ‘All, Ja‘far Qoll Rahzan, Re2a JozanI and Seyyed YOsef. In Lorestan: the 
Lors [Korramabad and Posteh Kuh], In §Iraz: the QasqaaT’s, and in Mazandaran: the Bolsheviks. MakkT 
(1369 SH/1991), p. 94
68 Ibid.
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save the country from this whirlwind. Unfortunately the doors of hope 
were closed on all sides and their attempts resulted in failure.’69
At the end of October 1920, the Sah appointed Qasem Kan Vail Sardar Homayun, 
‘an ineffective political figure’,70 as the commander of the Cossacks.71 General Ironside 
appointed Colonel Smyth72 to administer the finances of the Cossacks during the process 
of reorganisation of the force. The command of the Cossacks was to be transferred from 
Russian to Iranian hands. This was the process whereby the Cossacks came to be under 
the ‘so-called’ command of Sardar Homayun and the ‘actual’, though informal, control of 
the British under Smyth.73
General Starroselsky was formally dismissed at the end of October 1920.74 He was 
told that all Russian officers were to be removed from the Cossack Brigade and sent to 
Baghdad as soon as they could be shifted there.75 Ironside played a decisive role in the 
dismissal of the Russian officers from the Cossack Division. General Ironside had arrived 
in Iran to take over command of the North Persia force from Champain, who in early 
1920 had managed to evacuate Anzall from the threat of Soviet Naval forces. Ironside’s 
aim of bringing the Cossacks under British control had been somewhat aided by the fact 
that the majority of the force was involved with the Gllan campaign and were thus 
concentrated within easy reach of the North Persia force.76 However, certain Cossack 
units remained outside Ironside’s control, namely the Tabriz and Tehran units.
69 BahramI (1363 SH/1984), pp. 641-2.
70 Cronin (1997), p. 82.
General Ironside writes the following concerning Sardar Humayun in his diaries: ‘It was obvious that he 
[Sardar Humayun] could neither command them [the Cossacks] nor administer them’. Ironside (1972), p. 
149.
71 13.11.1920, FO 248/1285/71 and Ibid., p. 148.
72 Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Smyth was one the senior officers who had been sent out to raise the new 
Iranian Army under Sir Percy Cox. Ibid., p. 147.
73 The British were very well aware of the fact that many Iranians would regard the direct and formal 
employment of British officers, as equivalent to a complete surrender to British domination. This was the 
best solution to ensuring British control of the force. See Norman to Curzon 1921, 
F0371/6400/E1188/2/34.
74 25.10.1920, F0371/4914/C9573/267/34. The dismissal of General Starroselsky was greatly urged by 
the British and strongly favoured by General Ironside. Ironside (1972), p. 117.
75 Ibid., p. 145.
76 Concerning the above, he writes: ‘Luckily my opportunity for carrying out my two main objects 
arrived quickly. The Persian Cossacks collapsed in front of the Bolsheviks and I was able to dispose of the 
Russian officer en bloc. We certainly had luck but the opportunity was a fleeting one. I was then able to 
take a small operation against the Bolsheviks with practically every unit of my force and to carry it out 
with complete success. I thus rehabilitated the force completely and showed them what a contemptible 
opponent the Bolshevik was, and I made any future scandalous withdrawal an impossibility’. Ibid., p. 
118.
225
The dismissal of the Russian officers and the placement of the Cossacks under 
‘informal’ British control were part of the greater plan of Norman and Ironside. Their 
main objective was to implement the Anglo-Persian Agreement over and above the 
Majles, in an unofficial manner. Sardar Homayun had been appointed by the Sah as 
commander of the Cossacks to ensure the Division’s loyalty to the Sah.77 Sardar 
Homayun, however, was unable to assert his authority in Qazvin and departed from the 
camp. This left Ironside and Smyth free to ‘select a deputy’.78 Reza Kan was to be this 
deputy.79 Ironside, by sending Sardar Homayun on leave, put Reza Kan in effective 
command of the Division.
Reza Kan had become a figure o f considerable significance among the Cossacks 
by early 1918 when he had demonstrated an aptitude for intrigue by his involvement in the 
plot against Colonel Clergi. Both his political ambitions and his panache for coup-making 
were in evidence in the spring of 1920 when the British were preoccupied with the 
problem of turning the Division into a proposed uniform force. At the time, Reza Kan 
made an offer to Dickson to betray his Russian officers, perhaps hoping to emulate 
Starroselsky’s triumph over Clergi. By mid-1920, Reza Kan was in control of the 
Cossacks in Qazvin, and when a military man was sought by Seyyed Zlya’, he had to look 
no further than Reza Kan, whose past record made him the most suitable man for the 
job.80
The coup of February 1921 was the outcome of three sets of interrelated dynamics 
within Iran at the time: the role of the British, that of Seyyed Zlya’, and that of the 
Cossack officers. The dynamics of Anglo-Soviet rivalry had led to a general acceptance in 
Iran that British power and infiltration were too great to surpass. This perhaps may begin 
to explain the conjunction of Seyyed Zlya* and Reza Kan. Iranians executed the coup of 
1921; however the success of the coup remains doubtful if it had not been backed by the 
British. General Ironside writes in his diaries: ‘I fancy that everyone thinks that I
77 Ibid., p. 148.
78 Ironside acknowledges that the man who commanded the Cossacks would be in virtual control of the 
capital. Ibid., p. 148.
79 Ironside’s son writes the following concerning the selection of Reza l£an as deputy: ‘The story of 
choosing Reza ICan to command them [the Cossacks] is known to many and although he [General 
Ironside] could not know at the time that this man would one day become the king of Persia, he clearly 
paved the way for him.’ Ibid., p. 117.
80 BahramI (1363 SH/1984).
226
engineered the coup d’etat. I suppose I did strictly speaking.’81 The British played a 
crucial role in ‘setting the stage’ for the coup by facilitating and bringing together Reza 
Kan and Seyyed Zlya’.
‘Ironside and Smyth had revived the Cossack Division and placed Riza 
Khan in command. Smyth had brought Keyhan and Sayah to Qazvin thus 
facilitating contact between Riza Khan and Seyyed Ziya and ensuring the 
cooperation of the other important Iranian military formation, the 
Gendarmerie, while Seyyed Ziya had a long-standing friendship with the 
British. Ironside was well aware of and clearly approved of the 
preparations which Riza Khan and other officers at Qazvin were making 
for a coup. He was seriously worried about the consequences of 
Norperforces’ withdrawal and believed that only a strong military 
dictatorship could save Iran.’ 82
A deputation of four83 was sent to meet with Reza Kan84 near Mehrabad, about 
four miles outside Tehran, to persuade him not to enter the capital. Reza Kan stated that, 
‘... the Cossacks, who had had experience of the Bolsheviks and knew what to expect 
from them if they advanced further into Iran, were tired of successive governments who 
failed to take any steps for the organization of a force to oppose invasion, which might 
follow the withdrawal of British troops. They were therefore resolved to come to Tehran 
and establish a strong government who would remedy this state of affairs.’ Reza Kan 
added that they were loyal to the king and had no hostile intentions towards him. He also 
expressed goodwill toward Great Britain and said that no foreigners had any reason to 
fear the presence of his men at Tehran.85 The Cossacks entered Tehran shortly after 
midnight on 20 February 1921, and captured it without resistance or bloodshed.
The Construction of a New National Army and the 
Establishment of Military Supremacy 1921-1926
The Socio-Historic Roots of ‘Militarism9
On 25 February 1921 Seyyed Zlya’ was appointed Prime Minister, and on the 
same day he made a frill and confidential report of his policies to Norman, the British 
minister in Tehran. He had had a long-standing affinity with the British and thus
81 Ironside (1972), p. 117.
82 Cronin (1997), p. 86.
83 They were Haig, Huddleson, Adibol Sal lane, the Prime Minister’s assistant, and Mu’Tnol Molk, the 
Sah’s private secretary.
84 Also with the other leaders of the movement, Seyyed Zlya’, Captain Sayah and Major Keyhan.
85 Norman to Curzon, 1.3.1921, FO371/6403/E4926/2/34.
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anticipated a central role for Britain in the shaping of Iran’s future. In feet he had been 
involved in the British plan of ‘implementing the 1919 Agreement without appearing to 
do so’ for some time.86 Seyyed Zlya’ proposed a programme of reform which called for 
administrative reorganisation, agrarian reform and the setting up of a modem, unified 
army.87 For help with the implementation of his reforms, he looked to the Gendamerie. 
The Gendarmerie was the only force capable of providing resistance to Reza Kan’s 
Cossacks.
The cooperation of the Gendarmerie and the Cossacks was, however, short-lived; 
old hostilities resurfaced and gained strength as the personal rivalry between Reza Kan 
and Seyyed Zlya’ increased. The political power of Reza Ran was partly derived from his 
control of the Cossacks, as well as his ‘manoeuvring tactics’ and his aptitude for intrigue. 
The consolidation and expansion o f the Cossacks was linked directly to Reza Sah’s 
political ambitions and a desire to eliminate all opponents. During the first half of May 
1921, Reza Ran put forward his plan of creating a unified, centralized, national army, 
based on European lines and free of foreign control The Cossacks were to be the core of 
this new army. On 14 May the Gendarmerie was placed under the control o f Reza Ran, 
and was transferred from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of War. Furthermore, 
orders were given to merge the three officer schools - the Cossack Division cadet school, 
the Gendarmeire Officers’ School and the military college - into a single military school.88
Towards the end of May, Reza Ran in alliance with the Sah and other 
discontented elements, managed to force Seyyed Zlya’ both out of office and out of the 
country. After the fell of Seyyed Zlya’, the position of the Gendarmerie declined sharply. 
The Cossacks were given institutionalized preference over the Gendarmes. This was due 
to the fact that much of Reza Kan’s personal success was bound to the success and 
supremacy of the Cossacks. In feet, Reza Kahn’s position depended on Cossack support, 
and consequently, he had to give the Cossacks institutionalized preference over the 
Gendarmes in the new army he proposed to build. This artificial preference for the 
Cossacks was carried into the structure of the new army and marks the origins of the 
Cossack ascendancy. The fete of the Gendarmerie was sealed when Reza Ran alleged that
86 Norman to Curzon, 7.12.1920, F0371/4915/C13222/267/34. It is interesting to note that Seyyed 
ZTya’s post-coup programme is in fact very similar to the one which he worked out with the British 
Minister the previous December.
87 Norman to Curzon, 25.2.1921, FO371/6401/E2605/2/34.
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‘the Gendarmerie was a badly trained and practically useless force and proposed to 
abolish it by absorption into the Cossack Division, and thus forming one Iranian army.’89
During 1921-1926, Reza Kan set about reducing the power and independence of 
the Majles, curbing the activities of political parties, censoring the press, reducing the 
influence of the ‘Olama,90 controling the tribes, and abolishing the Qajars. To carry out all 
this he depended on the army, and the military came to dominate domestic policy and 
social relations in a way that were all novel to Iranian society. Reza Kan had made his 
intention concerning the future status of the military quite clear in his post-coup manifesto 
in which he had stated that he intended to bring about ‘...a government which would 
respect the army as the supreme means of the prosperity of the country. We are soldiers, 
and we are prepared to sacrifice our lives. We have no desire but the strength and 
greatness of the army for the protection of our sovereign and our sacred country.’91
The establishment of a new army took place in December 1921 when the 
Gendarmerie and the Cossack Division were formally unified and a commission was set 
up to discuss the future structure o f the army. On 5 January, orders were issued for the 
reorganization of the army, along the following lines; Iran was divided into five areas for 
the purposes of military administration, the new army was to be organized into five 
divisions with general headquarters in Tehran. All foreign military terms were abolished 
and replaced with Persian ones. The army was to be commanded by Reza Kan and the 
army GHQ at Tehran was to be under his direct control. His plan was to gradually bring 
the whole of Iran under the direct control of the army. In 1923 it seemed most likely that 
he would succeed. The army was better and more efficient than any Iran had possessed 
for many years ‘and probably since the days of Nadir Sah.’92 The whole fabric of the
88 Cronin (1997), pp. 91-2.
89 25.8.1921, F0371/6435/E11692/2004/34.
90 In the army, both among the ex-Cossacks and the ex-Gendarmes, there existed a shared dislike of 
religious orthodoxy and the influence of the ‘Olama. The military in general were anti-clerical, as were 
many Iranian reformists. The army was also at the forefront of promoting social reform, such as clothing 
reforms, which further irritated the ‘Olama. However, it is interesting to note that both Seyyed Zlya’ (a 
reformist) and Reza £an make references to Islam and the ‘Olama in their post-coup manifestoes. Reza 
Kan states: ‘A government which would not use the capital of Islam as the centre of evils’. Similarly 
Seyyed ZTya’s declaration reads: ‘For, after the grace of God and the support of the leaders of Islam, I rely 
on the victorious assistance of our excellent sovereign and the purity of my intentions’. 1921, 
FO371/6403/E4926/2/34.
91 Ibid.
92 Qa’em MaqamT (1355 SH/1966).
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army, however, was centred on Reza Kan and had his personality been removed, it would 
have probably collapsed.
Given the historical background of the army it is not surprising that Reza Kan did 
in fact face opposition from certain elements within the army and that his support was not 
always united and unanimous. Categorically, the opposition faced by Reza I£an may be 
divided into three: firstly, opposition activities which had their roots in the long rivalry 
between the Cossacks and the Gendarmeire, which had not been resolved but forced into 
an artificial and superimposed merger; secondly, discontent which arose as a result of 
Reza Kan’s proposal for a Republic to replace the Qajar dynasty; finally, the military 
mutinies of 1926, which had both an ideological as well as a material basis. However, 
pointing these out must not detract from the fact that on the whole the bulk of the army, 
particularly the ex-Cossacks, remained loyal to Reza Kan throughout this period. In feet 
the army played a key role in the survival of Reza Kan’s regime. Never before had the 
army occupied the dominant position throughout Iran which it had achieved in the early 
1920s.”
The direct intervention of the army in the political life of Iran began with the coup 
d'etat of 1921. This trend continued in the years 1921-26, during which Reza Kan 
established his political power and claimed the throne. In fact, the manipulation of 
political process by the army came to characterise Reza Sah’s entire rule. In the period 
1921-26, Reza Kan repeatedly harassed and intimidated the Majles and controlled 
elections by the threat of armed force. Intervention in the process of cabinet making, since 
the start of the World War had been the exclusive preserve of the British and Russian 
legation, and then of the British legation alone. The coup of 1921, however, marked the 
intervention of the military in this process.94
Also by the early 1920s Reza Kan had come to dominate the cabinet and turn it 
into an instrument of his own service and promoted the military at the expense of the civil 
authorities. Reza Kan, by combining the offices of the Minister o f War and de facto 
Commander-in-Chief of the army made himself the highest authority in the army and 
reduced the military’s accountability to civil power. His position within the cabinet meant 
that he could put forward the interests o f the army over and above the claims of other
93 Ibid.
94 Safiri (1976), p. 293.
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ministers. Although the other ministers were displeased and angered by this situation, they 
were afraid to take action as Reza l£an had complete control over the armed forces and 
was in a position to arrest the entire cabinet. Reza Kahn had a poor opinion of the other 
members of the cabinet and regarded the Majles with the greatest contempt, and ‘which 
he intended to close immediately when he finds that it is of no real assistance to him.’95
During the latter part of 1921, Reza Kan had come to resemble increasingly a 
military dictator controlling the cabinet, interfering directly in political and civil life to an 
extent that the Sah was quite fearful of him. Reza Kan was well aware of the fact, and his 
personal quest for power was based on controlling the army and serving the interests of 
the army. In feet during this period, amongst the general population, the army was viewed 
as Reza Iran’s personal instrument. The control of Reza Kan over state affairs had 
become so strong that by 1922 no Prime Minister could take any decision without his 
consent. During the next year Reza Kan continued to dictate the interests of the military 
in the programme of the Prime Ministers. Towards the end of 1923, after Qavam’s 
departure abroad, Reza Kan took the opportunity to assume the premiership. In doing so, 
Reza Kan unified the civil and military authorities, which had significant consequence for 
the future of civil government in Iran, although the cabinets of the Reza Sah period 
remained mainly civilian in character, especially after Reza Sah’s withdrawal from 
ministerial roles and his coronation.96
On 31 October 1925 the Majles voted in favour of the abolition of the Qajar 
Dynasty and the establishment of a provisional government with Reza Kan as its head. 
The population at large met the disposition o f Afimad Sah with indifference. On 12 
December, the constituent assembly decided to replace the Qajar Dynasty with the Pahlavl 
Dynasty on a hereditary basis. ‘Reza Kan’s success in using the military to pack the 
assembly was illustrated by the unanimity of the vote.97 Reza Kan, as the Sah, came to 
occupy the highest civil office in the country. The removal of the tension between Reza 
Kan as the commander of the army and Afimad Sah greatly improved the morale of the 
army. Also the fact that a military man had come to assume the throne raised military self­
esteem, and in turn the army was greatly rewarded for this achievement. The army
95 25. 8.1921, F0371/6435/E11692/2004/34.
96 Cronin (1997), pp. 184-7.
97 Of the 260 deputies, only three abstained from the decision to bestow the throne on the Pahlavl family.
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regarded itself as the first consideration of the new Sah as both the instrument of 
consolidation of power of Reza l£an as Sah as well as a maintainer of this position.98
During the reign o f Reza Sah, the army came to dominate the civil authorities 
throughout Iran in an unprecedented way. Military officers were appointed to replace 
regional semi-autonomous rulers and tribal chieftains. For example, in 1925 Na§er ICan of 
the Qasqaal tribe was dismissed from the ilkhanship of the tribe and a military 
governorship created.
‘The declaration of martial law and the establishment of military regional 
governments in place of civilian govemor-generals was a frequent 
occurrence in both the capital and the provinces. This enabled military 
authorities to tighten their control over all aspects of civilian life, especially 
political dissent. The two periods o f military governments in the capital, 
1921-22 and 1924-6, were crucial to Reza Kan’s rise to supreme power.’99
In these years there was constant friction between civil and military authorities,
resulting in administrative disorder. Even when a provincial civil-govemment was
officially in existence, the local military authorities tended to appropriate its authority and
assume many of its functions, leaving it stripped of administrative power. Thus, both in
the capital as well as the provinces, real power lay with military authorities, the civil
governors being no more than official figureheads. For the first time in Iran, the military
as institution had come to be preeminent in society, and authority concentrated in the
hands of individuals who were from outside the traditional elite and largely lacking in
education. This was widely remarked upon and frequently resented.100 The military’s
domination of provincial civil authorities was greatly aided and assisted by the central
government. Both civil and military authorities sought to gain the support o f Tehran
against the other. Reza Kan’s loyalty, however, lay strictly with the military. Another
factor contributing to the successful domination of civil authority by the military was the
absence of clearly demarcated spheres of authority, civil government and the ability of the
military to exert constant pressure against civil authorities, attempting to reduce its power
and prestige and replacing it by military authority.
There was, throughout these years, a general decline in the importance of the 
governor-general vis-a-vis the military command. Furthermore the govemor-generals at
98 Annual Report on the Persian Army 1925, Fraser to Loraine, 31.12.1925. FO371/11491/E760/326/34.
99 Cronin (1997), p. 201.
100 Fraser to Muspratt, 1.6.1924, FO371/10145/E5427/455/34.
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the same time as they were losing their power struggle with the provincial divisional 
commanders, were finding that their authority was also being whittled away by the 
increasing modernization and centralization of government. Formerly the control of all 
departments - revenue, judicial, etc. - was vested in them. Now not only the army, the 
Ammyeh, and (sometimes) the police been taken out of their hands, but for example the 
collection of revenue was the responsibility of the Finance Department under Millspaugh 
and justice was administrated by the ‘Adhyeh courts.101 The general tendency of the 
military to dominate the civil authorities worsened considerably after Reza Kan ascended 
the throne. ‘By the end of 1925, what remained of civil authorities was totally dependent 
upon military authorities. By the summer of 1926, the civil administration was 
paralysed.’102 In the period under review, certain aspects of Reza Sah’s policies - such as 
his policies of centralization and the strengthening of the state - were popularly supported, 
as was his appeal to patriotism and nationalism. However, there existed considerable 
resentment towards the growing power of the military at the expense of civil authorities, 
Reza Sah’s dictatorial methods and his arrogant disregard for the Constitutional 
governments and its principles.103
The role of the army in restoring law and order and establishing central 
government control after the anarchical conditions which presided was greatly appreciated 
particularly by the merchants whose livelihood was dependent on the security o f trade 
routes. Other members of the traditional elite, however, found the growth of the power 
and authority of the army particularly threatening to their own position, groups such as 
tribal chiefs, feudal lords, and provincial rulers. These groups found it increasingly 
difficult to preserve their traditional autonomy, including their armed strength. The 
‘Olama were faced with the pronounced anti-clerical tendencies of army officers and were 
particularly opposed to the modernizing reforms of Reza Sah which they viewed as 
directly undermining their influence and the authority of Islam.
The centralizing and reduction of the influence o f foreign powers in Iran by Reza 
Sah particularly appealed to Iranian nationalists and modernizers, and had ensured their 
support of both the army and Reza Sah’s policies of centralization and national 
independence. From a nationalist perspective, it was vital for the central government vis-
101 Mo§addeq (1365 SH/1986).
102 Nicolson to Chamberlain, 17.7.1926, F0371/1148/E4553/195/34.
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a-vis the army to establish its authority throughout the country as well as force foreign 
states to recognize its sovereignty. The strength of the army enabled Iran to reassert its 
territorial claims and establish Iran as a regional power. This was the basis for the 
nationalists’ support of the army, and its growing strength. The independence of Iran was 
seen as being integrally dependent on the power and strength of its armed forces. The 
growth in the power and strength of the army had led to military domination of civil life. 
Every sphere of civil life had increasingly come to be dominated by the military. The 
military had become the focal point for Reza Kan’s particular brand o f nationalism as well 
as a pioneer of social reform. The military personnel led the way in the clothing reforms, 
the abolition of titles, linguistic reforms and basic town planning.
Military personnel were ordered to give up their titles and adopt a family name for 
themselves, which was hitherto unprecedented in Iran. Reza Kan himself gave up his title 
of Sardar-e Sepah and took up the family name of Pahlavl, an ancient Iranian name. In 
terms of the clothing reforms that were introduced by Reza Sah, the military personnel 
were the first to adopt the wearing of the peaked cap, which later came to be known as 
Kolah Pahlavl, and in early 1925 some young men followed suit in Tehran. This aroused 
the hostility of the ‘Olama who viewed the cap as un-Islamic as it covered the forehead 
and prevented it from touching the ground during prayer.104
The initial reforms and steps towards the creation of a unified army under Reza 
Kan seemed to have been a point of national pride to many Iranians, and the army itself 
was very proud of its role in helping to pacify and unify Iran.105 However, this popular 
enthusiasm for the army decreased as the financial demands of the army increased, and 
also as the army extended its influence over all aspects of civil and political life of the 
country beyond acceptable limits. Over time the army came to be despised and popularly 
conceived as being unscrupulous and corrupt. The shortcomings of the army were directly 
blamed on the person of Reza Sah. It was popularly felt that, the Qajar dynasty, although 
it had its faults of weakness and corruption, also had its traditions. The new regime, 
‘while making no appeal to the innate conservatism of the Persian people’ was as weak,
103 Ibid.
104 A point needs to be clarified concerning the traditional symbolism of headdress in Iran. Traditionally 
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corrupt and oppressive as its predecessor. It had been expected that Reza Sah would 
justify his usurpation by providing internal and external security as well as the blessings of 
justice and economic progress. These hopes have proved ellusive.106
The worsening of the army’s relations with the civil population seems to have 
been directly related to the deterioration of the internal conditions of the army. As the 
British Military Attache Fraser observed in 1924 there were indications ‘perhaps still a 
trifle shadowy’ - that the people were beginning to show their resentment o f their 
domination by the military.107 This resentment was to harden and deepen dramatically, 
becoming particularly dangerous as it contributed considerably towards the unpopularity 
both of the regime and of Reza Kan personally. In August 1924, for example, Fraser 
remarked that it was reported from all sources that ‘Riza Khan was now regarded almost 
with hatred in the country, owing chiefly to the abuse of senior generals.’108 Furthermore, 
he fully reciprocated the civilian population’s distrust, claiming that it was only in the 
army that he found any spirit of cooperation, thus discounting the civilian sector 
altogether.109
During 1925, the army’s tendency toward abuse of power and corruption 
increased and further aggravated the provincial dislike and distrust of central government. 
In 1926, the army’s relationship with the civilian elements reached its lowest point in this 
period. The resentment of the whole country against the oppression of the military leaders 
and their interference in civil affairs was increasing and now came to be more freely 
voiced. In many quarters Reza Sah was blamed and the situation was regarded with 
pessimism. Loraine echoed the public view of the army in 1926 as being merely ‘a vehicle 
of extortion and injustice.’ 110 According to Howarth, the British Consul in Korasan,
‘No-one, except the few who benefited, desired the continued existence of 
the present regime; the poorer classes openly referred to the Sah as a 
Hammal [porter], while the view was widely expressed that, as a capable 
soldier, he had been well suited to the post o f war minister, but was out of 
place as Sah, while the old Sah had been a man of family and suited his 
position.’
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Haworth also stated that conditions were now such that both the civilians and the 
army could readily be convinced that Reza Sah had proved a failure and that the only 
alternative was to follow the example of Turkey and have a republic, however much this 
might be repugnant to them. On the other hand there were still those who, rather than see 
a republic, would prefer Afimad Sah back again.111 Discontent in Mashad reached its peak 
in the summer of 1926 and the ‘Olama were particularly vocal in their opposition against 
the Sah.
An example of military oppression of the civil population can be demonstrated by 
the maltreatment suffered by the civilian population of Korasan at the hands of the 
Eastern Division under Brigadier Davallu. The account of Davallu’s downfall in Korasan 
illustrates two aspects of the crisis in civil-military relations reached by mid-1926. Firstly, 
the contempt demonstrated by the Sah and his senior officers for the susceptibilities of the 
religious establishment further alienated a still- powerful sector already resentful and 
fearful of the regime’s encroachments on its functions and privileges, and caused offence 
in wide civilian circles. Secondly, the oppressive behaviour of the military authorities 
reflected upon the Sah personally, resulting in the growing unpopularity o f his dynasty 
and the sporadic emergence of both republican and pro-Qajar sentiments.112 Historically, 
there existed among the ex-Cossack officers in the army a tradition of contempt for 
religious personnel, which continued to affect the conduct of many senior officers in the 
national army. The other elements within the army, particularly ex-Gendarme officers, 
shared the dislike of Islamic orthodoxy and the influence of the ‘Olama frequently found 
among Iranian reformers. The ‘Olama were viewed as obstacles to Iran’s reform and 
progress. These two perspectives combined to produce a widespread tendency among 
army officers to treat religious institutions and the ‘Olama with disregard and arrogance. 
An example of this deliberate and outspoken resentment can be seen in the remarks of ex- 
Gendarme Lieutenant-Colonel Prince Mahmud at his court of inquiry, which were typical. 
Iran, he declared would never be a good country till all the Mollas had been killed and 
every Mojtahed hanged.113
The Slfaz military were apparently strongly anti-clerical, taking every opportunity 
to try and weaken the influence and position of the ‘Olama. During religious sermons,
111 Haworth (Mashad) to Loraine, 22.5.1926, FO371/11491/E4063/326/34.
112 Cronin (1997), p. 217.
236
armed soldiers were frequently present in case derogatory remarks were made about the 
government. Also, the military did not hesitate to imprison religious figures and cause 
widespread resentment by interfering in or prohibiting religious processions. For the first 
time in Iranian history, the military violated the traditional right of sanctuary, bast, 
forcibly removing deserters from mosques and shrines. These sorts of disrespectful and 
arrogant behaviour seriously offended the religious sensibilities of the population and 
increased the fear and resentment of the ‘Olama. The ‘Olama were generally opposed to 
the secularizing and modernizing policies of Reza Sah. The army was the driving force 
behind these policies. This, combined with the general disregard and deliberate contempt 
of the army towards the religious establishment, further irritated the ‘Olama. Reza Sah 
was anxious, for political reasons, not to openly antagonize the ‘Olama. However, due to 
the tactless way in which minor social reform was carried out, the ‘Olama had come to 
distrust and resent the regime. This fear accumulated and found popular expression in 
1927 over the introduction of compulsory military conscription. The anti-conscription 
movement and the role of the ‘Olama shall be discussed in detail later on.
The military character of Reza Sah’s regime was clear from its outset. In feet by 
1926 military ascendancy over all aspects of civil and political life was already 
implemented. The military authorities had managed to establish themselves as the 
controlling power in the land. In the period 1921-26, the distinguishing features of the 
Pahlavl military and its despotic dictatorship had already taken shape. ‘Militarism’ came 
to characterize the entire Pahlavl rule. This was to have significant consequences for the 
relationship between state and society in Iran. Tehran, as the central seat o f power came 
to exercise greater control over the affairs of the provinces. The degree of actual and 
effective centralization is, however, debatable particularly in regards to the reduction of 
the power of the traditional elite. The authority of the state over sources of power had 
undoubtedly increased, as compared to the weak lack of central administration of the 
Qajar period. The army played a central and crucial role in this process. A centralized and 
unified army under the direct and sole command of the Iranian government was a novel 
introduction into Iranian society. The army became the instrument by which the influence 
of central government was implemented throughout the country.
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Reza Sah’s military based regime changed the fabric of Iranian society, 
disempowering many traditional elite groups and facilitating the rise of a new elite 
component consisting of the upper ranks of the officer corps. Despite the newly-found 
political and financial supremacy of this new elite, they were unable to command 
legitimacy as had the previous ruling class. There existed great awareness amongst the 
population at large of the plebeian origins o f Reza Sah and his new elite and that they 
were unfit for the highest offices. Thus the rule of the military was perceived as both 
illegitimate and oppressive. Reza Sah’s policy of prioritizing the needs of the army 
contributed to the creation of a privileged class which often abused their power and 
position. The distasteful and arrogant violation of individual and property rights of the 
rest o f the population by army officers was condoned and contributed greatly to their 
unpopularity among the general public.114 It must also be pointed out that although the 
newly-created elite harboured much resentment and contempt for the traditional elite and 
were determined upon change, once in power, they tended to become assimilated into the 
old socio-economic order.
In the 1920s the project for the construction of a centralized and strong army had 
the support of the secular nationalists, intellectuals and reformers alike. The new army 
was viewed by these groups as being central to building a new Iran, free from foreign 
influence and along modem lines. The expansion of the power of central government, the 
settlement and disarmament o f tribes and the end to regionalism had long been viewed as 
a prerequisite for progress. The secular nationalists and advocators of reform soon 
became disillusioned with Reza Sah’s regime, as its arbitrary and dictatorial character 
increased. In fact by the 1930s, opposition ideologies, mainly various forms of 
communism and certain strands of fascism, had taken root among younger elements. In 
the 1920s and 1930s as a result of the introduction of compulsory conscription laws, the 
army underwent a massive expansion, drawing on the vast human resources now 
available. By 1941 it amounted to 18 divisions, totalling 127,000 men. Not only did it 
develop numerically and financially, but it also developed more sophisticated modes of 
organization and better training facilities, and imported larger quantities of up-to-date 
military hardware, while conscription itself had a profound effect on society in general. 
The effects of and the popular resistance to conscription will be discussed in detail later.
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In this period the military authorities clearly demonstrated their disregard for 
Constitutional and legal procedures, with their heavy handedness and intimidation of all 
civil institutions, arbitrariness and insistence on being the sole source o f ideological and 
political activity and intolerance of alternative ideological influences. Institutions such as 
the Majles and civilian government continued to exist, however, their role after 1926 was 
purely ornamental.115 All limits and obstacles to military power were removed. 
Throughout Reza Sah’s reign, the army continued to be preoccupied with ensuring the 
survival of the regime, as it had been from its outset. Although the Sah’s unrelenting 
control of the army continued in the 1930s, the army officers became increasingly 
frustrated with Reza Sah’s domination over the army exercised by his favourites. The 
army had helped to place Reza Kan on the throne and continued to be the principal 
institution of the Pahlavl State. The character of Reza Sah had to some extent blurred the 
distinction between Sah and state, and the army remained faithful to the person of the 
Sah, rather than to the nationalist aspiration preached by the army itself.116
The Implementation of Universal Military Conscription; the 
Rise of Popular Opposition and Clerical Leadership
The introduction of universal compulsory military conscription was viewed by 
many nationalists and reformers as capable of eradicating ethnic and linguistic differences 
and achieving the social and political objectives o f secular nationalism.117 The extent to 
which conscription succeeded in cutting across existing communal, tribal, regional, 
sectarian, ethnic and linguistic differences and creating ‘modem Iranians’ is somewhat 
ambiguous and uncertain. Prior to the Pahlavl period, the various communities that 
existed were on the whole geographically isolated, economically self-sufficient, 
autonomous and predominantly self-governing. During the Pahlavl period, geographical 
isolation was somewhat lessened through the construction of roads and railways and 
improved communication. Military governors replaced many provincial governors and this 
reduced the power and autonomy of provinces and brought them under the control of the 
central government. The tribes were settled and disarmed. The power and influence of the 
‘Olama were reduced. A large number of landowners had their lands confiscated, mostly 
in the north of Iran, and Reza Sah became the largest landowner in Iran. Many of the
115 DulatabadI (1371 SH/1992).
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industrialization, transport and communication schemes of this period were undertaken to 
a large extent with military requirements in mind.118
It was hoped that compulsory military conscription would provide every family in 
the country with an interest in defending their nation and result in the triumph of 
nationalism over religious and communal identities. Universal military conscription 
contributed to the urbanization of the rural and tribal population, the rise of literacy and to 
some extent the breakdown of communal and tribal ties and provisional isolation. 
Although all in all there is little doubt that the ‘militarism’ of the Pahlavl dynasty and the 
implementation of conscription contributed considerably to the amalgamation of society, 
however communal ties and loyalties continued to exist irrespective of the centralization 
achievements of Reza Sah. The regime’s determination to impose conscription met with 
bitter resistance. The population in general looked upon conscription as an evil to be 
avoided at all costs. Conscription remained highly unpopular amongst the general public 
and in particular amid the ‘Olama.
The desirability of the introduction of conscription was advocated with reference 
to its legitimacy in terms of Islamic law. Its underlying ideological implication, however, 
was the hope of replacing religious loyalties with the ideals of nationalism. The opposition 
to universal military conscription was a part of the greater struggle between the ‘Olama 
and the regime.119 Attempts were made in order not to antagonize the ‘Olama, such as a 
concession whereby total exemption was granted to all religious students from military 
service in the Conscription Bill of 1925. However by 1931 the power and influence of the 
‘Olama was curbed to such a degree that even the minor concessions which they enjoyed 
were removed from them. On 22 September 1931 the Conscription Bill was revised and 
passed by the Majles as a single bill.120 Article 19 of the revised bill stated that religious 
students were now to be exempt only until they had completed their study. Thus clerics 
could be called upon for military service. Under the new Bill religious students were
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classified in the same category as all other students and were deprived of their previous 
privileges.
Those who were exempt under the new bill were religious judges who had been 
permitted to function as a Mojtahed or to issue Fatvas by a state-recognized ecclesiastical 
authority, the superior ecclesiastics of the Parsee, Jewish and Christian religion and 
professors of science and theology. The official recognition of non-Muslim minorities 
represented a complete break with the past, and to a certain extent symbolizes the triumph 
of nationalist ideals over religious orthodoxy. The amendments of 1931 further 
demonstrated the expansion of the power of the central government at the expense of the 
religious institution. Even those ‘Olama who were declared exempt from military service 
were subject to state approval and regulation. The ‘Olama had hitherto been a self- 
regulating body, which had contributed greatly to their power and independence from the 
state. Under the 1931 Conscription Bill, a recruiting committee was set up to examine 
documents on which individuals based their claim to be exempt, and verify their 
authenticity in accordance to Article 20 of this law, thus making the ‘Olama subject to 
state regulation.121
The military conscription law was brought in the winter of 1926. Its application 
was limited to the provinces of Tehran, QazvTn and Hamadan. In 1927 the law was 
applied to all provinces in the country122 and resulted in the manifestation of popular 
opposition headed by the ‘Olama. There were anti-conscription demonstrations, bazaars 
were closed and riots broke out in most parts of the country.123 The implementation of 
universal military conscription was the principal grievance expressed during the series of 
clerical agitation in Qom, E§fehan and Slraz in 1927 and was a major contributing factor 
in producing the tribal revolts in Fars in 1929. In Slraz the closure of bazaars lasted one 
month, and clerical support of the movement had given it considerable strength.124 The 
anniversary of the death of Fatemeh,125 usually but little observed, was fully observed by 
processions and pious recitations. Four days before, carpeted pulpits were placed in the 
bazaars all over the town and sermons given. This, together with processions to the 
cemetery led by younger clerics, were outward signs of the invocation of divine aid for the
121 Ibid.
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popular cause.126 Local newspapers had pointed out the news of this disturbance, typified 
in the minds of the peasantry by the closure of the bazaars. The news of the closures soon 
spread all over the province, carried by the tribespeople visiting Slraz. Its duration had 
conveyed an impression of the powerlessness of the central government, and the power 
and influence of the ‘Olama.127
In E§fehan the Bazaars remained closed throughout the month of November. After 
several postponements, all liable for conscription were ordered to present themselves on 
27 November. Of those called for, 550 were exempted, about 300 presented themselves, 
and about 500 failed to answer the summons.128 In Gllan the bazaars were closed. Four 
people were reported dead due to anti-conscription riots, martial law was proclaimed, all 
letters and telegrams were censored and armoured cars were dispatched from Tehran to 
overawe the population.129 Similar occurrences were also reported in Kermanshah, 
Qazvin, Tabriz and Tehran.130 One particular point voiced by all, thoughout, was the fear 
of exposing their youths to the power of immoral officers. It was argued that if the age 
limit were 25, it might have been less objectionable.131 The popular distrust of the 
conscription law, backed by the ‘Olama, gave the movement force and direction and 
provided a platform for the ‘Olama to express their other grievances against the 
government. In the words of Clive:
‘The Persian masses are illiterate and inaccurate, and even if the rigorous 
press censorship were removed, they would probably be incapable of 
expressing their views, but the opposition of the Mollas is stubborn and it 
does not appear that they will easily give way where their existence is at 
stake.’132
The following appear to have been the main reasons which had driven the ‘Olama 
into the anti-conscription movement: the dislike of the Ministry of Justice; the way in 
which Telmurtas, the Minister of Court, conducted the court; the manner in which the Sah 
and his Minister of Court interfered in every little matter; and finally the dislike of Iran-e 
Nu Party and its anti-clerical programme. The ‘Olama demanded that the Constitution be
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respected, and that the Sah rule as a Constitutional monarch, leaving the business of the 
state to a fully-responsible cabinet. They derhanded also that the elections be free, the 
elected be chosen from the people and not nominees of the Sah and the army, and, most 
important of all, they wanted the written law of the Constitution to be carried out to the 
full. This was the most important point for them, as in accordance with the written law of 
the Constitution, five first-rank ‘Olama can preside over parliament and possess the right 
to veto any law which they consider not to be in the interests of Islam.133
The five high-ranking ‘Olama were drawn by lot from a batch nominated by the 
High Clerical Council of Najjaf. They had not sat in parliament since the second Majles; 
they were said to have stated that all laws passed during their absence from the last four 
parliaments had no legal value, with particular reference to laws passed by the Fifth and 
the Sixth Majles. Their objective was the Act which was passed in the early winter of 
1925,134 by which the Qajar dynasty was annulled. They held that it had been beyond the 
power of the Constitutive Assembly to do this; the only thing that the Assembly could 
have done was to give its authority to a special Assembly, freely elected from the people 
for the objective of modifying the Fundamental Law. The issues raised brought under 
question the whole legitimacy of the Pahlavl rule and illustrated that the ‘Olama had other 
political grievances than simply opposition to the Conscription Law. The way in which 
they came to assume leadership of the popular manifestation of discontent over
conscription suggests that in reality the ‘Olama had lost little of their power over the
135masses.
The government, faced with the outbreak of popular agitation, realized that its 
policy of ignoring the clerical movement could no longer be maintained.136 On 10 
December 1927, the Sah sent the Premier and the Minister of Court to Qom to meet with 
the hig-ranking clerics of Qom and the clerical delegation of Slraz, E§fehan and Tehran 
who had congregated there. Their mission was to get the leader of the Qom ‘Olama, Haj- 
Aqa Nurollah, to come to Tehran and to get the remainder to disperse.137 There were 
rumours that the British were behind the clerical opposition in Qom in order to make
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difficulties for the central government.138 Tehnurtas’s mission had met with little success. 
The ‘Olama of E§fehan had declined to see him and had referred him to the head of the 
‘Olama of Qom, SeU^  ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’en. The latter is reported to have said that the 
‘Olama had no particular grievances with the Sah; what they complained of was his 
entourage.139 This is also conveyed in the telegram sent to the Sah by Haj-Aqa Nurollah.
The telegram reads:
‘After expressing our compliments and praying for the prosperity of your 
Majesty, we thank your Majesty for the favour of sending to us the Prime 
Minister and the Minister of Court in order that they might convey to us 
the Royal favour. Prayers be to God that owing to the gentle character of 
these two messengers the matter has been arranged and the desires of the 
people and their spiritual leaders complied with. We hope that under the 
shadow of the Twelfth Imam all stated conditions will be put into 
execution, in consequence of which the whole people, and especially the 
‘Olama, will pray for your majesty. In conclusion, we hope that by the acts 
of the only Saviour of Iran [your Majesty], Islam and the Muslims will 
enjoy happiness.’
Signed: &eik Nurollah Najafi FesarakI, Haj-Sel^: Kamalloddln and Seyyed- 
Al-‘Araqem.140
The Sah sent the following reply to the above ‘Olama:
‘To their Honours Se% Nurollah Najafi, FesarakI, Haj Setfc: Kamalloddln, 
Seyyed-Al-‘Araqem. May their graces endure forever. Your Honours’ 
telegram has been received. We are glad to know that the head of the 
government and the Minister of Court have succeeded in announcing and 
conveying to your Honours our ideas. As it has been made known to your 
Honours, we never had any intention other than to safeguard the greatness 
and the glory of Islam and to preserve all respect and honour due to the 
spiritual leaders. We always were, and, indeed, will ever be, eager to see 
that our respect for the spiritual leaders and our devotion to Islam shall 
never suffer hindrance. We hope likewise that the ‘Olama on their part will 
welcome this expression of our intention and belief, for from it springs the 
prosperity of the country and the greatness of our religion. We hope,
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moreover, that sincerity towards Iran will ever increase for that will be a 
cause to us o f satisfaction and joy.’ 141
Following the negotiations in Qom between the Prime Minister and the ‘Olama, 
two clerical delegates were sent to Tehran and returned on the 18 December taking back 
with them the government’s signature to the acceptance of five conditions which the 
clerical body had put forward. The conditions accepted by the government were as 
follows: (i) A revision of Conscription Law to be made by the next term of the Majles. (ii) 
Five Mojtaheds of first degree shall take their seats in parliament as provided by the 
Constitutional Law. (iii) Ecclesiastical supervisors for the provisional press to see that 
nothing anti-Islamic is printed, (iv) A strict veto on practices which are forbidden by 
Islam, such as drinking of alcoholic beverages and gambling, &c. (v) Reintroduction of 
numerous small religious courts for dealing with matters of personal status, the 
administration of oaths, See., which the new regulation of the Ministry of Justice had 
centralized in the Central Court of Justice.142
The clerical body at Qom received their delegates with disappointment, as it was 
anticipated that the delegates would stay in Tehran to see the execution of at least some 
of the conditions. The postponement of the modification of the Conscription Law until 
next term of the Majles was received with satisfaction. Opinion was fairly general that 
these five conditions saved the feces o f both sides. Although the government had given 
way on paper, it did not amount to very much in reality with the exception of condition (i) 
and recruiting continued as before. From the ‘ Olama’s own material point of view 
condition (v) was important as it enabled a large number of minor ecclesiasts to gain a 
living. On 26 December Haj Aqa Nurollah passed away. This event deprived the ‘Olama 
of their leader and the clerical movement of a large amount o f its influence on the people 
and made truce a more possible outcome.143 Haj Aqa Nurollah death’s most certainly 
contributed to the dispersal of the agitators who had joined with him in Qom.144
In the year under review the ‘Olama became more prominent than they had been 
for some years past. ‘Had they possessed a recognized leader among the Mojtaheds 
residing permanently in Iran, a figure they would have been willing to recognize as their
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superior and who in turn could have made his authority over them felt and his orders 
obeyed, the ‘Olama might well have yielded more authority than the Sah.’145 However, 
there were continuous squabbles among the ‘Olama, no-one amongst them was 
recognised as a leader, each one thought himself above the other, and dissension was rife. 
‘The ‘Olama still had enormous power over the masses, but their inability to accord their 
differences deprived them of actualizing the potential power which they possessed.’146
The ‘Olama had been discontented for some years, perhaps not for any particular 
reason, but simply because they saw that they were quite incapable of upholding their 
former prestige and felt that their power was diminishing. It was the consequential 
outcome of the modernizing trends which had gradually made itself felt all over Iran. They 
were seeking the means to regain some authority when the popular dissatisfaction with 
conscription began to show itself. They eagerly put themselves at the head of the anti­
conscription movement and some sort of unity among them was established, when the 
people of E§fehan persuaded the aged Mojtahed, Haj-Aqa Nurollah, to betake himself to 
the shrine at Qom, and start an agitation from there against compulsory military service.147
SeBj: ‘Abdol-Karim had settled in Qom some years previously.148 It was hoped that 
he might be persuaded to take active part in the agitation. He, however, refused to be 
drawn into politics, and with the exception of the two fairly influential clerics o f E§fehan, 
those who came to join Haj-Aqa Nurollah in Qom from different parts of Iran were small 
clerics of no importance or influence. The government paid scant attention to the ‘Olama, 
but endeavoured to persuade the shopkeepers to resume their business. They failed, 
however, to achieve their objective, because the movement was in reality a popular 
movement of discontent. The government made a few promises on paper ‘hardly worth 
the paper on which it was written’149 and which were never honoured. The government, in 
order to enable the poorer clerics to regain their homes distributed a small amount of 
money and which was sufficient to break down the opposition.150
The role of the ‘Olama in the anti-conscription movement was in fact the last 
public manifestation of their power and influence until the end of Reza Sah’s rule. The
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revised Conscription Law of 1931 removed from them the last vestiges of privilege, and 
placed them at the mercy of the authority of the state. However, the ‘Olama remained 
generally opposed to the regime until the very end.151 Both the actions of the Sah and his 
army officers often offended the susceptibilites of the people from the point of view of 
religion,152 although the Sah was said to have been benevolently disposed towards 
religious principles, but not towards its grosser manifestations.153
Tribal Settlement and the Establishment of the Authority of 
the Central Government
The historical role of tribes from the point of view of previous rulers had been to 
act as frontier guards against outside assailants. It was for this reason that the principle of 
tribal armament had heretofore been admitted and the different tribes had been allowed to 
acquire semi-autonomous privileges, the extent of which had fluctuated in inverse ratio to 
the power of the central government. This practice had prevailed to such a degree that 
certain Sah’s in the past had transplanted warlike tribesmen from one end of Iran to the 
other to settle an undefined frontier. The system had the advantage of reducing the 
expenditure of a regular force to a very low figure. Historically the tribes had always 
played an important military role and continued to constitute the most significant fighting 
element in Reza Kan’s army in the years 1921-1926.
The tribes were utilised for military purposes in three ways: firstly, individual 
recruits from various tribes were incorporated into the army, particularly the cavalry arm - 
on a permanent basis; secondly, the tribal leaders were allowed to maintain armed bodies 
of Savors to guarantee order in their own districts, and were paid subsidies by the central 
government; thirdly, irregular levies were raised for particular campaigns and then 
abandoned.154 Although Reza Kan was very committed to disarming the tribes and 
establishing central government control, he was forced in a contradictory direction of 
having to rely on tribal elements for the conduct of his internal campaigns and for 
defending Iran’s borders. The army proper was still too weak to carry out these tasks
150 Ibid.
151 Clive to Henderson, 26.6.1931, F0371/15341/3611/145/34.
152 Demi-official letter from General J. I. Ennis, Intelligence officer, Baluchestan Intelligence Bureau, 
23.10.1931, F0371/15358/E4843/4843/34.
153 Malet to Simon, 14.7.1934, F0371/16941/E4225/47/34.
154 Cronin (1992), p. 217.
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unaided.155 Tribal men were considered to be the best fighting material in Iran.156 Thus, 
when Reza Kan began to construct the new army, he wished as far as possible to recruit 
the cavalry from tribes.
From as early as 1921, Reza Kan had attempted to disarm the tribes and to bring 
them under the authority of the central government. This process of centralization was 
hoped to have been completed by the autumn of 1924, if not earlier.157 Reza Sah’s tribal 
policy had its roots in the Constitutional period and the political programmes of the 
educated, reform-minded elite of Iran. Since the latter half of the nineteenth century the 
‘disruptive effects of tribal life’ had become one of the main topics of social reform. The 
recommended policy for the question of the tribe in almost all the political programmes of 
the parties of the Constitutional period was sedentarization. The only viable solution for 
the reformist was tribal settlement and abandonment of the nomadic way of life. The 
increased political meddling of foreign powers in the internal affairs of Iran, characteristic 
of this period, exasperated prevailing tribal disorder. The autonomous tendencies of tribes 
took on an unprecedented magnitude. At the turn of the century, the tribal population was 
estimated to form one-third to one-quarter of the total population o f Iran. The tribal 
policies of the Reza Sah period can be divided into two phases. The first phase, during the 
1920s, had a military and political nature, aimed at asserting the supremacy of the central 
government, while the second phase in the 1930s had a social and economic aspect in 
terms of tribal integration and settlement.
The following tables will help to demonstrate the strength of the tribes as 
compared to the army. Table 1 demonstrates tribal strength; Tables 2 shows the strength 
of Iranian forces including tribal recruits and Table 3 demonstrates the total strength of 
the Iranian regular army in 1923. (Please refer to the next page).
155 Please see tables on p. 249.
156 Annual Report on the Persian Army, 1922.
157 Loraine to Curzon, 6.10.1923, FQ371/9025/E10602/77/34.
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Table 1. Demonstrates tribal strength in 1923.
Name of Tribe No. of fighting 
men
Estimated rifle 
strength
Estimated strength tribe 
can keep in the field.
BaktTyari 30, 000 15, 000 6,000
Lors 30, 000 15, 000 5 ,000
Lors of Poste-Kuh 30, 000 15, 000 8 ,000
kohkiluyeh including Boyer Ahmadf) 15,000 10,000 6 ,000
Arabs (acknowledging Seifc of 
Mohammereh)
57, 000 40, 000 30, 000
Qasqaal (including KaskulT) 30, 000 15, 000 5, 000
KimeS 14, 000 10, 000 4, 000
Table 2. Demonstrates the strength of the Iranian forces including tribal recruits on 1/10/1923.
Infantry 22, 000
Cavalry 8, 300
Guns 94
Machine guns 185
Table 3. Demonstrates the total strength of the Iranian regular army on 1/10/1923.
Estimated strength of regular Army Infantry Cavalry Guns Machine Guns
Tehran 4,000 500 112 30
Southern Division 2, 700 1,500 115 13
Western Division 3, 800 1,00 88 14
Total15* 10, 500 3, 00 35 57
In 1921, after the effective defeat o f the JangalTs and the withdrawal o f the Soviet 
forces from the north, a series o f tribal uprisings threatened the internal security o f Iran. 
The first to be reckoned with was the rebellion of the Kurdish tribes o f the north-west 
under the leadership of Esma‘Il Aqa Sunltqu Slsak, known as Sunku, from the tribe of Il-e 
Slsak Kord. After capturing the fort o f Cehrlq in the vicinity o f Salmas, which he made his 
base, he joined forces with the son of Se% ‘ObeTdollah Kord and thus increased his forces. 
They took over Salmas and Orurruyeh and for a short period o f time they even extended
158 8,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, 30 guns, and 40 machine guns were the maximum force available for 
dealing with any tribe or groups of tribes at any one time. Military Attache, M. Saunders, 3.10.1923, 
F0371/9025/E 10602/77/34.
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their rule to Mahabad in the south. During this period, several attempts were made to 
defeat or negotiate with Stmku but nothing came of these efforts. It was not until August 
1922, following a heavy concentration o f troops in Azarbayejan, that the central 
government forces recaptured the fort of Cehriq and defeated Shnku. A large quantity of 
ammunition fell into government hands. Celebrations occurred throughout Tehran and 
many telegraphs were sent from the provinces to Sardar Sepah congratulating him on this
159victory.
The next rebellion that had to be dealt with was that of the tribes of Lorestan. The 
Lors can be divided into: the Lors of PoSteh Kuh and Borujerd who were based in 
Hoseihabad, the place of residence of Vail of Po§teh Kuh; the Lors of Cahar Lang who 
lived in the area between Arak and E§fehan but were considered as a part of the BaktTyari 
tribe; the Lors of Haft Lang who also resided within BaktTyari territories, and the tribes o f 
Kohkiluyeh and Behbahan who were a part of the Haft Lang tribe. The Lors resided in 
Korramabad, PoSteh Kuh, Borujerd, parts of Arak, parts of E§fehan, parts of Hamadan, 
Ilam and l^ozestan, thus forming a semi-circle. In 1922 fighting broke out between the 
Lors and the central government forces. In this conflict the main concern of the central 
government was that the road connecting Kozestan to the central parts was virtually 
severed. In 1922, the newly-stabilized army of the West attempted to suppress the Lors, 
but the government had more engaging military considerations, such as the operation 
against Simku for example, and hence the army was not able to take hold of Borujerd. 
Politically the question of the Lors was not as pressing as that of the Kurds, which had 
acquired a regional dimension. In mid-December 1923, under the command of General 
Amir AfimadI and with additional troops sent from Tehran, the first round of a long and 
difficult series of military campaigns to pacify Lorestan was ended. The fighting went on 
for seven years. It was not until 1928 that the Lors were completely defeated and plans 
for their forced settlement were put into action, setting the more rebellious families 
further away from their native territories.160
Also in 1922, the tribes of Sahsavan, who were scattered around Ardabll, Meskm 
Sahr and QazvTn, in the Province of Azarbayejan, conducted a number of raids under the 
leadership of ‘Abdollah Kan Amir TahmasebI, but were finally defeated by central forces
159 Bahar [Malekol So’ara] (1357 SH/1978), pp. 163,265-6.
160 Ibid., pp. 271-2.
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and the entire tribe was disarmed. However, their settlement was not completely carried 
out until 1932;161 There was inherent contradiction between Reza Sah’s centralizing 
policies and the traditional semi-autonomy of the tribes. The army’s attempts at disarming 
the tribes were bound to meet with resistance and result in military conflict. The 
distinguishing features of these campaigns were cruel brutality and unnecessary 
provocation of the tribal population. Another important aspect in tribal disarmament was 
to provide weaponry for the regular army.162 In feet in the early 1920s, the civilian 
population of Iran, particularly the tribal component, was an important source of weapons 
for the army. Reza Kan stated that part of his motive to launch an operation against the 
Sahsavans was to disarm them and to provide his own troops with rifles.
At the end of June 1922 each tribe was ordered to provide a certain number of 
cavalrymen, and towards the end of the year in a move of symbolic importance, Reza Kan 
requested and obtained small detachments of Savars from various tribes including the 
QaSqaa \  Sanjabi, Kalhor, Qarah Papaq and Yamut, to form a personal escort for him at 
his Headquarters. The way in which the new recruitment o f tribes differed from the 
traditional tribal levies was that the new recruits were merged into larger units of mixed 
composition and were not necessarily led by men from their own tribe. However, two 
exceptions to this were the Kurdish and Armenian squadrons of the cavalry Brigade of the 
Central Division.163 Both these units were organized along ethnic lines. There seems to 
have been far less reluctance among the tribes than the settled population to enlist for 
military service. In a way this was to be expected given the historic military role of the 
tribes and their way of life. Indeed, it seems that the military authorities deliberately 
recruited among defeated tribes as a way of defusing their discontent at disarmament and 
subjection to the central Government.164
In 1924, Selk Kaz‘al165 together with other tribal Arab forces namely the 
committee Sa‘dat who were known for their Anglophile tendencies, the leaders of the 
Ba^tlyari tribes, and the Lur tribe of Posteh Kuh, under the leadership of Vah Posteh 
Kuh, revolted against the central government. Se% Kaz‘al belonged to the tribe of Ban!
161 Ibid., p. 273.
162 Please refer to the tables on p. 249.
163 British Military Attachd, 5.1.1922, FO371/9021/E2461/71/34.
164 Cronin (1992), p. 219.
165 Selk Jaber I£az‘al from the tribe of Bani Ka‘ab, captured by Reza Sah and exiled to Tehran died at 
the age 75 in Tehran, in!355 SH/1936. Mo‘Ih (1358 SH/1979), p. 478.
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ka’ab. Se% Kaz‘al had offered his support to the British during World War I and had 
received many medals of honour from the British government. Se% Kaz‘al also had a 
close relationship with Afimad Sah. The Qajar Sahs granted tax exemptions to notables 
and grandees for services rendered to the crown, which were also hereditary. During the 
appointment of Arthur C. Millspaugh, the American financial advisor, these tax 
exemptions were cancelled.166 The cancellation particularly affected Se% I£az‘al who 
personally owned half of the province of ICozestan. Some Baktlyari tribal leaders were 
also identified by name and a tax was levied on them. Many telegraphs were passed 
between Kaz‘al and Sardar Sepah. Kaz‘al in his last telegraph to Sardar Sepah wrote, ‘I, 
I£az‘al, do not acknowledge you or Millspaugh.’ I£az‘al had managed to gather 20,000 
armed tribal Arabs and six Ba^tlyarT Kans167 accompanied by a number of Ba^tlyan 
tribesmen in his camp in Na§eri, ICozestan. Kaz‘al had already reached an agreement with 
Vah Posteh Kuh and §owlatod-Dowleh, the Leader of the Qasqaal tribe. However, 
§owlatod-Dowleh had decided not to help Kaz‘al in the end and pulled out of the 
agreement. At the time 18 ‘Olama issued a statement condemning the Separatist actions 
of Kaz‘al. In 1924 Sardar Sepah set off towards ICozestan and sent an armed battalion to 
Behbahan and Ramhormoz, passing through Ba^tTyarT-controlled areas. The military 
forces based in Fars and E§fehan also joined them. In this way Sardar Sepah had Kaz‘al 
completely encircled and was in an advantageous position for capturing ICozestan. 
Consequently Kaz‘al surrendered himself without a fight. Towards the end of 1924 Sardar 
Sepah returned to Tehran. He was met with great enthusiasm and there were many 
celebrations in the capital.168
During Kaz‘al’s rebellion, the British, who for a long time had relied on him and 
other tribal leaders in the region for the maintenance of the security o f the ICozestan oil 
fields, now had to make a decision whether to continue this traditional arrangement for 
the safeguard of their regional interests or to come to a new understanding with the 
central government in this regard. Furthermore, some of Reza §ah’s opponents in Tehran 
were considering backing Kaz‘al against him. Although the victory over l£az‘al was
166 The only taxes in Iran at the time of his arrival were on agricultural produce, crops and livestock. 
Shopkeepers, craftsmen and artisans paid a nominal sum to the state through their guilds. Millsapugh 
introduced a host of taxes, such as taxes on the issue and execution of commercial documents, on 
unrented idle real estate, on sales and on inheritance. He also cancelled all tax exemption formerly 
granted by Qajar Sah’s going back almost 70 years.
167 Morteza QolT Kan, Sardar Hesmat, Sardar Zafar, Amir Mojahead, Sohabol Sal tan e, Salar Eqbal.
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achieved through military means, the political process in resolving the crisis was also an 
important factor. The British authorities had decided not to back Kaz‘al and had advised 
him to accept Tehran’s terms. Another important factor which contributed to the success 
of the central forces over tribal rebellions was the revenue obtained through taxation. If  it 
were not for Millspaugh’s reforms Reza Kan would not have been able to continue to 
finance his campaign to pacify the tribes. Also, the taxes levied on the tribal leaders were 
a great strain on them and substantially weakened them. Millspaugh’s system of taxation 
was instrumental in making Iran a solvent nation.
In the spring of 1924, the Turkomans, who had been left to their own devices after 
the collapse of Russian rule in 1917, proclaimed an open revolt which threatened the main 
roads connecting Tehran to Korasan. Almost immediately after the return of Reza Kan 
from ICozestan, a military operation against the Turkomans was under way. The 
Turkomans were finally defeated in the autumn of 1925. In 1928, General JahanbanI in 
Balucestan defeated Dust Mofiammad Kan. This military operation can be considered as 
the last of its kind. During this period the main aim of the central government was to 
establish its authority over the various parts of the country. This goal was achieved 
through military operations and in part through less violent means.
‘Reza Sah was determined to establish and implement the authority and 
power of the central government, which may be said to be the natural 
progression of his regime. Centralization demanded disarmament. The 
foundations to form a bourgeois regime and to put an end to feudalism 
were laid during this time. Gradually, after nine or ten years o f PahlavT 
rule, the entirety of Iran was wiped clean of Kans, Ilians and armed tribes. 
Centralization and security were established throughout the country. 
However, the tragic stories of atrocities and the inhumane and unnecessary 
behaviour to achieve this end are the unfortunate characteristics o f the 
PahlavT rule.’ 169
The Qasqaal revolt of 1928-9 is the best example of the discontentment of tribes 
with the new policies of the state. If one examines the demands of the Qasqaal, it becomes 
evident that their concerns were far greater than just disarmament. Their traditions and 
way of life had been forcibly changed and replaced a with system which did not work. The 
demands of the Qasqaal tribe were: 1) The return of their tribal chieftain §owlatod- 
Dowleh who had been held prisoner in Tehran. 2) Exemption from conscription. 3) Non­
168 MakkI (1369 SH/1991), pp. 153-302.
169 Bahar [Malekol So’ara] (1357 SH/1978), p. 273.
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insistence on the PahlavT hat (the right to wear traditional tribal attire) 4) Return of arms. 
The demands of the Kurdish tribes and the Ba^tlyarTes were almost identical to those of 
the Qasqaal.170
Many tribal leaders were arrested and imprisoned in a deliberate policy of breaking 
the power of the tribes. In 1934 Bahtiyar! chieftains were put on trial accused of treason 
and convicted to death or life sentences. The tribe was supposed to have settled down to 
modem urban life; the registration department had stated that about 50 per cent of the 
tribe had received civil registration documents. The government had gradually assumed 
control of the judicial, fiscal and other administrative activities of the tribe. The 
descendants of tribal leaders were growing up accustomed to subservience to the central 
government.171 However there were still many l£ans left, and although the government 
had achieved its objective of breaking the power of the tribes, it did not succeed in 
replacing the tribal social structure. The tribal chieftains may not have had the autonomy 
which they once possessed, but they still enjoyed the allegiance of the tribe and 
commanded respect.
In the period 1921-26, the army’s main role seems to have been the establishment 
of the power of the central government throughout the country. The army provided Reza 
Kan with a power base whereby he could suppress alternative sources of authority and 
attempt to bring them under central government control The role of the army in this 
period seems to be almost entirely an internal instrument of central government control. 
Reza Kan used the army to control tribal leaders and local rulers. Several attempts were 
made to disarm the tribes, pacify the civilian population and to maintain and establish 
internal security. If one examines the campaigns undertaken by the army during this 
period, it becomes evident that the army’s primary role was the establishment o f central 
authority.172 1926 was a very difficult year for the newly established PahlavT dynasty.
170 28.7.1926, FO371/11502/E4812/4323/34, 28.5.1928, FO371/13781/E2670/95/ 
34/E289434/95/34/E3351/95/34/E3515/95/34/E3589/95/34.
171 Knatchbull Hugessen to Simon, 5.1.1935, F0371/18990/E7530/40/34.
172 The main internal campaigns of this period were:
1920: Operation against revolt of I£FyabanT in Azarbayejan
1921: Operation against Kowdak Kan in Gilan, and Amir Mo’ayyed Kuhl in Mazandaran.
1922: Operations against STmltqu in Azarbayejan; suppression of LahutI lean’s rebellion at Tabriz; 
operation against the Sahsavans in the Ardabll area; operation against Seyyed lalal in Gilan.
1923: Operations against the Sahsavans in Azarbayejan: operations in Lorestan.
1924: Operations in the Balucestan Sarfiad; in Lorestan; against the §eil£ of Mofiammareh; against the 
Turkmans.
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There were two revolts in Azarbayejan and Korasan by some dissatisfied members of the 
army as well as a series of revolts in the Western parts of Iran by the Kurdish population, 
which posed serious threats for the newly-established order. The role of the army as the 
protector of Iran from external aggression remained at best a theoretical one, although 
even theoretically the army, as it stood, was incapable of waging wars against foreign 
armies. The Allies forcible entry into Iran in August 1941 showed that the Iranian army 
was totally incapable o f sustaining full-scale modem warfare. This trend of using the army 
as the instrument of internal security and suppression of rival forces continued throughout 
the reign of Reza Sah.
Tribal organization was broken through disarmament, arrest and imprisonment of 
tribal chieftains and forced settlement. The military regime which replaced it was 
inefficient and ineffective. After central government victory over the tribes and their 
subjection to central control, a series of measures were introduced which transformed the 
tribal way of life. These measure included direct taxation, compulsory military service, 
enforcement of uniform dress code, and the forced settlement and relocation of migrating 
tribes. In 1932 a new office was created in the Ministry of Interior to carry out plans for 
sedentrisation of tribes. The task of forced settlement, until now carried out by the army, 
was now entrusted to civilian authorities. Between 1933 and 1937, the programme of 
forced sedentrisation was carried out in Lorestan, Fars, Azarbayejan and Korasan. In a 
short period of time tribal life was transformed by coercive and violent methods. The 
British Consul in Slstan remarked in early 1926 that their Russian and Cossack 
background might have made Skobelev’s policy of ‘massacre and embrace’ the system of 
tribal management most familiar to Reza Sah and his military advisors.173
The main objective of Reza Sah was to secure and make permanent a centralized, 
unified Iran. To obtain this end it was necessary to disarm and settle the tribes, send 
military expeditions into the provinces and bring rebels under the authority o f the central 
government. In undertaking this, a carefully worked out plan was followed. Those tribes
1925: Operations against the Arabs of Kozestan; against the Turkmans; in the Sarfiad; in Lorestan; 
against the ValT of PoSteh Kuh; in southern Kordestan.
1926: Operations in Lorestan; Kordestan; Suppression of mutinies in the north-western and eastern 
divisions.
1928: Operation against Dust Mofiammad I£an in BaluCestan.
1928-9: Operation against QaSqaaT revolt.
173 Consul, Slstan, toLoraine, 7.2.1926, F0371/11483/El870/87/34.
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nearest to Tehran were the first to be brought under the authority of the central 
government. The further away the threat of rebellion, the later it was subdued by the 
government. After the submission of Lorestan, the next step was taken with Balucestan. 
Previously there had been no connection between BalucT chieftains and the central 
government. The disarmament and settlement expeditions of Reza Sah made the province 
an integral part of Iran. Two years later, the Qasqaal and Bal^tlyarles were subdued. In the 
winter of 1930, ‘the final, act in the drama of centralizing Persia took place,’ when the 
Beddehan and Kohkiluyeh tribes submitted to the central government.174 According to 
Ala, the Persian legation in London, ‘One of the greatest services rendered to Persia by 
His Majesty Reza Sah Pahalvi has been to break the power of the tribes and put an end to 
feudalism.’175 By 1931 all this was accomplished. However, minor tribal uprisings 
continued to occur until the 1940s.
In an interview in 1931, the Minister of Court, Teunurtas stated that Reza Sahs’ 
main aim was to create a unified Iran under a national power. To achieve this end, a 
carefully worked out programme was constructed. The first part of the programme was 
the pacification of tribes, the arrest of provincial rebels and the extending of the power of 
the central government to all parts of the country. ‘The second part of His Majesty’s 
programme consists in the recognition of the legitimate rights and interest of all foreign 
powers subject to the recognition of our legitimate rights and interests by foreign powers. 
The third part of His Majesty’s programme may be summed up as “independent Persia”. 
Our aim is to follow a separate and independent form of existence.’ The extent to which 
theses aims were successful or fully implemented is debatable. What is certain, however, 
is that the role of the military was crucial, and formed the basis and drive of the whole 
programme.
Finally it must be pointed out that Reza Sah’s main source of political support 
and initial popularity rested on his ability to create and organize a modem army and 
establish internal security. The success o f military operations and the pacification of the 
tribes were important components in the political popularity of Reza Sah, in an era when 
war provided the opportunity for states to assert their supremacy over society and 
legitimize their monopoly of the means of coercion. This enabled Reza Sah to assert his
174 Interview between Ennis and Timurtache, 23.10.1931, F0371/15358/E4843/4843/34.
175 Knatchbull Hugessen to Simon, 5.1.1935, FO371/18990/ E380/ E380/34/E7530/40/34.
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legitimacy as the sole agent that could preserve the unity of the country. Thus his tribal 
campaigns were an essential and indispensable component in his state building 
endeavours.
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Chapter Six: The Establishment of Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh 
Qom: Continuation of the Hierocratic Challenge or its
Pacification?
258
Introduction
‘ There are two classes o f kings: kings o f the world and kings o f religion. *
Najem ud-Din RazI
The Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh is a conglomerate of educational institutions in which 
learned teachers teach Islamic sciences. The school was established in 1923 just at the 
time of Reza Sah’s consolidation of power under the leadership of Se% ‘Abdol-Karim 
Ha’eri (1863-1936). §e% ‘Abdol-Kariin Ha’eri strengthened and revived the educational 
structure in Qom and Qom emerged as the city of religious learning and political activism. 
It is interesting that the Reza §ah period, often characterized by secularization, should 
coincide with the establishment of one of the most important Shi’i theological schools. 
Reza Sah aspired to limit autonomous ecclesiastic charisma and make it subordinate to 
secular power. However, he was unable to eliminate completely the social and doctrinal 
power of the ‘Olama as by this time the ‘Olama had a well-established foundation. ‘A folly 
developed ecclesiastical hierarchy, with an established body of dogmas and particularly 
well-organized system cannot be uprooted at all.’1 The importance of centres of religious 
learning, particularly the Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom, did not diminish even when the ruling 
elite began to monopolize legal and educational institutions. The establishment of Howzeh 
‘Elmlyeh Qom was vital for the continuation of the hierocratic challenge to the state. This 
chapter will examine the role of Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom in the continuation of the 
hierocratic challenge to the state as well as in terms of the pacification of this challenge by
A
the state through the control of the Howzeh. This will be done vis-a-vis a historical study 
of the establishment, the reasons for establishment, the structure o f the revived schools,
A
the curricula, and the teachers of the Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh. Furthermore, we will attempt to 
examine the relationship between the Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh as the official representative of 
Shi’i hierocracy and centre of orthodoxy and the state through a number of empirical 
studies pertaining to this relationship. We will consider the following events to highlight 
our arguments concerning the nature of the relationship between the state and Shi’i 
hierocracy: the ‘Olama’s attempts against the Republican Movement; the incident 
between Reza Sah and Se3£ Mofiammad Bafql; the implementation of the Uniform Dress 
Code and the opposition from the ‘Olama; and finally the introduction of Compulsory 
Unveiling and the responses from the Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh.
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It will be helpful to recapitulate our main arguments in setting the theoretical 
framework of this chapter. In historic religious systems such as Islam, history is a 
fundamental category. History is linear and fraught with transcendent meaning in the 
working out of the divine purpose. Historic religious systems have an important function 
in terms of attempting to develop religious ideologies of social change. The development 
and institutionalization of the perception of the basic tension between the transcendental 
and the mundane were closely linked to the emergence of a new social elite in Iran, 
namely the Shi’i ‘Olama. This process of institutionalization turned the new scholar class 
into relatively autonomous partners in the major ruling coalitions. In Shi’i Islam the 
institutionalization of clerical authority was directly related to the belief in the return of 
the Mahdl by means of the doctrine o f occultation of the twelfth Imam.2 The importance 
of this argument from the point of view of later developments is that the doctrine of 
occultation made the activation of the utopian potential of transcendence a recurrent 
possibility while it made clerical authority a reality. The institutionalization of the norm of 
the juristic authority of the ‘Olama enhanced by the evolution of the juristic norm of 
authority throughout the nineteenth century resulted in the independence of the 
hierocaracy from the state.
The establishment o f Shi’ism thus transformed the societal structure o f domination 
in Iran, as can be seen from the distinctive pattern of development of Shi’i ‘Olama from 
the time of the Greater Occultation until the period under study. After the Greater 
Occultation until the establishment of the Safavid dynasty the Shi’i ‘Olama were a distinct 
social group but did not constitute a recognized institution, a hierocracy. The Safavid 
period marks the transition of the ‘Olama from a distinct social group to a hierocracy. The 
eventual consolidation of the Shi’i ‘Olama as a ‘church’ occurred in the nineteenth 
century. In Chapter Two, it was effectively argued that the Weberian term ‘church’ can 
loosely but accurately be applied to the ‘Olama during the Qajar period. Church systems 
are more affected by the institutional separation of religion and polity (church-state 
separation) and the denial of the religious identity of the polity (non-recognition of a state 
religion or religious character of the state). In church religiopolitical systems there are 
powerful ties between ecclesiastical and political structures, and church-state separation
1 Weber (1968), p. 1175.
2 Arjomand (1993), p. 59.
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constitutes a fundamental break with tradition. Reza Sah ascended the throne in a country 
where the ties between ecclesiastical and political structures had already taken firm roots. 
His policy of centralization was the antithesis to this dual power structure o f authority. 
Reza Sah was thus faced with a rival power structure and made every effort to ensure its 
displacement. Consequently the ‘Olama were irreconcilably alienated and ‘disembedded’ 
from the PahlavT State.
Reza §ah ‘was neither antagonistic nor unbeholden to the Shi’i ‘Olama for his 
accession to the throne. However, he simply saw no conflict between modernization and 
the precepts of Islam.’3 The ‘Olama, on the other hand viewed the modernization policies 
of Reza Sah as contradictory to the tenets of Islam and a direct attack on their power and 
prestige. The ‘Olama were unwilling to accept these policies o f Reza Sah but were often 
forced to compromise. ‘The history of all churches demonstrates that even the most 
powerful hierocracy is continuously forced to compromise with the economic and political 
realities’.4 These policies of Reza Sah were directed at curbing the political power and 
level o f interference o f the ‘Olama in matters o f government rather than an attack on their 
spiritual and religious role. This may help to explain partly his close relationship with Sei^ ; 
‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri and his tolerance of the Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom. Se% ‘Abdol- 
Karim’s abstinence from any political involvement, his insistence on the scholarly, 
religious and spiritual role o f the ‘Olama combined with his lofty social standing and high 
moral integrity made him the ideal ally for Reza Sah against the politically-oriented 
‘Olama. It can be said that Reza Sah was not anti Islam per se, but rather anti ‘power- 
sharing’. He is often quoted as saying ‘In this country, there can be only one king, and 
that is me!’5
The regime’s reform of previously ‘Olama-controlled institutions was carried out 
mainly for its own political purposes. However, these bourgeois reforms did not 
fundamentally change the fabric of Iranian society or the structure of social relations. For 
all this change Iran remained an Islamic state, secular in part but nevertheless preserving 
the one vital link that connects state and society to God: the Sarfah. The Sarfah 
maintained its theoretical and social primacy. Although the Sarfah was changed in a 
drastic manner and the sources from which legal principles can be drawn were expanded
3 Amuzegar (1991), p. 121.
4 Weber (1968), p. 1174.
5 Ha’erl YazdT, Unpublished Memoirs, p. 47.
261
beyond its boundaries, this did not repudiate the theoretical or social ascendancy of the 
Sarfah. Scholars have generally considered the secularization of Islamic law to have been 
almost completed during the Reza Sah period and point to the changes in the personal 
status codes as the final destruction of the Sarfah. Yet the crucial theoretical link between 
the state and sacred law remained in tact. Although reform removed education and law 
from the jurisdiction of the ‘Olama to that of the state, however, the ‘Olama still enjoyed 
the sole monopoly over interpretation of the Sarfah and continued to argue that San 
principles must govern the ‘Ommah. Governmental policies and ideological 
pronouncements can not be equated with ‘actual’ socioeconomic and political changes. 
The economic and administrative changes only partly altered the life and organization of 
Iranian society. The traditional family, the traditional value system and behavior patterns, 
and religious community remained almost intact.
During the Reza Sah period the modernization of the state did entail drastic 
decline of the institutional prerogatives and social power of the hierocracy. However, it 
did not diminish the legitimacy of the exclusive hierocratic authority of the ‘Olama, which 
assured the continued financial independence of the hierocracy from the state. The 
institutionalization of the autonomy of the Shi’i hierocracy during the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries assured its survival despite inexorable pressure from the state in the 
twentieth century. The Shi’i hierocracy not only survived but withstood the challenges of 
the PahlavT state and triumphed with virtually exclusive control over religious learning and 
over authoritative interpretation of Shi’i Islam. The loss of judicial and educational 
functions and the loss of control of religious endowments and land ownership seriously 
undermined the hierocarcy. But these developments also had another important 
consequence: the differentiation and separation of religious and political powers became 
complete. Irrespective of the erosion of clerical control over education, the major defeat 
of the hierocracy in the legal sphere and the establishment of centralized supervision over 
religious endowments, the Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh maintained the independence of religious 
institutions of learning from the state. This independence was sustained by the one source 
of income that was inevitably immune from state encroachment: the voluntary payment of 
religious taxes to the ‘Olama as ‘vicegerents of the Hidden Imam’. The other aspect of the 
traditional role of the ‘Olama which survived and was in fact strengthened was their role 
as ‘the refuge from the oppression of tyrants and governmental officials’. This was one of
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the reasons for the continued influence, importance, and popularity of the ‘Olama. 
Although many of their public and political functions were removed from them this did 
not reduce the importance of the Marfa ‘ Taqtid or the ‘Olama-ye Ma ‘navt or the extent 
of their power and influence over the lives of many Iranians.
The revival of the Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom as the centre of Shi’i studies meant that 
the Iranian government could exercise greater control over the school, as it was within the 
geographical boundaries of Iran and under the jurisdiction of the government. Moreover, 
the Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom came to represent the centre of orthodoxy, if the Howzeh did 
not protest against the policies of the government it meant that Shi’i orthodoxy had no 
objections. This, however, did not stop individual clerics from voicing their opinions or 
leading local uprisings. These individual cases remained usually at a local level as isolated 
incidents and did not take on the form of national protest. The importance of Se3$: ‘Abdol- 
KarTm Ha’erfs general stance of non-political involvement and his role as the founder of 
the school and a first-rank Mojtahed in pacifying potential mass movements cannot be 
overstated. It may be argued that Reza Sah endeavoured to revert Iran to 
‘Caesaropapism’ but Qom achieved the status of an alternative political centre and a 
potential challenge to the state. Reza Sah strove to legitimize the basis of his rule by 
partaking in the charisma of the great kings of Persia and its pre-Islamic past. However, 
during his coronation there were numerous members of the ‘Olama present, which 
indicates that the forces of hierocracy were still influential in the endowment of 
legitimacy. Furthermore, Reza Sah did not alter the Fundamental Law, which defines the 
Sah as ‘defender of the faith’, nor did he change the amendment whereby five members of 
the ‘Olama presided over the Majles in a supervisory role.
Finally, the reduction of power and the disengagement of the ‘Olama from the 
PahlavT regime contributed to their solidarity as a tightly knit status group in control of 
autonomous religious institutions, particularly the Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom, and aided their 
survival and success. The PahlavT regime’s attempts at the separation of religion from 
politics or the disengagement of religion from political society did not mean, however,
6 DulatabadT makes an important distinction between ‘worldly ‘Olama’, DonyavT, and ‘spiritual ‘Olama’, 
Ma'navT or Ahle Mana. He describes the ‘worldly ‘Olama’, as ‘those whose quest for worldly domination, 
RIyasat Ma‘-abT, outweighs their religious aspects, who intermingle with state functionaries, hold 
religious court and gain large fortunes. He describes the ‘spiritual ‘Olama’, as ‘those who have no 
relations with state functionaries, who do not interfere in the administration of the law and avoid worldly 
luxuries.’DulatabadT (1371 SH/1992), pp. 50-54 & 134.
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that religion became necessarily privatized or that it no longer played a public role. It only 
meant that the public locus of religion was no longer the state or political society, but 
rather civil society. In the traditional religio-political system, political participation was 
limited to a small number of individuals, whereas religious participation was on a mass 
scale, irrespective of periodical outbreaks of anti-clericalism. The anti-clerical policies of 
the PahlavT regime, the newly found locus of religion, and mass participation in religion . 
enabled the Shi’i hierocracy to politicize the sacred symbols o f religion, and find in these 
sacred symbols the bases of social support. In this sense religion contributed to the 
process of mass politicization by providing sacred symbols that acquired political 
significance. The Shi’i hierocracy found in these sacred symbols an important key to mass 
support and mobilization, a key that their secular rivals in the struggle for power had 
denied themselves.
What Do the ‘Olama Say About Themselves?
As an introduction to our discussion of o f the role and position of the ‘Olama 
within Iranian society towards the end of the Qajar period and during the PahlavT period, 
it may be helpful to present some of the accounts of the ‘Olama concerning themselves. 
The following three accounts by Hojjatol-Islam Mofiammad RazT, Hojjatol-Islam ‘AlT 
Davanl, and Ayatollah TaleqariT will be considered:
Hojjatol-Islam Mohammad Rail
‘During the reign of the previous Sah [Reza Sah], which coincided with 
the time of §eik ‘Abdol-Karun Ha’eri, the faithful followers of the 
Household of the Prophet [the ‘Olama] were downtrodden, oppressed and 
deemed worthless. In the Islamic country of Iran, Jews, Christians, and 
Zoroastrians were honoured and respected but the ‘Olama, men of God, 
men of knowledge, Jollab, and all turban wearers were disdained, 
dishonoured and disrespected. That infidel [Reza Sah] had managed to 
penetrate his poison and apostatic propaganda into the common psyche of 
the people. This was to such an extent that the very people who used to 
kiss the hand of their ‘Olama and take the water with which they [the 
‘Olama] performed their ablautions as blessed and for a cure, turned 
against them and cursed and scorned them. This hatred was such that 
people would rather deal with atheists and infidels than with the ‘Olama.
[People would not enter into commercial or social interaction with the 
‘Olama] There was not even one bus or taxi driver who would deal if not 
in an Islamic manner, but at least humanly with the leaders of society, the 
men of knowledge, the men of Islam, the courageous soldiers of the
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Twelfth Imam, and the propagators of the Qoran [‘Olama]. The sentence 
‘do not let an Ajpind 7 get into your car for you will get a puncture’, was 
the utterance of every driver, his apprentice, every merchant, and Bazari? 
It is still not forgotten by the people! If out of 25 passengers on a bus, 24 
were Bahai, Jewish, Christian, Zoroastrian and Materialist and one was a 
member o f the ‘Olama, Seyyed 9 or non- Seyyed, Hojjatol-Islam or 
Ayatollah and if the bus had an accident or a puncture the other passengers 
would immediately say that this calamity is brought upon us by the curse 10 
of this AkundP 11
Hojjatol-Islam ‘All DavanI
‘[During the Reza Sah period] People neglected the ‘Olama and had a 
negative and disapproving attitude towards them. To prove my point I 
shall quote a section from Haj Aqa Rufiollah Mu§tafavf s [Komeyrn] the 
leader of the Islamic Republic’s book.12 “The ‘Olama, from the advent of 
Reza Kan’s reign realized that his rule was against the interests of the 
country, and did everything in their power both overtly and covertly, to 
reveal to the people the evil conduct of Reza Sah. However, they [Reza 
Sah and his government] had managed to reduce the status of the ‘Olama 
among the general public to such an extent that even public transport 
drivers refused to allow members of the ‘Olama to board their vehicles. 
Whenever misfortune befell the vehicle it would always be blamed on the 
Alcundl I [l£omeym] was a witness to this myself. One day I was on a bus 
and it ran out of petrol, the driver turned around to face me and while 
pointing at me told the other passengers: ‘it is because o f the cursed 
presence of this Alyund that we have ran out of petrol!’...” ,13
Ayatollah Jaleqllm
[In regard to people’s indifference towards religion, TaleqanI gives the 
following explanation.] ‘Europe was drenched in darkness under the yoke 
of the church. Europe was illuminated by the Dawn of the East and the 
enlightening rays of light of the principles of freedom... From there on it 
began to progress. However, in the East charlatans and thieves put on the 
robes of religion. They contaminated the civil, legal and political principles 
of Islam and enslaved the people. It was after this that the regression of the 
Islamic world began... The degeneration of Islam continued until a hundred 
years ago. It was during the Tobacco incidence of 1306/1889 that the late 
Ayatollah SfrazFs Hohn awakened the people.’ [In relation to the demise 
of the position and prestige of the ‘Olama in Iranian society TaleqanI 
provides the following analysis] ‘Some lightheaded people, returning from
7 Colloquial term for cleric. Please see glossary.
8 The commercial class and the bazaar were the traditional stronghold of the ‘Olama.
9 Descendant from the Prophet.
10 It was commonly believed that allowing an Akund onto a public vehicle will bring bad luck for the rest 
of the passengers.
11 RazT (1334 SH/1954), pp. 51-2.
12 Komeynl (1987), as quoted by DavanI (1360 SH/1981), p. 177-8.
13 Ibid., p. 9, as quoted by DavanI (1360 SH/1981), p. 177.
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Europe, who had become completely alienated from their own culture 
spread their immoral views amongst the people and published their 
thoughts in newspapers which had no principles. Britain began a deliberate 
policy of causing contention and discord amongst the ‘Olama in order to 
lessen their influence amongst society at large. General hysteria did not 
allow for great ‘Olama and the leaders of the movement [Constitutional] to 
sit together and fully discuss their views...’14
Yafiya Dulatabadi, although from a diametrically opposed premise, arrives at a 
similar conclusion as the three above clerics concerning the demise of the position of the 
‘Olama. Dulatabadi confirms that the influence of the Shi’i ‘Olama, which had lasted for
A A V
more than half a century and had reached its zenith at the time of Haj MIrza Hasan SlrazI, 
went into a steady but rapid decline.
‘In Iran with the reduction of the influence of the counterfeit ‘Olama, 
Rowfiarii Nemayan15 in political affairs, their significance and importance 
had greatly declined. Even the fete of Alimad Sah himself who was a 
strong supporter of the ‘Olama, remained uncertain. If  one imagines that 
there is still a place for the ‘Olama among the people, one is greatly 
mistaken. Due to the irreligious behavior of these Rowfiarii Nemayan, 
those around them, their families and relatives, there is no respect left 
among the masses for the men of the cloth. The period of their influence 
has expired. This is due to the spread of a new culture, modem schools, 
increased contact with the outside world, the increase of educated people 
returning from abroad, better links with the rest of Iran, an increase in the 
number of intellectuals, and freethinkers. The doors of new knowledge 
have been opened up to the people and they are no longer fooled by the 
Rowfiarii Nemayan. People do not have any tme sympathy for the ‘Olama 
and have realized their pretence, materialistic aspirations and this 
‘worldliness’. Those who are good amongst them have suffered due to the 
bad behaviour of the rest. The end of the ‘Olama is almost certain.’16
Sell  ^‘Abdol-Karlm Ha’eri and the Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh-e Qom
‘Haj Se% ‘Abdol-Karun Ha’eff Yazdl, the son o f Mohammad Ja‘far was bom in 
186317 in Mehreh Jerd in Yazd. He had his elementary schooling in Ardakan, one of the 
towns of the province of Yazd. At the age of 18 he set off for Karabla.18 He studied for 
two years in Karbala with Fazel Ardakan! (d.1884). He then went to Samereh [Iraq] and 
studied there for a further 13 years. His general, §a(f, teachers were Aqa MIrza Ibrahim
14 Na’ml (1334 SH/1955), pp. 74-5.
15 Dulatabadi (1371 SH/1992), pp. 50-54 & 134.
16 Ibid., pp. 289-92.
17 Bamdad (1348 SH/1969) confirms the above additional information but disagrees on the date of birth 
of §etk ‘Abdol-Karlm Ha’eri, which he places at 1859.
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Mafiallatl, and §e% Fazllollah Nuri. His studied Feqh and 0§iil with Seyyed Mohammad 
FeSarakI and MIrza Mofiammad TaqI Slrazl. He continued his outer limits of excellence, 
ICarej Ally eh,19 with MIrza Hasan Sirazl. After MIrza Hasan SlrazFs death in 1894, Se% 
‘Abdol-Karlm Ha’eri continued his studies with Seyyed Mohammad FesarakI, Seyyed 
Isma‘Il §adr, Haj MIrza Hosem Nuri, in Najjaf [Iraq]. During his stay in Najjaf he attended 
the study circle of Seyyed Mofiammad FesarakI and Aqa Afcund. Se% ‘Abdol-Karim 
Ha’eri resided in Najjaf until the death of Seyyed Mofiammad FesarakI in 1898. In 1898, 
on the invitation of the notables and the ‘Olama of Arak, Se% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri 
returned to Iran and for a while resided in Sultanabad [Arak] and busied himself with 
administration of religious affairs. At the beginning of Reza §ah’s reign he immigrated to 
Qom and established the theological school there at great financial cost. As a result of 
§e% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’erfs residence in Qom the city became the centre of clerical 
activity and power. He revitalized Qom as a centre of learning, which earned him the 
respect of both the government and the people. Setk ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri was an 0§ull 
Mojtahed but he abstained from any political involvement. In 1936 at the age of 79 he 
passed away. His father and grandfather were not clerics and he is said to be descended 
from the royal family of Al-e Mozafar.’20
Mofiammad TaqI Bafql, Mofiammad Reza Saif atmadar Savuji, and other 
‘Olama of Qom had insisted that Selk ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri Yazdl should reside in Qom 
and establish the Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh. At first Se% ‘Abdol-Karlm Ha’eri Yazdl was 
apprehensive due to the following reasons: firstly, there was a serious lack of finances; 
secondly, most theological students were concentrated in Iraq around the various, already 
well-established centres there; thirdly, he was unsure as to the response of Reza Sah to 
such an initiative and disliked any direct involvement in political and temporal matters. 
However, the ‘Olama of Qom managed to persuade him to stay and establish the Howzeh 
‘Elmlyeh. The merchants and the Bazar were encouraged to assist financially towards the 
establishment of the school. The Bazar was most cooperative as Se!^ ; ‘Abdol-Karim 
Ha’eri was greatly esteemed and honoured among the community. As a result of the 
insistence of the ‘Olama, great popular demand, the cooperation of the Bazar and
18 In Iraq which was the center of Shi’i theological learning.
19 The highest qualification in theology.
20 Ha’eri Yazdl, Unpublished Memoirs & Memoirs of Morteza Ha’eri Yazdl, the eldest son of Selk 
‘Abdol-Karlm Ha’eri Yazdl, pp. 6-8, 12,25,27-28.
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merchants, and Reza Sah’s respect for the wishes of Se% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri, he finally 
accepted.21
The concord of Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom with the military regime of Rem Sah was 
an important and influential factor in maintaining peace and defusing any attempts by the 
religious opponents of the government to start mass movements. During the first years of 
Reza Sah’s reign Iran faced internal disorder and the future seemed precarious. The 
establishment of Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom was of great importance, particularly as it 
coincided with a period most often characterized by its secularization tendencies. The role 
o f Se% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri was significant as the founder of the Howzeh and a 
representative of the Shi’i hierocracy. Moreover, it is argued that the Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh 
Qom played a vital role in preventing the spread of communist ideology throughout 
society.22 For this reason the newly-established theological school in the centre of the 
country was of significance to both foreign and domestic policies of the state.
Sei^ ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri is described by one of his students, Mohammad RazI as 
‘the only flag-bearer of Islam who counteracted the enemy’s most brutal attacks against 
Islam with patience and forbearance and through his equanimity brought the enemy [Reza 
Sah] to his knees.’23 Based on the memoirs of Se% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri, however, it does 
not seem that he himself regarded Reza Sah as the enemy. There is nothing explicit or 
implicit which implies this. Concerning the relationship between religion and politics he 
writes:
‘The worlds of piety [religion] and that of politics operate through very 
different mechanisms. They are separate but interrelated spheres. Harmony 
must preside over both for the prosperity of the nation. For this to be made 
possible Iran needs to become strong, united and free of external [foreign] 
intervention. Threats of Materialism [communism], civil unrest, and 
banditry must be completely removed. True men of God must be 
distinguished from the impostors.’ [In terms of his perception of his own 
role as a leading cleric he says the following] ‘We must emulate the role 
model of our Infallible Guides and Masters [the Imams] as teachers of 
religious sciences dedicated to the furtherance of wisdom and illumination.
It is hoped that through the will of God and the efforts of this most humble
V A .  _
servant [Selk ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri] of the Imam of the Time [12th Imam],
21 Ha’eri Yazdl, Unpublished Memoirs & Memoirs of Morteza Ha’eri Yazid, pp. 6-8, 12, 25, 27-28. Also 
RazI gives similar reasons for the stay of §eik ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri YazdT in Qom. RazT (1334 SH/1954),
pp. 21-2.
22 Ibid., pp. 289.
23 Ibid., pp. 59-60.
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Qom shall be revived as the centre of Shi’i learning in the homeland of the 
lovers of the Household of the Prophet [Iran].’24
The Internal Structure of the Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom
The Howzeh consisted of a conglomerate of educational institutions, many of 
which existed prior to Se3$: ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’erTs arrival in Qom. However, most of the 
schools were not in use and often derelict. Apart from the structural decay of many of the 
buildings there was actually very little teaching in Qom, which meant that Iranian 
theological students had to go abroad - mainly to Iraq - in order to further their advanced 
theological studies. Under §e3£ ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’effs leadership, Qom became the seat 
o f Shi’i learning and was revived as a centre of Islamic sciences. The Feyzlyeh School
A
became the focal point of the Howzeh. Prior to its establishment only those students with 
pecuniary assistance or family connection could attain the ranks of Ijtehad, due to the 
distance and the financial means needed to go to Iraq. The Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh provided 
opportunities for students from less privileged backgrounds to complete their advanced 
studies, and this somewhat altered the social background of Mojtaheds.
List of the Schools which were Revived by Sefti ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri
1) Madreseh Feyziyeh consisted of 300 Jollab25. This school was revived and a second
floor was added to the school by Se% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri, which consists of a 100
26rooms.
2) Dar Al-Safa, previously a hospital, was rebuilt as a dormitory for the Jollab. The 
building housed 120 students.
3) Madreseh Kan, situated on the opposite side of the shrine of Hazrat Ma‘§umeh and 
consisted of thirty Jollab.27
4) Madreseh Haj Molla §adeq.
5) Madreseh Seyyed §adeq Rowhanl-Qoml.28
6) Madreseh Razavl situated in the Bazar of Qom.
A
7) Madreseh Janl-^anl.
8) Se% ‘Abdol-Karlm Ha’eri encouraged and promoted the building of two new hospitals: 
BTmarestan Fafrril and Bimarestan Sahmlyeh. He is also responsible for the building of the
24 Ha’eri Yazdl, Unpublished Memoirs, pp. 50 & 61-4.
25 This school was first established by Fa{fi ‘All Sah.
26 Ha’eri Yazdl, Unpublished Memoirs, pp. 50-3 and RazI (1334 SH/1954), p. 72.
27 Ibid., p. 75.
28 Ibid., p. 76.
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library of the Madreseh Feyziyeh,29and the cemetery, Qabrestan-e Nu outside of the 
compounds of the Shrine.30
The Curriculum at the Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom Under the Leadership of Seflt
‘Abdol-Karlm Ha’eri
1) Introductory Studies, which consisted of the completion of the following fourteen 
books: Ketab Al-Amsaleh, Ketab Sariah Al-Amsaleh, Ketab Sarf-e Mir, Ketab Al- 
Tasrif, Ketab ‘Avamel Goram, Ketab Sarfiol Al-‘AvameL, Ketab Sarfiol Al-Tasrif, 
Ketab ‘Avamel-e Molla Mofisen, Ketab ‘Avamel-e Manzomeh, Ketab Al-Hedayeh, 
Ketab Adab Al- Mote’allemih, Ketab Slyaq-e Moskeleh, Ketab Al-Kobra Fel Manjeq 
and Ketab Sarfi-e Al-An-Mozaj. These 14 books are known as Jameh ul-Moqdamat 
or Introductory Texts, and are still studied by the new theological students as a part of 
their preparatory studies.
2) Intermediary studies, which consisted of the completion of the following six books: 
Makaseb, Kefayeh, Lommeh, Sarfiol-Lommeh, Derayeh and Rejal. These six books 
were studied after the completion of the 14 preliminary books.
3) Advanced studies, which consisted of the following subjects Feqh, 0§ul, Hekmat31 
and ICarej Makaseb.32 Se%: ‘Abdol-Karlm Ha’eri taught Feqh in the mosque of the 
Shrine ‘Masjed Bala Sar ’ in the morning and 0§ul in Feyzlyeh in the afternoon.
The Teachers who Taught at the Newly Revived Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom
Before the arrival of §et^ ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri in Qom a few of the residing 
‘Olama of Qom had a limited number of private classes. The most eminent and well- 
known of these ‘Olama were: §e% Abu’l Qasem Kablr (d. 1353/1934), MIrza Mofiammad 
Feyz (d. 1370/1950), and Sei^ : Mofiammad TaqI Bafql (d. 1365/1945) who had come to 
Qom in 1337/1918. All three ‘Olama taught Feqh and 0§ul. They played an efficacious 
role in persuading Se% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri to remain in Qom.
The other ‘Olama who taught at the Howzeh after its re-establishment and revival were:
1) Seyyed Isma‘H §adr known as §adr Al-Dln (d. 1373/1953). He had come to Qom in 
1349/1930 from Najaf and taught Feqh and 0§ul and was one of the three executors 
named in §eik ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri's will33
2) Seyyed Mofiammad TaqI IConsari (d.1371/1951). He had come to Qom in 1337/1909 
from Najaf. He was a student of Se% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri and taught Feqh and 0§ul.
29 Ibid., p. 74.
30 Ibid., pp. 61-2.
31 Hekmat is usually translated as philosophy/mysticism.
32 Ha’eri Yazdl, Unpublished Memoirs, pp. 53-55.
33 The other two people were Seyyed Mofiammad Hojjat and Mofiammad HoseTn Yazdl. Ha’eri Yazdl, 
Unpublished Memoirs, p. 128, additional information by Morteza Ha’eri, the eldest son of Selfc ‘Abdol- 
Karlm Ha’erT.
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3) Seyyed Mofiammad Hojjat (d. 1372/1952). He had come to Qom in 1349/1930 from 
Najaf and taught Intermediary sciences, §aflJ, advanced rational Feqh and 0§iil 
EstedlalT.
4) Se% Mofiammad ‘AH Ha’eri-QomI (d. 1358/1939). He had come to Qom in 
1349/1930 from Najaf and taught Feqh and 0§ul.
5) MIrza Mofiammad Kablr (d. -). He had come to Qom in 1338/1919. He was severely 
hostile to philosophy and Hekmat, and taught Feqh and 0§ul.
6) Se% Abu’l Qasem Molla Karim (d. 1352/1933). He taught Feqh and 0§ul both before 
and after Se% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri.
7) MIrza Javad MalekI (d. 1343/1924). He had come to Qom in 1329/1911 from Najaf 
and taught Feqh and 0§ul.
8) Haj MIrza §adeq Tabriz! (d. 1351/1932). He had come to Iran in 1312/1894 from 
Najaf and taught privately.
9) Haj Se% Mehdl HakamI QomI (d. 1360/1941). He was close friend and contemporary 
of Se% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri. He came to Qom in 1322/1904 from Najaf and taught 
privately.
10) MIrza ‘All Akbar Yazdl (d. 1344/1925), who taught Philosophy, and Mysticism.
11) Mofiammad ‘All SahabadI (d.1369/1949). He had come to Qom in 1347/1928 and 
taught Hekmat and philosophy.
12) Seyyed Falp* Al-Dm QomI (d. 1363/1944), the grandson of MIrza Abu’l Qasem QomI, 
the author of Qavanm, one of the most important and frequently referred books in 
Feqh and 0§ul. He taught Feqh and 0§ul privately. He had performed the ceremonial 
prayers for §e% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri34 funeral
Political Figures Who Visited SeU^  ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri in Qom
1) Afimad Sah Qajar officially visited Qom three times, I) In 1921 to congratulate Se% 
‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri on the establishment of the Howzeh. II) In 1922 to visit the exiled 
‘Olama of Najjaf Na’M  and E§fehanl. Ill) In 1923 to say goodbye before leaving to 
Europe.
2) Reza Sah PahlavT visited Sel^ : ‘Abdol-Karlm Ha’eri in Qom as Sah, as Prime Minister 
and during his post as Minister of War. In 1921 he visited Qom concerning the debate 
over republicanism, and to visit the exiled ‘Olama of Najjaf. In 1923, during his 
premiership, he came to say farewell to the ‘Olama before their departure to Iraq. In this 
meeting he reached a compromise with the ‘Olama in not declaring a republic in Iran. In 
1924 in his declaration addressed to all Iranians he confirmed this:
34 fta’eri Yazdi, Unpublished Memoirs and Razi (1334 SH/1954), Vol. 1, pp. 58-69 & pp. 24-26.
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‘Compatriots! Experience has demonstrated that a government must not 
oppose public opinion. It is for this reason that the present government has 
never shown any desire to oppose such opinion. From the first day my 
personal aim has been to protect the grandeur of Islam, the independence 
of Iran and the best interests of the nation. Whoever opposes such aims 
shall be considered an enemy of the country and will be punished severely.
The present ideology that is republicanism has created confusion in the 
country. I myself and all the armed forces of Iran are ready to protect and 
preserve the glory of Islam. This I consider to be my most important duty.
I have always wanted to see the progress and promulgation of Islam and 
have the highest respect for the honour and prestige of the ‘Olama. At the 
same time when I had the honour to pay my homage to the Innocent 
Fafeme at Qom, I also had the privilege of exchanging ideas with the 
Proofs of Islam, Hojjajol-Islam, [Na’InI and E§fehanl] and we came to the 
conclusion that it would be better for the welfare of the country if all 
efforts to promote a republican form of government were halted. From 
now on our efforts shall be directed towards reform, strengthening the 
fundamentals of religion and maintaining the independence of the country.
I, therefore, recommend to all patriots to decline from their demands for a 
republic and to cooperate with me in order for us to reach our higher 
goals.
Signed: Prime Minster and Commander in chief 
Reza.35
After his coronation, Reza Sah visited Se% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri, both officially and 
unofficially, on numerous occasions. For example, in 1927 Reza Sah visited Qom 
concerning the disturbances caused by §e% Mofiammad BafqI.36
3) In 1927 Telmurtas, the Minister of Court, visited Qom in order to hold negotiations 
with Haj Aqa Nurollah E§feham over the anti-conscription riots,37 as was discussed 
previously in the Chapter Five, and will be briefly considered again.
4) Mofisen §adrol-Asrafj the Minister o f Justice, went to Qom for a personal visit with 
§e% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri. He wrote the following concerning the meeting:
‘I went to visit Haj Aqa Se% ‘Abdol-Karim in Qom He was a great man 
of substance. He accepted me in the inner chamber of the private quarters 
of his house. I remember that he was so disturbed about the political 
situation that tears flooded down his face like the falling rain. Then he said,
“The British have grabbed hold of the Muslims and Islam by the throat, 
and they will not let go until they have strangled us!” ,38
35 MakkI (1369 SH/1991), pp. 354, 52-1.
36 To be discussed in detail later.
37 MakkI (1369 SH/1991), pp. 402-510.
38 §adr [§adrol Asraf] (1364 SH/1983), p. 293.
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5) Mehdl Farrolj: the Minister of Education, visited Se% ‘Abdol-Karim concerning the use 
of religious endowments for educational purposes. In 1930, Seyyed Mehdl Farro^;, 
Mo’tasamol Saltaneh, on Reza Sah’s command, visited Se%: ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri, to 
discuss what must be done with revenue obtained from religious endowments which did 
not have specified purposes of expenditure. Farro^ wrote:
‘His Majesty declared to me that a law must be passed concerning 
religious endowments, Awqaf, so that the revenue obtained could be used 
for establishing modem schools and teacher-training colleges. His Majesty 
then asked my opinion on the subject. I replied, “At present there is no 
need for such a law as many of the religious endowments do not have a 
specified purpose of expenditure, Majhul ul-Masrafy thus we can use this 
revenue for the purpose of establishing modem schools. However, the 
revenue obtained from the endowments which have specified purposes of 
expenditure must be used in the way specified by the donor”. His Majesty 
paused for a moment and then replied, “Farro^;! Nurouz39 is near. You 
must go to Qom for a pilgrimage and at the same time pay your respects to 
his Excellency Haj Aqa Ha’eri [§e3$: ‘Abdol-Karim] and see whether you 
can come up with a solution and inform me of the result as soon as 
possible.” I went to see his Excellency §e% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri, Marja‘
Taqlid, and asked his opinion on the endowment issue. He agreed that the 
revenue from endowments which do not have stated purpose of 
expenditure could be used for establishing modem schools. However, 
those which have a purpose specified by the donor must be used in the way 
specified, as within the Sari‘ah the wishes of the deceased must be 
honoured and carried out to the full. I returned to Tehran and reported 
back to his Majesty and his Majesty accepted and agreed.’ 40
6) Seyyed Na§rollah TaqavT and Seyyed Mofiammad Fajeml who were both members of 
the Supreme Judiciary, went to Qom on a personal visit. SeH$; ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri sent a 
message to the Sah via Seyyed Na§rollah TaqavT and Seyyed Mofiammad FaJemI 
concerning the change in the law of Age of Consent. Reza Sah had raised the legal Age of 
Consent from 9 to 18 for girls from 16 to 18 for boys. Se% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri 
describes this incidence in the following way:
‘Haj Seyyed Na§rollah TaqavT and Seyyed Mofiammad Fajeml, both 
honoured and high-ranking members of the Ministry of Justice, came to 
visit me. I sent a message with them for His Majesty [Reza Sah] 
concerning the Age of Consent. I put it to his Majesty that in Islam it is 
permissible to marry before the age of 18 on the condition that it is 
accompanied by a medical verdict certifying that the person in question has
39 Iranian New Year.
40 Farrofc: [Mo‘ta§amol-Saltaneh] (1347 SH/1968), pp. 255-6.
273
reached full adult development. It was my intention that this should be put 
in as an extra clause to the legal Age of Consent...’41
Se% ‘Abdol-Karim’s suggestion was accepted by Reza Sah and his government.
The Exile of the ‘Olama of Iraq
After the First World War [1914-1918], the most renowned and, some argue, 
influential pro-Constitutionalist among the ‘Olama §e% Mofiammad Hoselh Na’Ihl, a first- 
rank Mojtahed residing in Iraq, protested against Iraq being placed under British 
protection. On 17 August 1923 Na’Ihl, accompanied by a number of other high-ranking 
clerics including Seyyed Abul Hasan E§feham and a few others, was forced to leave Najjaf 
[Iraq] and go to Iran. The party of exiled ‘Olama stayed the total of eight months in Qom. 
On 22 April 1924, having accepted the condition not to interfere in the political affairs of 
Iraq, Na’M  and the other ‘Olama returned to Iraq. During his stay in Iran, Na’Ihl had a 
meeting and close encounters with Reza Kan and forged a strong and lasting friendship 
with him. This led to Na’Tnfs declaration of Takfir42 against all those who opposed Reza 
I£an. Na’Ihl was also one of the strongest advocates of Reza Kahn's claim to the throne. 
This friendship was to last until Na’m fs death in 1936.43
A A
In 1923 MTrza Hoselh Na’M  and Seyyed Abu’l Hasan E§feham, both first-rank 
Shi’i clerics, and Seyyed ‘All SahrestanI, ‘Abdol Hoselh Hojyat, Mohammad Hoselh 
GaravT E§fehanl, Se% Mehdi KalesT, were exiled from Iraq. When the news of their exile 
reached Afimad Sah he sent his courtiers to the border cities of Kosrow and Qa§r-e Sinn 
to welcome them into Iran. They were escorted to Qom. A day after their arrival, Afimad 
Sah and some of his ministers went to visit the exiled ‘Olama. During the eight months of
V A
their stay in Qom, Se% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri had stopped teaching his classes in their 
honour and had asked them to take over. These ‘Olama began to teach at the Howzeh 
during the eight months of their stay. However, Sel^ ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri abstained from 
any involvement in their political affairs. The ‘Olama finally returned to Iraq on the 
condition that they would not interfere in political matters once back in Iraq. Malek Fassal 
sent a special envoy to Iran requesting the return of the ‘Olama to Iraq.
41 Ha’eri Yazdl, Unpublished Memoirs, p. 31.
42 Charge of disbelief
43 Mo‘menT (1372 SH/1993), p. 257.
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‘On their arrival in Baqdad they were met by government officials, and the 
situation was resolved. Sardar Sepah sent one of his foremost officers,
Sardar Raf ’at, to accompany the ‘Olama back to Iraq. It may have 
appeared as though he had sent his envoy out of respect for the ‘Olama, 
however, in reality it was due to his love of religion. Upon his return 
Sardar Raf ’at brought back a sword in honour of Hazrat ‘Abbas44 from 
the government of Iraq and the keeper of the shrine of Karbala.45 A 
general invitation was sent out by Sardar Sepah and in front of thousands 
of people he ceremoniously placed the sword around his waist...’46
The ‘Olama’s Attempts Against the Republican Movement
In 1923 Afimad Sah appointed Reza Kan Prime Minister. The composition of 
Reza {pin’s cabinet was rather mediocre: four of the ministers were selected purely in 
settlement of political debts. All four47 were members of the socialist faction in parliament 
who had provided crucial support for Reza Ifan in building up the armed forces and 
attempts to establish internal security. The single most crucial event during the first six 
months of Reza ICan’s Premiership was the attempt to abolish the Qajar dynasty and 
establish a republic with himself as the president. In 1924 a newspaper in Constantinople 
printed an article favouring the establishment of a republic in Iran. In Iran a Tehran 
journalist attempt to ascertain Reza Kan’s view of the article but he was non-committal.48 
Reza ICan was quoted as saying: ‘The progress of a country depends less on their form of 
government than on the moral of the people. Take Greece and Great Britain both are 
monarchies, one is decadent and decayed and the other great vibrant and prosperous.’49 
Reza Iran’s principal advisors, however, encouraged the idea of a republic.
44 The brother of Hoseln Ibn ‘AIT, the third Imam and commander of Imam Hoseln’s army in Karbala. 
The government of Iraq and the custodian of the shrine of Karbala where ‘Abbas is buried sent the sword 
in honour o f ‘Abbas. ‘Abbas’s spiritual powers of healing and performing miracles are widely believed in 
the Shi’i world. The sword symbolized that Sardar Sepah had the support and blessings o f ‘Abbas.
45 Karbala is where the battle between the Ummayyad Caliph Yazid and Hoseln Ibn ‘AIT the third Shi’i 
Imam took place. It is the place o f ‘Abbas’s martyrdom and burial.
46 DulatabadI (1371 SH/1992), pp. 289-94. Concerning the exiled ‘Olama of Iraq, Bahar [Malekol 
So’ara] (1357 SH/1978), pp. 352-60, provides more or less the same report as DulatabadI. Hoseln MakkT, 
however, has the following additional information; ‘In 1340 SH/1921, Na§erol Tolu‘1, the deputy 
custodian of the shrine o f ‘Abbas, sent a sword for Sardar Sepah. There was also a gift of clothes specially 
sent on behalf of the shrine of ‘Abbas. When the sword and the clothes reached Tehran, Sardar Sepah, in 
a special military ceremony, put on the clothes and the sword. The following day a group of the ‘Olama, 
‘ayan, tojjar, and mardome ‘am, gathered in Sardar Sepah’s house to offer him their congratulations.’ 
MakkI (1369 SH/1991), p. 97.
47 They were Solieman MTrza Eskandarl, Abbol Hasan Pifnia, ‘Amamol Molk Ardalan and Qasem Sure 
Esrafil.
48 FO371/10145, Ovey to MacDonald, 1 April 1924.
49 FO 371/10144, col. e. t. R. Wickham to Victor Mallet, 25 February 1924.
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During the early stages of his Premiership, Reza I£an had preferred to stay out of 
the debate publicly and to make it appear that the idea of a republic was mass-inspired and 
that he was forced to accept public opinion. After the establishment of a republic in 
Turkey and the abolition of the caliphate, the complete separation of religion and state 
was viewed as a threat to clerical power by the Shi’i hierocracy who, until now, had 
remained quietly disapproving of a republic. However, after the events in Turkey, 
republicanism became equated with secularism and their disapproval turned to overt 
hostility.50 Reza Kan knew that he had lost the fight for a republic and consequently, on 1 
April 1924, he issued the following declaration:
‘The government of any country must not oppose public opinion, which is 
divided... In Qom I exchanged opinions [with the ‘Olama] and reached the 
conclusion that the idea of a republic should be dropped...’51
It must be pointed out that the other contributing factor to Reza Sah’s decision was 
the fear that the establishment of a republic would bring an even greater risk of disorder 
among the tribes, ‘who at least accorded the monarchy some prestige [and who] would 
refuse to acknowledge the sovereignty of a president.’52 It was feared that the tribes 
would take advantage of the situation and begin separatist movements which would 
threaten the unity of Iran. As has been pointed out, Reza Ipm was initially an advocate of 
a republic while the ‘Olama were, on the whole, staunch monarchists. This was 
particularly so after the abolition of the Caliphate in Turkey as a republic became 
synonymous with secularism. The following three events during the end of the reign of 
Afimad Sah involved the ‘Olama and Reza I£an and had a lasting effect, and to some 
extent came to shape the future relations between the ‘Olama and Reza Sah’s regime:
In 1923, during the Fifth Majles, the parliamentary ‘Olama, known as the Hey’at 
‘Elmtyeh, were headed by Seyyed Hasan Moddares53 E§fehanl. ‘In this group both liberal
50 FO 371/ 10145, Ovey to MacDonald, 1 April 1924.
51 FO 416/74, Ovey to McDonald, 7 April 1924.
52 FO 616/68, Norman to Curzon, 1 March 1921.
53 During the early stages of the 1921 coup d’etat, Seyyed Hasan Moddares, the leader of the 
parliamentary ‘Olama, had contemplated staging a coup himself. Salare Jang, one the sons of Lady Ozma 
in Varamm, had gathered some ammunition and a few armed men around himself They were suppose to 
have been joined by tribes’ people from E§fehan. Their aim was to capture Tehran through a coup de tat 
and seize control. Bahar writes, ‘Moddares, told me [Bahar] later on, that during that time, Reza Kan 
came to see me [Moddares] and said “I had a meeting with Vo§uq Al-Dowleh, but he did not take much 
notice of me. I am prepared to work with you and finish this mess, as I am scared, that that if  we do not 
act quickly, Iran might fell to the Bolsheviks.’” Moddares’s attempts had remained on the whole
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and reactionary thinkers could be found. This group was “supposedly” anti Sardar Sepah. 
However, the real enemies of Sardar Sepah were the independent members of Parliament 
who did not belong to any group or association.’54 Moddares knew that if the issue of 
establishing a republic were put to a vote, the pro-republic majority would prevail. The 
only alternative was to delay the parliamentary procedure as long as possible and try to 
shift public opinion outside parliament. Hence Moddares began his delaying tactics, such 
as charges of fraud and voting irregularities in election of newly-elected deputies. In 
retaliation, Tadaayon questioned the validity of the election of deputies who were close to 
Moddares. The certificate verifying Moddares’s election had also come under suspicion.
Moddares had failed to persuade Sardar Sepah to convince his supporters to vote 
positively in favour of the validity o f his certificate of verification. Tadaayon had ordered 
a walk-out by his supporters. Moddares then argued that the newly-convened Majles had 
no mandate from the electorate to amend the Constitution and establish a republic. The 
debate became even more heated. Consequently, on 17 March, Hosem BahramI, Efiyaol- 
Salfane, one of Sardar Sepah’s supporters, slapped Moddares, ‘the force of which 
knocked Moddares’s turban off his head.’55 This incident caused further splits within the 
pro-republican ranks. This meant that Reza ICan’s desire to have the issue resolved before 
the New Year [21 March] was now quite impossible.56 The news of the assault of 
Modarres soon spread across the capital and a large mob assembled outside the Majles 
expressing anti-republican sentiment. Reza Kan had miscalculated the innate conservatism 
of the people and the power of the ‘Olama over public opinion.
Modarres and the other anti-republican ‘Olama adopted the policy of shifting 
public opinion outside parliament in order to prevent parliamentary procedure. In 1923 
the Republican Committee was set up to promote the aims of republicanism. The 
committee had planned a programme for the closure of the bazaars of Tehran followed by 
a demonstration in support of a republic. The anti-republicans had attempted to prevent 
the closure of the bazaars and a verbal confrontation had broken out between the two 
factions. Major Mofiammad Kan Dargahl had ordered the doors of all the mosques which 
open onto the bazaar to be closed. Se% Mofiammad Kalesizadeh and Se% Hosem
unfruitful, and Reza lean’s role in the 1921 coup d’etat has been extensively covered elsewhere, and does 
not concern us here. Bahar [Malekol So’ara] (1357 SH/1978), p. 61.
54 DulatabadI (1371 SH/1992), pp. 311-2.
55 Ibid., pp. 311-5.
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Lankaranl and their supporters had set off for Masjed Sah as they had done on previous 
occasion but found the doors closed. They did not attempt to enter, fearing arrest. In 
order to attract attention and gather a crowd the two clerics proceeded to place their 
cloaks on the floor in the middle of the bazaar and ordered one of their supporters to 
recite the call to prayer. Within a few minutes a large group of people had gathered to 
perform the congregational prayers. The crowd is estimated to have been over 8,000.
Afimad Sah and the Crown Prince had supposedly paid large sums of money to the 
‘Olama to distribute among the people to ensure a large enough crowd at the anti­
republican demonstrations.57 After the completion of the prayer Se% I^aleslzadeh 
mounted a stool and delivered a highly emotive speech against the idea of a republic, the 
Majles and Seyyed Mofiammad Tadaayon. Sel^ Kaleslzadeh asked the people to 
demonstrate their hatred of republicanism by marching to the Majles. All the various 
elements that had gathered signed a petition and each group elected a representative to 
take their grievances to the Majles. Se% Kaleslzadeh, Se% ‘Abdol Hoselh Karrazi, and 
§e% Hoselh Lankaranl led the demonstrators to the Majles.
The ‘Olama were the leaders of the demonstration. Each member of the ‘Olama 
entered the Majles compound mounted on a mule surrounded by their followers.58 After 
the demonstrator’s arrival, Kaleslzadeh entered while the Majles was in the middle o f a 
formal session. Some of the deputies, including Tadaayon, left their seats in protest at this 
interruption and a physical fight broke out between some of the deputies and l^alesizadeh. 
It was decided that the demonstrators should nominate a number of representatives and 
send them back in four days time to discuss their demands with the deputies. The 
demonstrators thus managed to prevent the Majles from pursuing normal procedure in 
formally voting on the question of a republic as had been intended. The idea of a republic 
was thus nipped in the bud.59
Four days later on the day that the Majles was scheduled to vote demonstrators 
gathered around the Majles once again. The deputies in favour of a republic sent for Reza 
Kan. He arrived, accompanied by Brigadier General Morteza Kan Yazdanpanah, 
Brigadier General l^odayar Kan, Major Mofiammad Dargahl, and a number of soldiers
56 Ibid., pp. 311-3 and Davanl(1360 SH/1981), pp. 2, 138-9 & 143-4.
57 DulatabadI (1371 SH/1992), pp. 358-9.
58 Ibid.
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who he had placed around the Majles compound. The crowds were chanting ‘Death to 
Republicanism’. Se% Mehdl Soljan was preaching on the steps to the entrance to the 
Majles. Reza Kan, on arrival, knocked the Se% down with his staff and ordered his 
removal. Someone then threw a stone from the crowd, which hit Reza Kan on the head. 
He then ordered the dispersion of the people. Fighting broke out between the soldiers and
A —
demonstrators. ‘Many were injured, but there were no fetal casualties, apart from Haj Aqa 
Jamal E§feharifs mule!’60 For this reason, the liberals refer to this incident as the ‘the 
movement of the mule.’61
This incident and the actions of Reza Kan angered the deputy leader of the Majles, 
Mo’tamenol-Molk. He asked Reza Kan to explain what right he had to open fire on the 
people and added angrily, ‘Ensuring the security of the Majles is my responsibility, not 
yours!’ Sardar Sepah replied, ‘I am the head of the government and ensuring the security 
of Iran is my responsibility!’ The deputy leader responded, ‘I will show you now who is in 
charge!’ He then returned to the Majles and ordered the session to commence and voting 
to proceed.62 The other deputies asked Moslrod Dowleh to,try and calm the situation 
down. In an attempt to defuse the situation, MoSTrod Dowleh then asked Reza Kan and 
Mo’tamenol-Molk to accompany him to the private chambers of the deputy leader. The 
deputy leader demanded that Reza I£an should apologize to the ‘Olama and the other 
representatives. Reza Kan accepted this condition and apologized to the deputies and the 
‘Olama adding, ‘Now that you do not agree [to a republic], I shall decline from the idea 
on the condition that the deputies should work out another solution as I cannot work with 
Afimad Sah any longer....’63 The meeting had lasted for about four hours, and it was 
agreed that Reza Kan should refrain from his idea of establishing a republic and altering 
the Fundamental Law. In return, the deputies of the Majles should not support Afimad 
Sah.64 This was Reza Sah’s first defeat in the political arena by the ‘Olama. He had learnt 
the bitter lesson that if the ‘Olama united against an issue which they felt was harmful to 
their interests, they could carry the masses with them. Their power was overwhelming.
59 MakkI (1369 SH/1991), pp. 484-89.
60 Ibid., pp. 513-4.
61 DulatabadI (1371 SH/1992), p. 360.
62 MakkI (1369 SH/1991), pp. 513-4.
63 Ibid., p. 514.
64 DulatabadI (1371 SH/1992), pp. 360-1.
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This experience was to have profound effect on Reza Sah’s later decisions to curb the 
power of the clergy.
Seyyed Mofiammad, Imam Jom ‘eh o f Tehran, known as Seyyed Mofiammad 
Imamzadeh, played a vital role in the following incident. Firstly, a short preliminary 
biographical explanation concerning Seyyed Mofiammad will be provided. Seyyed 
Mofiammad Imam Jom‘eh, the son of Seyyed Zemol ‘Abedln Imam Jom‘eh, finished his 
theological training in Najjaf [Iraq]. He was a student of Molla Mohammad Kazem 
KorasanT. Like his teacher, Seyyed Mofiammad was a pro-consitiutionalist. Towards the 
end of 1908, he came to Tehran. In 1908, after the bombardment of the Majles he joined 
the ranks of the pro-Consititutionalists and began to participate actively in politics. He
A V
joined the merchants’ protests against Mohammad ‘AH Sah in support of the 
Constitutionalists and accompanied the merchants who had sought refugee, Bast, in the 
Ottoman embassy in Tehran. In 1909, after the capture of Tehran by the pro- 
Consititutionalists, he was appointed the Imam Jom ‘eh of Tehran, replacing his brother 
Mlrza Abu’l Qasem Imam Jom’e who was a supporter of Mofiammad ‘All Sah. Until 
1947 he maintained his position as the Imam Jom ‘eh of Tehran.65
The incident which involved the Imam Jom ‘eh of Tehran seems to have been 
triggered by the high cost and poor quality of bread. Protesters had assembled in front of 
the central mosque in Tehran, requesting that the Imam Jom ‘eh should lead their protest 
to the Majles. However, Mofiammad Imam Jom‘eh had been directly but covertly 
involved in this plot from its outset. He led the march, accompanied by ‘other Prayer 
leaders, Pis Namaz, and Rawfiam Nemayan, from the Masjed Sah to the Majles. They 
[the ‘Olama] will provide the right conditions for their plot at any cost.’66 The police were 
unable to prevent the advance of the demonstrators as they had been ordered to hold their 
fire. The news reached the Majles, which was just about to begin a session. The session 
soon became a private one and a vote was taken to summon the members of the cabinet. 
Within minutes, Reza Kan and the rest of the ministers appeared in the Majles. Reza Kan
65 He became a member of the revolutionary court, set up after the victory of the pro-Constitutionalists, 
which consisted of ten members: Selk Ibrahim ZanjanT, Mofiammad the Editor of Nejat news paper, 
Ja‘far QolT l£an Ba^ tTyarT, Na§rollah l£an l£alatbarT, Ja‘far QolT l£an EstanbollT, Abdol-Hosem I£an 
§aybanl, Abdol-Hamld £an YamTn Nezam, Mofiammad ‘AIT £an Mojahead, and Afimad ‘AIT Jpin 
Mojahead. The Revolutionary court sentenced a number of people, including Seik Fa±llollah NurT, to 
death. Seifc Fazllollah was hanged in Tehran in 1327 SH/1909. Bamdad (1348 SH/1969), pp. 104-218.
66 Ibid., p. 330.
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ordered a number of his soldiers to aid the police in preventing the advance of the 
demonstrators- Before the arrival of the demonstrators the soldiers had completely 
surrounded the building, forming a security belt. On arrival Reza Kan had refused to allow 
normal procedure to take place, stressing the danger, the number of the demonstrators, 
and the fact that some of them were carrying hidden arms. He had informed the deputies 
that the crowd was intent on taking over the Majles, closing the bazaars, and finally 
toppling the government. Reza Kan had declared that there was no time for further 
discussion and that the mob would reach the Majles within the next few minutes and a 
speedy decision must be taken.
‘I [Reza fpin] have provided a number of men in order to stop them and 
prevent them from entering the Majles. I just want to ask for a vote if the 
mob should attack and get into a confrontation with the soldiers. Should 
the soldiers use force or not?’67 A vote was taken and it was agreed that 
the demonstrators should be given a choice to go to the adjacent mosque,
Masjed Sepah, and then send their representative to the Majles. If the 
demonstrators failed to accept this condition and tried to enter the Majles 
by force, the soldiers were permitted to open fire on them. Reza ICan then 
summoned the commander of the central division and ordered him to 
disperse the crowd adding, ‘If they do not comply, then open fire on 
them.’68
The crowd did not accept the condition and tried to enter the Majles by force. 
After a few minutes, the soldiers began to open fire. As soon as there were shots fired 
‘Reza Kan left the Majles speedily and gave a secret order to one of his officers and 
returned. Later, it became clear that the command was to shoot in the air and not at the 
people and if forced to shoot, then to aim at the feet.’69 The mob resisted the shooting for 
a while and some of the demonstrators fired back. After a few foiled attempts to enter the 
Majles and a number of wounded people, the crowd dispersed. Finally, ‘the Rowftani 
Nemayan realized that the firing of the soldiers was with the consent of the Majles, and 
realized that their attempt at toppling Sardar Sepah had foiled.’70
67 Ibid., p. 330.
68 Ibid., pp. 331-2.
69 Ibid., pp. 331-2.
70 Ibid., pp. 332-5.
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The S3h and the Molla
§e% Mohammad TaqI Bafql was one of the ‘Olama of Qom who had assisted Se% 
‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri in the establishment of the Howzeh ‘Elimyeh. On the New Year’s 
Day of 1927, the Queen and her two daughters, Sams and Asraf PahlavT, had taken 
residence in one of the rooms in the upper landing of the ‘Hall of Mirrors’ of the Shrine of 
the Innocent Fafeme in Qom.71 It was customary for people from all over Iran to spend 
New Year’s Day at the Shrine in Qom. The ladies were awaiting the countdown to New 
Year. Sel^ : Mofiammad Bafql had thought it inappropriate and infelicitous for the Queen 
and her daughters to be in the ‘Hall of Mirrors.’ His discontent led him to incite the 
people to take action over this incident. News of this affair reached Reza Sah. The Sah set 
off from Tehran in order to resolve the situation. Bafql was severely humiliated, arrested, 
and later exiled.
There are many different versions of this incident. We will consider three versions. 
1) The version of Mofiammad RazI, a member of the ‘Olama. 2) A newspaper article. 3) 
An eye-witness account by the TowUyat of Qom. It is interesting to see the extent to 
which these accounts vary. Concerning this incident Mofiammad RazI writes the 
following:
‘For the New Year, the ladies o f the Royal Court, with uncovered faces 
and hair, had come to the balcony of the ‘Hall of Mirrors’. This incident 
had occurred before the declaration of official unveiling. The religious 
inhabitants of Qom were outraged by this and had informed Haj Aqa 
[Mofiammad] Bafql. Haj Aqa Bafql was greatly disturbed by the news and 
sent an immediate message to the ladies of the Court stating: ‘If you are 
Muslims why have you come like this [unveiled]? If you are not Muslims 
then what are you doing here?’ The loud cries of evil doers, corrupt 
elements, infidels, and satanic people who for a long time were upset with 
Bafqf s ‘negation of evil and the encouragement of the good’ found an 
opportune moment and told the ladies of the Court that ‘this Akund is 
manipulating the people against you’. The ladies informed the Sah. The 
following day the Sah came to Qom and ordered Telmurtas to bring Bafql 
to him. Telmurtas indecently dragged Haj Aqa Bafql to the Sah. Reza Sah 
knocked him down with his boot and severely injured him. The Sah then 
ordered Bafql to be arrested and sent to Tehran together with Seyyed 
Abdol-Rasoul Tehran! and a couple of other ‘Olama. From there they were 
exiled to Share Ray. In 1945 Se% Mofiammad TaqI Bafql passed away.
His body was taken back to Qom and buried there ,’72
71 Which are not open to the public.
72 RazI (1334 SH/1954), pp. 35-6.
The newspaper Qiyam Sarq, published in Iran after September 194173 reports the 
following based on an eye-witness account:
‘A few hours after dark the sound of an armoured car was heard pulling up 
by the Haram [shrine]. The Sah seemed furious. He got out of the car 
holding his staff. He marched toward the shrine, followed by a few officers 
and some soldiers. Upon entering the ‘Hall of Mirrors’ the accompanying 
officers and soldiers began to arrest all the people wearing turbans. The 
attendant of the Shrine, KXlid-dar, who had come to the ‘Hall of Mirrors’ 
to welcome the Sah found himself surrounded by the military. He cried out 
“I am the attendant of the shrine! Please have mercy upon me!” The Sah, 
who was fully aware of all that had happened, gave orders to his men to 
leave the attendant well alone and said: “Bring that Seyyed and that A^und 
to me!” Field Marshal [Afimad] AmlrafimadI and some other officers began 
to search. They found the Se% [Bafql] in Masjed Bald Sar and dragged 
him to the Sah who was in the courtyard of the shrine. The Sah was now 
completely outraged, he cried out “Se%!” and used all the ‘personal’ swear 
words associated with him.74 §e% Mofiammad TaqI [Bafql] was thrown 
down on his face and the Sah publicly flogged him with his staff. The Selk 
screamed out “Oh Imam of the Time [12th Imam] save me!”... After his 
anger had subsided Reza Sah let the §e% go. He then ordered his men to 
“Bring that so and so Seyyed to me!” The officers who had given up their 
search for the Seyyed uttered in sheer terror that, “The Seyyed has 
disappeared!” The Sah yelled out “Where is the head of the security forces 
of Qom?” The head of security who was present, saluted the Sah and 
replied, “Your Majesty, plain-clothed police were watching the Seyyed but 
from the time of Your Majesty’s arrival attentions have become scattered 
and the Seyyed has managed to get away. I am afraid he has disappeared.”
The Sah struck the head of the security forces so fiercely that all his teeth 
fell out and blood gushed forth from his mouth. He ordered the Se% 
[Bafql], the head of the police force and a few others to be arrested and 
sent to Tehran. It could not have been conceived that the Sah would 
behave so disrespectfully towards a member of the ‘Olama in the holy city 
of Qom, in particular, the beating of Se% Mofiammad TaqI [Bafql].75 The 
actions of Reza Sah left a negative and lasting impact on the people. This 
action of the Sah had such an impact upon the common people that it 
could have easily escalated into a rebellion. However, the late Se% ‘Abdol- 
Karim Ha’eri; who was a wise Marfa ‘ [TaqlTd\ prevented further agitation 
and bloodshed. He saved the honour of the ‘Olama of Qom by issuing a 
religious ordinance, Hokm. 76 This Hokm was like water poured over fire
73 Sahrlvar 1320 SH.
74 Reza Sah was well known for his use of obscene language when angered.
75 Mofiammad TaqI Bafql was the treasurer of Se% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’erT. He was in charge of 
distributing the monthly salary of the theological students and the ‘Olama. Bafql also performed the 
congregational prayers in the absence of Selk ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri. However, according to RazI and the 
Memoirs of Setk ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri, Seyyed §adrod-Dln §adr, and at times Seyyed Mofiammad Hojjat 
Kookehkamarei, performed the congregational prayers in the absence of Selk ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’erT.
76 Selk ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri is reported to have said: ‘Do not even mention Selk Mofiammad TaqI 
Bafqfs, name in front of me! RazI (1334 SH/1954), p. 46.
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and prevented further uprising protest and rebellion. Se% Mofiammad 
Bafql was imprisoned in Tehran and after a meeting between the Sah and 
Se%: ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri Bafql was released from prison and transferred 
to Shahr-eh Rey and placed under house arrest.’77
According to Abu’l Fazl TowUyat [Mesbafiol-Towhyeh] the custodian of the 
Shrine of the Inoccent Fafeme and an eye- witness,78 the reason behind the occurrence is 
as follows:
‘The Royal Ladies and their ladies-in-waiting had come to the Purified 
Shrine of Her Holiness, Hazrat,79 the Innocent Fafeme in Qom for the 
New Year of 1306 SH/1927. For their stay, the room in the upper balcony 
of the ‘Hall of Mirrors’ had been allocated and prepared so that the Royal 
party may pass the first few hours of the New Year in the blessed and holy 
surroundings of the shrine. A few moments before the start of the New 
Year, the Royal ladies had replaced their black Cadors with white ones [in 
the room]. The room had windows, which opened out, into the greater 
courtyard of the shrine, §adneh AtabakJ, and another set of windows 
which faced the Shrine itself. The ladies must have been seen by some of 
the people in the courtyard as they changed their Cadors. News of this 
reached §e% Mofiammad TaqI BafqL This was the root of the
o n
disturbances. The actual number of protesters was not very many.’
Se% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri, concerning the reason why he had abstained from 
direct involvement in the Bafql affair, provides the following explanation:
‘Foreigners, AjnabJ-ha, want nothing more than dissension and discord 
between the government and the ‘Olama. Iran’s internal instability is 
advantageous to them. We must not fall into such traps. Members of the 
‘Olama must not concern themselves with affairs that are beneath their 
honour and prestige. Our role is to be the Servants of our Infallible 
Masters [the Imams] and we must emulate their example at all times.’81
Uniform Dress Code and the Opposition From the ‘Olama
In 1928, during the 14th session, a Bill was presented to the Majles concerning 
the introduction of a Uniform Dress Code throughout Iran and requesting a speedy
77 Qlyam Sarq, MakkI (1369 SH/1991), pp. 272-88, gives more or less the same account as above. 
Solyeman Behboudi, the head of the private offices of the Sah, writes the following in his Memories: ‘The 
ladies of the court were standing amongst the people in the shrine. The Cador of Princess Sams, who was 
not of age [still a child and therefore not required to wear Hejab] slipped off her head and fell on the floor, 
and the preacher made an incident out of this.’ According to Behboudi, this was an excuse for the ‘Olama 
to cause a disturbance and a scene amongst the people. Murza §aleh (1372 SH/1993), pp. 332-3.
78 As cited in Selk ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri, Unpublished Memoirs, p. 45.
79 A respectful from of address.
80 The rest of the incident is not too different from the other versions.
81 Ha’erT Yazdl, Unpublished Memoirs, pp. 60-1.
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approval. The Bill was discussed immediately and after two sessions it was passed as the 
following:
Article One:
All Iranian nationals who do not have a particular uniform [such as the 
military and the police force] are required by law to wear uniform 
[Westem-style] clothing [consisting of] a Pahalvi hat, a coat and waist­
coat made out of Iranian cloth.
Article Two:
The following groups are exempt [from the above law]:
Those ‘Olama who have a certificate, Ejazeh, from an established Marja ‘
TaqlTd [officially recognized by the government] and those who are 
involved in matters of religion.
Those who are responsible for the conduct of religious affairs in villages, 
small towns and the provinces, conditional on the fulfilment of all 
government requirements.
Sunni ‘Olama, Moftis, who have permission, Ejazeh, from two 
[recognized] Moftis to issue Fatvas.
Prayer leaders, Pis Namaz, who have a specific mosque, recognized by the 
people and at least one Marja ‘ Taqlld.
Theological students, follab, who have permission from two recognized 
Mojtaheds to give religious sermons and talks, Mo ‘ezeh.
Theological students, J'ollab, of Feqh and 0§ul, who have fulfilled 
government requirements and have an approved certificate.
Theological teachers of Feqh, 0§iil, and Hekmate Elahi
[mysticism/philosophy].
Clerics of other faiths.
Article Three:
Those who do not obey this law, [if they are town dwellers], will be fined 
between 1 and 5 Toman, or 1 to7 days’ imprisonment. [If they are 
villagers], they will face 1 to 7 days’ imprisonment, pending on the 
decision of the local court. The local councils, Sahrddrl, will use the 
revenue obtained from these fines to purchase clothing for the less 
fortunate and those who can not afford to buy clothes for themselves.
Article Four:
This law will be in effect in the towns and their suburbs from the beginning 
of 1929. In the villages the law will be put in effect from 1930 and no later 
than the specified date. The government is responsible for the law and its 
implementation.82
82 Law ofUniformity of Dress (1929), FO 371/13784/E1018/10434 & (1929), F0371/13781/E353/95/34.
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This law was passed by the Majles in 1928 and was supposed to have been fully 
implemented throughout Iran by 1930. However, it was not fully implemented until the 
winter of 1934 under Prime Minister Forugl who put particular pressure on the ‘Olama. 
Forugl added an additional clause to the above articles. Under this new addition, only 
those ‘Olama who had a certificate of competence from two Marjaf Taqlid were entitled 
to wear clerical robes and turbans. The certificates were to be taken to the Ministry of 
Culture and Education where their authenticity was to be ascertained. If the Ministry did 
not approve of the certificate or found it fraudulent, the person in question would be 
derobed.83 This law led to a number of protests and disturbances which will be discussed 
below.
In Slfaz, Tabriz and Mashad, people protested against the introduction of the 
Uniform Dress Code and the compulsory wearing of the PahlavT hat. In 1934 the Minister 
of Culture, ‘AH Asqar Hekmat, attended a local celebration in Slfaz where large number 
of people from various classes were present. The ceremonial talks were preceded by a 
show during which a number of young women took off their veils and began to dance. 
Large sections of the audience left in protest. The following day news of this incident 
spread all over the town and a large number of people come out in protest. The 
demonstrators congregated in Masjed Vakil.84 Seyyed Hesamod-Dm Fall, who was a 
respected and influential member of the ‘Olama of Slfaz, severely criticized the girls’ 
conduct, condemning it as Satanic and un-Islamic. The bazaars were closed down in 
protest and the news of the disturbances in Slfaz reached Tehran. The order for the arrest 
o f Seyyed Hesamod-Dm was given and he was later arrested and imprisoned. The news of 
his arrest reached Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Slfaz, Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Mashad, and Howzeh 
‘Elmlyeh Tabriz. In Tabriz two Marja * Taqlids, Seyyed Abu’l Hasan AngajI and Mlfza 
§adeq Aqa Tabriz!, protested against the Uniform Dress Code, the introduction of the 
PahlavT hat, and the arrest of Seyyed Hesamod-Dm Fall. Orders were given for their arrest 
and they were both exiled to Semnan.85 After these incidents, the two small Howzeh 
‘Elmlyehs of Slraz and Tabriz were closed down.
83 MakkI (1369 SH/1991), p. 251, and Vafied (1366 SH/1987), pp. 37-8.
84 The mosque of Karim Kan Zand in Slraz.
85 MakkI (1369 SH/1991), p. 252. In other accounts it is said that they were exiled to Kordestan and then 
from there to Qom. RazI (1334 SH/1954), pp. 37-8, & DavanI (1360 SH/1981), p. 156.
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The ‘Olama of Qom and Ma§had were disgruntled by the outcome of events. They 
viewed the Uniform Dress Code as a direct attack on themselves and on Islam. There 
were murmurs of discontent from the ‘Olama throughout the country; however, §e% 
‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri Yazdl remained silent over this issue and did not voice any opinions. 
‘Se% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri was a man of discernment and he closed the doors on to 
himself and kept silent over this. Because of the power of the government and the close 
proximity of Qom to Tehran the murmurs soon died down.’86 However, in Mashad the 
‘Olama, in particular Hosem Tabataba’I QomI,87 were especially opposed to this law and 
demanded its nullification. QomI had sent a telegraph to the Sah stating his objections but 
had not received a reply. QomI came to Sahr-e Rey88 in order to have an audience with 
the Sah and discuss his grievances. On arrival, QomI was placed under house-arrest. The 
police were given secret orders to make sure that QomI had no visitors. Once the secret 
order had leaked people stayed away fearing arrest. QomI then wrote a letter to the court 
asking for an audience with the Sah but did not receive a reply. He spent a few days alone 
and without purpose and realized that the Sah would not respond to him. He then 
requested permission to go to Iraq. However, the protests in Mashad did not die down.89
The government placed great pressure on the ‘Olama to accept the Uniform Dress 
Code. The Mojtaheds were exempt from this law, which resulted in a flood of forged 
Ijtehad papers from Iraq into Iran. In Mashad Sel ;^ Bohlule, during a sermon in the 
Masjed Goharsad,90 incited people against the wearing of the PahlavT hat, Uniform Dress 
Code and the unveiling of women. The order for Bohlule’s arrest was issued by the 
central government but the gathered crowd had intervened and prevented his arrest. The 
enforcement of law and order within the premises of the shrine of Imam Reza91 was the
86 §adr [§adrol ASraf] (1364 SH/1983), pp. 302-3.
87 He was bom 1282/1865 in Qom, his teachers were; §el^ Faillollah NurT, MIrza Hasan AStlyam, MIrza 
Hasan STrazT, A^und Moll5 Mofiammad KorasanI, Seyyed Mofiammad KazemI YazdT. In 1331 SH/1912 
he went to Mashad and began to teach there. In 1314 SH/1935, when unveiling was made compulsory, he 
came to Tehran in protest and stayed for a while in Sahr-e Rey, under house arrest. Then, he immigrated 
to Iraq with the permission of the government. In 1362 SH/ 1943 he returned to Iran, to Mashad. In 1365 
SH/ 1945, after the death of Seyyed Abu’l Hasan E§fehanl, he became the Marja* ‘Am, for a short while. 
In 1946 he passed away in Najjaf Bamdad (1348 SH/1969), p. 91. Sel^ ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri writes the 
following concerning QomI; ‘The late Haj Aqa Hoseln QomI Jabataba’I was an honest and pious man, 
and strictly followed all the tenets of the Sari* ah ...’ Unpublished Memoirs, pp. 134-5.
88 In close approximity to Tehran and where the Shrine o f ‘Abdol ‘Azlm is located.
89 §adr [§adrol ASraf] (1364 SH/1983), pp. 303-5.
90 Six months after the episode of Masjed GoharSad, compulsory unveiling was introduced, which will be 
discussed later.
91 The 8th Shi’i Imam.
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duty of the Nayeb ul-Touleyyeh of Mashad, a layman entrusted by the Sah with the 
custody and administration of the large revenues of the shrine at MaShad, the provincial 
capital of Korasan. In the afternoon of 10 July,92 Mohammad VaU AsadI, Nayebol- 
TowlTyeh of the time, had arrested and imprisoned §et^ Bohlule in the guardhouse of the 
shrine. However, the crowd had forced their way into the guardhouse and insisted that 
§e% Bohlule should deliver a sermon. Meanwhile the police, sharehbani, had completely 
encircled Masjed Goharsad, situated next to the shrine, preventing the entrance of people 
in or out of the mosque. ‘The crowd rushed forward towards the government forces and 
they began to open fire.’93
After a while the security forces stopped firing, as they were unable to prevent the 
crowd from forcing their way into the mosque. As news reached the surrounding villages, 
people began to pour into Mashad armed with sticks and batons. There were a number of 
‘Olama in the crowd. According to police and military reports AsadI was accused of 
starting the protest and having direct involvement in the affair. There are various accounts 
as to the exact role of AsadI in the Masjed Goharsad episode. Some believe that AsadI 
had encouraged the protest and that the coming of the villagers to MaShad was a result of 
Asadfs manipulation. Others believe the opposite to be true, in that AsadI had no hand in 
that matter whatsoever. According to §adrol-A3raf, AsadI94 was aware that the Sah 
intended to use force to suppress the protesters. Thus he had taken the ‘Olama who had 
been in the Masjed on the pretence of negotiation to the ceremonial rooms and kept them 
there until the disturbances died down.95 On 12 July96 1935, acting on orders of the 
central government, the military forces encircled the mosque, placing machine guns on top 
of the surrounding buildings and began to open fire onto the crowd. The shooting is said 
to have lasted for about an hour. The military forces then entered the mosque and ‘all 
those who were alive ran away, the injured and those killed were dumped in ditches which 
were dug on the outskirts of the city and marshal law was declared. There is no accurate 
account of the exact number killed.’97 The Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh of Tehran, Mashad, E§fehan,
92 19 Tir 1314 SH.
93 §adr [Sadrol ASraf] (1364 SH/1983), pp. 325-6.
94 It should be noted that Mofiammad Vail AsadI was arrested on the grounds of involvement in the 
uprisings and was convicted in a court of law and hanged.
95 Ibid.
96 21 TIr 1314 SH.
97 Sadr [Sadrol A§raf] (1364 SH/1983), p. 327.
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Tabriz, and other places were closed down soon after the Masjed Goharsad incidence. 
The only Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh which was not closed down was Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom.98
As mentioned previously, in 1928 the Majles passed the Law of Uniform Dress, 
which included the ‘Olama. Some uneducated ‘Olama, in order to become exempt from 
this law, managed to obtain forged certificates of Ijtehad and teaching certificates from 
first-rank Mojtaheds in Iraq. The government, therefore, was rather particular about 
implementing this law in Qom, now the centre of Islamic learning in Iran. The ‘Olama and 
inhabitants of Qom had hoped to receive preferential treatment on the grounds of Se% 
‘Abdol-Karim Ha’erTs close relationship with the Sah. However, this was not the case. 
The law of Uniform Dress, the derobing of the ‘Olama and the permission for wearing a 
turban were to be fully implemented in Qom. The ‘Olama viewed this as a direct insult 
upon their autonomy and rights as an institution to regulate themselves. It was felt that 
Selk ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri, as the most important clerical figure in Iran, should oppose 
this law and its implementation. There was mounting pressure from both the ‘Olama and 
the general public on Selk ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri to send a telegraph to the Sah. Se% 
‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri was rather apprehensive about doing so as he felt that protesting 
would be of no use and would result in even more severe measures. The theological 
centres of Tabriz, Slraz and E§fehan were closed down soon after the Masjed Goharsad 
episode and Se% ‘Abdol-Karim feared the same fate for the Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom. 
Furthermore, he intensely disliked involvement in political matters. However, due to 
increasing pressure on 2 June 193599 he was forced to send the following telegraph to the 
Sah:
‘To His Imperial Majesty,
After sincere and heart-felt prayers... Your Majesty is well aware that to this 
day, I, your most humble servant, have not involved my self in any affairs of 
the government. However, I hear now that there have been attempts in 
carrying out actions which are in direct contradiction with the Ja‘fari [Twelver 
Shi’ism] school of thought and against the laws of Islam. I cannot contain 
myself any longer. This has caused great concern for me and the generality of 
Muslims. It is important that your Majesty should put an end to this affair.
Your most humble servant,
98 The only Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh, who put up a pacifist resistance was Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom under the 
leadership of Haj Aqa SelV ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri. RazI (1334 SH/1954), p. 114.
99 11 Tir 1314 SH.
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‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri.’100 
On 3 June 1935101 the following telegram from the Prime Minister Mofiammad ‘AH 
Forugl was sent to §e% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri:
‘To His Excellency Haj Aqa Se% ‘Abdol-Karim,
The telegraph of Your Excellency was delivered to His Reverent Imperial 
Majesty, the King of Kings. May all of our lives be sacrificed for him. It 
was declared in your telegraph that the present conditions are against the 
holy Sari ‘ah and the Ja‘farl faith. This really surprised and angered the 
Protector of Love and Affection [Reza Sah] in the light of what you 
already know of him [the fact that Reza Sah is not only religious but also a 
Moghled of Seik ‘Abdol-Karim]. His Majesty has ordered the arrest of all 
those who make such accusations. If the opinion of Your Excellency is 
based on the nonsense, lies and scandalous rumors, it is surprising that you 
have been persuaded without further investigations. You have committed 
an act, which is not worthy of your Excellency’s position. It is surprising, 
given your accuracy of judgment that Your Excellency should think that 
the Uniform Dress Code is in any way against the holy SarVah. I, your 
most humble servant who is sincerely devoted to you believe that you 
should not lose the path which you have chosen and which has met with 
His Imperial Majesty’s favour. Please consider carefully all that is said to 
you by the common and illiterate people. Please do not act in such a way 
that the exquisite efforts of His Imperial Majesty for the progress of the 
government and the people, which is the only vehicle for the advancement 
of the Superior Truth [of the Ja‘fari faith], are represented as being against 
religion. This will result in his Majesty’s anger and disapproval. To end, I 
will say most humbly once again that those who poison the mind o f the 
general public with lies, forgeries, and deception will be punished.
Your most humble Moqalled,
Mofiammad ‘AH ForugL’102
100 Rail (1334 SH/1954), pp. 146-7. Mofiammad TaqT Falsafi has a slightly varying telegraph in his 
Memoirs;
‘To his Imperial Majesty the king of kings, May God grant him eternal Rule,
After sincere and heart-felt prayers,
As Your Majesty is aware, I, your most humble servant, have always wanted the progress and eminence of 
your government, and have considered it the most important of aims. At present, with this in mind, I say 
the following: the present conditions are against the laws of the holy Sarfah, and the Ja‘fari faith 
[Twelver Shi’i sm]. This has caused concern for me and the generality of Muslims. Of course, Your 
Majesty is the supporter and protector of the honour of Islam, and thus it is important that your Majesty 
puts a stop to this affair. Not only the general population of Iran, but also the entire Muslim world, will be 
ever thankful for your grace. I hope that your Majesty will put a stop to the worries of this feeble servant 
and the generality of all Shi’i.
Your most humble servant
‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri.’ 11 Tir 1314 SH/2 June 1935.
Falsafi (1376 SH/ 1997), pp. 82-4.
The actual text of the telegraph is not included in the Memoirs of SeTk ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’erT. However, 
concerning the authenticity of the actual text of the telegraph, according to Mehdl Ha’erT YazdT, Selk 
‘Abdol-Karim Ha’erfs second son RazT’s version is more accurate.
101 12 TTr 1314 SH.
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Falsafi writes the following in his memoirs concerning the Law of Uniform Dress:
‘It was ordered, even in Qom that the law of Uniform Dress, the derobing of 
the ‘Olama and the certificate for wearing a turban to be implemented. The 
late Mofiammad TaqI E§raql told me that at the time the people of Qom 
went to Sei^ ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eff and requested that he should send a 
telegraph to the Sah and ask him to order an exemption for the people of 
Qom. Haj Se% told him, “My telegraph will be of no use; Reza Sah will not 
listen and it will not have any effect.” As a result of repeated pleas on the 
part of the people and the refixsal of Haj §e%, some people in Qom accused 
him of being in favour of the Uniform Dress Code. The J'ollab and some of 
the teachers of the Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom were distraught that Haj Se% did 
not telegraph the §ah. I told him that the conditions are such that you have 
to either telegraph the Sah or prepare to be accused of being in favour of his 
actions. Haj Se% said, “In my opinion, sending a telegraph for this purpose 
is like throwing oneself into a well. I know that it will be harmful and not 
helpful.” I said although you know this, however, it is absolutely necessary 
that you send a telegraph. The late Haj §e% played with his beard, as was 
his habit when thinking, and after a few moments he said, “All right, fetch 
me some paper and a pen.” Haj Seifc; then dictated a telegraph to me and I 
wrote it and he signed it. The Sah failed to honour this great Marja' Taqlid 
with a personal reply.’103
In the Memoirs of Sei£ ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri, none of the above is mentioned. 
However, he does mention the increasing pressure placed upon him from the people to 
send a telegraph to the Sah and his concerns and reservations. He writes:
‘The tide of modernism, once started cannot be stopped. Its forces bring 
both good and evil. Some of its evils are more harmful and harder to bear 
than others [referring to Compulsory Unveiling]. I personally think that the 
law concerning the issue of Ejazeh [certificate of competence] and its 
approval and recognition by the Ministry of Education is a positive step. It 
will help to distinguish between real ‘Olama who have competence and 
knowledge and those who want to take advantage of the cloak. It will put 
a stop to those who are incompetent and unworthy of the cloak. However,
I am obliged to take up the people’s grievances with the Sah. I fear that all 
this may not amount to much and have adverse and severe consequences.
The Sah is a determined man. We have witnessed the consequences of 
such impulsive actions, which led to the closures of centres of learning in 
other parts of the country [the Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh of Tabriz, Slfaz, Mashad 
and E§fehan] and brought more harm to Islam and the Muslims than good.
We should learn from such lessons.’104
102 Ha’erT YazdT, Unpublished Memoirs, as attachment. Also Falsafi (1376 SH/ 1997), pp. 82-4.
103 Please see Falsafi (1376 SH/ 1997), pp. 81-4.
104 Ha’erT Yazdl, Unpublished Memoirs, p. 181.
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Compulsory Unveiling
Compulsory unveiling was not passed as law but became standard government 
procedure, as it would probably not have been passed through the Majles. In autumn 
1934 an official pronouncement had prepared the public for unveiled women teachers in 
schools. The Sah had declared that all female government employees must attend work 
unveiled and in Western dress.
‘The Sah summoned the members o f government and declared that we 
have to become Westernized in custom and appearance, and in the first 
instance all traditional hats must be changed to the “chapeau”. In two 
days’ time, when the First Session of the new Majles begins, everyone 
must attend wearing a chapeau and must take off their hats on arrival in 
doors in accordance with Western custom.105 We also need to start 
unveiling our women. It will be difficult for the common people to start 
unveiling their women; ministers, their wives, secretaries, and all female 
government employees must initiate this trend. One night a week you and 
your wives [unveiled] must gather in the Iran club.’106
In 1935 Reza Sah took the initiative in appearing in public with the Queen and his 
two daughters unveiled. On Thursday, 14 January 1935, the Sah and his family attended 
the inauguration ceremony of the newly-founded female teacher training college. ‘AH 
Asqar Hekmat, Minister of Education, describes the background to this incident as 
follows:
‘I went to see His Majesty and he told me, “As I had told you before I 
want you to organize a meeting in which ladies will be present. I want to 
rid this country of this wretched custom of covering. I was not completely 
decided upon this; however, as the result of the incidences in I^orasan 
[Masjed Goharsad] I am now determined to carry this out. I want you to 
see to this immediately.” During the governmental session of ministers, His 
Majesty added: “It has been suggested to me by the Minster of Education 
that I should make a public appearance with my family. I can see that none 
of you will volunteer to do this [appear in public with their wives unveiled] 
so I, an old man, have to do it! When will you arrange for such an 
occasion?” It was decided that the Sah and his family should make a public 
appearance at the opening of the teacher-training college and present the 
graduates with their diplomas. The members of the government, the 
teaching staff and employees of the college should also attend with their 
wives [unveiled]. On 14 January 1935 the Sah together with Her Majesty 
the Queen, and Princess Sams and Asraf attended the ceremony. The ladies 
were dressed elegantly but modestly. All the female teachers, employees, 
new graduates, students and the other women stood unveiled in matching
105 Traditionally in Iran it was considered rude to take off one’s headdress in public.
106 §adr [§adrol ASraf] (1364 SH/1983), pp. 302-5 & 326-7.
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outfits. His Majesty faced the women and said, “Today is no different for 
me than any other day; however, it seems that it is an auspicious day. The 
reason for this is that today Iran has entered the international society of 
civilized countries.”’107
In May 1935 the women’s Cultural Centre was established and Princess Sams 
became its patron. The Centre came under severe criticism by the ‘Olama for hosting a 
parade of schoolgirls in gymslips. On 28 June, the Prime Minster gave an historic tea 
party at a prominent club in the capital and members of the cabinet and high officials were 
bidden to arrive accompanied by their wives. Reza Sah viewed compulsory unveiling as 
Iran’s passage to the civilized world.108 This policy, however, met with a lot of resistance 
in traditional Iranian society, particularly in the provinces. The police were ordered to 
remove the Cador from women who appeared in public veiled. ‘I had witnessed on a 
number of occasions the forceful removal of the Cador from the heads of women by the 
police, which was the most appalling sight.’109 The ‘Olama were not the only group who 
opposed the policy of compulsory unveiling. Many members o f the government, notables 
and dignitaries as well as the general people were against this policy and the brutal way in 
which it was carried out. However, ‘no one dared to oppose this policy openly.’110 The 
severe implementation of this policy forced many women not to leave their homes and 
many girls to be kept back from attending school.
Mo^berol Saljaneh Hedayat, who had served six years as Prime Minister under 
Reza Sah, expressed his views on Compulsory Unveiling in his Memoirs. He writes:
‘Foreign hats destroyed our national identity, compulsory unveiling 
threatened the modesty of our women. The police were ordered to pull the 
Cador from the head of any woman who dares to appear in public veiled. I 
heard of many women who did not leave the house for this reason. Many 
disgraceful opportunists took their wives to dancing halls and left them at 
the mercy of louts. Women, like freed birds from a cage, went completely 
overboard with their newfound freedom, baring as much flesh as they 
possibly could. If it had been the custom in Paris or Berlin to go out 
completely naked our women would have followed suit!’111
107 Quoted form the memoirs o f‘All Asqar Hekmat by MakkT (1369 SH/1991), pp. 258-9.
108 Tolu‘T (1372 SH/1993), pp. 322-5.
109 Ibid., p. 323.
110 Ibid., p. 324.
111 Hedayat [Mo^berol Sal{aneh] (1344 SH/1966), pp. 405-8. Similar views are also expressed by Farrolj; 
[Mo‘ta§amol-Sal$aneh] (1347 SH/1968), pp. 331-3.
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It seems somewhat surprising that Seij£ ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri remained silent over 
the issue of Compulsory Unveiling. His silence, however, must not be taken to mean that 
he was in favour of such a policy. He simply felt that these policies could not be prevented 
and any attempt to do so would have adverse and serious consequences for the ‘Olama. 
Concerning unveiling, BldejabJ, he writes:
‘To forcefully change a people’s way of life and age-old customs is truly 
mournful. I am deeply saddened by this late policy of compulsory 
unveiling, which is not only against the holy tenets of the Sari‘ah but is an 
outrageous oppression against the people of Iran. I am so disturbed and 
burdened by this that I cannot even attend my classes or lead the 
prayers.112 It is for this reason that I asked Seyyed §adrod-Dm to take my 
place in leading the congregational prayers. I was ordered in a half­
awakened state not to neglect my duty in performing the congregational 
prayers. §adrod-Dm replied that he was unable to accept as he performs 
the prayers in Masjed Imam and also gives sermons there. He suggested 
that Aqa Hojjat [Seyyed Mofiammad Hojjat] take his place, as he is a 
pious, wise and educated man. I accepted. Throughout Ramazan of this 
year [1315 sh/1936] Hojjat has led the prayers. I do not have the strength 
to face much more of this evil’113 Two months later, Se% ‘Abdol-Karim 
Ha’eri passed away.114
In summing up the effects of the Uniform Dress Code and Compulsory Unveiling
A
on Qom and the Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom, RazI explains:
‘During these years and all its evil occurrences, the evil effects of the 
Uniform Dress Code and Compulsory Unveiling have had the worst effect 
on Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom and Haj Aqa Se% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri. The 
implementation of the Uniform Dress Code has had a devastating effect on 
the theological students. A large number of the students of the Howzeh 
‘Elmlyeh Qom, who had gathered there for worldly purposes of finding an
A
occupation, have now distanced themselves from the Howzeh. They have 
become state employees by taking an exam and obtaining a certificate. They 
have deserted the ranks of religion and the Qoran. Haj Aqa Ha’eri, given the 
encumbrance of his endeavour in establishing the Howzeh, the depth of 
intellectual capacity and social understanding, knew the ‘dictator Solfan’
[Reza §ah] would not yield to the forces of reason and truth. Haj Aqa 
Ha’eri knew that Reza Sah’s claim to complete adherence and obedience 
and his declaration of being a Moqalled of Se% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri was 
nothing but venality and pretense. Haj Aqa Ha’eri knew that inwardly Reza
112 Se% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’erT used to lead the prayers in the mosque of the Shrine in Qom known as 
Masjed Bala Sar.
113 Ha’erT YazdT, Unpublished Memoirs, p. 191.
114 ‘My late father had nominated three executors for his will, Aqa §adr [ol-DIn] and Aqa Hojjat [Seyyed 
Mofiammad], the third is not mentioned.’ Addition to the Memoirs of Ha’eri YazdT by Morteza Ha’erT 
Yazdl, p. 87.
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ASah was really an enemy and superficially declared his friendship. Thus Haj 
Aqa Ha’eri used this pretence of friendship to his advantage and resumed 
the method of precaution and silence [concerning the law of Uniform 
Dress]. Ayatollah Ha’en had witnessed the exile of the ‘Olama [of Iraq] and 
waited, he had witnessed the martyrdom of Haj Aqa Nurollah115 and waited, 
he had witnessed the exile of Hojjatol-Islam Bafql and waited, he had 
witnessed all the insults to his children [Jollab and ‘Olama] and waited.
Now he has to witness the tearing off the robes of Islam from the bodies of 
Muslims [derobing of the ‘Olama] and pulling off the veils o f modesty and 
innocence [Cador] from the heads of our virtuous women [unveiling]. They 
want to uproot Islam in one go, to destroy the Qoran by the orders of their 
‘sea pirate’ masters [the British] and to totally obliterate the proofs of Islam, 
Hojjatol-Islam. §e% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri realized that the time for 
patience, forbearance and silence had come to pass and thus he sent a fierce 
and powerful telegraph to Reza Sah. The century in which Sei^ ; ‘Abdol- 
Karim Ha’eri lived was one of the most important Islamic centuries. For 
whoever other than Se% ‘Abdol-Karim Ha’eri in Qom and Aqa Seyyed 
Hasan E§fehanl in Najjaf were the leaders of the ‘Olama and Islam, the 
blows to Islam and the Qoran would have been far more severe.’116
Hierocratic Challenge or its Pacification? Concluding 
Remarks
It maybe concluded that the ‘Olama had emerged and functioned as a hierocratic 
organization. Weber defines a hierocratic organization as an organization which enforces 
‘its order through psychic coercion by distributing or denying religious benefits 
(hierocratic coercion). The establishment o f the Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom helped to 
reinforce the role of the ‘Olama as a hierocratic organization and it may be argued that the 
collective body of the ‘Olama functioned as a ‘church’. In Weberian terms ‘a compulsory 
hierocratic organization will be called a “church” insofar as its administrative staff claim a 
monopoly of the legitimate use o f hierocratic coercion.’117 In formulating the concept of a 
hierocratic organization, it is not possible to use the character of the religious benefits it 
offers, whether worldly or otherworldly, material or spiritual, as the decisive criterion. 
What is important is rather the fact that its control over these values can form the basis of 
a system of spiritual domination over human beings. ‘What is most characteristic of a 
“church”, even in the common usage of the term, is the fact it is a rational, compulsory 
association with continuous operation and that it claims a monopolistic authority. It is
115 He actually died of natural causes according to other sources such as Makki (1369 SH/1991), pp. 
408-9.
116 RazI (1334 SH/1954), pp. 46-7, 50-1.
117 Weber (1968), p. 54.
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normal for a church to strive for complete control on a territorial basis and to attempt to 
set up the corresponding territorial or parochial organization.’118 The establishment of the 
Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom within Iran helped to further the territorial and spiritual claims of 
the ‘Olama, as Iran represented the homeland of Shi’ism and the Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh was 
its commanding centre and symbolic base. ‘So far as this takes place, the means by which 
this claim to monopoly is upheld will vary from case to case.’119
a
While the establishment o f the Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom helped to reinforce the role 
of the ‘Olama as a hierocratic organization, Reza Sah’s policies in other spheres ensured 
the demise of ‘Olama power in the education, the legal and the political domain. Hence 
reducing their jurisdiction and only allowing them monopoly over religious affairs as 
defined by the state. Religious jurisdiction excluded control over affairs previously defined 
as within the rightful dominion o f the ‘Olama, such as education and the legal system. The 
Howzeh ‘Elmlyeh Qom had the potential of becoming a centre for resistance and 
organized defiance, as it did become in later years, but during the Reza Sah period it 
became the means by which the Sah could exert discipline and control over the religious 
establishment. ‘The history of all churches demonstrates that even the most powerful 
hierocracy is continuously forced to compromise with the economic and political 
realities’.120 Reza Sah attempted to rule along caesaropapist lines; however, the Howzeh 
‘Elmlyeh Qom, once established became the means by which the ‘Olama came to function 
as a ‘church’, ensuring the survival of the dual structure of religious (hierocratic) and 
political (temporal) power, re-emerging in later years as a legitimate challenger. This was 
a gradual development which did not make itself fully felt until the reign of Mofiammad 
Reza Sah.
The anti-clerical policies of the PahlavT regime, the newly found locus of religion, 
and mass participation in religion enabled the Shi’i hierocracy to politicize the sacred 
symbols of religion, and find in these sacred symbols the bases of social support. In this 
sense religion contributed to the process of mass politicization by providing sacred 
symbols that acquired political significance. The Shi’i hierocracy found in these sacred 
symbols an important key to mass support and mobilization, a key that their secular rivals 
in the struggle for power had denied themselves. The power of sacred symbols to inspire
118 Ibid., p. 56.
119 Ibid.
120 Weber (1968), p. 1174.
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mass movement and mobilization, through out Iranian history, particularly during the 
1979 Revolution, serves as the best testimony to the continuing social power and 
influence of the ‘Olama.
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Conclusion
Many modernizing leaders within the Middle East such as Reza Sah and Attaturk 
sought to fully implement and imitate the Western model of modernization/secularization. 
This shows the extent and the far-reaching impact of this kind of thinking as a discourse 
of dominance within a global context. Reza Sah modelled himself on Attaturk and his 
reforms, and the Turkish elite consciously copied the model of secularization and 
modernization that was presented by Western society. The only alternative model in the 
first half of the twentieth century was the model of communist development in Russia, but 
the adaptation of this model was ruled out by the historical geographical threat which 
Russia presented for Iran. Also British and Russian rivalry in the internal political scene 
ensured that this model of development was ruled out. There were many elements among 
Iranian intellectuals who favoured the communist path but they were suppressed. Western 
vocabularies of motive were adopted in the Middle East because the new elite had been 
trained in a European tradition, so secularization in Iran was essentially mimetic. The only 
reason that such models seem to fit Iranian social development at all is because of political 
imitation of the West and not some intrinsic global value of these theories. However there 
is a crucial difference between Western and Iranian secularization in that the latter was 
imposed by political decree rather than emerging necessarily and automatically from 
economic change.
Throughout his reign Reza Sah introduced and accomplished many unprecedented 
policies in Iran, which were achieved at the cost of sacrificing the aims and aspirations of 
the Constitutional Revolution and fundamentally changing the fabric of Iranian society. 
However despite the many new institutional innovations, social relations remained very 
much the same, as economic change occurred at a slower pace than in other areas such as 
the legal and educational systems. The ongoing debate for Iranian scholars has been 
whether the achievements of Reza Sah justified the cost at which these new measures 
were accomplished, in other words, whether the means justified the end. Whatever the 
response, it cannot be denied that the Reza Sah period was the comer stone for what may 
be termed ‘modem’ Iran. The ‘modernism’ of the Reza Sah period was more far-reaching, 
profound, and consequential than the measures implemented or even envisaged during the 
1960s and 1970s. The period witnessed the most concentrated effort to limit and regulate 
the power of the ‘Olama, and it may have succeeded further had it not been for the Allies’
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invasion and occupation of the country in 1941. The foundations of present-day 
government structure were laid during the Reza Sah period.
The PahlavT era marked the establishment of a highly differentiated political and 
social structure. Under Reza Sail, Iran became a transitional society, socially and 
economically as well as politically. Reza Sah embarked upon the construction of a 
comparatively modem state and inaugurated a course of rapid modernization. This 
process was achieved by reinforcing national unification and by establishing a modem 
armed force. During 1921-1941, most of the basic institutions needed for the elementary 
needs of society were established. It has been suggested that Reza Sah’s twenty-year 
reign ‘was a prolonged revolution, particularly in the light of the dramatic changes that he 
implemented in Iranian political society.’1 Although considerable quantitative changes did 
occur in the bureaucracy and the economic powers of the state increased during the Reza 
Sah period, the basic format of political institution stayed intact. The political system was 
still composed of an absolutist monarch but with the difference that the PahlavT monarchy 
was supported by strong military and bureaucratic institutions. Reza Sah attempted to 
modernize the country’s industrial infrastructure and its culture, but his reforms did not 
extend to the political realm, and the basic political structure remained unaltered. 
However, the political structure of the PahlavT regime had a fundamental difference from 
that of the Qajars, namely the reduction of the influence and power o f the ‘Olama in the 
political system. The bureaucracy, the military and the royal court functioned as the 
primary pillars of the PahlavT dynasty.
During the reign of Reza Sah, the institutional separation of religious and political 
power became virtually complete; however, the internal structure of Iranian society was 
far slower to change and the influence of the ‘Olama over the masses stayed almost intact. 
Reza Sah coveted to limit autonomous ecclesiastic charisma, and make it subordinate to 
secular power. However, this policy was part of a greater one of reducing all other 
alternative sources of power, such as the autonomy of Tribal chieftains, for example, and 
was not specifically directed at the ‘Olama. Centralization was achieved by modernization 
from above and by institution-building. Reza Sah sought to implement the power of the 
central government through establishing a professional standing army, uniform judiciary, 
the rule of law, uniform secular education, and curbing the power of ‘Olama, tribal
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chieftains, major landowners and all other alternative sources of power. These bourgeois 
reforms did not fundamentally change the fabric of Iranian society or the structure of 
social relations. Throughout this period, as the power of the central government 
increased, the political power and influence of the ‘Olama decreased.
It was under Reza Sah that secularization became an official government policy 
and made a profound impact on society. In Iran, the aim of secularization was not to 
eliminate Islam but to limit its social function as only one source of national cultural and 
social integration. According to this view, it was necessary to differentiate the social 
order, releasing Islam from its encasement within the political, legal and education 
sectors. Furthermore, within the secularization thesis, the secularization of law and 
education were fundamental requirements of their rationalization that prepared the way 
for the process of capitalism. The secular control of religious education was not primarily 
an attempt to eliminate Islam, but rather to sever religion and religious education from 
traditional values and institutions. The end result was a set of parallel educational 
institutions, one religious and one secular, mutually antagonistic and revealing the 
profound intra-elite conflict between the military, the civilian secular elite and the religious 
hierarchy. With reforms in the legal sphere, Reza Sah took institutional secularization to 
its logical conclusions, namely the removal of the vestiges of power of the Sarfah and the 
‘Olama. Although the Sarfah was severely restricted it still retained considerable 
normative prestige and influence.
The religious code was the legal basis of family life and therefore exerted its 
influence in the most influential aspect of everyday life. The impact of Reza Sah’s reforms 
was nevertheless profound: they represented a frontal attack on the remaining institutions 
of the religious order. Reza Sah was, however, not content with imitating the West in 
terms of institutional changes. The mimetic quality of Iranian secularization had to be 
carried out in detail at a personal level in terms of dress and habit. The modernization of 
dress was one aspect of the attempt to achieve modernization in detail. It was crucial to 
this process to change and modernize the appearance of Iranian women with the anti­
veiling policies of the government. The robe and the turban were restricted to certified 
‘Olama and a Western style suit and hat was compulsory for all other civilian classes. It 
was for this reason that the hat law was passed.
1 Lenczowski (1980), p. 88.
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The assumption that secularism is the consequential result of modernization is 
theoretically problematic when placed within a historic perspective. Although there is no 
institutionalized priesthood in Islam, the ‘Olama played a crucial and decisive role in the 
political realm. This informally structured institution acted in such a formalized and 
collective manner that it may be argued that they constituted a church in the Weberian 
sense of the word. Shi’i Islam has undoubtedly played a formative role in shaping Iranian 
culture; Iran’s pre-Islamic culture, however, is also of equal importance. The language, 
mythology, and historic identity of Iran have all to some extent preserved their pre-Islamic 
past. The interplay of these two forces - Shi’i Islam and the pre-Islamic heritage - has 
made Iran’s reaction to the West extremely complex and also different from that of the 
rest of the Middle East. Religion has had a notable effect on political behaviour and has 
significantly transformed Iran’s polity. Religion and politics often compete to establish the 
legitimacy of their authority in a hegemonic way. Thus, to this extent, rivalry between 
them for the loyalty of the subjects is inevitable. In the words of Max Weber: ‘The 
antagonism of political and magical charisma is primeval.’2 The structural elaboration of 
religious thought and the development of the ‘Olama have been consequential for the 
development of the political system during the Reza Sah period.
In Shi’i Islam there existed a separation of power of the state and authority of the 
Imam from the death of the Prophet onwards. The Shi’a lived as members of the Islamic 
community, but with allegiance to the Imam and not to the state. The only legitimate 
authority was the religious authority of the Imam, the Imam of the time until the Greater 
Occultation of the Twelfth Imam. The Shi’a believe that the rightful temporal rule of the 
Imams was denied to them through the system of caliphate. The only time that the Shi’i 
ideal was recognized was during the short caliphate of ‘All (656-d. 661). Thus from the 
death of the Prophet onwards there existed a separation of temporal and spiritual rule for 
the Shi’i minority. Twelver Shi’ism developed a distinct doctrine and system of 
jurisprudence under the leadership of the Fifth Imam, Mofiammadol-Baqer (d. 733) and 
the Sixth Imam, Ja‘farol-§adeq (d. 765). By the ninth century, the Shi’i community was 
already well established both socially and doctrinally. A vast body of theological and legal 
literature existed - quoting from the Fifth and the Sixth Imams, and, to a lesser extent, 
from Musaal-Kazem - compiled in books and collections by Shi’i scholars, which made
2 Weber (1968), p. 1173.
301
the Shi’i community self-sufficient except in odd cases where a new question arose or 
reports conflicted or opinions regarding interpretation differed. The Shi’a had managed to 
avoid the politicization of religion through the doctrine of Imamate until the Greater 
Occultation. Paradoxically, the Occultation, after many centuries and different 
circumstances, became the basis for the assertion of the power of the ‘Olama and the 
politicization of religion. Socio-political circumstances were of great importance in this 
turn around. From the Greater Occultation (329/940) until the establishment of the 
Safavid dynasty, in the sixteenth century, the Shi’i ‘Olama were a distinct social group but 
did not constitute a recognized institution. The Safavid period marks the transition of the 
‘Olama from a distinct social group to a hierocracy.
The period of infallible rulers came to an end with the Greater Occultation of the 
Twelfth Imam who remains alive but hidden, because the universe could not survive 
without a representative of God on earth, or without him as proof (Hojja) of God. For the 
Shi’a, from the time of the Greater Occultation, there existed no direct link to legitimate 
authority. In time, the ‘Olama came to partake of the authority and, to some extent, the 
charisma of the Imam as his representative, although, according to Shi’i doctrine, after the 
death of the last agent no-one could claim any privileged position in relation to the Imam. 
Temporal/political power was devoid of any religious authority preceding the advent of 
the Hidden Imam. Until such time, all states would be devoid of religious authority. No 
claims could be made on such authority; only the consensus (Ijma) of the body of the 
‘Olama was a guarantee that the community was not acting against the wishes of the 
Imam. The idea of rulership gradually came to hold an important place amongst the 
‘Olama. Historically, the ‘Olama had come to take on the role of leaders and advisors on 
religious matters. This privileged role had come to be viewed as synonymous with Islam 
per se. In Muslim societies, therefore, any change in the traditional lifestyle and the 
removal of any sphere of activity from clerical influence came under the heading of 
‘secularization’. Consequently, in practical terms this often meant restricting the power 
and influence of the ‘Olama.
The Safavid period (1501-1722) marked the establishment of the first Shi’i state. 
For the first time in history the Shi’a were no longer a minority group living among the 
Sunni majority. In this period, the ‘Olama enjoyed a great deal of influence in the state. 
Many of the ‘Olama cooperated closely with the Safavid rulers. The interaction and
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involvement of the ‘Olama with the Safavid state and the misconceptions regarding the 
history of Sunni Islam (as discussed earlier) have led many to argue that one cannot talk 
about a separation of the temporal and spiritual realms within Islamic countries, although 
it may be argued that historically within the Islamic Empire, due to the all-encompassing 
nature of Islam and the close association of the ‘Olama and the state, such distinctions are 
hard to trace. However, from this proposition one can not draw the conclusion that due to 
the Islamic ‘essence’ such a separation of the temporal and spiritual is not possible or 
could not or did not exist.
The basis for the development of the Shi’i ‘Olama as a distinct institution can be 
said to have occurred during the Safavid period. Safavid rule may best be explained as a 
‘caesaropapist’ rule. Safavid rulers excised supreme authority by virtue of their 
descendance from the Seventh Shi’i Imam, Musa Ibn Ja‘far (Al-Kazem, d. 799). The 
Safavids ‘imported’ a number of Shi’i ‘Olama, mainly from Lebanon. These ‘Olama were, 
on the whole, state functionaries, treated as a branch of the political administration. 
Throughout Safavid rule, high-ranking clerical position was transformed into ‘hereditary 
family property expropriate as a source of income’, power and prestige.
In the subsequent one-and-a-half centuries, the ‘Olama succeeded in establishing 
monopolistic control over the religious life of the population, monopolizing the 
authoritative interpretation of doctrine, creating an autonomous administrative apparatus, 
a tax system and legal forms for the protection of ecclesiastical land-owning. The financial 
independence of the ‘Olama was a simultaneous development, by means of the 
authorization of religious taxes as representatives for and on behalf of the Imam. The 
concept of the collection of the Imam’s share as a part of the religious taxes of iComs was 
introduced, now collectable by the ‘Olama on ‘behalf of the Imam. With popularization 
of the concept of TaqlTd, the faithful paid their religious taxes to the Marfa ‘Taqlid. Also 
during this period, the religious, judicial and educational institutions fell within the sphere 
of control of the ‘Olama. By the nineteenth century, Safavid ‘Caesaropapism’ was 
replaced by the consistent Twelver Shi’i dualism of politics and hierocratic domination, 
and consolidation of the Shi’i ‘Olama as a ‘church’ was complete.
It may be argued that during this period Shi’i hierocracy emerged as a ‘church’. 
The extent of this development was such that, during the Qajar period, the only two 
legitimate institutions of domination were the state and the ‘Olama. The ‘Olama’s power
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was further strengthened by the inherent weakness of Qajar administration. Decentralized 
and ineffective Qajar administration encouraged the continued power and ideological 
hegemony of the ‘Olama. In the absence of government strength or armed force, the 
‘Olama could effectively block attempts at educational, legal, and economic reform. 
Consequently, by the time Reza Sah ascended to the throne in the 1920s, the extent of 
‘Olama power and influence was unprecedented. Reza Sah sought to limit autonomous 
ecclesiastic charisma, and make it subordinate to secular power.
The transition of the ‘Olama from a distinct social group to a hierocracy occurred 
in three distinct but interrelated cycles of development. The formative cycle is the period 
after the Greater Occultation in the tenth century, when the Shi’i ‘Olama were a distinct 
group but did not constitute a recognized institution, a hierocracy. The second cycle is the 
Safavid Period in the sixteenth century, which witnesses the transition of the ‘Olama from 
a privileged group to a hierocracy. The third cycle, during the Qajar period, marks th,e 
consolidation of exclusive religious authority resulting in the emergence of the ‘Olama as 
a ‘church’, so that by the 1920s, when Rem Sah ascended the throne, the ‘Olama had 
long-established institutional organization and considerable social power and prestige, 
particularly in the areas of education and the law.
From Reza Sah’s first entry onto the political scene, which can be said to be in 
1299/1921, he dealt severely with his opponents and all those who stood in his way. The 
‘Olama were not excluded from this although Reza Sah ‘was neither antagonistic nor 
unbeholden to the Shi’i ‘Olama for his accession to the throne. However, he simply saw 
no conflict between modernization and the precepts of Islam.’3 The ‘Olama, on the other 
hand, viewed the modernization policies of Reza Sah as contradictory to the tenets of 
Islam and a direct attack on their power and prestige. The ‘Olama were unwilling to 
accept these policies of Reza Sah but were often forced to compromise. ‘The history of 
all churches demonstrates that even the most powerful hierocracy is continuously forced 
to compromise with the economic and political realities’.4 These policies of Reza Sah 
were directed at curbing the political power and level of interference of the ‘Olama in 
matters of government rather than as an attack on their spiritual and religious role. It can 
be said that Reza Sah was not anti-Islam per se, but rather anti ‘power-sharing’. He is
3 Amuzegar (1991), p. 121.
4 Weber (1968), p. 1174.
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often quoted as saying, ‘In this country, there can only be one king and that is me!’5 Reza 
Sah was not able to eliminate completely the social and doctrinal power of the ‘Olama as 
by this time the ‘Olama had a well-established foundation. ‘A fully-developed 
ecclesiastical hierarchy, with an established body of dogmas and particularly well 
organized system cannot be uprooted at all.’6
5 Ha’eri Yazdl, Unpublished Memoirs, p. 47.
6 Weber (1968), p. 1175.
Appendix I 
A Critique of Weber’s Sociology of Islam
In Weberian terms, what is ‘positively’ present in Christianity is ‘negatively’ 
absent and lacking in Islam. Islam is posited as the complete negative of Christianity. It is 
a religion in which rationality does not and could not exist. Raymond Aron1 describes the 
method used by Weber in his comparative sociology as the method of ‘absence’, which is 
common to most neo-orientalists theories. The absence of rationalization underlies the 
emergence of social carriers of religious norms in Islam. In Christianity the social carrier 
was the ‘internal journey man’, whereas in Islam it was the warrior seeking to conquer the 
world. Furthermore, Weber maintained that in Islam ‘only a few heterodox sects that 
possessed considerable influence at certain times, displayed a distinct intellectual 
character.’2 In contrast to Christianity, Islam is a sensual religion, one that had never 
known the quest for salvation. The spirit of mysticism was consequently neglected by the 
warrior in favour of wealth, power, and glory. Weber did acknowledge the existence of 
ascetic sects among Muslims, but he viewed these as periodically effective and fatalistic. 
Pre-determination, the concept that opened the gate to rationalization in Protestantism, 
had been transformed in Islam into fatalism that restricted human freedom and became an 
obstacle in the path of rationalization. The other obstacle in Islam, for Weber, was its 
dogmatism. God’s presence had suffocated human freedom.
Rationalization, according to Weber, is the most crucial factor in any process of 
change. As Talcott Parsons3 points out, rationalization is the key concept by which 
cultures define their religious situation and through which sociology of religion must 
understand such cultural definitions of the situation. In The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit o f  Capitalism, Weber points out that capitalism has existed in various forms of 
societies - Babylon, ancient Egypt, China, India and medieval Europe. However, it is only 
in the modem West that capitalism has become associated with the rational organization 
of labour, routinized calculated administration and continuously - functioning enterprise. 
Within this analytical framework, Weber treats the development of the modem Western 
world as the vanguard of a most important general evolutionary trend. Weber never
1 Aron (1998).
2 Weber (1968), p. 512.
3 Weber (1993).
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rejected the ideals of progress and evolution, though he clearly departed from 
evolutionism. He shared in the evolutionist conception of history as gradual progress 
towards ‘rationalization’, but rejected its belief in progress. For Weber, modernity 
contains in its folds a rationalization of all personal and public conduct that is synonymous 
with bureaucratization, which means nothing more than a pervasive institutionalization of 
the ‘iron cage’. The ‘iron cage’, according to Weber, is the necessary condition of 
modernity and can only be resisted by resignation. In rejecting the evolutionist concept of 
progress, Weber managed to dismantle the connection between rationalization and 
emancipation that had long been entangled in the political discourse of modernity.
While in Europe feudalism had created the necessary conditions for capitalist 
development, oriental societies were controlled by social structures that were prone to 
stagnation and precluded social change. Islamic society, Weber maintained, is 
characterized by patrimonial domination, which makes political, economic and legal 
relations unstable and arbitrary, or, in Weber’s terminology, ‘irrational’. The social 
structures necessary for the emergence of capitalism are incompatible with ‘oriental 
despotism’. This is why, for Weber, Islam ‘stands in extreme opposition to any puritan 
economic ethic and thoroughly corresponds with feudal conception of status.’4 It follows 
that Islamic institutions were incompatible with capitalism because they had been 
dominated by a long history of patrimonial political structures of domination, which 
resulted in instability of the mode of production. Within these societies there was no class 
struggle, no private property, no free cities and no abstract legal structure.
For Weber, Islam consists of a purely hedonistic spirit, especially towards women, 
luxuries and property. In the Qoran, one perceives no tension between moral 
consciousness and the imperfection of the world. It follows that no ascetic ethic of world- 
mastery could emerge in Islam.5 Indeed the role played by wealth in Islam ‘is dramatically 
opposed to the role wealth played in the puritan religion.’6 Therefore no ethics of world 
mastery could emerge in Islam, and since asceticism was absent in Islam, this explains the 
absence of rational institutional development in Islamic societies. His analysis of Islamic 
ethic seems to stand independent of his analysis of the socio-economic structures of 
Islamic society. At the centre of Weber’s view of Islamic society is a contrast between the
4 Ibid., p. 236.
5 Turner (1974), p. 12.
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rational and systematic character of occidental society and the unstable political and 
economic conditions of the orient. Weber focused on the political, military and economic 
nature of Islamic society as a patrimonial form of domination. In this way he treated the 
role of values as secondary and dependent on Islamic social conditions.
Islam, for Weber, was distinct from Judaism and Christianity by virtue of its 
deficiency in the field of metaphysical rationality. Islam’s deviation from Judaeo-Christian 
monotheism occurred as early as the Prophetic era. Therefore it becomes impossible in 
Weberian terms to separate Islam’s historical deficit from its philological foundations. In 
Islam, the development of an internal metaphysics had been precluded by the emergence 
of a ‘military aristocracy’, while the popular Dervish faith proved utterly lacking in any 
tendencies towards rationalism. In this respect, the scope Islam allowed for intellectual 
activity is narrower than that provided by Christianity. Islam, because of its feudal 
character and anti-rationalism, never possessed the ethical or epistemological conditions 
that paved the way for modem capitalism.
Weber called the process of metaphysical systematization and intellectualization of 
religious doctrine, the ‘rationalization of religion’. Intellectualization suppresses belief in 
magic and disenchants the world’s processes, which in turn lose their magical significance. 
They simply ‘are’ and ‘happen’ but no longer signify anything. Consequently, a demand 
grows for the world and the total pattern of life to be subject to an order that is significant 
and meaningful. For Weber, the role of the Prophet (especially the ethical prophet) is of 
crucial importance in the shift toward metaphysical rationalization. The rationalization of 
religion in Weber’s reading is equal to the rise of an intellectualization of theology; he 
clearly stated in the Protestant Ethic that the full development of a systematic theology 
must be credited to Christianity under the influence of Hellenism. It must be pointed out 
that Islamic theology was also greatly influenced by Hellenic thought, which will be 
discussed later.
Weber demonstrated a classical orientalist approach in constructing an ontological 
dualism between an oriental world where despotism and social stagnation reign, and an 
occidental world which is the homeland of dynamism and democracy. This image of a 
political stagnation of the orient was not found only in Weber, but also in the works of
6 Weber (1993), p. 263.
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Marx and Hegel. In fact it is a consistent and re-emerging concept in Western political 
thought. For Hegel for example, Western political conditions - in its early form in the 
Greek period and later in Christianity - had encouraged the emergence and development 
of subjectivity or self-consciousness and reflexivity. In oriental societies, however, the 
political conditions prevented the growth of individuality and freedom. This dualistic 
paradigm can be traced back to the Greeks. In the context of the Hellenic-Persian wars, 
the term ‘despotism’ was used to describe the political condition of Persia and indeed 
‘Asiatic societies’ as a whole. In Aristotelian terms, Asiatic people, whom he referred to 
as barbarians, desired despotism by their very political condition, as ‘barbarians and slaves 
by nature (as) one and the same.’7 The Aristotelian conception o f ‘Asiatic despotism’ was 
not surpassed but rather reinvented and revoked by Western political thought. Weber like 
those before him, (Montesquieu, Mill, Hegel and de Tocqueville)8 divided the world into 
dynamic and progressive West distinct from a stagnant and despotic East. Weber’s 
analysis of the east is in keeping with the general orientalist tradition that is interested in 
other societies only in so far as highlighting the absence of institutions from other cultural 
systems in order to assert the peculiarity and indeed superiority of the modem West.
Weber stressed the peculiarity of the West, referring to its mature rationality, as 
incorporated in bureaucracy, that it largely owes to its Hellenic tradition. In the Weberian 
context, the advance of the West in modem times is not a mere product of its various 
achievements in the present but has its roots in the past. The over-emphasis of the 
importance of the Hellenic tradition is a myth that haunted not only Weber’s work but 
also other Western political discourse since the Renaissance. Even if one accepts the 
theory of the maturity of Hellenic rationality, one could not render this intellectual 
achievement into a homogenous cultural identity called Hellenism, for Hellenism itself is 
the product of a long history of acculturation. It is indeed impossible to think of Hellenic 
philosophy without reflecting on its borrowing from and affinity with ancient Egypt, India 
and China. Furthermore, Perso-Islamic culture was the mediator of the Hellenic tradition 
to modem Europe. The particular rationality of Greek thought lies in its postulation of 
‘logos’ in opposition to imythos\ However, the very logos of Hellenic philosophy is 
heavily influenced and dominated by Greek mythology. Thus, ‘logos’ was operative only
7 Aristotle (1962).
8 Aron (1998).
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in so far as it was a ‘systematic construction’ of ‘ mytho s’ in terms of Greek mythology. 
The peculiarity of Western culture, the bedrock of Max Weber’s theories, lies essentially 
in two factors:
1) The epistemological sophistication of the West, achieved through its highly 
systematized thought as well as its possession of rational concepts. These derive their 
roots from Hellenic philosophy that had achieved maturity in the doctrine of Aristotle, and 
which had later on become incorporated into Christian theology. Weber acknowledged 
that although other religions too have their own theologians and dogmas they did 
however not develop such a systematic theology as Western Christianity. Christianity 
incorporated Greek thought into itself and adopted it to suit the purpose of its dogma. 
The rational structures of law and administration of Western social structures and 
institutions. The West saw the accomplishment of the process of rationalization and its 
incorporation into bureaucracy, where the most fundamental function of everyday life 
‘came to be in the hands of technically - commercially - and above all legally - trained 
government officials.9 For Weber, the process of bureaucratization was the hallmark of 
rationalization and was unprecedented in all other cultures. It appears that, for Weber, the 
process by which modem civilization had evolved was virtually identical with the 
development of calculating bureaucratic organizations.10 Only in the Occident had there 
been a clear affinity between rational religious ethic and economic rationality. Christianity 
shaped Western mind and history in the form of intellectual theology and the emergence 
of free cities. “... these notions frilly developed nowhere else in the world, but within 
Mediterranean culture, particularly in Hellenistic and definitely in Roman law. What is 
more, the specific qualities of Christianity as an ethical religion of salvation and as 
personal piety, found their real nature in the urban environment.’11 Christian theology 
represents an intellectual rationalization of the religious certainty found in salvation; as 
such it is science-grounded in the specifically unscientific presupposition that a particular 
supernatural revelation is an event, which has been decisive in ensuring salvation.
2) Hellenic thought, which Weber viewed, as the foundation of Christian 
rationality, also played a crucial and formative role in Islamic thought. Certain schools of 
thought in Islam, such as the Asharite, the Mutazilite and many of the great Muslim
9 Weber (1976), p. 16.
10 Keane (1984), p. 31.
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philosophers, falasefeh, such as Farabi, Ibn Sma [Avecena], Ibn Baya, Ibn Ru§d 
[Averoes] and others, were greatly influence by the Hellenic heritage. In fact, some 
Islamic modernists view the ‘over-intellectualization’ of the Islamic doctrine as the major 
problem in Islam. Islamic thought, they contend, had exhausted a great deal of its energy 
in the abstract metaphysical domain, as a result of the influence of the Hellenic heritage 
which is incompatible with the realistic nature of Islam. Classical speculation was 
incompatible with the spirit of the Qoran that had directed human thought to Anafos [the 
self] and Alfa [the world]. According to the Qoran, inner experience is but one source of 
knowledge, and there are two other sources - nature and history. The criticism of the 
‘f  alasfeh’ and their Hellenic heritage is not a modem debate. The revolt of renovation, 
Tajdid, against classical scholasticism, started with Gazall12, who heavily criticized the 
premise of Greek metaphysics, and was fully elaborated by Ibn Tamlya and Ibn Kaldun, 
the pioneers of reform in the history of Islam. Weberian analysis of Islam seems somewhat 
limited in its over-emphasis on the role of the Hellenic tradition. It seems simplistic to 
attach so much importance to an intellectual tradition and to make it a yardstick for 
understanding the complex and heterogeneous system of belief.
Weber’s definition of power is neo-Kantian. Power is obeyed only when men find 
legitimate reasons for its obedience. Charisma and its legitimization are two important 
concepts in Weber’s analysis of power. Weber viewed charisma as the principal catalyst of 
movement and change in traditional society. Another factor that determines the evolution 
of religious ethics is what he terms the ‘social carrier of religion’, that is ‘the laity, whom 
the Prophets and priests seek to influence in an ethical way.’13 The transformation of the 
religious message by the social carriers heralds a process of institutionalization of the 
spontaneous charismatic force of the Prophet. It becomes objectified in the community of 
believers created by the Prophet’s lay disciples. This process Weber called the 
‘routinization of religion’. Weber stressed the importance of success as a condition 
necessary for the maintenance of charismatic authority. Weber seemed to imply that 
disciples apply utilitarian or materialistic standards to charisma while the charismatic 
leader himself wants to establish his authority based on a call to duty.
11 Weber (1968), p. 472.
12 Al-Ghazali (1985).
13 Ibid., p. 439.
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In Weber’s interpretation, Mohammad’s position as a charismatic leader/Prophet 
followed inevitably and solely from his military and political supremacy. Having 
recognized Islam as a Prophetic mission, Weber goes on to give a basically economic 
determinist explanation for its success. According to Weber, the deviation of Islam from a 
Prophetic ethical religion to a warrior religion was to a great extent due to its early move 
from Mecca - the commercial urban city - to Medina that was overwhelmed by Bedouin 
Arab warrior values. As such ‘the warrior nobles and indeed feudal powers have generally 
not become the carriers of rational religious ethics’.14 For Weber, Islam was simply a 
warrior religion of a particular social class and its success rested on military conquest. It 
was in Islam that religious premise became connected with war and material interests. The 
motive underlying religious commands was not conversion but war. Considering this 
analysis, Weber asserted that Muslims had neglected the concept of salvation.
Islam, according to Weber, is not a religion of salvation, since it lacks the 
necessary conditions of ‘self-salvation’15 including the concept of sin. Islam appears 
different from other Prophetic religions, particularly Christianity and Judaism, in the 
relationship it constructs between its ethical system and worldly life. Its ethic is feudal- 
orientated, even in its mystical form, towards ‘world conquest’ and not towards ‘world 
renunciation’ as is the case in Christianity. Islam had completely deviated from any 
methodical control of life by the advent of cults, saints and magic. In the Weberian 
perspective, Islam is seen as being in utter opposition to ascetic Protestantism, having 
eliminated the presence of magic and the supernatural quest for salvation. Islam is 
classified in the general category of other worldly religions of the orient. Islam, as a 
religion of warriors produced an ethic that was incompatible with the spirit of Capitalism. 
Thus, Weber ends up connecting the two geographical sides of the East (Far East and 
Near East) under the typology of an oriental sociology of religion. Although Weber had 
recognized certain common elements between the great monotheistic religions, he was led 
though his analysis to a distinction between Judaeo-Christianity and Islam. Islam remained 
for him a very peculiar case.
In Weber’s view, Islam before the migration of the Prophet to Medina was a pure 
monotheistic doctrine which might have resulted in this worldly asceticism but Islam was
14 Weber (1968), p. 472.
15 Whereas Christianity is a religion of salvation.
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diverted from this ‘transformative’ ethic, to employ Eisenstadt’s phase, by two social 
forces:
1) The Bedouin warriors whom Weber claimed transformed Islam into a sensual religion 
of accommodation and conformity. Warrior religion is not concerned with inner salvation 
and transformed Islam into a ‘national Arab warrior religion’. Adherence to the external 
form of religion and the rituals and institutions of the community became more important 
than personal conversion. ‘In Islam, religion makes obligatory the violent propagation of 
the true prophecy which consciously eschews universal conversion and enjoins the 
subjection of unbelievers under the dominion of a ruling order dedicated to the religious 
war as one of the basic postulates of its faith without recognizing the salvation of the 
subjected. For this is obviously no universalistic salvation religion. The practice of 
coercion poses no problem as God is pleased by the forcible dominion of the faithful over 
the infidels who are tolerated once they have been subjected.’16
2) The Sufi brotherhoods who by rejecting the luxuries of Islamic worldliness created an 
emotional otherworldly religion for the masses. Weber maintains that in Islam the very 
impressive power of the priesthood was limited by the challenges of Sufi speculation.The 
warrior groups turned the religious quest for salvation into a territorial adventure while 
Islamic asceticism became transformed into a military caste. The Sufi brotherhoods 
introduced magical orgiastic elements into Islam, which watered down its monotheism.17 
In Islam both the warrior and the Oriental trader regarded the use of luxury and personal 
adornment as an indication of social status. Puritan ethical motives encouraged capitalist 
investment, whereas in the Islamic world capital was tied up in personal commodities. 
Sufism for Weber was a mass religion that satisfied the emotional needs of Islam’s 
conquered subjects. The result was that Islam contained within it an ethic of physical 
pleasure and an ethic of worldly rejection. Neither the warrior nor the Sufi could produce 
a set of motives that would fit the needs of rational Capitalism.
A tribal warrior society took over Mofiammad’s message and refashioned his 
doctrine to meet their life conditions. It was the needs of the warrior as a status group 
that determined the Islamic world view. In considering the Arab warrior as the social 
carrier of Islam, Weber relinquished his own empirical stance of regarding religion as
16 Weber (1968), p. 594.
17 Turner (1992).
313
determining the structure of the Islamic state. Here it would be interesting to provide a 
summary of Islamic history from a Shi’i perspective, as it seems to be very similar to the 
Weberian position. The Shi’a maintain that after the death of the Prophet, Islam was 
diverted from its true path that would have ensured its correct implementation. With the 
usurpation of the political leadership by Abu Bakr, Islamic rule was deprived of its 
esoteric and spiritual dimension and turned into a purely temporal rule. This deviation led 
to the re-emergence of the old Bedouin and tribal values. As a result Islam was turned 
into a warrior religion based around conquest and booty. Furthermore, there was an 
emphasis on the external observations of faith at the expense of inner commitment and 
personal salvation. The de-sacralization of Islam by the dominance of Sunism left a 
spiritual void that came to be filled by Sufism at the popular level. Only within Shi’ism 
was the true essence of Islamic gnosis preserved, safeguarded and elaborated by the lives 
and the teaching of the Imams.
Weber contended that in the Occident clans and tribes did not survive the city. The 
guild and the voluntary religious associations were both substitutes for the tribal 
organization. The occidental city was pre-conditioned for the emergence of middle class 
piety; Christianity played a fundamental part in the development of the associations that 
make up city life. Christianity helped to break tribalism in Europe. It was only in Christian 
Europe that cities became ‘urban communities’. The legal and political autonomy of the 
cities was fundamentally connected with their military independence. By contrast, oriental 
cities were characterized by bureaucratic centralization of trade and warfare. The 
autonomous occidental city, while being stimulated by Christianity, flourished because it 
was not set within a rigid patrimonial order. In Islam, it was the combination of warrior 
religiosity with patrimonialism that limited the growth of autonomous cities.
In Europe, it was in the autonomous cities that urban piety, legal autonomy, 
occupational associations and political investment developed, and Christianity was the 
social cement that bound and aided this process. Islamic cities never became ‘urban 
communities’. They did not produce a rich life of independent burgher associations and 
continual intervention of patrimonial control produced a patrimonial monopoly. Islamic 
cities were aggregates of sub-communities rather than socially-unified communities. Other 
scholars have viewed the Mediaeval Islamic society as made up of garrison cities in which
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Sunni orthodoxy is controlled by the ‘Olama and surrounded by tribalism in which the 
more heterodox faith of Sufism was triumphant.18
Weber ascribed a key role in his analysis of the transition of traditional Islam to 
military recruitment and finance. Weber treated Islamic patrimonialism as an extreme case 
of political uncertainty and arbitrariness. Occidental feudalism was based on personal 
fealty to a lord but this relationship was stereotyped in terms of strict regulations of rights 
and duties. Islamic feudalism was prebendal and impersonal - that is, Islamic feudalism 
was characterized by benefice rather than fief. Due to the political and economic 
uncertainty that this brought, the methodical bourgeois style could not develop. The 
despotism and stagnation of the East may be accounted for by the absence of particular 
institutions and beliefs.19
The identification of Islam with the warrior ethic is understandable given the 
history of the spread of Islam. However, Weber’s equation of the Arab warrior ethic with 
Islam as a religious system demonstrates both a reductionist and simplistic approach to 
Islam. His reading of Islam seems to have been largely derived from German classical 
Orientalism and more particularly from his friend Becker.20 Islam is the only great religion 
on which a special and detailed study is not found in Weber’s comparative sociology. His 
remarks about Islam are therefore less informed than they are about other religions. 
Furthermore his typology has never been modified to take account of the specific features 
and various branches of Islam.21
The warrior vocabulary of militaristic motives was not the sole motivational 
language of Islam, although it became the dominant one. Islam contained numerous 
vocabularies of motive that were both distinctive and conflictual with the warrior 
vocabulary of militaristic motives. The side that often emphasized by most Western 
scholars on Islam22 is the commercial vocabulary of motives. Turner,23 for example, 
argues that early Islam was a triumph of Meccan merchants and financiers over tribal 
anarchy. Much of the Qoran contains the language of commerce. Islamic leadership came 
from the merchant elite of Mecca. Islam contained the morality both of tribal desert
18 For more details see Gellener (1981).
19 Turner (1974), pp. 272-273.
20 Hourani (1980), p. 60.
21 For more details see Hourani (1980).
22 For example see Watt (1968).
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dwellers and of merchants. Turner argues that the counterpart of Weber’s one-sided 
emphasis is Islam as a faith of tradesmen and merchants who were doing well. In fact, 
Islam with its stem morality and emphasis on law and order and on individual 
responsibility was well suited to the same sorts of needs as was Calvinism in a smaller 
area. During the Umayyad period and the first two centuries of Abbasid rule there was a 
growth of Islamic commercialism, and trade became a very important aspect of the 
Islamic Empire.
Furthermore, even if one accepts the Weberian typology of the sultanate state as 
the most arbitrary type of rule, it would still be historically inaccurate to equate the long 
and complicated political history of Islam exclusively with the sultanate state that was a 
rather late historical development. Weber’s definition of the sultanate state is confined to 
the Mamluk and Ottoman models of power. Weber shows that with prebendal feudalism 
and patrimonial bureaucracy the characteristics of the Abbasid, Mamluk and Ottoman 
dynasties, the prerequisites of rational capitalism could not emerge. The military and 
economic conditions of Islamic societies were inappropriate for the development of 
capitalism. To this extent, Weber’s study of Islam is historically limited and inaccurate. It 
demonstrates a deep misunderstanding of the spiritual, doctrinal and ethical principles of 
Islam.
There are two factual problems with Weber’s analysis: firstly, he over-emphasized 
the role of the warrior group as the social carriers of Islam. In doing so, he rejected the 
notion of salvation in Islam and equates Arab tribalism with the message of Islam. 
Secondly, he ignored Qoranic and other Muslim accounts of early Islam. One can criticize 
Weber for not applying his own methodological principles to his understanding of Islam. 
In respect to the study of Islam, he in effect ignores some basic principles of his own 
verstehende sociology. Weber’s explanation of early Islam treats the religious content as 
an epiphenomenon superimposed on secular conquest.
For Weber, Islam had all the characteristics of a distinctively feudal spirit: the 
unquestioned acceptance of slavery and polygamy, the subjection of women, the 
essentially ritualistic character of religious obligations, and finally the simplicity of 
religious requirements and the even greater simplicity of modest ethical requirements.
23 Turner (1974).
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Therefore Weber concluded that Islamic societies had neither the necessary social and 
economic conditions nor the sufficient conditions of those worldly motivations that he 
regarded as crucial for rational capitalism.24 Weber’s sociology of early Islam is closer to 
a moral critique and personal dislike and reflects all the ideological prejudices of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Weber’s treatment of Western asceticism and Eastern 
mysticism seems to be viewed as a part of the simplistic nineteenth-century view of the 
‘spiritual’ East and the ‘material’ West. Weber’s view of the capitalist ethic and 
secularization came to fit the Middle East not because of any intrinsic relationship 
between industrial society and secular ethics, but because these worldviews were 
imported by Muslim intellectuals who had accepted a Western interpretation of history.
It may be concluded that Islam was a potential test-case for Weber’s thesis on 
religion and capitalism. In his study of Islam, one can criticize Weber for not applying his 
own methodological beliefs and for ignoring some basic principles of his own verstehende 
sociology. Weber’s own observations of Islam refer almost exclusively to the traditional 
Arab location of Islamic culture. Although Weber does not provide a set of issues by 
which one can study Islam, the framework is empirically open-ended. It is only to this 
extent that Weberian concepts have been meaningfully applied throughout this thesis.
24 Ibid.
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Appendix II
Two Accounts of the Government of Reza Kan and the Reign 
of Reza Sah, by Two Key Political Figures
It would be interesting to consider two accounts of the government of Reza Kan 
and the reign of Reza Sah, its advantage, disadvantages and consequences for Iran, by 
two renowned and highly important political figures of the time, Mofiammad Mo§addeq 
and Yafiya DulatabadL The views of Mofiammad Mo§addeq deal with the government of 
Reza Kan while Yafiya DulatabadI ‘s views deal with the reign of Reza Sah. The 
following is a part of the speech delivered by Mofiammad Mo§addeq during the Fifth 
Session of the Majles in 1304/1925. During this particular session, the abolition of the 
Qajar dynasty and the crowing of Reza Sah were the topics of discussion. Mofiammad 
Mo§addeq criticizes Reza Kan’s government, and opposes the proposal of Reza Kan to be 
crowned king on the following grounds:
[Concerning Reza Kan PahlavT] ‘I respect and believe in him... However, what I 
have to say is not of a personal nature but rather it is based on what I consider to in the 
best interest of Iran. Reza Kan has without a doubt rendered some valuable services to the 
country, which cannot be denied. The previous conditions of the country are well known 
to us all. There was no security or protection; if one wanted to travel or if one was a 
landowner, and owned a village, one had to employ a number of gunmen in order to 
protect one’s property. We all know that since Reza Kan has taken control of the 
government, he has restored safety and security to the country. For the protection of 
myself, my family, my property, I am in favour of having someone like him in charge of 
this country. I, like the rest of the population, require security and protection. The 
revision of the Fundamental Law will have both internal and external repercussions. Its 
effect and consequences on domestic politics and on international relations must be 
considered carefully. [In terms of its internal effect] No-one can deny that the Qajar 
Dynasty is despotic and in need of change. However, today’s candidate [for the throne] is 
the Prime Minster!!!... Let us suppose that the Prime Minster becomes King, can one in 
the twentieth century claim that in a Constitutional country the king is also the 
government? If we accept that there should be a change in the Fundamental Law, can the 
honourable gentlemen of the Majles who are all educated and wise, truly say that the king 
of a Constitutional country should have absolute power and be in full control, irrespective
318
of the Constitution? Are we not then repeating the Qajar pattern and going backwards? If 
we say that he is King, Prime Minster and absolute ruler, is it not the same as declaring a 
dictatorship? We say that the Qajars are reactionary and despotic; if the Prime Minster 
becomes King, are we not regressing to the exact same situation? Today, after twenty 
years, and much bloodshed, our country wants to regress and become the same as 
Zanzibar! I doubt that even in Zanzibar the King is also the government. If we assume 
that he will become King and not be politically responsible, we are then betraying the 
country, because Reza Kan as Prime Minster is effective and can bring about much 
needed change. In a Constitutional country, it is the Prime Minister who is important and 
not the King. The only function of the King is to appoint the Prime Minister, contingent 
upon the vote of confidence of the Majles, and nothing else! If we presuppose that the 
Prime Minster becomes King and proceeds to directly interfere in the running of the 
country, he will act in exactly the same way as he does now, only then he will be King, 
Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces! If,you behead me and cut 
my body up into a thousand pieces, and if Seyyed Yaghub1 insults me a thousand times, I 
will not accept this [Reza Sah as king]! I will not accept this as it is in direct contradiction 
to the interests of the country...’2
Yafiya DulatabadI, a member of parliament and influential political figure, in his 
Memoirs written in Belgium in 1317/1938, describes the reign of Reza Sah in the 
following manner:
‘After Reza Sah ascended the throne, civil government was replaced by a military 
one; the Majles was nothing more than the mere apparatus for furthering his domestic and 
foreign policies. To give his policies a lawful appearance, some twenty members of the 
Majles whose redundancy would have had adverse consequences were kept in order to 
pass any policy that the Sah proposed, in particular in relation to taxation and government 
expenditure. During this time, not one of the proposed taxation policies and government 
expenditure which was presented to the Majles were rejected. The members of the Majles 
were, on the whole, appointed and not elected, and reappeared like obedient soldiers in 
every session. What is of significance to consider is whether it was in the best interests of 
the country to keep up this semblance of Constitutional law or would it have been better
1 A Member of Parliament and supporter of Reza Iran’s claim to the throne.
2 MakkT(1369 SH/1991), pp. 424-450.
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to completely do away with this pretence and openly acknowledge the absolutist nature of 
Reza Sah’s rule? Concerning this question there are two varying views; we shall consider 
both. Firstly, there are those who believe that the existence of the Majles albeit 
counterfeit, was beneficial to the country for the following reasons:
Governments and politicians did not fall out of the habit of having to deal with the 
Majles, real or fraudulent. Foreign governments had recognized the government of Iran as 
Constitutional; even if some of these governments realized that the Majles was spurious, 
it was better than doing away with the Majles and Constitution altogether. Furthermore, if 
these governments realized that the military as an institution was over and above all other 
institutions in Iran, they would have thought it a necessity of the time, in other words, as a 
deterrent against the spread of communism, as is the case in Turkey, Germany and Italy. 
Even the facade of a Majles enabled beneficial laws pertaining to economic, judicial and 
municipal affairs to be passed, which were necessary requirements for the country. 
Moreover, the Majles was fundamental in amending and reforming previous legislation. 
Over-all progress, in particular in the sphere of international relations, combined with the 
increased level of education of the younger generation would eventually bring about an 
end to despotism. If this occurs, it will be easier to breathe life into the corpse of the 
Constitution rather than bring about an altogether nationalist government which may 
result in revolution and bloodshed, in particular given the brutal record of the military. If a 
revolution occurs, the concentration of military power, which at present is made possible 
by the person of Reza Sah, will be destroyed. Senior officer will fight senior officer for 
supremacy, which will be most detrimental for the well-being of the country, and may end 
in civil disarray.
We must not forget that the present military government [of Reza Sah] has 
destroyed the power of the Rowfarii Nemayan, who consider themselves more entitled to 
people’s lives, property, and honour than themselves. The government by its various 
policies, such as unveiling, has brought women into society and has managed to silence 
the Rowfiam Nemayan. The Majles serves as a viable deterrent and an effective defence 
against these Rowfiam Nemayan. Two-thirds of the blame for the underdevelopment of 
Iran are on the shoulders of these charlatans and one third is on the shoulders of 
ineffective and feeble governments. The ineffectiveness of the government reflects the 
general ignorance of the people as the government is representative of a peoples worth.
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One of the articles of the Fundamentals Law is that the Majles cannot be dissolved. The 
protection of this article, even at the level of appearance, is better than its negation.
Secondly, there are those who believe that no Majles is preferable to a fraudulent 
one for the following reasons: If  the government were recognized as authoritarian and 
despotic, people would rise up in protest and overthrow or change the government. The 
‘appearance’ of a Majles pacifies people into non-action. If the Majles did not ratify some 
of the concessions given to foreigners, these concessions would not have achieved legal 
status both internally and internationally. Furthermore internally the concessions could be 
opposed on the ground of their illegality. If such measures were passed through the 
Majles there would be no room left for opposition, as it would be considered legally 
permissible. This is deleterious to the interest of the country, in particular in relation to the 
extension of concessions to foreign nationals and governments. DulatabadI then goes on 
to say:
‘During the short period of Constitutional rule we did not show the 
necessary competence for such a system. We did not effectively use our 
freedom to establish a true nationalist and patriotic government. Freedom 
seekers attacked one another, thieves and charlatans put on the robes of 
constituionlism and made the space too small for the real patriots. It is 
better to use the present level of security and maintain the present 
situation, while at the same time we should endeavour to achieve cultural 
progress so that we can actualize the potential capabilities of our young 
into positive and constructive forces for our society. In particular, we must 
strive to extend the education of women in order to nurture educated 
mothers for our future children. Now that women have freed themselves 
from the Cador we must actualize their potential which for so long has lain 
dormant. The needs of our time require these changes and change is 
inevitable.’3
Reforms of Reza Sah
1921:
The setting up of the Ministry of War by Sardar Sepah.4 
1923:
The law for registration of documents, deeds and property was passed and in the same 
year the Bureau for the registration of documents, deeds and property was established. In
3 DulatabadI (1371 SH/1992), pp. 417-21.
4 Mo‘m (1358 SH/1979), p. 434.
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1309/1930, a number of amendments were made to this law and the Bureau for the 
registration of documents, deeds, and property was placed under the control of the 
Ministry of Justice.5
1924:
The passing of the Law for the holding of a national census. The actual nation census was 
conducted in 1939.6
The setting up of notary public offices and the Bureau of Municipal Register of births and 
deaths was established, which was responsible for the emission of birth and death 
certificates, administrative registration and statistics. In 1916, the law for the registration 
of births and deaths was passed and was implemented in Tehran.7
1925:
The introduction of compulsory military conscription.8
The passing of the law of identity and status and the introduction of surnames in Iran for 
the first time.9
The formation of the Department of Public Education [Edareh Amuzese ‘Omumf\. 
1926-1937:
The gradual reorganization of the Ministry of Interior, in control of the Gendarmerie, 
police force, civil defence, registration of statistics, the Bureau of Municipal Register of 
births & deaths, Bureau of Provincial Planning and Development, and non military- 
institutions.10
1926-1941:
The Ministry of Education and Culture consisted of various bodies, and was responsible 
for the establishment of modem schools, teacher-training colleges, universities and other
5 Ibid., p. 412.
6 Ibid., p. 435.
7 Ibid., p. 57-8.
8 DulatabadI (1371 SH/1992), p. 318-9.
9 Ghani (1998), p. ix.
10 Mo‘m (1358 SH/1979), p. 2209.
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specialist colleges as well as their administration staffing and curriculum. The Ministry 
was also responsible for dispatching Iranian students abroad for further studies.11
In 1928, all foreign schools were compelled by a decree to use the official syllabus up to 
the forth grade and Persian was to be the only language of instruction. Also, all school 
textbooks for all regions were standardized.
1926:
The setting up of the Ministry of Justice, headed by Davar.12 
The abrogation of capitalization.13
The setting-up of Sepah Bank from taxes paid by officers on their pensions. In turn the 
officers had shares in the bank.
The setting up of Kargosal Bank [Bank of ‘relieving by way of loaning’], set up to give 
people credit on their ‘moveable property’.
1926-1938:
The start of the construction of a railway line connecting the north, Bandar Sah, a port on 
the Caspian Sea to the south, Bandar Sah Pour port on the Persian Gulf, passing through 
Tehran. This line was financed by taxation on sugar and built by German engineers.14
1927:
The introduction of regulation for shipping and ports.15
The construction of the port of Bandar Sah in the Caspian Sea.16
The setting-up of Banke Melll, the National Bank of Iran, which was later divided into the 
Central Bank [Banke MarkazI] and the National Bank [Banke Melll] of Iran.
1927- 1934:
The reconstruction and widening of existing roads and building new roads in Tehran.
11 Ibid., pp. 10354-5.
12 Ibid, pp. 493-4, 21 October 1927, FO 371/12293/E4735/52c/34, 26 April 1927, FO 
371/12293/E1943/526/34,20 May 1927, and FO 371/12293/E2523/526/34.
13 Ibid., pp. 493-4,21 March 1927 FO 371/12293/E1393/526/34.
14 Ibid., p. 580.
15 Ibid., pp. 281-2.
16 Ibid., pp. 273.
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1928:
The passing of the law for dispatching students abroad for further studies, financed by the 
government.17
The passing of the law of Uniform Dress.18
The establishment of the Higher Teacher Training College and the Military Academy.19
The abrogation of the sale of slaves.20
Establishing state monopoly of tobacco.21
The establishment of the College of Agriculture.22
The setting up of the Ministry of Commerce.23
The abrogation of all previous import and excise treaties with the Soviet Union.24 
1929:
The commencement of the national smallpox vaccination campaign.25
The introduction of the law preventing the growth of poppy seeds for making opium.26
The setting-up of the Tehran Fire brigade.27
1930:
Iran’s inclusion in international inter-parliamentary gatherings.28 
The setting-up of the Town Planning Committee.
The setting-up of the Institute of Commerce and Trade.29 
The introduction of income tax.30
17 MakkI (1369 SH/1991), pp.72-3.
18 Ibid., pp. 71-2, 1929, FO 371/13784/E 1018/10434, and 1929, FO 371/13781/E353/95/34.
19 Mo‘m (1358 SH/1979), p. 505
20 MakkI (1369 SH/1991), p. 80.
21 Ibid., p. 801
22 Mo'Ih (1358 SH/1979), p. 2209.
23 Ibid, p. 2208.
24 MakkI (1369 SH/1991), p. 529.
25 Mo‘m (1358 SH/1979), p. 31.
26 MakkI (1369 SH/1991), p. 130.
27 Mo‘In (1358 SH/1979), pp. 938-9.
28 MakkI (1369 SH/1991), p. 201.
29 Mo‘m (1358 SH/1979), p. 155.
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The setting-up of the Ministry of Roads and planning for the building of roads across Iran, 
shipping, railways and civil aviation.31
1931:
The setting up of the institute for the training of statisticians.32
The establishment of the Karaj sugar-cube factory.33
The passing of the law for the fixture of an annual budget.34
The right to issue currency was transferred from Bank-e Sahl to the National Bank of Iran 
and in 1936 the National Bank moved to its new premises designed and built by German 
architects.35
1932:
The introduction of the metric system.36
The issue of bank notes by the National Bank of Iran.37
The abrogation of the D’Arcy Oil Treaty.38
1933:
The following industries were set up: cement, sugar, cloth and thread.39 
1933-1935:
The establishment of the University of War.40
30 MakkI (1369 SH/1991), pp. 81-2.
31 Mo‘m (1358 SH/1979), p. 579.
32 Ibid., p. 28.
33 MakkI (1369 SH/1991), p. 419.
34 Ibid., p. 145.
35 Mo‘m (1358 SH/1979), p. 240.
36 Ibid., p. 183.
37 MakkI (1369 SH/1991), p. 510.
38 In 1901, a British national William Knox D’Arcy obtained a concession for the exploration, 
production and sale of oil and other mineral deposits which in a few years proved to be more profitable 
than anything any foreign power had hitherto been granted. In 1908 oil was struck and it became clear 
that the British political and military presence would become permanent. Ibid., p. 275, and, Ghani 
(1998), p.7.
39 MakkI (1369 SH/1991), pp. 184-171.
40 Mo‘m (1358 SH/1979), p. 504.
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1934:
Completion of providing electricity to Tehran.41
The establishment of Tehran University comprising of the following faculties:
Literature, Medicine, Law, Pharmacy, Veterinarian science, Agriculture, Divinity, Fine 
Arts.42
The establishement of the Centre for Physical Education and Excellence.43 
The setting-up of the organization for Scout Training.44
The establishment of the Department of Autopsy and Vivisection in the Faculty of 
Medicine of Tehran University. This was strongly opposed by the ‘Olama on the grounds 
of disrespect to the dead. A Muslim is required to be buried as soon as possible, unless 
the deceased has willed otherwise.45
The exhibition of home-produced goods.46
The construction of the FerdowsT Memorial Building and the 1000-year anniversary 
celebrations of FerdowsT.
The abrogation of the law of inter-tribal election of a tribal member of parliament.47 
1935:
State monopoly of leather and wool.48
Replacement of the lunar [Hejjri-Qamarl] calendar by the Solar [Samsi] calendar in all 
official documents.49
The establishment of barter exchange of export and import relations between Iran and 
Germany.50
41 Ibid., p. 256.
42 Ibid, p. 560, MakkI (1369 SH/1991), p. 199.
43 Ibid., p. 384, and Tolu‘I (1372 SH/1993), pp. 136-7.
44 Mo‘m (1358 SH/1979), p. 368.
45 MakkI (1369 SH/1991), pp. 200-1.
46 Ibid., p. 196.
47 Prior to this each tribe would elect a representative to the Majles. Reza Sah did away with this law as 
he viewed it as an extra concession to the tribes. He argued that the tribal population of Iran is an integral 
part of the larger population, should not have any extra privileges, and should participate in the election 
of members of parliament in the same manna* as the rest of the people of Iran. Ibid., p. 160.
48 Ibid., p. 222.
49 Ibid., p. 285.
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The introduction of Compulsory Unveiling.51
The setting-up of the regulatory body for the control of ports. In 1927, Bandar Pahlavl, 
which was built by the Russians, came under Iranian control.
The abrogation of hereditary titles.52
The introduction of synchronized timing.53
The establishment of the centre for the Study of Iranian culture, heritage and language, 
Farhangestan Iran.54
The Setting-up of Serkat Buneh Iran [Insurance].55 
1936:
The abrogation of all prior import duties and concessions.56
The setting-up of the Pasteur Institute, compromising a vaccination clinic for humans and 
animals, a research institute, malaria clinic, and disease prevention.57
The establishment of the Museum of Anthropology.58 
1937:
The completion of piped water throughout Tehran.59
The setting-up of the regulatory body for the administration of sale, imports, and exports 
of tobacco.60
The division of the country into districts and provinces.
The setting-up of the Ministry of Industry and Mines.61
50 Ibid., p. 222.
51 Ibid., pp. 263-3.
52 Ibid., pp. 203-4.
53 Ibid., p. 205.
54 Mo‘In (1358 SH/1979), p. 1356.
55 Ibid., pp. 313-4.
56 Ibid. p. 222.
57 Ibid., p. 324.
58 Ibid., p. 2045.
59 Ibid., pp. 938-9.
60 Ibid., p. 521.
61 Ibid., p. 1036.
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1938:
The setting-up of the Bank RahnI [for mortgages].62
The setting-up of the institute for the development of thought.63
1939:
The building of the premises for the manufacture of steel; the building was completed but 
the apparatus which were bought from Germany never reached Iran due to the outbreak 
of World War II.64
1940:
The setting up of Tehran Radio.65
The establishment of the institute for the protection of mothers and infants, compromising 
hospitals, baby clinics, and 24-hour mobile midwives.66
The setting-up of the regulatory body for commercials and radio.67
There are many more changes, which have not been mentioned.
62 Ibid., p. 239, and MakkI (1369 SH/1991), p. 412.
63 MakkI (1369 SH/1991), pp. 412-3.
64 Ibid., p. 52.
65 Mo‘m (1358 SH/1979), p. 570.
66 Ibid., p. 465.
67 Ibid., p. 182.
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Glossary
A frund:
Colloquial Persian term for a cleric. Can be used in a derogatory manner.
Faqih:
A jurisprudent.
Fdtvd:
A legal ruling; an expression of opinion by one of the ‘Olama, on a point of religious law 
or on a legal case.
Feqh:
Jurisprudence.
Geybat:
The Occupation of the Twelfth Imam.
Geybat-e Kobra
The ‘Greater Occupation’, the period marked by the absence of human intermediaries 
between the Imam and the faithful, beginning with the death of the last Vakil/Na’eb 
(Agent) in 940, and still continuing.
Geybat-e §ogrd:
The ‘Lesser Occultaion’ the period of the four Vakils/Na’ebs.
Hadis:
The traditions concerning the sayings and deeds of the Prophet; for the Shi’a, also those 
relating to the Imams.
Ijma:
For the Shi’a the consensus of opinion of the ‘Olama, both the living and the dead.
Ijtehdd:
Independent exertion in deciding matters relating to religious law; or the competence and 
ability to exert oneself.
‘Elm:
Knowledge; more particularly that of the religious law and Ps sources.
Imam:
For Twelver Shi’a, one of the religious laws of twelve divinely-appointed guides of the 
community.
Imam Jom‘eh:
One designated by the monarch to lead congregational prayer and pronounce the Friday 
sermon in each major city.
Isna AsarT:
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‘Twelver’, a believer in the cycle of Twelve Imam which culminated in the Occupation of 
the last in the series.
Kadfcoda:
A village headman.
Kdfer:
Infidel. [Plural Koffar]
Mahdi:
For the Twelver Shi’a, the Twelfth Imam, reappearing at the end of the Greater 
Occupation to establish the true faith throughout the world and inaugurate a brief reign of 
justice before the coming of the apocalypse.
Majles:
The Iranian parliament.
M arja‘-e Taqtid:
A Mojtahed whose practices and pronouncements furnish a binding example for those 
unable to exert independent judgment in matters relating to the religious low.
Mojtahed:
One who may act according to his own judgment in matters relating to religious law; one 
who practises Ijtehad.
Molld:
A lesser member of the religious classes, synonymous with Afrund.
Moqalled:
One who is unable to exercise independent judgment in matters relating to religious law 
and is obliged to follow an exemplary model, one who practises TaqlJd.
QdzT:
A judge.
SarPah:
Islamic jurisprudence.
SeTfcol-Isldm:
The dignitary presiding over Sar ‘ [Sarl‘ah\ courts in each major city.
Sonna [or Sonnat in Persian]:
The exemplary practice of the Prophet; and, for Twelver Shi’a, that of the Imams.
Takjtr:
Charge of disbelief.
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Taqlld:
The process of following the practices and pronouncements of a scholar more learned 
than oneself in matters relating to the religious law, with faith in his correctness and 
without independent investigation of his reasons.
Tollab:
9
Students of religious sciences. [Singular: Jalabeh.] Its literal meaning is ‘Seeker of 
knowledge.’
‘Olama:
Those learned in the religious law (plural of ‘Alem, derived from the root ‘Elm or 
knowledge).
0§ul:
Principles of jurisprudence.
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